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1. 
A B S T R A C T 
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES AND ECONOMIC POvillR IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 9 1951-
1964, \'liTH PARTICULAR Ri:IT.ERENCE TO RELATIONS \'liTH SOUTH AFRICA DURING 
THE Sll''IONSTOWN NEGOTIATIONS (1954-1955) AND THE POST-SHARPEVILLE PE~IOD 
( 1 960-1964) 0 
by Geoffrey Raymond Berridge 
The central preoccupation of this work is the hypothesis that economic 
power (resting also on non-economic bases) has been an important factor 
in explaining the ability of states in the recent past to achieve their 
foreign policy objectives. In addition, the hypothesis that economic 
considerations have also loomed large amongst these objectives them-
selves is investigated9 especially since the extent to which this has 
been the case is likely to have influenced the efficacy of economic 
pressure in diplomacy. 
By way of introduction 9 the principal extant theories bearing on these 
issues are subjected to exegisis and criticism. 
It is then argued that economic considerations represented a higher prior-
ity in British foreign policy in the later 1950s and early 1960s than is 
sometimes supposed 9 following which detailed attention is given to the 
political economy of Anglo-South African relations at the two historical 
junctures indicated in the title. For this purpose a vital distinction 
bet\·'een 'putative 9 and 'actualized' economic power is employed. 
The essence of the argument is that, whilst on both occasions the British 
and South African governments were each economically dependent upon the 
other (in the sense that each was theoretically in a position to grant or 
withhold economic favours in urgent demand and unobtainable elsewhere), 
the South African government was able to transform this into putative econ-
omic power vis-a-vis Britain as a result of a marked superiority in the 
non-economic bases of such power. This power 9 it is finally argued 9 was 
'actualized' in the extraction of political and security concessions from 
Britain on the occasions in question. Of particular significance in this 
connection 1:1as South Africa 9 s ne\-T-mined gold. Both main hypothesis are 
thus held to be valid for the historical relationships studied. 
By way of conclusion, the arguments are summarised and the method defended. 
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES AND ECONOMIC POWER IN BRITISH FOREIGN 
POLICY 9 1951-1964? WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO RELATIONS 
WITH SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE SIMONSTOWN NEGOTIATIONS (1954-
1955) AND THE POST~SHARPEVILLE PERIOD (1960-1964)o 
by 
Geoffrey Raymond Berridge 
A Thesis submitted to the University of Durham in 1977 for the 
Degree of Ph .. Do 
Department of Politicso 
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D E C L A R A T I 0 N 
No part of the material offered in this thesis has previously been 
submitted by the cendidate for a degree in this or any other university; 
neither is it a 1 joint work'. 
C 0 P Y R I G H T 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from 
it should be published without his prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
PREFACE 
This thesis is intellectually indebted in particular to two scholars: 
Charles Reynolds, v!ho supervised its progress, and Klgus Knorr, vrhose 
book, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy g_f International Power~ 
(1973), provides much of the analytical scheme for its development. 
In attempting to write a work of international political economy, I 
v~as ~ like Knorr, "more intrigued by the idea than held. back by the 
appe.,rent a.ifficulties of the task" 0 These difficulties are, however, 
just as real as "apparent". As Knorr observes in his ovm Preface~ 
they reside in "the requirements that the author possess the skills of 
at least tv10 disciplines (economics and political science) and 
preferably more (e.g. history); the ability to search and use the 
fjndings of several disparate literatures; the aurlacity to improvise 
a.bout problems nhich have not attracted much research; and to weld the 
ve>rious components into an intelligible and useful synthesis 11 • When 
to this is added the further fact that the case chosen for study is a 
contemporary one ( vJhere the 1 hard' evidence is virtually non-existent 
and the 'soft' evidence is suffociitingly copious), the difficulties 
become awesome ind.eed. 
9. 
No history of post-war political relations between Britain and South 
Africa has yet been v1ritten a...nd most of the secondary material avail-
able on the economic relations betvreen the two countries is polemical. 
But if this made the chal1enge difficult, it at least made the challenge 
exciting. The v10rking out of the response in the following pages may 
v;ell reveal the author to be wanting in some of the requirements 
correctly suggested as ~ndispensab1e by Knorr but not in one of them -
audacity. This is at once the weakness and, it is ventured, the 
strength of this thesis. Chatham House, the Anti-Apartheid Society and 
the City press have h.eld a monopoly of interpretation of post-vrar Anglo-
South African relations to their respective audiences in Britain for 
long enough; it seemed time to share not only in the lately discovered 
enthusiasm for the political economy approach in extra-rliarxist 
'International Politics 1 circles but also to offer an alternative view 
on this particularly vexed issue. 
10. 
T1any people have assisted me in the production of this thesis, amongst 
whom I must give special mention once more to Charles Reynolds, to my 
wife, Sheila (for stylistic criticism and general donkey-work), to 
Laurence \'Jhi tehouse and Hm.,rard v/illiams (both of whom read and 
criticized parts of the MS), to Richard Bm·lley (who helped me to fill 
in some important gaps in the statistical appendices), to Mrs. P. Lay 
(for typing up the MS in record time) and to librarians all over the 
country. 
References are placed as 'Endnotes' at the end of each Chapter and, 
since full 'Bibliographies' are included at the end of the thesis, 
only books which have been published outside London and Harmondsworth 
(PengUin Books) are identified by place of publication in the Endnotes. 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
The principal purpose of this work is to throw some light on the 
extent to which economic considerations were taken into account in 
general by Britain's foreign policy-makers during the 1951-1964 
period but~ more especially~ to establish the nature of the influ-
ence which economic interests had on Britain 1 s policy tO\vards South 
Africa at two critical junctures in their post-vrar relations: that 
represented~ first~ by the Simonstown negotiations during the 1954-
1955 period and then 9 second 9 by the events following the Sharpeville 
shootings in 1960. 
It will be necessary to devote considerable space to the question of 
economics and British foreign policy in general over the 1951-1964 
period (the subject of Chapter I), since the conventional treatment 
11. 
of this subject is open to question on one or two points of emphasis. 
However 9 the major justification for including it is contextual; that 
is to say 9 it is an important preliminary to the main subject 9 which 
is 9 in effect, the political economy of Anglo-South African relations 
on the occasions indicated (the subject of Chapters II-IV). This is, 
therefore 9 essentially a work of contemporary international history 
which concentrates on what Knorr would call 9 as we shall see, the 
criteria of 'putative', and the dynamics of 'actualized', economic 
power. 
Quite a lot has been written in general terms, however, about the influ-
ence of economics on foreign policy and it thus seems important to begin 
by examining some of the more relevant arguments on this subject which 
have been offered. This task of exegisis and criticism is made somewhat 
easier since 9 in so far as economic considerations have been adduced as 
explanatory factors, they have been seen normally as contributing to 
either the fundamental objectives of foreign policy or to the instruments 
through which that policy is pursued; though it is true 9 of course, that 
many authors have combined both ideas in their writings. 
12. 
Marxists have naturally emphasised the former role of economic interests 9 
whilst non-Marxists have tended to dwell on the latter9 though the 
emphases of both have been influenced by the level of generality at 
which their analyses have been pitched. At the risk 9 therefore 9 of 
producing an over-rigid dichotomy between 'ends' and 'means' (the one 9 
of course 9 clearly affecting the other) 9 it will be convenient to employ 
this same distinction in an analysis of the arguments in this field. 
1. Economic Considerations as Objectives of Foreign Policl 
Since Lenin wrote his pamphlet Imperialism: The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism during his exile in Switzerland in the spring of 1916 9 his 
views on the ultimate determinants of the foreign policies of capital-
ist powers have been 9 with only slight qualification 9 Marxist orthodoXY.
1 
Moreover, they remain the most systematic attempt to explain the roots 
of foreign policy in economic terms and it is for this reason that I 
begin with them. 2 
In the view of Lenin and his followers3 the world economy has been in 
the 'imperialist stage of development' since the last decades of the 
19th Century. This has been signified by the existence of a number of 
capitalist states (not just England, as in the previous stage) in which 
monopoly capital has ousted competitive capital and in which 9 partly 
as a result of this and partly as a result of the independently matur-
ing contradictions of the capital accumulation process, 'surpluses' of both 
capital and goods have been generated. In this situation, it is only by 
seeking out and exploiting investment outlets and markets abroad that the 
monopoly capitalist can maintain his profit rate and thus protect the 
whole structure of contemporary capitalism. And 9 since national capital= 
ist competitors exist who are equally subject to this expansionist dyn-
amic, since opposition is also likely to be met from indigenous sources 
in the semi- and under-developed parts of the world which are important 
targets of imperialist 'exploitation', and since such areas invariably 
require infrastructural and administrative development if they are to 
be made amenable to such exploitation, it is clearly in the interests of 
the capitalist class in each state to enlist the support of its govern-
ment. And 9 that this support will be forthcoming is axiomatic since, 
as Marx and Engels so unequivocally express it in the Communist Manifesto: 
"the executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie".4 Guaranteeing governmental 
support, finally, is the consideration to which Horowitz points, that 
is to say 9 that "•••• as long as the national economic framework remains 
capitalist, domestic prosperity will be dictated by the nation's place 
in the hierarchy of the international market; therefore imperial and 
national interests will appear to coincide".5 
The foreign policy objectives of the governments of the monopoly capital-
ist states are thus fundamentally rooted in the compelling demand for 
secure and expanding sources of raw materials and, above all, for simi-
larly secure and expanding outlets for a "capitalism which has burst the 
boundaries of the nation state".6 Characteristically, such objectives 
lead to the pursuit of either formal or informal dominion over the coun-
tries in which these opportunities reside, which may, or may not, be 
located in the poorer parts of the world. As Magdoff explains: "the 
competition among groups of giant corporations and their governments 
takes place over the entire globe: in the markets of the advanced 
nations as well as in those of the semi-industrialized and non-industrial-
ized nations. The struggle for power by the industrialized nations for 
colonial and informal control over the economically backward regions is 
but one phase of this economic war and only one attribute of the new 
imperialism".? 
It is, therefore, readily apparent that the Marxist-Leninist theory of 
monopoly capitalist foreign policy is based on the twin props of the 
economic theory of surplus and the ruling class theory of the state. 
What are we to make of it? How useful is it in demonstrating the sig-
nificance of economic considerations to foreign policy formulation in 
such states as Britain and America in the 20th Century? 
Let us be clear, first of all, about a very important way in which its 
more sophisticated defenders readily concede that the theory is of no 
use~ it does not purport to explain particular foreign policy moves on 
the part of monopoly capitalist states by reference to a direct economic 
motive. In fact, of course, it is precisely for this reason that the 
attacks upon it made by historians such as Fieldhouse are somewhat 
beside the point.8 For in reply to his demonstration that the bulk of 
British investments during the great period of 'formal empire' at the 
end of the 19th Century did not go to the freshly annexed territories 
14. 
in Africa but to the USA and the white dominions, it is sufficient 
for the Marxist-Leninist school to maintain that such annexations were 
of an 'anticipatory' nature9 or, more shrewdly, only assume economic 
significance in the context of the needs of the wider 'economic 
empire'. Thus Sweezy: "An empire must be defensible from a mili-
tary standpoint, and this obviously implies the need for well-placed 
land and sea bases, lines of communication and so forth". 1° Foreign 
policies which are prompted by motives of an immediately non-economic 
nature are, in consequence, easily accounted for and thus are dismissed 
attempts to refute the economic theory of imperialism on "book-
11 keeping" or "balance-sheet" grounds. 
Not all non=Marxists have missed this point. Staley, who compiled 
mountains of evidence on the direct relations between investment 
interests and diplomatic rivalry during the decades around the turn of 
the 20th Century, was acutely aware of it. Having shown that, in the 
majority of cases, the former were a tool of foreign policy rather than 
the opposite, he insisted cautiously that this only refuted "A crude or 
naive form of the economic interpretation of history11 • 12 Accordingly 
he concluded: "It may still be true that the larger political purposes 
in the service of which private investments become most dangerous -
expansionism, the strategy of power, etc. - are themselves the product 
of forces best described as 'economic 1 • 13 
But if evidence relating to the involvement (or non-involvement) of 
economic motives in the genesis of particular foreign policies in spec-
ific historical circumstances is irrelevant to the ultimate validity of 
the theory, how, we are entitled to enquire, can we be convinced that the 
'basic driving forces' behind the foreign policies of monopoly capitalist 
states remain economic in nature? In reply to this, we are characteristic= 
ally invited to observe the large and_strategic nature of the foreign 
economic involvement of the monopoly capitalist states since the end of 
the 19th Century as evidence of the indispensability of the external 
sector and thus of the validity of the first prop of the argument - the 
economic theory of surplus. 14 But even if the theory is internally con-
sistent (and serious criticisms can be ma~e of it on this score) 15 and 
this evidence is accepted as compelling (though certainly not without 
serious qualification on this point, too, especially in the case of the 
USA), 16 we are still left with the task of validating the second prop 
of the argument = the Marxist theory of the state. For, as Reynolds 
points out: "It is, however, the link between political decision-
and policy-making? that is, the political level, and the alleged econ-
omic interest, which is important to students of international politics11 • 17 
This, mf course, raises both theoretical and empirical problems in the 
area of foreign policy of the same order as those in domestic policy, 
concerning which argument has long raged between Marxists, elitists and 
pluralists •18 For instance, it is clear that studies \-Thich demonstrate 
close personal connections, similarity of class origin, and inter--change-
ability of personnel between the business and foreign policy establish-
ments19 do no more than establish the potential for business domination. 
Indeed, such evidence could equally well testify to the politicization 
of the business community as to the commercial enslavement of the foreign 
policy-makers. ·In fact, if empirical research in this area has demon-
strated anything at all, it is that there is a considerable diversity 
of power structures and that elitist as well as Marxist theories have 
. . f th d . . k" 20 a na2ve v2ew o e ec1s2on-ma 1ng process. 
The limitations and true nature of the Marxist-Leninist theory of mono-
poly capitalist foreign policy are thus obvious: not only is it cavalier 
towards the political and self~admittedly of no use in explaining partic-
ular foreign policies but it fails to offer us a form of explanation 
which is in principle capable of empirical verification. In short, it is 
a non-empirical form of explanation. The theory clearly rests on the 
essentially a priori premiss of the materialist philosophy of history that 
the mode of economic production in any given historical period constitutes 
the basic independent variable from which all the 'superstructural' 
characteristics of the society may be deduced, according to their relation-
ship to this particular mode of production. During the years of 'formal' 
and, subsequently? 'informal' imperial expansion, this mode of production 
happens to have been capitalism in its monopoly stage, and so the task 
of the Marxist-Leninist school became to show how this particular kind 
of foreign policy must necessarily have been a result of the distinctive 
features and peculiar contradictions of this particular mode of economic 
production. Accordingly, the chain of deductive reasoning which links 
monopoly capitalism to imperialist foreign policy by means of a sophis-
ticated economic theory of surpluses and declining profit rates amounts 
to nothing less than an historical rationalization. 
Ultimately, of course, the Marxist-Leninist theory is a political 
argumento As Knorr observes: "Lenin needed a theory of capitalized 
imperialism as P?rt of a powerful anti-capitalist ideology, in turn 
21 
required as a means to achieving revolutionary power11 o In seeking 
to expose the roots of the modern American empire 9 William Appleman 
Williams makes no bones about the need for "relevant history"o 22 
As political arguments, then, the pursuit of truth is clearly secon-
dary to the achievement of political success and the extent of this 
achievement is 9 indeed 9 the only legitimate criterion of theoretical 
validationo Accordingly 9 it cannot be said that this school has 
thrown much useful light on the question of economic considerations 
as objectives of foreign policy 9 though this is not to say, of course 9 
that individual Marxists have not made useful contributions to the 
question in so far as they have occasionally emerged from their non-
empirical re-doubt to deal with fairly limited historical eventso 23 
What 9 then 9 have non-Marxists had to say on this issue? 
Whereas 9 as we have seen 9 the Marxist-Leninists have deduced the economic 
purposes necessarily pursued in the foreign policies of monopoly capital-
ist powers from the inherent logic of the mode of production itself, 
non-Marxist writers have characteristically pointed to the importance of 
'economic factors' amongst a range of objectives contingently pursued in 
capitalist (and other) foreign policyo In so doing9 of course 9 they have 
consummated the materialist heresy of mystifying the distinction 
. 24 
"between surface phenomena and deeper driving forces". In fact 9 
whilst ah.rays acknowledging that the business and finance groups within 
capitalist society constitute extremely powerful 'pressure groups' 
which are capable from time to time of obliging their governments to 
shape foreign policy in their interests 9 
25 non-Marxist. '>'Jri ters have 
typically been cautious of this approach because of the conspiracy 
theory of government to which it is always in danger of leading. 
'Instead9 they have tended to insist that 9 when governments willingly 
attempt to further the interests of these groups 9 this is because their 
promotion simultaneously advances the cause of domestic prosperity 
(most notably through the balance of payments) or the economic power 
upon which military strength and diplomatic leverage are held to depend-
or, best of all, both. Thi~ vie\v is, in short 9 that pursuit of the 
capitalists' interests as one important objective of foreign policy 
occurs not mainly because of the political influence of the bourgeois 
class or, more typically, the business and financial sections of the 
pluralistic elite 9 but because these interests coincide \vi th one or 
more of the government's own interests or with what are commonly 
referred to as 'national interests 1 o 26 
17 0 
That domestic prosperity is an important component of the national 
interest cultivated in the foreign policies of most states = certainly 
most liberal democracies = is hardly controversial o As \ve have already 
seen (page 13 above), Marxists-Leninists themselves acknowledge it. 
The point is, however, that whilst this is for them marginal to the 
main argument, the defence of domestic prosperity as an explanation 
of foreign policies which are geared to export promotion or the protec= 
tion of overseas investment stocks is a much more central argument in 
this context for non-Marxist writers. 27 
Much more interesting, however, is the second main feature of non~Marxist 
commentary in this field, that is to say, the insistence on 'economic 
power' as a major objective of foreign policy. It is clear that this 
first began to attract attention as a result of the currency given to 
the related notion of 'total war' in the aftermath of the 1914-1918 
conflagration. In such a war, the battlefield is transcended and the 
resources of entire socio=economic systems are locked in conflict, with 
the result that not only must the state possess the economic wherewithal 
to produce an enormous and flexible military machine but, in order to 
avoid dependence upon a potential enemy, cultivate self-sufficiency in 
foodstuffs and strategic materials. In short, total war required much 
28 greater emphasis upon the economic component of national power. 
One of the most uncompromising exponents of the economic power theory 
of foreign policy was Hawtrey, whose little book, Economic Aspects of 
Sovereignty, was first published in 1930.29 Hawtrey's book has many 
fascinating features but its main significance for us resides in the 
fact that: first, it propounds economic pmver as a "general principle" 
of foreign policy; second, it subsumes the historical phenomenon of 
formal empire under this general principle and thus constitutes an 
attack on the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism. 
For Hawtrey, economic power was one of the most resolutely pursued 
ambitions of the modern state (in domestic, as well as in foreign, 
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policy) as much for its political convenience as for the fact that it 
was indispensable in total war.3° With the liberal-democratic state 
no doubt principally in mind 9 it was Hawtrey's view that governments 
preferred to resolve their foreign conflicts on the basis of their 
reputations for strength 9 or "prestige" 9 rather than by engaging in 
explicit trials of strength, or "war". This being the case and 
democracies being what they were 9 to establish such reputations on 
the basis of economic strength was a much more expedient course of 
action than "ostentatious militarism".31 Thus could Hawtrey observe 
that "Economic power is the foundation of prestige, and (that) from 
time immemorial Governments have held it to be their duty to do what-
ever may lie in their power to enhance every component of economic 
power".32 
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Having established the central role of economic power in his explan-
ation of foreign policy 9 Hawtrey immediately announces that "Extensions 
of territory and population are a particular application of this general 
principle ••• (for) ••• in general, the acquisition of any territory 
reasonably endowed with resources or potentialities 9 and inhabited by 
people who may be expected to acquiesce in the rule of their future 
sovereign, if not to become active adherents of it 9 will be a source of 
strength".33 Here, then 9 is Hawtrey's explanation of imperialism, a 
phenomenon which he later defines as "the support given by the power of 
the State to private enterprise .in exploiting territory which is either 
politically vacant or ruled over by a weak and decadent government".34 
Formal empires 9 for example 9 are thus established, according to Hawtrey, 
not because capitalist governments are simply the servants of expansion-
ary bourgeois interests but essentially "because this policy has been 
believed to further the power of the State. 11 35 
Hawtrey believed that the establishment of sovereignty over "undeveloped 
lands" increased the economic power of the state for the following 
reasons: first, since performing the basic governmental functions 
necessary to orderly development and allotting the most favourable priv-
ileges and concessions to its own nationals 9 enabled the imperialist 
government to increase their wealth and, ipso facto, the populations 
and properties available for taxation and - in times of emergency -
requisition; second 9 since it provided more manpower for military 
service; and third 9 since it provided security for strategically vital 
raw materials and fuels in both peace and war. 
This essentially neo-mercantilist theory of foreign policy which 9 with its 
emphasis upon the pursuit of autarky 9 numbered E. H. Carr amongst its 
supporters 9 3
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was clearly in tune with what were regarded as the lessons 
of the first \vorld \var and the circumstances of the subsequent 'Twenty 
Years Crisis'.37 Angell 9 who had earlier held that the establishment of 
sovereignty by one state over another would entail no economic advantages 
and that 9 as a result 9 conquest vlith this end in view was irrational 9 3B 
was held to have been unreservedly refuted 9 and a central position for the 
concept of 'economic power' as at least one of the major goals of foreign 
policy was thus established in non-Marxist writing. Staley suggested this 
as the chief reason for "Diplomacy's" readiness to further the interests 
of "Investments", 39 tvhilst Robbins 9 too 9 accepted most of Hawtrey' s 
reasoning though he baulked at the notion of power as the ultimate end 
in itself.40 
What are \ve to make of this argument? It might be objected that 
Hawtrey's theory of imperialism and 9 indeed 9 of foreign policy in general 9 
is conceptually flawed since it distinguishes power- albeit economic 
power - as a separate goal of foreign policy. For 9 as Reynolds points 
out 9 since power consists essentially in a relationship and cannot be 
said to exist until some specified objective has been achieved against 
opposition, it can hardly be identified= let alone measured - independent-
ly of that 'other' objective. 41 However 9 it is one thing to maintain that 
povrer is strictly inseparable from the results which it achieves; quite 
another to hold that statesmen do not from time to time engage in policies 
which are principally designed to strengthen their ability to succeed in 
the pursuit of different policies. It would not appear offensive to 
usage to describe the former as 'power-oriented' policies 9 even if it is 
only 'potential' power which is being sought. Thus Hawtrey stands exoner-
ated on this count. 
On the other hand 9 with its exclusive emphasis on economic power 9 Hawtrey's 
theory clearly is flawed in so far as it ignores the many other consider-
ations which have been sho>vn to determine the shape of foreign policy 9 
for instance 9 ideology and the personal pre-dilections of state·smen. It 
is 9 in short 9 almost as reductionist as the theory of the Marxist-Leninists. 
Despite this failing 9 however 9 it is obvious that it squared well with the 
thinking of critically disposed non-Marxists of the inter-war period. 
For it could concede 9 in the face of persuasive evidence 9 the Marxist-
Leninist argument that imperialist policies were designed above all to 
increase the wealth of the bourgeois class, whilst at the same time 
remaining sceptical tov1ards the economic theory upon which this 
argument \vas based and denying the ruling class theory of the state 
which ostensibly clinched it. In short 9 the concept of economic 
pmver ivas congenial to non-Marxists since it reasserted the supremacy 
of the political over the economic in foreign policy formulation, 
,.,hilst admitting - indeed emphasising = the importance of economic 
interests in the process. 
After the second World War, however, the emphasis in non-TIJarxist 
writing on economic considerations as objectives of foreign policy 
certainly in contemporary histories of national foreign policies 
(see Chapter I below) = shifted away from economic power to an in-
sistence instead upon domestic prosperity. This was probably a 
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result of the enormous changes which had occurred in military strategy 
under the impact of nuclear weapons 9 the retreat from at least 'formal' 
empire 9 the reduced dependence of the industrialized states on imported 
raw materials,42 and the slow but substantial liberalization and expan-
sion of international trade. Together 9 these developments had rendered 
it less likely that the governments of the major powers were construct-
ing their foreign policies with a view to preparing for total war. And, 
in any case 9 as Knorr points out, Keynesian economios was by now in the 
ascendant and was teaching that the route to national wealth lay in 
domestic, rather than in external, economic management. 43 
Nevertheless 9 over the last fifteen years, against a background of 
increasingly economic competition between the major powers for the 
allegiance of the non-aligned countries, on the one hand, and of the 
growing diplomatic use by once weak states of their control over such 
vital natural resources as oil 9 on the other, something resembling the 
concept of economic power as an objective of foreign policy is once 
more becoming a fashionable feature of non-r!Jarxist commentary. Thus 
Knorr, for example, has recently pointed to the fact that states are 
pursuing conscious policies designed to approach the ideal base for 
the exercise of economic power (see page27 below) through the forma-
tion of monopoly or monopsonist organizations with other states, 
notably in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
and in the European Economic Community (EEC).44 
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These shifts of emphasis in the non-Marxist literature are not, of 
course, surprising, since they have occurred, in the main, within a 
context of empirical generalization of an historical nature, albeit 
frequently on a very high level and occasionally of a markedly reduc-
tionist nature. As a result, being characteristically offered at best 
as contributions to the explanation of the foreign policies of parti-
cular states or kinds of state, in particular circumstances or kinds 
of circumstance, in particular periods, their emphasis has naturally 
reflected the changing historical experience upon which they have 
drawn and on the evidence of which they remain ultimately testable. And 
it is in this last essential respect, of course, that they are perhaps 
most atvariance with the Marxist-Leninist theory. 
This Section, then, has dealt briefly with the treatment of economic 
considerations as objectives of foreign policy at the hands of both 
~~rxist and non-Marxist writers. Whilst the ratiocination of the for= 
mer has tended to dominate the field, it will be evident that their 
approach has been rejected here on the grounds that it deals in an 
essentially non-empirical form of explanation, whilst, on this level 
of generalization, it will also be clear that many non-Marxist writers 
havenot offered us much more than extremely broad hypothesis and thinly 
veiled neo-Machiavellian prescription. Indeed, that this should have 
been so largely the case in non-Marxist writing is not really surprising 
since, to the extent that the materialist approach is eschewed and an 
attempt is nevertheless made to answer the question 'To what degree and 
in what manner do economic concerns represent a basic objective of 
foreign policy?' the empirical referent is bound to recede. In short, 
whilst the question is in principle capable of an empirical reply, its 
focus is so broad as to produce almost inevitably an answer which is in 
practice banal. It is, as a result, the argument of this section that 
the Marxist-Leninist approach is unacceptable on epistemological grounds, 
whilst that of most non-Marxists who have not confined themselves to the 
analysis of fairly limited historical cases but have been seduced by the 
global focus (if not conclusions) of the former, springsfrom far too 
broad an empirical base for instructive generalization.45 
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Nevertheless, if, as a substantial number seem agreed, the cultivation 
of economic interests - prompted either by considerations of domestic 
prosperity or of pO\ver, and assuredly the two are related= is a major 
objective of the foreign policies of most contemporary states, we are 
led logically to the question of the involvement of economic relations 
in the diplomatic relations between states. The more particularly, 
since the more economic concerns motivate policy in general,the greater 
significance for policy is the employment of economic weapons likely 
to have; and conversely, the more frequent and serious the use of such 
instruments in diplomacy, the greater the importance which is likely to 
be attached to economic power as an objective of foreign policy. 
2. Economic Considerations as Instruments of Foreign Policy 
The Marxist-Leninist theory of foreign policy, as we have seen, is basic-
ally concerned to explain foreign policy in terms of its fundamental 
economic functions. One of its more valuable contributions, however, 
has been to stress the role played by economic relations in the power 
which governments can bring to bear in the exercise of their foreign 
polic:les. Consequently, it embraces both sides of the analytical 
distinction which I have made between economics as purpose and economics 
as instrumental to purpose. 
Indeed, to the extent that the burden of contemporary Marxism-Leninism is 
to show that, despite the withdrawal from formal empire, the imperialist 
'domination' of the less developed world is still a reality, the power 
implications of economic relationships have received increasing attention 
from members of this school. Thus, so the argument goes, no longer able 
to maintain formal political control and employ direct force in order to 
secure its markets, capital outlets and so on (with certain notable, 
chiefly American, exceptions), Western imperialism must perforce rely upon 
more subtle and discrete means of control. These are to be found in the 
relations of economic dependence which remain undiluted as a result of 
monopoly capitalist expansion into the less developed world and, indeed, 
into the terri tory of weaker rivals (see page 13 above). Political 
influence then, is the child of the structure of trade, the control of 
capital investment, credit flows and= most typical of the new age 
foreign aid. Such 9 in so far as it involves the relations between ex-imp-
23. 
erial and ex-colonial states, is the phenomenon of 'neo-colonialism•.46 
It should be clear that this conception of the political significance of 
economic relationships is in no way necessarily related to the J1arxist-
Leninist view of the fundamental purposes which are at the roots of 
foreign policy. Hmvever we might conceive of these purposes in the 
case of capitalist states, the impact of economic factors on power 
relations is at least analytically separable and, if acknowledged, 
compatible with any such conception. This being the case, it is not 
surprising that non-Marxist \'lri ters should have d\vel t on this implic= 
' 
ation of the economic relationships betv1een states as well. Indeed, 
writing in The Twenty Years' Crisis, E. H. Carr prefaced his own treat= 
ment of the 'economic weapon' vri th the observation that "its use to 
acquire power and influence abroad has been so fully recognised and 
freely discussed that the briefest summary will suffice here11 .47 
As in the case of power-oriented economic foreign policy objectives, of 
course, this conception of the significance of inter-state economic 
relations was also consistent with the theoretical assumptions concern-
ing the nature of government of non-T1arxist writers in the inter-war 
period. After all, it asserted even more unmistakeably the supremacy 
of the political over the economic. It was thus, for instance, the 
major conclusion of Staley's extensive research into this subject, as 
of that of many other historians both before and after him, 48 that even 
in the age of formal empire itself, economic means (chiefly investments) 
were used to penetrate the regions upon which the governments of the 
capitalist powers had political designs and then to assist in holding 
them through the relations of economic dependence which had been 
created. In Staley's o\im words, "Investments" assisted "Diplomacy" by "••• 
facilitating penetration and conquest, maintaining regional dominance, 
cementing alliances, exerting pressure on a political adversary, or 
rallying domestic support to foreign policy".49 
But how could "Diplomacy" persuade "Investments" to adopt this role? 
In Staley's viev1 9 governments had a variety of expedients up their 
sleeves, amongst which were appeals to class and national sentiments, 
agreeing to guarantee particularly risky ventures, bribery, or the 
threat that if the investor failed to cooperate in one instance then 
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he could well find himself forfeiting government protection of his 
interests in some other part of the \vorld. Indeed, it was following 
his assessment of their mutual need that Staley concluded that it was 
reasonable to expect that each would help the other even in circum-
stances 1vhere their direct interests were not being furthered, for 
fear of reprisal in some other area.5° This, however, did not prevent 
him from maintaining, on the basis of a quantitative analysis of all 
the instances of international political friction in which investments 
had been rumoured to have been involved, that "Diplomacy" was only 
prepared to risk war with a powerful state v1here political ambitions 
were paramount and in which, accordingly, the investor's involvement 
could only be construed as the occasion, rather than the cause, of the 
conflict. 51 For Staley, then, the economic interests of national 
capitalists, especially their foreign investments, were more often 
found in the role of "instruments of policy" than in that of 
"instigators" of that policy. 
Within the European context, furthermore, Lenin was not the only one 
by any means to draw attention to "usury imperialism". Einzig, for 
example, was bellicose in his insistence in 1932 that "France, ambitious 
to attain hegemony in Europe in order to secure her frontiers against 
German aggression, has sought to attain that end by making political 
use of her financial po\ver". 52 According to Einzig, the policy of the 
"French Financial General Staff"(sic) was to build up liquid reserves 
during the 1920s and then to use this financial power to extract politi-
cal concessions from other states. Amongst a multitude of examples, 
Einzig cites the fact that the French would withdraw reserves from 
London on each occasion that relations with the United Kingdom deterior= 
ated, and that in Hungary they secured a change of government in return 
for financial assistance. "Indeed", he claims, "in Central and South 
Eastern Europe France reigned supreme by the mere fact that she was the 
only potential source of financial support •e• capable of dismissing 
and appointing governments and Central Bank governors and breaking or 
saving currencies and banking institutions 11 .53 Einzig, not surprisingly, 
was also amongst the first to point to the use made by Hitler Germany 
of financial and commercial weapons in the "penetration of Eastern 
Europe" in the prelude to the second \vorld vlar.54 
Subsequently 9 in the cold war context of the essentially economic 
competition between the Soviet bloc and the NATO powers for the 
allegiance of the non-aligned countries of the third world 9 the 
importance attributed by historians and economists alike to the 
use of economic instruments of foreign policy has 9 of course 9 been 
enormous. Attention has been drawn particularly to the political 
employment of foreign aid55 and direct investments. Indeed 9 the 
latter has also been held to have clear implications for the power 
relations between states within the Western Alliance 9 or for the 
sovereignty (as it is normally expressed) of the weaker states 
involved.56 Also 9 of course 9 the occasions in the post-war period 
when the power relations implicit in the economic intercourse be-
tween most states have actually materiali~ed into open economic war-
fare - as in the case of the NATO ban on trade in 'strategic' goods 
with the Soviet bloc and China9 the US blockade of Cuba9 the Arab 
boycott of Israel 9 Afro-Asian boycotts on trade with the white 
supremacist regimes in Southern Africa 9 and so on = have all attracted 
considerable attention from non-Marxist writers.57 
It is thus evident that both Marxist and non-Marxist writers have had 
quite a lot to say about the power implications of the economic relation~ 
ships between states. Nevertheless 9 it seems fair to observe of the 
state of contemporary commentary that 9 with the neo-Marxists 9 on the one 
hand 9 being rather more absorbed in the task of refining their general 
theory in the light of new international developments and empiricist 
criticism9 and documenting the extent of "imperialist exploitation" 
and "development distortion" in the third world and non-Marxists 9 on the 
other 9 being attracted to a greater degree by the more obvious and dram= 
atic manifestations of the political use of economic weapons (frequent= 
ly with a view to making policy-oriented criticisms of their efficacy) 9 
neither school has given much attention to the study of the general 
implications of economic power for historically specific inter-state 
relations. In the field of economic power relations 9 the non-Marxist 
tradition 9 for its part 9 has not been so much wanting on this occasion 
in empirical foundation as in pertinent historical perspective. After 
all 9 if we are interested in understanding the impact of economic re-
lations on the political relations betvreen states 9 we have to investi-
gate all of their different aspects in so far as they are involved in 
a particular relationship and not simply foreign aid £E arms supplies 
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££ raw materials, for instance. Nevertheless~ building on the early and 
tenta~ive work of scholars such as Hirschman58 and Michaely,59 Knorr has 
recently made an outstanding contribution to the construction of a 
conceptual and analytical framework within which such investigations can 
proceed. This is his publication: Power and \Ileal th: The Political 
Econo~y of International Power.60 
Knorr is not concerned with economic power with a view to establishing 
it as a major objective of foreign policy in the manner of Hawtrey and 
his followers (though he does have something to say on this, .see page 
above}. Rather, his main purpose is to exPlicate the concept of economic 
power, "deduce the foundations upon which it rests11 , and idehtify its 
principal uses. Thus, according to Knorr, "national eco~omic power" 
in its "active" sense is "the ability of a state to benefit itself, 
using economic or financial policy9 by hurting, or threatening to hurt, 
benefiting, or promising to benefit, weakening or strengthening another 
state economically" and, in its "passive" sense, "a state's ability to 
limit such use of economic power by other states against itself".61 
As well as being either active or passive, however, Knorr's notion of 
economic povlSr has also to be seen as a condition which has both its 
'!_putative" ar!d its 10actualized" dimensions. Thu:::: putative economic pm·rer 
consists in "the capabilities that permit the pm..rer=wielder to make 
effective threats", whilst actualized economic power is that which is 
"generated in an interaction which is an encounter11 • 62 
Now this latter distinction is both important and useful. It is import-
ant because it signifies an understanding that, whilst 'power' may be 
casually used as a synonym for capacity or potential (putative power), 
it has really no strict meaning, as we have already seen (page 19 
above), except when this capacity is put to the test in pursuit of some 
specified objective (actualized power). As Reynolds argues, "power is as 
power does". 63 It is also useful, however, because the field is complex 
and it offers us a convenient distinction to employ in the organization 
of a welter of empirical detail. 
Of remaining interest to us here is Knorr's analysis of the foundations 
on which putative economic power rests. 64 Economic wealth defined in 
terms of Gross National Product (GNP) is not, in itself, he stresses, 
economic power of this kind (though such a conception is close to that 
of Ha\·rtrey ~ Hho sau economic power or strength mainly as a base of 
military power: (see pages 17-18 above). Rather, putative economic 
pmver rests principally on "economic strength", \·rhich, in turn, 
possesses four main elements. In the first place, there is the sheer 
size of a state's foreign economic transactions, and the larger the 
better. Secondly, there is the size of these relative to GNP: if 
they are large relative to GNP then, though active economic povrer 
is great, passive economic power is reduced (thus in this respect, 
for instance, the USA has been economically stronger than Britain). 
Thirdly, there is the structure of a state's foreign economic 
transactions and under this heading v1e are informed that "a state 
VJould be equipped structually with an ideal base for exercising 
economic power if (1) it exported things in urgent demand abroad 
\vhile importing things regarding which its own demand was highly 
elastic and if (2) it held monopoly control over the supply of 
things demanded by foreign importing countries and monopsony control 
over the goods which foreign countries have to export~ 65 After the 
second vlorld vlar, Knorr remarks, the USA came close to possessing 
this ideal base. On the other hand, it is clear that, as Knorr is 
equally a\vare 9 "Since presumably no state is interested in exercising 
economic power vis-a-vis the entire outside vmrld all at once, but 
rather vis-a-vis a particular state or group of states, the structural 
desiderata are not as exacting as the ideal type suggests. Even 
:potential economic pO\ver then depends", he concludes 9 "on particular 
actor relationships of conceivable interest". 66 And finally, in adding 
what really amounts to a fourth element of economic strength (though 
Knorr does not explicitly describe it as such), he indicates that 
"International currency reserves and gold are of some significance 
to national economic power", vli th the key currency countries (such as 
the USA in the 1960s) having a particular advantage in this respect. 
Reserves, he suggests, are important to both active and passive 
economic pm·Ter, since they cushion the economic consequences of its 
use on the domestic economy. 67 
An important point to note at this stage is that "economic strength", 
the first and certainly the most important of the foundations of 
putative economic povmr v1hich Knorr identifies, is clearly a notion \vhich 
subsumes the concept of 'economic dependence' upon which both Marxists 
and non-Marxists have so persistently dwelt in this field. 68 This is 
so because to say, for instance, that State A derives greate~ economic 
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strength over State B from its economic relations ivi th that state 9 than 
does State B over State A from those same relations, is to say not much 
more than that the nature of these relations renders State A less 
'dependent' upon State B than it renders State B 'dependent' upon 
State A. vlhether Knorr's formulation has any advantage in this 
respect over the traditional one is a consideration which Hill be 
postponed until Chapter V. 
In any case, economic strength, whilst the most crucial foundation of 
economic pov1er, is not alone sufficient. Such strength is only 
transformed into putative power in the presence of three non-economic 
conditions: "the vlill to use this strength for power purposes; the 
skill of applying this strength for such purposes; and the inter-
national reputation a state has in terms of an expected disposition to 
use its economic strength in order to exercise power". 69 And such 
factors are particularly affected, according to Knorr, by the type 
of state concerned, ivi th 'command economies' having a strong edge 
over private enterprise economies in most of these respects. 70 
Knorr has, therefore 9 provided us i·li th an analytical framei'Tork i·lhich 9 
in particular: first, explicates .i.mportant organizing concepts, 
especially putative and actualized economic pmver, subsuming, in the 
process, the hardy concept of economic dependence; and second, spells 
out in some detail the criteria 1:1hich are essential to an evaluation of 
the extent to which putative economic pmver (both passive and active) 
can be said to exist in any given inter-state relationship. In short 9 
the historian concerned to investigate the influence of economic 
relations on the political relationships between states is provided 
by Knorr with a set of very useful ideas and hypotheses to guide his 
work. 
3. Hypotheses and Stratagem. 
This brief survey of the literature has emphasised that there are two 
main empirical hypotheses and one sUbsidiary one which seem to merit 
particular attention. The first main hypothesis is that the foreign 
policies of states in the contemporary period are motivated, inter alia, 
by a concern with the conditions of both economic prosperity and 
potential economic power, whilst the second is that their ability to 
achieve these, as well as the other goals of foreign policy, is 
importantly affected by the economic power 1..rhich they are capable of 
deploying in their pursuit. Subsidiary to the last of these t\<JO main 
hypotheses is the proposition that the economic power which states can 
exercise depends very importantly on non-economic, as well as on 
economic, foundations. Though each of these hypotheses will in 
fact be considered, it is especially the second main hypothesis to 
\·rhich attention will be directed; this, after all, in the 
comprehensive sense indicated above, is the relatively most neglected 
area, as well as being the most amenable to empirical research. 
The point has now been reached, therefore, at Hhich ive are in a 
position to see to just what extent these hypotheses hold true for 
certain historically specific foreign policy situations in the 
contemporary period, for a major critical theme of this Introduction 
has been to emphasise the marked failure of most extant commentary 
~ in this area to apply empirical tests to ideas such as these. 
The case ivhich is to be studied for this purpose, as indicated at the 
beginning of this Introduction, is that of British foreign policy over 
the period from 1951 until 1964, especially vli th regard to its shape 
vis-a-vis the Union, and subsequently, the Republic, of South Africa 
at certain critical junctures over these same years. Though these Here 
years, as we shall see 9 in i..rhich it is conventionally assumed that 
economic considerations ranked low in the order of Britain's foreign 
policy priori ties as a 1..rhole, this is certainly not commonly thought 
to have been the ca,se i'ii th regard to UK policy towards South Africa. 
In this connection, it is widely believed that Britain's economic 
interests v1ere of singular importance in determining policy and that, 
furthermore 9 it 1..ras Britain 1 s investments and Britain 1 s markets there 
which were the key to this circumstance. 
Following Knorr, the intention is to establish the nature of the 
putative economic power relationship which obtained between the British 
and South African governments during the Simonstown negotiations (1954-
55) and during the post-Sharpeville period (1960-64). This \>Till be the 
ultimate aim towards which Chapter II v!ill drive, although its course 
will be necessarily circuitious and, in parts, repetitive, as a result 
of the extent and complexity of the empirical evidence= especially 
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statistical = to be assessed. In an attempt to make the argument 
comprehensible = to make possible~ as it were~ the discernment of 
the \·rood from the trees - the Chapter has been considerably sub-divided 
and liberally sprinkled Hith sub-headings. In particular~ the import-
ant distinction made by Knorr behreen the economic and the non-economic 
bases of putative economic po\ver has been employed in the organization 
of the evidence in this Chapter (Parts A and B respectively). 
Having accomplished this task and having summarized the argument in 
Part C of Chapter II (see 'Contents' above), an attempt is next made to 
demonstrate that the South African government 'actualized' its putative 
economic po\ver superiority over the British government (the conclusion 
of Chapter II), both during the Simonstmm negotiations (Chapter HI) 
and during the post-Sharpeville period (Chapter IV). It is especially 
in the last Sections of these two Chapters that the nub of the thesis is 
to be found. In the Conclusion (Chapter v)~ the overall argu~ent is 
summarized~ some general implications of the empirical findings for 
the theories discussed in this Introduction are drawn out, and a 
brief criticism of the method and evidence upon which the thesis rests 
is made. 
To begin with~ however, how important were economic priorities in general 
in the formulation of British foreign policy over the 1951~64 period as 
a whole? The answer to this question will throw some light, of course~ 
on the first main hypothesis but, more importantly, have a strong 
bearing on the subsequent investigation of Anglo-South African relations. 
For it is a reasonable assumption that the importance v1hich -vras attached 
by Britain's foreign policy-makers to British economic interests in 
South Africa vrould have been significantly influenced by the importance 
which was attached by them to economic considerations in general in 
these years. This~ therefore, is the subject of Chapter I~ to which we 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER I 
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 9 1951=1964g ECONOMIC CONSIDER-
ATIONS IN THE HIERARCHY OF POLICY PRIORITIES. 
1 • The conventional view 
It is an almost universally held view onpost-war British foreign 
policy that the peculiarly large involvement of Britain in the inter= 
national economy 9 together with the countryvs recurring external pay-
ments weakness 9 have combined to make economic interests one of the 
most vital components of the 'national interest'. Thus Northedge 
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includes "economic interests" in a list of four "vital British interests" 
in the post-war periodp along with "security"~ "peace"~ and the "perenn~ 
ial British demand for representation in the highest councils of 
nations 11 • 1 And 9 whilst he appears to place security and peace at the 
head of this list advisedly 9 he nevertheless observes that 9 of domestic 
influences on foreign policy formulation 9 nby far the most important ••oo 
is the British economy11 • 2 For his part 9 Goodwin is led to remark that 
"ever: since (1945) 9 the struggle to become and to remain solvent has 
coloured every aspect of policy" 9 3 whilst Grant'Hugo is induced to 
speculate (:probably wildly 9 but nevertheless symptomatically) that it is 
the very importance which British foreign policy-makers attach to economic 
consider~tions which leads them to over-estimate the extent to which they 
weigh with other countries 9 especi~lly in regard to the efficacy of 
economic sanctions.4 
It will already be evident 9 furthermore 9 that the economic interests 
. 
which are held to have so substantially influenced British foreign policy 
since the war are also commonly supposed to have been prosperity- rather 
than power=oriented and to have been pursued willingly by successive 
British governments rather than under pressure from conspiratorial 
groups within the business and financial sections of British society. 
Thus 9 whilst it is true that Hawtrey 9 not surprisingly 9 had no doubt 
that the re-establishment of sufficient economic power to promise 
successful defence in a future Vtotal war' against an expansionist 
Soviet Union was a prominent motive behind British9 as well as American 9 
policy in promoting Western European co-operation at the end of the se= 
cond World War 9 5 subsequent commentators on British foreign policy over 
later years have given little prominence to this kind of calculation9 
probably as a result of the economic and military developments to which 
attention was drawn in this context in the Introduction (see page 
above). Moreover, whilst it is also true that Northedge 9 for instance, 
claims that "British mining interests" were a significant factor "in the 
Conservative government's dissent from United Nations action against the 
secessionist regime of Moishe Tshombe in Katanga during the Congo crisis 
in 1961-2" 9 it is significant that he should also add that "in many of 
these instances there are grounds for thinking that the British Ministers 
would have followed broadly the courses which they did, even had no such 
pressures existed".6 
If such 9 then, is the conventional attitude towards both the nature and 
the general importance of economic interests in British foreign policy 
formulation over the post-viar period, how does this attitude shape up 
with regard to the manner in which these interests varied in nature and 
importance at different stages within the period? For, as Frankel 
observes, "It seems futile to endeavour to answer in general terms the 
question which is occasionally put, whether the political or the economic 
aspects of British foreign policy are or should be dominant. Security and 
prosperity are its constant twin objectives and one is given precedence 
over the other in the light of the perceived necessities of any given 
situation11 • 7 Taking the post-war period as a whole, therefore~ for 
this is a lesson which has not been lost on historians - it is the 
common view that economic considerations had greatest influence over 
British foreign policy in the post-1964 period, somewhat less but still 
exceedingly marked influence over the years from the end of the war un-
til 1951 9 and least significance of all during the years which intervened; 
and that, furthermore, it was only in the immediate post-war years that 
anything resembling a concern with economic power coloured these consider-
t . 8 a ~ons. 
It is almost certainly true, as Wallace in particular has argued, that 
economic considerations were more important in British foreign policy 
after 1964 than before. This view, explicitly shared by Northedge 9 was 
massively confirmed by the Duncan Report when it was presented to 
Parliament in July 1969. Chaired by Sir Val'Duncan, the managing direc-
tor of Britain's leading mining-finance house (Rio Tinto Zinc) 9 and 
including Andrew Shonfield9 one of the most outspoken critics of British 
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foreign economic policy in the 1950s 9 the composition of the three-man 
committee \'lhich produced this report was itself of unmistakeable signif= 
icanceo9 Whilst they naturally found it necessary to affirm that even 
a country in dire economic straights must still regard national security 
as the overriding constraint upon policy9 they left no doubt that the 
"work load" of the Diplomatic Service "should now reflect the clear 
precedence that belongs to the commercial objective in the day-to=day 
conduct of Britain's relations with other countries 11 o10 Moreover 9 they 
made it clear that they were not recommending any new precedence for the 
commercial objective: this had been established, by gradual process, 
in the mid-1960so 11 
As Wallace rightly maintains, the post-1964 period brought an unprecedented 
ascendancy for economic considerations in policy formulation not only 
because these years saw an enormous deterioration in Britain's external 
payments position against an international background characterised by 
"more turbulent patterns of economic relations 1112 but also because they 
witnessed a diminished preoccupation with great power status and = in the 
circumstances of post-Cuba detente- with securityo 13 There can be little 
doubt that this goes a long way towards explaining, for instance 9 the 
Wilson government's attempt to negotiate EEC entry despite the strong 
possibility of another rebuff from De Gaulle, its understanding attitude 
towards American policy in Vietnamp and the speeded-up withdrawal from 
East of Suezo These are all matters of recordo 14 And following the dis-
position made by the Conservative government in the Middle East crisis 
subsequent to the Arab 9il boycott, "Any remaining illusions 11 9 as 
Wallace remarksp "that foreign economic policy was a less vital concern 
to the British government than the 'high policy' issues of national 
security and national defence must finally have been dispelled during 
197311 o15 There is 9 moreover, little evidence to suggest that the conven-
tional view is awry in emphasising the importance of prosperity rather 
than power considerations in the economic motives which featured so 
clearly in British foreign policy over this periodo International 
financial prestige vras certainly a factor as well but even this was 
justified in terms of its contribution to prosperityo 16 
Equally, it seems true that economic considerations ranked very high with 
the British foreign policy establishment in the years immediately follow-
ing the second World War but that on this occasion they were, nevertheless, 
outstripped in ultimate importance by considerations of security. After 
all, the end of the war saw Britain faced with acute security problems in 
a struggling and increasingly restive colonial empire in the Far East and 
Africa (with the Indian Army no longer on hand to keep order), difficul= 
ties in economic and especially atomic energy matters vrhich strained 
relations with the Americans and in the early years called into question 
their attitude towards European security and 7 above all, very serious 
apprehensions concerning Soviet motives and military capacities which 
made Britain all the more worried about the condition of the war=weakened 
states of Western Europe. Not surprisingly 9 therefore 9 first priority in 
foreign policy was given to building up a Western European-North Atlantic 
security system and 9 in domestic policy 9 the manufacture of the Atomic bomb 
was assigned priority even over housing, coal-mining and exports. 17 
Nevertheless, the enormity of Britain's economic problems at this time 
ensured that economic considerations always ran security a very close 
second in the formulation of British foreign policyo The export trade had 
suffered enormous damage during the war9 on both visible and invisible 
account 9 and huge debts had been accumulated. Moreever 9 the newly 
elected lLabour government was determined to underwrite an extremely 
expen~ive domestic welfare programme. These were clearly crucial factors 
in the unwillingness of the British government to continue assistance to 
Greece and Turkey which led to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 
1947 9 in the beginnings of imperial withdrawaland 9 Churchillian rhetoric 
about the "three circles" of British influence notwithstanding 9 in the 
tying of Britain's fortunes even more closely to the Atlantic orbit. 18 
After all 9 direct American economic aid, together with forebearance in 
the nature of Britain's relations with the Sterling Area and Commonwealth 
markets, were crucial to the United Kingdom's economic recovery. 
There can be little doubt, however9 that the economic motives behind 
British foreign policy in these immediate post=war years were not rooted 
solely in a concern with domestic prosperity. Partly because security was 
itself the paramount concern and partly because of the very recent 
experience of 'total war' 9 it seems likely that they also consisted in 
some measure in a desire to build up economic power in the Hawtrey sense 
of war-making potential. Indeed, \..re have recently noted Hawtrey 1 s own 
observations in this regard concerning the reasons for the promotion of 
Western European cooperation and it is perhaps significant that he made 
19 them in the role of 'rapporteur' of a Chatham House study group. But 
if there was a political~military motive in promoting the industrial 
recovery of Western Europe 9 this was equally evident in the British and 
American attitudes towards the sources of raw materials and fuels which 
were located in the world beyond Europe and which seemed increasingly 
imperilled by communist and nationalist agitation. 
The fear that 'strategic' raw materials such as tin, rubber and 9 above 
all, uranium 9 would fall into hostile hands became particularly acute 
after the communist victory in China and the subsequent outbreak of war 
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in Korea in 1950. This seemed to presage a general expansion of communist 
world influence and to pose a particular threat to the bountiful regions 
of South East Asia. 20 In 1950 9 the report of another Chatham House study 
group was sprinkled with references to the importance of South East Asian 
raw materials to Britain and to the precariousness of their situation, 21 
whilst in April 1951 9 Anthony Eden 9 shortly to be Foreign Secretary in 
Churchill's new administration, demonstrated similar views in the context 
of a discussion of Britain's contribution to the Western defence effort 
in an article in the journal Foreign Affairs. 22 Drawing explicit 
attention to the vital nature of Britain's imported foodstuffs and raw 
materials for her war~making capacity, Eden concluded that "unrest in 
certain colonial areas, or failure to uphold significant interests in other 
parts of the world 9 may deprive ourselves and our friends of some vital raw 
II 23 
materials without which our efforts would be ham-strung. It is 9 there= 
fore, probably not entirely coincidental that the man whom Churchill 
should have chosen to be his Colonial Secretary when he came to office 
at the end of 1951 - Oliver Lyttelton9 subsequently Lord Chandos = should 
have for many years specialized in making the Empire self-sufficient in 
non-ferrous metals. 24 Finally9 it is important to note in this context 
that Britain's influence in the raw material producing regions of the 
semi= and under-developed non-communist world constituted an extra-
ordinarily significant claim on American goodwill 9 and none moreso than 
in the case of the uranium-rich areas, as we shall see in Chapter II. 
Therefore, with the reservation that insufficient attention has perhaps 
been drawn to the economic power dimension of economic policy motives in 
the immediate post-war years, the conventional view of the nature of 9 and 
priority accorded to 9 economic considerations in British foreign policy 
in the 1945-51 and post-1964 periods can be broadly accepted. \4hat 9 
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howeverp are we to make of the conventional treatment with regard to the 
1951=64 period? As we have seen 9 economic considerations are commonly 
thought to have received relatively low priority during these years and 
the further assumption is usual that, in so far as they were taken into 
account 9 they were almost wholly concerned with promoting the conditions 
of domestic prosperity rather than with bolstering war=making potentialo 
The extent to which this is a valid interpretation will be the principal 
pre=occupation of the remainder of this Chaptero 
It is abundantly clear that the main lines of the conventional argument 
apropos these years were, in fact, established right in the middle of 
the period in a highly influential \-Tork by Andrew Shonfield. 25 "Looking 
back on the decade following the war11 9 wrote Shonfield in 1958 9 "one of 
the strangest aspects of British politics now appears to be the mood of 
insouciance in which a whole series of political decisions were taken 9 
regardless of their effect in adding to the existing overload of economic 
26 burdens on the country". \Vhilst Shonfield regarded the encouragement 
of overseas investment at the expense of domestic industry and the 
continued attachment to the Sterling Area as products of this mood 9 he 
held that it "appears at its most vigorous and intransigent in the field 
of military strategy". 27 
In support of this argument 9 Shonfield not only drew attention 9 as might 
be expected 9 to the costly British insistence on military self-sufficiency 
in the massive re=armament programme of the early 1950s but to the cavalier 
disregard of balance of payments considerations in policy to overseas 
bases (particularly the new Middle East base on Cyprus) 28 and especially 
with respect to new military commitments outside the colonial area and 
traditional zones of influence. Singled out for special mention on this 
latter count 9 is Anthony Eden's solution of the EDC crisis in 1954 
by the promise of a virtually indefinite commitment of substantial 
British forces to Europe without a mention of their cost in foreign 
exchange to the West Germans. "The .. · new British commitment was presented 
as an unconditional free gift of military aid for half a century11 , 29 he 
records 9 with the result that it was indeed a "costly diplomatic victory")0 
Following Shonfield9 Wallace also draws attention to Eden's continental 
commitment in 1954 and adds that "The implications for the balance of 
payments were again neglected in the negotiations which led to West 
41. 
Germanyvs admission to Nato in the following year11 .31 \1hilst for his 
part Northedge adds SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to the list and concludes 
that "The country's three original areas of defence policy - the gome 
islands, the colonial empire and overseas dependencies and protectorates, 
and allies linked to Britain by treaty obligations - seemed to be expand-
ing at a time when all the economic indices were pointing to the need for 
movement in precisely the opposite direction 11 o32 And certainly sympto= 
matic of the attitude which this argument is concerned to demonstrate 
(if not necessarily convincing in its own context, see below) 
is Macmillan's claim thatp even when he was at the Treasury 9 he was 
prepared to risk loss to the reserves in pursuit of the more important 
political objectives of the Suez expedition in 1956. As he said in his 
defence in the House of Commons on November 12 9 1956~ if the reserves 
"fall away as a result of some temporary difficulties which occur9 then 
that is \oJhat the reserves are for, and that is what the reserves will be 
used for" o 33 
How is this relegation of economic considerations in the hierarchy of 
British foreign policy priorities in the 1951=64 period explained? In 
this respect, Wallace provides the most complete answer, though his account 
is clearly indebted on certain points to Shonfieldo According to Wallace 9 
then 9 the low economic priority was essentially a product of the passing 
of Britainvs major war-induced economic difficulties by the early 1950s 
together with the supplementation of continued worries on the security 
front (as a result of developments in Soviet weaponry) by heightened 
anxieties over the 'high policy' goals of great power status and 
j, international responsibility" o 34 In any case 9 he holds, high policy 
claimed much more of the personal interest of the Conservative prime 
ministers of these years relative to international economic matters.35 
Other factors, however, reinforced this tendency 9 amongst the most import= 
ant of which were the stability of the international economy during these 
years of unquestioned American strength and as a result of which problems 
in this area could be safely left to the cooperative efforts of inter-
national officials supervised by finance ministers and central bank 
governors;36 the high degree of compartmentalization in the management 
of policy within Whitehall 9 which was cause as well as effect of the low 
economic priority at this time;37 and the technical complexity of inter-
national economic matters, which tended to discourage Foreign Office 
interesto3B 
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This is certainly a convincing thesis and clearly one 'vhich commands a 
wide measure of acceptance. Its insistence on a low priority for economic 
considerations throughout the 1951-64 period is consistent with most of 
the significant foreign policy positions adopted during these years, 
including, as 'vell as those already mentioned in the defence area, the 
British decision to apply for EEC membership in the early 1960s, which 
is commonly held to have been prompted more by political, than by econ-
omic, considerations.39 Moreover, there is undeniable cogency in the 
reasons to vrhich Wallace points in order to explain this situation. 
Britain's economic problems certainly were less acute during these years 
than they had been under the Attlee government and the implications of 
this co-called "Age of Affluence" were widely felt to be having a 
significant political impact in other areas besides foreign policy.40 
Moreover, it is also evident that these were the years when Britain's 
great power status was first seriously challenged and 'vhen9 as a result, 
exceptional measures, such as the building of an independent nuclear 
deterrent and independent military intervention in the Middle East, were 
felt to be essential to its retention. Wallace, moreover, is by no means 
the first to have pointed to the lack of coordination between the economic 
departments and the Foreign Office in Britain. 41 
To the extent, furthermore, that the conventional argument acknowledges 
the existence of an economic interest in British foreign policy over the 
1951-64 period nevertheless, its implicit assumption that this was rooted 
in a concern with domestic prosperity rather than with economic power is 
also consistent with what might have been expected to have been the 
response of the foreign policy-making elite~2 to the fundamental changes 
which were taking place in ~ilitary strategy during the mid-1950so43 If, 
after all, the outcome of a future general war was likely to be determined 
by a brief exchange of atomic weapons rather than by a protracted engage-
ment of conventional forces after the earlier fashion of 'total war 1 9 it 
would hardly have made sense any longer to shape foreign policy with a 
view to the promotion of economic self-sufficiency. And 9 in any case, 
the Korean \var had ended in stalemate 9 the Americans '·Iere now increasing-
ly involved in the protection of raH material producing regions behind the 
doctrine of 'containment', and large stock-piles of 'strategic' raw 
materials had been accumulated. 44 Reflecting this nevr situation was the 
fact that by the second half of the 1950s the terms of trade had begun to 
move significantly against the primary products of the semi- and under-
developed worlds.45 In short, the kind of economic strength which had 
43. 
traditionally been thought necessary for total war-making potential was 
not likely to have been a significant factor in the economic consider= 
ations shaping British foreign policy in this period since the major 
wo-rries on this score had by now been settled and influential sectors 
of the British elite were not 9 in any case 9 thinking in terms of this 
sort of war any longer. 
All in all 9 then 9 it seems unreasonable to quarrel with the broad outlines 
of this thesis. Economic considerations clearly were of less importance 
in the formulation of British foreign policy over the 1951-64 period 
than in either the previous or subsequent ones. Nevertheless 9 certain 
criticisms of the conventional argument can still be made. 
In the first place 9 defence of the sterling parity and the maintenance 
of the Sterling Area may well have been "accepted as a high policy 
objective" during these years; 4P they may have been considered9 that is 
to say, along with a substantial degree of overseas investment 9 as the 
indispensable attributes of a great power and thus to b:e immune from 
criticism on purely economic grounds. 47 It is 9 however 9 one thing to hold 
that these policies were economically harmful to the long-term gro,V"th of 
the British economy (the accepted belief of the conventional argument); 
quite another to hold that 9 since this was the case 9 they could only have 
been pursued for status or other political reasons. For this is to over= 
look the possibility that sectional interests within the British business 
and financial communities 9 which undoubtedly had a powerful stake in the 
continuation of these traditional patterns 9 were in a position to promote 
these policies within the Conservative governments of these times on econ= 
omic grounds as well. 
In the second place 9 whilst it is probably true that the factors to which 
attention has already been drawn did indeed dilute the importance of the 
traditional power dimension in the economic considerations which influ-
enced British foreign policy over the 1951-64 period9 it is at least 
conceivable that the change in the nature of the cold war which occurred 
in the mid-1950s might have gone some way towards counteracting this 
development 9 albeit via a somewhat different route. Thus 9 with the 
increasing emphasis on economic prosperity as the visible token of 
ideological sanity and on aid and trade dispensations to the countries 
on the non-aligned world in the direct competition for their favours 9 
it seems likely that the economic power motive might have been resurrec-
ted in new form. In the absence of domestic prosperity, prop.,ganda con-
cerning the virtues of 'free institutions' and 'free enterprise' would 
have rung rather hollow and insuperable difficulties would have been 
placed in the way of generous aid and trade arrangements. As a resultp 
it seems reasonable to conclude that prosperity as such may well have 
become the base of economic power in the 'cold war', as economic self-
sufficiency had been its foundation in 'total war'. It is at least 
plausible, therefore, that, against this background, a new measure of 
urgency could have been given to the cultivation of economic interests 
in British foreign policy after the mid-1950s. 
Most signally of all, however, it seems likely that, partly because of 
its weakness on this point and partly because the argument of Wallace, 
in particular, tends to interpret the whole of the 1951-64 period in the 
light of the priority hierarchy obtaining in its first half, the conven-
tional view underestimates the extent to which the relative priority 
attached to economic considerations had begun to rise after 1956. Shon-
field himself was sensitive to changes which were afoot in the second 
half of the 1950s and in fact regarded the Suez crisis as a turning 
point.48 Indeed, it is arguable that, if there was no diminution of 
Britain's anxieties over great power status before the end of this period, 
the preoccupation with security had nevertheless been somewhat lessened 
by the second half of the 1950s and that, in addition, a recognition 
was simultaneously dawning that Britain's immediate post-war economic 
difficulties were not wholly abnormal and that, as a result, foreign 
policy would have to take them increasingly into account. 
If we are to explore these criticisms and see if there is any substance 
in them, it seems essential to begin by looking at the actual nature of 
Britain's overseas economic interests during these years. In what did 
they consist? Or, more to the point, how were they regarded by those 
with the major responsibility for directing British foreign policy at 
this time? 
2o The perception of overseas economic interests by the foreign 
policy elite. 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix A provide us with the best introduction to 
this subject, for the most cursory inspection of these figures is 
sufficient to confirm the well known fact that, then as now, the British 
economy possessed a very considerable relative dependence upon its visi-
ble trade with the outside world. This dependence was certainly not 
unique, as is sometimes implied, being paralleled by, for example, 
Canada: however, it was significantly greater than that of France, 
Western Germany and Japan, and vastly in excess of that of the USA. 
Moreover, when invisible trade is taken into account, it becomes clear 
that as much as one quarter of the British economy was dependent upon 
overseas trade in these years, with no particularly marked fluctuations 
from year to year.49 
It is not difficult to deduce from these figures that Britain had a clear 
interest in securing access to foreign commodities. As a typical text-
book explained in 1966: "Britain, lacking virtually all the major raw 
materials save coal, lives by trade. Her only hope of making a living is 
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This requirement, in turn, has generated an interest in selling sufficient 
of its own goods and services abroad to obtain the foreign currencies 
required for the settlement of its import bill and the avoidance of balance 
of payments difficulties. In particular, this has given Britain an inter~ 
est in both protecting and expanding its overseas markets and investment 
stocks. These, thenp were Britain's basic and obvious foreign economic 
interests in this period; there were others but they were in part deriva-
tive from these and we shall deal with them latero Let us look a little 
more closely, first of all then, at the nature of Britain's interest in 
imported goods during the 1951-64 period. 
Imports, of course, consist of those goods and services51 which either 
cannot be produced at home or cannot be produced at home as efficiently 
as they can abroado According to Scott, the volume of Britain's imports 
grew during the 1950s "at what'was, for this century, an unusually rapid 
rate 11 .52 As is well lmown and widely lamented, one of the chief ingred-
ients of this increase was the very considerable growth in the importa-
tion of manufactured goods. But since, with one or two notable exceptions, 53 
this was a result of, inter alia, consumer preference and lower British 
efficiency against a background of more liberal trade policies, rather 
than absolute domestic non-availability, 54 it cannot be said that Brit-
ish industry in particular9 or the economy in general, had an interest 
in access to foreign sources of manufactures. On the contrary9 as sub-
sequent barriers erected against them by the Wilson government testi-
fied, there was rather more of an interest in keeping them out! Of princi~ 
pal concern to us, therefore, are those commodities which Britain had no 
alternative but to obtain from abroad and these are traditionally sub-
divided into three categories: foodstuffs, raw materials (or 'basic' 
materials) and mineral fuels. How important were these commodities to 
Britain? What were their major regional sources? To what extent did 
the individual categories contribute to the upsurge in general demand 
for imports from Britain in the 1951-64 period? 
As can be seen from Appendix A9 Table 39 foodstuffs regularly accounted 
for between 34 and 40 per cent of Britain's total imports over this 
period. Though it is true that the massive increase in imports of 
manufactured goods had put this category in a position to challenge 
foodstuffs as the leading component of Britain's foreign supplies by 
the end of the period, they remained the dominant feature for the most 
part. Even more telling9 food imports accounted for roughly 50 per 
cent of Britain's total food consumption during this period. 55 Assuming 
such huge proportions, it is not surprising that their sources were dis-
tributed all over the non-communist world9 though it is notable that, as 
Appendix A, Table 4 reveals, the Sterling Commonwealth was a p~rticularly 
important supplier. 
Between 1950 and 1959 Britain's imports of foodstuffs increased by 18 
per cent at 1954 prices.56 Given their large proportion of total imports, 
they were, as a result, a very significant factor in the general increase 
in imports. As Scott explains, this was due principally to the fact that 
domestic consumption, prompted by a growth in population and real income 
per head together with the ending of food rationing, outstripped domestic 
food production.57 All things considered, then, it is clear that access 
to foreign food supplies constituted an extremely important external 
economic interest for Britain in this period. 
Imports accounted for the '!Lion's share"5B of domes'tic raw material consump~ 
tion, of course, but it is significant that this category represented a 
declining proportion of Britain's total imports. Indeed, of all the main 
categories of imports, this was the one which increased - by only 6 per 
cent at 1954 prices between 1950 and 1959 - least of all over this period. 59 
Apart from their displacement by manufactures, this was partly a result of 
a contraction of output in the import-intensive textiles, leather and 
clothing industries during this period, 60 partly a result of the deterior-
ation in the terms of trade of the primary commodity producing countries, 
and partly a result of a phenomenon which was also affecting other advanced 
industrial societies and to which attention has already been drawn, that is 
to say, profound changes in industrial technology which, on the one hand, 
were beginning to reduce considerably the raw material content of final 
products and, on the other, were beginning to make possible the manufac-
ture of synthetic substitutes. 
Nevertheless, even at the end of the period9 as can be seen from Appendix A9 
Table 39 raw materials accounted for one-fifth of Britain's total imports 
and in certain commodities dependence on foreign sources was more or less 
absolute. In the early and mid=1950s, for example, the massive re-armament 
programme together with the general increase in the output of the metals, 
engineering and vehicle industries, led to a great increase in the demand 
for foreign ores and concentrates. Even steel had to be imported in 
considerable quantities at this time.61 Uranium ore, of which Britain had 
no domestic sources whatsoever, and which was of the first importance for 
both energy and defence reasons 9 is only the most dramatic example of this 
dependence on foreign sources of raw materials. Moreover, as in the case 
of food imports, it is evident from Appendix A9 Table 49 that these 
sources were fairly evenly distributed throughout the non-communist world9 
though it is perhaps significant that 9 by 1958 9 the Sterling Commonwealth 
was providing Britain with almost three times as many raw materials as the 
Colonies. 
Finally, we arrive at mineral fuels. These represented the smallest of 
the main categories of Britain's imports over the 1951-64 period9 fluctu-
ating at between 10 and 11 per cent of total imports (App.A 9 Table 3). 
Nevertheless 9 with a serious coal shortage in Britain lasting until 1957 
(consumer rationing was not abolished until July 1958)62 and with changes 
in transport patterns leading to an enormous increase in demand for 
petroleum,63 fuel imports more than doubled over the 1950s and continued 
to increase into the early 1960s.~ These consisted in the main 9 of course, 
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of crude oil from the Middle East, as can be seen from Appendix A, 
Table 49 but even costly coal had to be imported in some years during 
this period, especially in 1955o65 
There is no shortage of evidence that the British foreign policy elite in 
these years was well versed in the general importance of access to foreign 
supplies of fuel, raw materials and mineral fuelso We have already noted 
the evident concern on this subject which was expressed by certain ele-
ments within it against the background of the Korean War in the early 
1950s, owing, in particular, to the military significance of these 
commodities when 'total war' was still the dominant strategic concept 
and \-/hen shortages were still fearedo The view which Anthony Eden had with 
regard to the necessity for secure access to Middle East oil in the mid-
1950s, for instance, is a matter of record66 and 9 as we shall see in 
Chapter II, there were no illusions at the top concerning Britain's depen= 
dence upon imported uraniumo Having said this, however, there is equally 
strong evidence to suggest that British anxiety concerning, as opposed to 
awareness of, the extent of this reliance on foreign supplies was appreci= 
ably reduced in the second half of the 1950s and in the early 1960so 
It has already been observed that the 1950s witnessed a progressive and 
initially unexpected improvement in Britain's terms of trade with its 
primary product supplierso Even oi167 and uranium (see Chapter II, 
Part A, Seco2 bela~) became abundant on the world market in the second 
half of the 1950s and, Eden's efforts in the case of oil notwithstanding, 
their security of supply remained unjeopardisedo At home, there was an 
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embarrassing surplus of coal by the end of the decadeo Perhaps also 
because 'total war' no longer seemed likely, strategic stockpiling tail~ 
ed off in the middle of the decade and, as Streeten observes, "Althougt& 
subsidies and import controls encouraged import substitution until the 
early fifties, the general trend was away from greater self-sufficiency oo 
0 0 0 Subsidization of agriculture was retained, but not intensified 11 69 0 0 0 0 0 
Furthermore, a greater proportion of British overseas investment in the 
manufacturing industries of the white dominions rather than in the raw 
material and food producing areas of the Colonial Empire was countenanced 
by the Conservative governments of these days o 7° Clearly 9 these \-/ere not 
the policies of a nation which was anxious about cheap and easy access to 
foreign supplies of primary commodities and fuelso 
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Nevertheless, these items still had to be imported and the growth of the 
British economy- albeit slow and fitful~ meant that they had to be 
bought in increasing quantities 9 as we have already seen. Moreover, 
the priority which was assigned to the re-establishment of multilateral 
free trade in the commercial policy of this period71 meant that a rapid= 
ly growing quantity of manufactured imports had to be tolerated as vrell 9 
as we have also previously noted. Despite the improvement in the terms 
of trade, therefore, this meant that Britain's exports had to be sub-
stantially increased if the bill for imports was to be covered and if 9 
in addition, sufficient foreign currency was to be left over to finance 
both the desired expansion in overseas investment and the rebuilding of 
the reserves to a level consistent with the safety of a freely convert-
ible pound~72 Failure to achieve a significant expansion of exports 
could thus lead only to periodic balance of payments crises and threaten 
the all-important status of sterling. Was the British balance of payments 
healthy during the 1951=1964 period? Were Britain's exports sufficiently 
well placed during these years for it to be likely that their advancement 
was not a major preoccupation of the foreign policy elite? _It is import= 
ant that these preliminary questions be answered before an assessment is 
made of the importance which was actually attached to this second British 
foreign economic interest - export markets = by the foreign policy~makers 
of this period. 
Fortunately, the historical course of Britain's balance of payments during 
these years has been amply described elsewhere,73 and a summary review will 
thus be sufficient here. It is certainly true that a remarkable recovery 
had been made in Britain's export trade by the beginning of the 1950s and 
that, despite the gradual relaxation of import controls, the basic visible 
balance improved significantly over the subsequent decade. This was assist-
ed, of course, by the considerable improvement in Britain's terms of trade. 
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the United Ilingdom's productive 
efficiency was wholly inadequate to meet the challenge of rival manufactur-
ing exporters such as West Germany and Japan and the result of this 9 togeth-
we with a marked deterioration of the invisible trade balance, was that in 
no year except 1958 was Britain's overall performance on current account 
sufficiently impressive to even approximate the Treasury's target surpluses. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, with the depleted reserves being set against 
a very high level of short-term sterling liabilities and the Conservative 
governments resolved to permit a large net outflow of capital to the 
Sterling Area and significant overseas military spending, sterling 
crises were a marked feature of this period. In fact, there were 
serious crises in 1952, 1955, 1956, 1957 9 1961 and 1964, and, as 
Scott remarks, "Even in the years of no crisis the danger of one 
never seemed far removed".74 
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Such a picture of what amounted to a long-term weakening in Britain's 
payments equilibrium is produced, of course, with the benefit of hind-
sight. It seems clear, however, that in the first half of the 1950s, 
at any rate, there was a fair degree of complacency in the foreign 
policy elite about the balance of payments in general and the position 
of Britain's exports in particular, for which the improvement in the 
terms of trade and the great success of the dollar export drive were 
in no small measure responsible.75 As the immediate post-war balance 
of payments problem had been seen as "merely a short-term effect of 
the war which would probably pass with a little financial assistance 
from the United States and Canada", 76 so it was possible to explain away 
Britain's declining share of world exports of manufactures as a result 
of the 'natural' catching-up of the ex-enemy states in the mid~ and 
late 1950s and to take comfort from a similar decline which was being 
experienced by the United States.77 Brittan records that in 1957 
Macmillan "did not think that Britain was doing all that badly in 
production and trade, considering the difficulties", 78 whilst in 1959 
the Radcliffe Committee reported that, compared to the inter-war years, 
the 1950s as a whole saw "far less preoccupation with the competitive 
position of British exports 11 .79 And as late as 1960 9 Strang, latterly 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, could observe of the 
British economy during the period from 1951 until 1959 that "Precarious-
ly poised though it must be from the fact that the pound sterling carries 
nearly half the world's trade and payments on less than 4 per cent of the 
world's exchange reserves, and thus vulnerable to the fluctuating 
judgements of the foreign money market, it had perhaps not been more 
healthily constituted or more br0adly based aj any time since the 
industrial revolution". 80 
On the other hand, there is also some evidence to suggest that this 
complacency was being pricked in the second half of the 1950s and that 
by 1960 it had been replaced by considerable anxiety. Since, in the 
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tense circumstances preceding and suceeding sterling convertibility9 
the condition of the balance of payments and the level of the reserves 
were held to be virtually the sole test of internal as well as external 
economic policy81 and since 9 further 9 the principal objectives of both 
facets of economic policy ~ a strong and convertible pound within a 
rejuvenated Sterling Area - were themselves held, as Wallace acknowledges 9 
to be an important component of 'high' foreign policy~2 it was always 
likely that the problerrs·attending the balance of payments would pene-
trate the consciousness of elements of the foreign policy elite. In 
fact, we have Eden's own testimony to his unease on this score during 
his first three months as Prime }linister in the spring of 1955. Commen-
ting on this period in his memoirs in tones which speak volumes for our 
theme 9 he remarks that "During the years which I spent in the Cabinet 
before the war, I never once heard mention of the problem of gold and 
dollar reserves. These \'lere ample for any purpose 9 immediate or 
conceivable oooo The second world war changed all this. Behind the 
transient economic situation" 9 continues Eden, "the problem of the balance 
of payments obtruded continuously; exasperating9 monotonous and inescap-
able.n83 Furthermore, following the sterling crisis in July 1955 of which 
Eden claimed to have had forebodings, 84 ~~cmillan was very precipitately 
switched from the Foreign Office to the Treasury 9 in part 7 according to 
85 ~cmillan himself, because of Eden's concern·over the economy. "He 
(Eden) 9 says ~cmillan, "knew that the ~uccess of his government, how-
ever well conducted its foreign policy might be 9 would depend ultimately 
upon our ability to ride out the series of economic storms which seemed 
the inevitable condition of modern life •••• 11 • 86 
When Macmillan himself became Prime Minister at the end of 1956 9 he only 
had to wait until late the following summer before liaving his own first 
sterling crisis to face. And, though his personal analysis of this 
particular problem was akin to that of Shonfield, it is true that he was 
prepared to go along broadly with the Treasury view.87 Nevertheless 9 
whilst this was no doubt in part because "Foreign affairs was his vocation, 
economics his hobby", 88 it seems obvious that Macmillan was slowly becom~ 
ing anxious about Britain's external economic strength and especially 
about its impact on other aspects of his government's policy. 
To begin with 9 he had been at the Treasury during the Suez crisis in 1956 
and had thus been the Cabinet minister most intimately acquainted with the 
limitations imposed on that venture by the parlous state of the reserves.89 
It is consistent with this 9 therefore~ that he should have written to his 
own Chancellor in the aftermath of the 1957 sterling crisis~ apropos the 
economic situation in general and Britain's position in the Sterling Area 
in particular 9 that "In the course of the next.few months we must really 
search for an answer to some of these fundamental q~estions. It haunts us 
at every point and makes foreign policy9 defence policy and home trade 
policy very difficult to carry on. II It may be~ he continued 9 "that \ve 
must resign ourselves to being permanently in this position9 but I am 
bound to say that I view with much apprehension the last six months of 
this government 9 when the money will (sic) be running out of this country 
at the same rate that the sands are running out of our power."90 
In 1958 and 1959 9 however 9 largely as a result of a particularly bountiful 
windfall on the terms of trade~ Britain's current account improved dramati~ 
cally and the reserves were greatly strengthened. Overseas loans drawn 
in 1956 were repaid and larger gold quota payments were made to the IMF. 
Above all 9 most remaining exchange-saving import controls were removed and 
the pound was made fully convertible. Thus freed from external constraint 9 
the economy could now be spared the deflationary policies which had soured 
the three preceding years and 9 in these circumstances 9 even the Treasury 
91 appears to have been complacent about the balance of payments. Mac~ 
millan'a concern with this problem was certainly temporarily allayed but 
it re-emerged in 1960 - with a vengeance. 
The higher rate of economic growth of the years from 1958 to 1960 naturally 
led to an enormous growth in the rate of Britain's imports 9 access to which 
was now much easier as a result of the removal of the remaining restrictions?2 
Moreover9 a series of statistics which had been published annually by the 
Board of Trade since 1957 was by now showing that the declining proportion 
of world manufacturing exports enjoyed by Britain was continuous and 
serious.93 It was thus not surprising that by 1960 itself the current 
account was seriously in the red once more and an exchange crisis was only 
staved off by a very large inflow of short-term money attracted by the 
relatively high interest rates~evailing in London. 94 In these circumstan-
ces9 Macmillan decided that it was time to personally launch a major new 
British export drive. 
Addressing an audience of industrialists brought together by the FBI 9 
the National Association of Manufacturers and the Association of British 
Chambers of Commerce on July 18 9 1960 9 Y~cmillan 9 in a widely reported 
speech 9 dwelt on the importance of trade to Britain9 the joy of export-
ing ("Ebcportfreudigkeit") 9 the manifold services to exporters which the 
government provided and ended by appealing to them "In the name of the 
nation •••• to recruit a great band of merchant adventurers among your 
own. ranks; and •• o to search them out from the many thousands vrho are 
not here today". 95 Shortly afterwards 9 he circulated a directive on 
exports to all of his colleagues 9 asking them "to make sure that all 
departmental and domestic interests in conflict with our main object= 
ive - a substantial and sustained improvement in overseas earnings -
should be set aside. There now began11 9 he recalled in his memoirs 9 "a 
determined effort to ensure that all our posts abroad were made fully 
avrare of the creative part that they could play. This proved highly 
successful 11 • 96 
At home 9 such a substantial number of Cabinet ministers became 
involved in the export drive subsequent to Macmillan's initiative 
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 9 Heathcoat Amory 9 felt it necessary 
to reassure a group of Maidenhead businessmen that nothing had "suddenly 
gone wrong vri th exports" 9 adding that he did not want them to think 
"that we are in a panic about this or anything else". 97 The astuteness 
of Claud Cockburn's observation that one ought to believe nothing until 
it has been officially denied would not have been lost on these captains· 
of industry! In November 9 after a "full-dress 1 debate 1 •••• in a full 
Cabinet" 9 Macmillan once more decided to lend his personal authority to 
the export driveg this time by presiding over a "committee on increasing 
exports".9S Poor trade ~igures in early 1961 and the subsequent sterling 
crisis confirmed riJa.cmillan in his belief that "we were becoming uncompet-
itive".99 and 9 despite the spasmodic optimism engendered by the improve-
ment of the next few years, 100 it seems safe to conclude that the exper-
ience of 1960-1961 had finally removed any remaining feelings of complac= 
ency about British exports. The catching-up of the ex-enemy states was 
one thing; being over-taken by them was quite another. Moreover 9 the 
consequences of the failure of British trade policy vis-a-vis the continent 
101 
of Europe now had to be faced. 
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If the anxieties of Britain's foreign policy elite concerning access to 
foreign supplies of raw materials and food were greater in the first 
part of the period than in the second and greater in the second than 
in the first in the case of manufactured exports 9 what of its attitude 
towards overseas investments? It is t-Tell known that Britain has 
traditionally off=set a deficit on its visible trade account by a 
surplus on 'invisibles' and that the most significant net contributor 
to this invisible surplus is the return on British investments over-
seas.102 During the 1951-1964 period9 as can be seen from Appendix A 9 
Table 5 9 invisible earnings accounted for well over one=third of total 
receipts on current account and these were composed, in turn 9 of invest-
ment earnings to the tnne of almost 30 per cent. Indeed, on a crude 
estimate 9 the overseas stocks which generated these earnings represented 
something over 10 per cent of Britain's total national wealth (Appendix A9 
Table 6). These stocks thus represented an overseas interest for Britain 
which was of considerable importance for the balance of payments, 
especially since at this time a growing deficit on government account 
was steadily eroding the traditional invisible account surplus. 
This had stood at an annual average of £331 millions over the 1952-1955 
period but by 1956=1960 had fallen to £216 millions and by 1961-1964 was 
as low as £160 millions1°3 \Vhere were Britain's overseas assets located? 
As can be seen from Appendix A9 Table 79 most of them were to be found 
in Africa (mainly West 9 Central and South), Australia and North America, 
where roughly one-fifth of the total was located in each 9 though a fourth 
principal host region to British capital was the Middle East, which 9 through 
a certain possible "coyness" on the part of British officials to oil invest-
ments,104 is not revealed in these figures. The remainder were widely 
scattered throughout Western Europe (where the proportion was rising 
significantly) 9 the Indian sub-continent 9 South and Central America and 
South-East Asia 9 where there were particularly large concentrations in 
Malaya. This, however 9 is only one index of the regional importance of 
Britain's overseas investments during these years; another is their 
profitability. From a comparison of Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix A with 
Table 79 it is 9 furthermore 9 at once apparent that the areas with the 
largest stocks of investment were not necessarily those which generated 
the highest returns. 
Thus~ in 1960 for instance 7 the North American continent retained 24.4 
per cent of the United Kingdom's total direct overseas investment stocks 
but, with an average rate of return of only 5.2 per cent, contributed a 
bare 15.2 per cent of Britain's total earnings from this source. Con~ 
versely, South-East Asia 7 with only 5.5 per cent of the United Kingdom's 
total direct overseas investment stocks but with extremely high rates of 
return in Hong Kong (22.4 per cent), in Malaya (17.8 per cent) and in 
Singapore (30.0 per cent), contributed as much as 10.7 per cent to total 
earnings. Apart from South-East Asia, the highest rates of return were 
obtained in West, Central and South Africa, whilst the lowest - North 
America aside - came from Western Europe, East Africa and Ceylon. 
Balance of payments reasons gave Britain an obvious interest in protect-
ing these overseas assets and in securing an uninterrupted repatriation 
of profits; they also gave Britain a long-run interest in expanding 
them through the encouragement of fresh investment from home, since this 
was one way to further fatten 'the goose that laid the golden eggs•. 105 
A great variety of additional arguments were, however, advanced to demon-
strate the economic importance of overseas investment to Britain. 
In the early part of the period it was, for instance 7 common to find 
references to the important role played by British overseas capital in 
developing the availability of primary products, which were a particular 
source of anxiety to Britain at that time, as we have already seen. This 
was an attitude of long standing106 to which the circumstances of the 
'dollar gap' in the late 1940s and early 1950s gave a new twist by making 
it seem particularly useful to be able to employ British capital in expand-
ing the output of the Sterling Area's main dollar earners. 107 Direct 
investment was also held to make Britain's control of certain foreign~ 
produced raw materials and fuels more secure108 and to improve the pros~ 
pects for British exporters in the regions in which it was located. 109 
Finally~ overseas investments enabled the Conservative governments of 
these years to argue their commitment to the economic development of the 
poorer parts of the Commonwealth (if one ignored their regional and indus-
trial distribution) 7 110 and to provide constant reminders to its overseas 
members of the value of the Sterling Area. 
Whatever, therefore 7 the real reasons for the enthusiasm for fresh overseas 
investment of the British governments of the 1951-1964 period (for ample 
grounds exist for regarding some of those which have just been mentioned 
as rationalizatio~ 9 111 there is little doubt that balance of payments 
reasons alone gave Britain a massive interest in the existing stock. 
Its value and its sustenance were unquestioned within government 
circles. As Susan Strange records: "the few lonely individual voices 
that were raised in criticism of the outflow of capital in these years 
were mostly greeted with blank indifference and total disinterest both 
in ~fuitehall and in Westminster1~2 And it is thus not surprising that it 
was only in the worst balance of payments crises that the government 
would even.contemplate making a move against the free outflow of British 
capital during this period9 as in Selwyn Lloyd's famous 'July measures' 
of 1961. 113 Indeed 9 in the Budget of 1957 the Macmillan government 
testified to the value which it attached to overseas investment by 
making important tax concessions to British companies operating abroado 
Replying in his memoirs to criticism of this particular move 9 Macmillan 
claims that the short-term balance of payments argument "misses the real 
point. The greater the investment abroad 11 9 he continues "and the great-
er the success of companies operating overseas 9 the greater in the long 
run becomes the strength of our island economy11 • 11 4 
Cheap and secure access to foreign foodstuffs 9 raw materials and fuels 9 
expanding export markets 9 and profitable overseas investments 9 were clear= 
ly Britain's basic foreign economic interests over the 1951-1964 period. 
Dwarfing all three 9 however 9 was an obsession with restoring the pound 
sterling's status as a foremost international trading and reserve curr= 
ency 9 which entailed both preserving the Sterling Area after its direct 
economic value had become highly questionable11 5and promoting multilateral-
ism in trade and payments as swiftly as possible 9 even though this might 
de-stabilize the balance of payments and jeoparize domestic economic 
growth. 116 Susan Strange has documented this obsession at length. 117 
Suffice it to add here 9 therefore 9 that it is particularly interesting 
for our argument that she should claim that 9 rather than reflecting 
complacency about the balance of payments 9 the considerable increase in 
government spending overseas and in net lon~term overseas investment 
which occurred over the 1951-1964 period was instead the price which 
successive British governments had to pay in order to defend the new 
'negotiated currency' status of sterling. 118 This status 9 it is widely 
agreed 9 was associated by the British foreign policy elite with Britain's 
general standing in world affairs. 11 9 
Finally 9 it is important to note that 9 because Britain had such strong 
interests in the international economy and in the conditions which would 
restore and preserve the international status of sterling, it had a 
further interest in the welfare and order of the international economy 
as a whole. A tradesman 9 after all, needs customers who are, amongst 
other things, prosperous, honest and predictable. Pointing also to the 
manner in which the 'Top Currency Syndrome' magnified this interest, 
Susan Strange concludes that it generated "a concern for the general 
international welfare so great as to induce a kind of blindness or 
impotence towards the particular, national interests of Britain11 • 120 
And what this amounted to, of course, was active cooperation with, and 
broad support of, the foreign economic policy of the United States 
government through the institutions created at Bretton Woods towards 
the end of the second World War. 121 
Such 9 then, are the broad outlines, briefly sketched, of the major 
foreign economic interests as seen by Britain's foreign policy elite 
and generally pursued by the Conservative governments of the 1951-1964 
period. In summary 9 it is clear that the most important throughout 
was the creation, and subsequent defence, of the arrangements through which 
the international status of sterling was to be re=establishedg this also 
placed an enduring premium on concern for the welfare and stability of 
the international economy as a whole. Susan Strange has convincingly 
demonstrated that these really were the paramount - if atavistic -
concerns of Britain's foreign economic policy at this time. And, with 
sterling so vulnerable to crises of confidence once multilateralism had 
been largely achieved in the second half of the 1950s, it was almost 
inevitable that these concerns would remain uppermost for the rest of 
the period under review and, indeed, beyond. Partly because they were 
also important to the strength of sterling, however, as well as for the 
reasons already noted, it seems clear that anxiety over Britain's exports 
and foreign investments (given the marked drop in the overall invisible 
trade balance at the end of the 1950s), was pushing these particular 
interests higher up the rank of foreign economic priorities towards the end 
of the decade 9 following an interlude in the earlier years when there had 
been a certain amount of complacency on these counts. On the other hand, 
it appears that, whilst the security of foreign supplies of important 
primary commodities had been a major worry in the early and mid-1950s, 
the remainder of the period saw a diminishing preoccupation with this 
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aspect of policy. 
3o The mounting ascendancy of economic priorities 
In the light, in part 9 of this assessment of the manner in which Britain's 
foreign economic interests were perceived by the British foreign policy 
elite over the 1951-1964 period, what substance is to be found in the 
tentative reservations which were recorded at the end of Section 1 of 
this Chapter concerning the nature and importance attached to economic 
considerations in the conventional view of British foreign policy over 
these years? The first reservation will be dealt with separately but 
the second one = that concerned with the new significance of economic 
prosperity in the cold war- will be dealt with together with the major 
reservation (that is to say, that the conventional view tends to under-
emphasise the mounting ascendancy of economic priorities in the later 
1950s) since, logically, it forms part of this argument. 
It will be recalled that the first of these criticisms consisted in the 
claim that, by accepting the foreign policy elite's designation of defence 
of the Sterling Area (with its concomitant demand for a large and regular 
outflow of sterling capital) and of the parity of a convertible pound as 
goals of 'high policy', the conventional account minimises the extent 
to which these policies were pressed on the elite by the City, the 
business community, and the economic ministries of government on grounds 
which were explicitly economic. There is no intention here to quarrel 
with the contention that these goals were regarded as matters of 'high 
policy'; on the contrary, it is consistent with the argument of this 
Chapter that this should have been the case. What it is important to 
stress, however, is that it is unlikely that they were so pursued for 
~ purely prestige or other political reasons, which is the principal argument 
of the conventional school. 
Of course, the manner and the extent to which these undeniably potent 
political considerations were supplemented by the influence of the 
financial and business lobbies within the Tory governments of these years 
would be a major study in its own right and is, unfortunately, beyond the 
scope of this work. 122 The hypothesis that they were so supplemented is 
of a kind with the assumptions about the policy-making process upon which 
Hobson's economic theory of imperialism was based and his empirical evid-
ence was not exactly plentiful eithera 123 Nevertheless 9 a number of 
favourable nods have been made in its direction by representatives of 
the conventional school itself, 124 and it will be useful to draw to= 
gether briefly the pointers on this matter which are availableo 
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To begin with, it is obvious that British business had a very consider-
able private stake in overseas investmento This stake was both relatively 
extensive and, in certain countries, highly lucrative, as we have now 
establisheda Moreover, almost all sectors of British business were 
significantly involved in overseas enterprise, 125 and some of the most 
important ones overwhelmingly so. 126 And the bulk of this investment 
was concentrated, of course, in the Overseas Sterling Area, which, in' 
1960 for example, accounted for 56a5 per cent of Britain's total non-oil 
overseas investment stocks and for 67a3 per cent of total non~oil 
earnings (see AppoA9 Tables 7 and 8)o It would 9 therefore, be extremely 
surprising, to say the least, if British business had not pressed for 
government policies which were favourable to overseas investment" 
Susan Strange has recorded something of its attitude in this regardo 127 
For its part, the City also had a clear interest in overseas investment, 
though this \ofas not so great in this period as it had been in earlier 
times as a result of the fact that the greater part of post-war invest-
t b d td • tt d th b d •t • t"t t• 128 M t men a roa was 1rec an us ypasse 1 s 1ns 1 u 1ons. ~~re o 
the point, hmo1ever, it is clear that it was widely believed in the City -
whether rightly or wrongly is beside the point in this context129 
that its prosperity depended on the restored international status of a 
convertible poun<il. and a strong Sterling Areao "Only towards the end of 
the 1960s, in fact", as Susan Strange also records, "did the realization 
begin to dawn in Britain that financial activity could continue to flour-
ish and prosper in London independently of the decline of sterling". 13° 
In short, it is thus evident that powerful sections of Britain's plural-
istic elite had very important economic interests at stake in the status 
of sterling and the Sterling Area and in the high net capital outflow to 
its members which was thought to be a necessary condition of their contin-
ued adherence to ito 
This is significant on two counts: first, because Conservative govern-
ments presided throughout the 1951=1964 period and the links between the 
Tory Party, on the one hand, and the City and British business, on the other, 
were then 9 as now 9 notoriously close;
131 second9 because the Bank of 
England naturally regarded the status of sterling as its first priority 
and had 9 in any case 9 a symbiotic relationship with the private inter-
ests of the City132 and is, further 9 acknowledged by numerous commenta-
tors (\.rho \vere in a position to knmv) to have increased significantly 
its influence over government policy in the 1950s. 133 Against this 
background it is not 9 perhaps 9 surprising that 9 though at the end of the 
1950s 9 when the policy \-ras beginning to come under attack from certain 
journalistic and academic quarters 9 134 Macmillan himself expressed in 
private his personal reservations about the obsession with sterling and 
the Sterling Area (though not, it is true 9 about overseas investment), 
he was unable to make any headway against Treasury and Bank opposition. 135 
It would thus seem unwise to conclude that it was only political calcu-
lations which inclined the prime ministers and othexsinvolved officially 
in the process of 'high' foreign policy-making in these years to place 
such emphasise on sterling and the Sterling Areao Economic considera-
tions were almost certainly important as well 9 though it is true that 
no clear estimate of their force can as yet be madeo Perhaps it may be 
that their influence was as much negative as positive 9 as it is now 
currently fashionable for neo-Marxist pressure group theorists to 
advocate generally. 136 This is consistent with Susan Strange's 
insistence on the enduring influence of the values and attitudes which 
made up the 'Top Currency' syndrome and, in fact 9 with Wallace's con-
tention that "Particularly under a Conservative government 9 informal 
access to MPs and ministers helps to constrain the government's percep-
tion of possible choices of policy within the boundaries of what 
influential opinion in the City regards·as practical or 1 sound'". 137 
If economic considerations thus coloured this aspect of so-called 'high-
policy' throughout the period, it has also been ascertained 9 on the 
evidence of Section 2 of this chapter, that export promotion had also 
ceased to be exclusively a matter of 'sectoral policy• 138 and had been 
established9· at least intermittently, 139 as a concern of 'high policy' 
from 1960 onwardso For, as was determined in this Section, the complac-
ency attending Britain's position in world manufacturing exports had by 
this time been rudely shaken and both the Prime Minister himself and a 
large part of his Cabinet had become involved in the new export drive. 
Moreover9 it was in 1960 itself that international economic stability9 
to which V/allace has pointed as a major factor in the lower priority 
of economic considerations over the 1951-1964 periodp began to be 
seriously undermined as the weakness of the dollar was exposed on the 
London Gold Market following the outbreak of fighting in the Congoo 14° 
Furtherp there is also some evidence to support the view earlier 
expressed that economic considerations may also have been given greater 
weight irt foreign policy-making in the second half of the 1950s as a 
result of the increasingly economic form being assumed by the cold waro 
For the very developments in the security field which were permitting 
more attention to be given to economic costs (and to which we shall turn 
in a moment) 9 were also placing a premium on economic prosperity as the 
major weapon in the continuing rivalry with the Soviet Uniono Thus 9 
following the announcement by Kruschev in 1956 that the Soviet Union 
intended to follow a policy of Vpeaceful co=existence 9 with the West 9 
Macmillan was led to feel that "in the period which lay ahead the 
struggle against Communism would shift more and more into the economic 
fieldo So long as \·le maintained the alliance and did not lower our 
guard" 9 he continued9 nthe Communists eould not launch a hot waro 
But the cold war in all its forms would grow in intensity11 o141 And 
so it provedo As one of Britain's most senior diplomats r~marked in 
the context of a discussion of American diplomatic method on his retire-
ment in 1959g "I suppose the most marked innovation of method is the 
enormous part which economic aid plays in American diplomacy11 o142 
As already suggested 9 there appear to be two main reasons for supposing 
economic prosperity to have been the base of economic power in the cold 
waro In the first place 9 its propaganda value seems to have been consid-
ered important in the attempt to convince the non-aligned and wavering 
countries that the vlestern route was the best 9 as equally in preventing 
the development of conditions within the NATO camp which might encourage 
the growth of domestic communist partieso Both of these considerations seem 
to have been behind Macmillan's conviction that "work and production were 
the best defences against Communist subversion ooooo A recession in 
world trade would be a staggering blow to the stability of the Westo"143 
vlhilst in the second 9 it was clearly necessar.Y to provide both the 
wherewithal and the domestic acceptability for the dispensation of economic 
aid in the attempt to purchase foreign political influence. 
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A considerable increase did 9 in fact, take place in the foreign aid granted 
by Britain in the late 1950s and Krassowski 9 the principal student of this 
subject, is in no doubt that political motives were the major factor behind 
ito144 In 1958 the policy that no aid should be granted to a colony after 
independence 'l-Ias reversed "and bet\veen 1957 and 1962 the aid programme 
doubled- from £80 million to about £160 million- with the bulk of the 
increase going to independent Commonwealth countries 11 o 145 In such circum-
stances it would be strange indeed if the foreign policy elite had not been 
even more conscious of the need to look to economic advantage in making 
its disposi tions 9 for it v1as certainly aware of the limitations 'l'rhich were 
placed on Britain's ability to assist the Americans in cold war competition 
by domestic economic 'I'Teaknesso As Hayter said of Britain in this context, 
"She can make some economic and financial contribution to the success of 
her foreign political aims; but her contributions are microscopic compar-
ed with those of the United States 9 and the prevailing aim of her economic 
policy must be the preservation of the United Kingdom's ultimately rather 
fragile economy and high living standards 11 o146 And as Britain's Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Home, warned in 1960 9 "there is the most direct relation= 
ship between our economic strength and our world influence"o 147 
It is also even more clearly the ca~e tha~ 9 if these co;J.d '"ar de_velopme!J.ts 
were encouraging the devotion of more attention to economic considerations 
in foreign policy-making (as seems likely), such considerations were allow-
ed more expression by a perceptibly reduced British concern over security 
in the second half of the 1950so For the middle of this decade had 9 after 
all 9 witnessed the consolidation of the Western alliance in a variety of 
regional defence pacts and the result was that 9 in so far as government 
attitudes towards NATO in particular \vere concerned9 "there was a general 
feeling" 9 in 1956-1957 9 "that the initial function of building up a 
military machine to halt further communist aggression was now well in 
hand 9 and that it was desirable to sustain or even create popular support 
for the Alliance by emphasising its non-military potentialities11 o148 
Eden 9 giving a number of "pointers" to the leading Cabinet members of the 
foreign policy elite in the early summer of 1956, at a time when he felt 
"that a thorough re-examination of our long-term needs was required" 9 was 
quite categorical: "The main threat to our position and influence in the 
world is now political and economic rather than military? and our policies 
should be adapted to meet that changed situationo Effort must be transfer-
red from military preparations", he insisted9 "to the maintenance and 
improvement of our political and economic position11 • 149 
Furthermore, whilst it is true that difficulties attend:ed the development 
of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent delivery capacity, the United 
Kingdom successfully tested its own H~bomb in May 1957 and? after the 
amendment of the MacMahon Act in Britain's favour in June of the follow~ 
ing year 9 it was obvious that nuclear relations with the Americans were 
becoming markedly more close. 15° And9 added to this 9 post Stalin develop= 
ments in the Soviet Union and in the nature of that country's relations 
with the West were beginning to produce a feeling, as we have already 
noted 9 that accommodation could be achieved. 151 All things considered, 
thereforep Epstein's conclusion with regard to Britain's concern with 
European security seems appropriate: "while it remained dominant" 9 he 
observes, "(it) appeared to lose some of its urgency in British minds 
by the late 1950s 11 • 152 
At this~age it is interesting to consider what was going on within 
Whitehall itself 9 for if it is true that increasing \veight was being 
given to economic considerations in foreign policy=making in the later 
1950s - both because of the increase in the absolute importance attached 
to these matters and because security was becoming a marginally less 
absorbing preoccupation- it is reasonable to suppose that this would 
have been reflected in the internal organization of the Foreign Office 
itself and in the work-load of its missions overseaso 
It is certainly true that a contempt for 'trade' was long and well est-
ablished in the Foreign Office, surviving without much difficulty, accord-
ing to Platt, even the great days of 0economic imperialism' in the later 
19th Century. 153 Moreover, even though continental practice in the 
inter-war years had made a small dent in this attitude and, encouraged 
by war experience and the personal interest of Bevin9 had led to the 
creation of sections within the Foreign Office which were primarily 
concerned with economic affairs, 154 it seems that something of the old 
attitude was allowed to re-emerge under Eden in the early and mid-1950s, 
with the result that these sections lost status. 155 This is, of course, 
consistent with the conventional view of the relatively low priority 
accorded to economic considerations in British foreign policy at this time. 
The evidence suggests? ho111everp that, whilst the Treasury and the Bank of 
England retained primary responsibility for international financial 
policy and the Board of Trade for foreign commercial policy, the 
economic sections of the Foreign Office had "staged something of a 
comeback" by the end of the 1950s. 156 "By 1959", according to Beloff, 
who was,,it must be admitted, a little over-anxious to defend the 
Foreign Office on this point, "there were a very large number of people 
v1orking in the economic field which \vas hardly developed at all before 
the Second vlorld War". 157 Furthermore 9 he continues, "Side by side with 
the growth of the economic work of the Foreign Office itself, new 
machinery for interdepartmental cooperation was created, and new 
informal relationships were established with other departments in order 
to facilitate the closest cooperation in day-to=day work11 • 158 This 
enabled Beloff to record that "By the end of the period (that is to say, 
by 1959), it was possible to claim that, at any rate in the economic 
field, British foreign policy could be looked at as an operation 
carried out by the government as a whole". 159 
In the light of Wallace's more detailed work in this field, Beloff's 
conclusion was probably over-sanguine in this regard; 160 however, his 
work is a clear indication of the direction in which the wind of organ-
izational change was blowing within the Foreign Office at this time. 
Butler confirms this by recalling that he arrived at the Foreign Office 
in 1963 to find that "Not only was there a big change in Britain's 
world position, but foreign policy itself had become more attuned to 
the economic facts of life. I found a new and large economic section 
presided over by Sir Charles Johnston. 161 Much of my work11 9 he recounts, 
~!was concerned with trade and finance, such as the progress of the 
Kennedy Round of tariff reductions and the economic preliminaries of 
going into Europe". 162 
As for the work of Britain's overseas missions, commercial diplomacy 
and export promotion had in fact been an officially recognised responsi-
bility.since 1945. 163 Furthermore, Wallace himself has testified that 
the status of this kind of work had begun to rise from the mid-1950s. 164 
It is perhaps, therefore, not entirely because Macmillan was addressing 
an audience of businessmen that he should have said in a speech in 
July, 1960, to help launch the new export drive, that "The old diplomacy 
has gone} the new diplomacy is being taken up more and more with trade, 
industry and commerce", and then proceed to outline in some detail the 
lengths to which the government in general 9 and the Diplomatic Service 
in particularp were prepared to go in assisting :Britain's "merchant 
adventurers" to conquer new export markets. 165 And nor is it surprising 
that the Duncan Report should have acknowledged that the pre-eminence so 
much more obviously accorded to economic considerations in :British 
diplomacy after the dramatic economic events of 1964 9 did not represent 
one of the_"sudden changes" in emphasis which had affected :British 
policy in the 1960s. 166 
So far 9 then 9 the argument that economic considerations were gradually 
becoming a more important priority in :British foreign policy-making from 
the middle of the 1960s has been based largely {not wholly) on the 
recorded views of leading members of the foreign policy elite and on a 
good deal of supposition. Is there any more tangible evidence that this 
gradual shift in priorities actually affected policy during these years? 
A complete answer to this question isp of course, beyond the scope of the 
present work but two major illustrations can be provided which do seem to 
lend support to the argument: the first one concerns :Britain's defence 
policy at this time and its impact on relations with Europe in general 9 
and Germany in particular; the second one relates to the manner in which 
:Britain's economically-inspired foreign policy •style' was adhered to in 
these years. 
It has already been mentioned that Shonfield himself suggested that the 
1956 Suez crisis may have represented a turning point in so far as 
economic priorities and foreign policy are concerned and attention has 
similarly been drawn to the significance of Macmillan's tenure of the 
Exchequer during this traumatic interlude. Wallace, too 9 in another 
context, has drawn attention to these points. "The events of the Suez 
campaign11 9 he writes 9 "could not fail to leave a deep impression on 
:Britain's defence and foreign policy ••••"p concluding that "The economic 
weakness of the country brought home the limitations in :Britain's freedom 
of action in foreign affairs 11 • 167 In fact, even before Suez and long 
before the 1957 Defence White Paper dramatized government recognition of 
the constraints placed by economic weakness on :Britain's defence and 
foreign policies 9 the government was considering the steps which \-Tould 
have to be taken 9 in Eden's own words 9 "to cut our coat according to the 
cloth". 168 
The progressive cutbacks in the Attlee government 9 s re-armament programme~ 
of which the Sandys White Paper in 1957 was only the latest and most 
dramatic~ have been amply documented elsewhere, not least ably by 
Wallace himself 9
169 In the emphasis which this document placed on the 
independent nuclear deterrent it is certainly true 9 as Wallace maintains 9 
that the Macmillan government was determined to retain "world status" 
but it testified similarly, as he also makes clear, to the recognition 
that the existing military establishment and the size of the convention= 
al forces located overseas were placing an unacceptably high burden on 
the economy in general and on the balance of payments in particular. In 
short, at the very time that Shonfield was castigating the government for 
ignoring the economic consequences of its foreign and defence policies, 
the same government was, as he himself suspected, 17° beginning= if only 
in a small way - to re-shape those policies in a manner more consistent 
with prevailing economic conditions: to retain "world status" certainly, 
but "without tears". 171 
The significant point about this change in defence poli~! was, however~ 
not so much the withdrawal of troops from such distant outposts as Korea, 
Jordon and Libya- though this in itself~ of course 9 was a hefty straw in 
the wind= but of those from Germany, for it is on Eden's 'continental 
commitment' in the mid-1950s that such emphasis is placed in the 
conventional treatment to illustrate the low priority accorded to 
economic considerations in this period as a whole. This may well have been 
the case in the early and mid-1950s but the German question hardly lends 
support to this particular argument for the remainder of the period. 
According to vlallace, the official justification for the withdra\.,ral of 
troops from Germany was that the new nuclear strategy made many of them 
redundant. As he points out, however, the tactical nuclear weapons which 
were supposed to obviate their requirement had still not arrived in 1957 
and the fact that the troop withdrawa~nevertheless began immediately 
"indicated the priority of economic and political considerations over 
military and diplomatic11 • 172 At the end of 1957 the Macmillan govern-
ment did, in fact, admit this point. 173 
Changes in defence policy, of course, usually entail significant implic-
ations for foreign policy~ and this occasion was no exception. The manne~ 
as well as the nature, of Britain's decision to fall in with current 
American strategic conceptions antagonised its European allies in NATO 
and especially so in the case of Dr. Adenauer's government in West 
Germany. 174 Relations with Germany were further embittered by the 
demands which Britain had already begun to make in 1956 (and ·was to 
continue until the early 197Qd) for German °offset' payments to defray 
the foreign exchange costs to Britain of the British Army on the Rhine. 
As D.C. Watt has expressed it: "The goodwill won by Mr. Eden's pledge in 
1954 and his brilliant revival of W.E.U. was frittered aaay as Britain 
adopted a strategic position which put nuclear fire=power before manpower, 
and nuclear striking forces before convent"ional forces oooo A further 
loss of goodwill was occasioned by long and wearisome disputes over a 
German contribution to the eost of maintaining Britain's ground forces 
in Germany. The effect", he continues, "was to induce in Europe the 
feeling that Mr. Eden's successors resented the pledge he had given, 
grudged the national effort involved in implementing it 11 and were doing 
their best, in one way or another~ to whittle it away11 • 175 
This particular development underlines the increasing importance which 
was being attached to economic considerations in the later 1950s and early 
1960s since, as D.C. Watt also explains, " .... the revival of the European 
movement, the signature of the Treaty of Rome, and above all the capture of 
its direction by France, faced Britain with a situation unknown since 
the 1890s, one in which German friendship and diplomatic support was to 
be increasingly necessary, despite the fact that Britain had little or 
nothing to give in return11 • 176 Nevertheless, though British designs for 
Europe may have had the support of much of West German business and 
finance, 177 the goodwill of Dr. Adenauer's gov®rnment itself was forfeited 
and these designs collapsed in the face of an increasingly united E.E.C. 
based on a Franco-German rapprochement. 178 Wallace acknowledges that 
Britain's economy-inspired defence reappraisal made some contribution 
towards this debacle. 179 
It thus seems obvious that if Britain had attached less importance to 
economic considerations in its foreign policy at this time, it would not 
have gratuitously offended the Germans in this manner, though this point 
must not be exaggerated since it is no doubt true that this action also 
reflected the premium which Britain continued to place on relations with 
180 the USA and the Commonwealth at the expense of Europe. Once the 
decision to apply for E.E.C. entry had crystallized, however, the force 
of this rider is reduced and the consensus seems to be that late 1959 
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and early 1960 were the decisive moments in this regard. And yetp 
in 1961, the British Foreign Secretary saw fit to bring to a head the 
dispute over offset payment:?, announcing that "Britain vTOuld have to 
cut down the number of her troops in Germany unless ways and means 
could be foun~ of reducing the burden on Britain's foreign balance 
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of payments." 
Finally, then, how might it be held that the 'style' of British foreign 
policy in the later 1950s lends weight to our argument? Northedge 
explains that "style is a satisfactory or congenial manner of handling 
the count~'s interests1118 3 and argues that Britain's overseas economic 
interests have influenced the style of British foreign policy in at 
least three important respects: first, by producing almost reflexive 
support for the international status quo, since a trader "wants to lmow9 
not what the policies of a local ruler are 9 but whether he can keep 
the peace and create the physical security necessary for trade"; 184 
second, by encouraging "British respect for international law and the 
sanctity of treaties (which) reflects the trader's interest in the 
observance of contracts •••• 11 ; 185 and third, by contributing to the 
importance attached by Britain to the security of the chief sea routes 
and the cultivation of friendly, or the creation of subservient, regimes 
along their littorals. 186 
Now it would be extremely convenient to be able to prove that this sort of 
style became more exaggerated in the later 1950s. If this could be done, 
it could then be held with reasonable certainly that this too provided 
evidence that economic considerations were becoming increasingly important 
in British foreign policy during these yearsp for if Northedge is right, 
these elements of style are economically derived to an important degree. 
That this was the case, however, is by no means self-evident and it 
would, in any event, be exceedingly difficult to establish. On the other 
hand, however, it is certainly true that these elements in the style of 
British foreign policy were not played down in these years; on the 
contraryp they remained as~ronouncedas ever. And yet 9 the world had 
become a much more idealistic place. Not only had ideals been for some 
time at a premium in the cold war but they were increasingly coming to be 
so too in the relations between the industrialized colonial powers of the 
West and the 'emerging' countries of the impoverished Southern hemisphere. 
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The result, of course 9 was that a s~gnificantly higher price had to be 
paid for the retention of its tradesman's pose by Britainp for such a 
pose was fundamentally, indeed, provocatively 7 anti-idealistic; ~he 
point is 9 however 9 that it \vas paid. 
Suez itself, of course 9 is a classic illustration of this point in all 
respects 187 but so too was the 'dualism' in British policy towards Africa-
endorsing black nationalism where this was irresistible and white suprem-
acy where this was too well entrenched - which was such an increasing 
source of embarrassment to Commonwealth relations and to Britain's image 
~t the United Nations. 188 And so also was Britain's early acquiescence 
in the consolidation of communist power in China and Eastern Europe and, 
indeed 9 in Cuba, upon which score the Americans were particularly 
sensitive. In each of these areas, as well as vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
itself9 Britain's attitude towards US embargo policies was most revealing 
in this connection. As Doxey points out 9 Britain was one of the leading 
"revisionists" in the attempt to get the Americans to water down the 
Western strategic embargo on the communist states in the mid- and late 
1950s. 189 "I told him", recalls Macmillan in his memoirs, of the time 
when as Foreign Secretary in 1955 9 he pressed Dulles for a reduction of 
the 'China list 1 9 "that because exports were not vital to America9 they 
failed to realize how important they were to us." 19'Q 
All this culminated, of course, in the famous affair of the Leyland buses 
to Cuba, which did so little for Anglo-American relations under Douglas= 
Home's premiership, and provided such a fitting final curtain to the 
period. 191 If 9 therefore, Britain had not had more cause to retain the 
tradesmen's style in its foreign policy9 it seems reasonable to argue that 
it would have reduced these diplomatic costs by exhibiting it less freely. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion of this Section and, indeed, of the Chapter as a whole, it 
seems clear that the conventional view is sound in emphasising the 
relatively low priority accorded to economic considerations in British 
foreign policy in the early and mid-1950s 9 though it perhaps unduly mini-
mises (for want of evidence) the influence which sectional economic 
interests had in the process of designating the sterling parity and 
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the Sterling Area as questions of 'high policy' and fails to acknowledge 
the extent to which traditional notions of economic power were important 
in the immediate post-war period and lingered on well into the 1950s. 
On the other hand, it is also clear that the vulnerability of a ne\vly 
exposed pound after 1958 9 Britain's weakening competitiveness in world 
manufacturing exports, the added concern with domestic prosperity induced 
by the change in the nature of the cold war, and the marginally reduced 
anxiety over security ~ all conditioned by the economic sfuock of Suez -
had conspired to produce an increase in the importance attached to 
economic priorities somewhat earlier than is sometimes supposed. 
There is no desire here, however, to exaggerate this development: the 
evidence is too scant for certainty and the motives behind the first E.E.C. 
application support the view that political considerations still retained 
primacy over economic ones even in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the 
diplomatic implications of the change in defence policy in 1956-1957 
and the stubborn insistence on retaining the tradesman's style, despite 
its mounting diplomatic costs, suggest that those economic worries were 
penetrating the consciousness of the British foreign policy elite to an 
increasing extent in the later 1950s. 
The first main hypothesis, that the foreign policies of states in the 
contemporary period are motivated, inter alia, by- a concern with the 
conditions of both economic prosperity and potential economic power, is 
thus vindicated, with increasing force, in the case of British foreign 
policy over the 1951-1964 perioda In broad outline, of course, this 
conclusion is neither original nor controversial. The main point 
concerns the bearing which it has on British policy towards South Africa 
during the most significant years of this period for their bilateral 
relations. Other things being equal, the relatively higher priority 
accorded to economic considerations in British foreign policy in the 
early 1960s (the post~Sharpeville period) than in the 1954-1955 period 
(that of the Simonstown negotiations), may have rendered Britain's 
economic stake in the South African connection more diplomatically 
consequential in the former period than in the latter. It is to this 
question in general which -v1e now turn. 
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CHAPTER II 
BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE PUTATIVE ECONOMIC PO\iER RELATIONSHIP 
DURING THE SIMONSTOvm NEGOTIATIONS AND THE POST-SHARPEVILLE PERIOD 
80. 
It was said at the end of the Introduction 9 it will be recalled 7 that, 
following Knorr, economic power in inter-state relations must be seen 
in terms of its 'putative' and its 'actualized' dimensions, and that 
the former consists in "the capabilities that permit the power-wielder 
to make effective threats" whilst the latter is that ivhich is "generated 
in an interaction \'lhich is an encounter". This Chapter will 9 therefore 9 
be concerned to demonstrate the nature of the putative economic power 
relationship, conceived in Knorr's sense 9 vThich obtained between Britain 
and South Africa. As such 9 it will constitute a preliminary to the 
subsequent assessment of the following chapters of the extent to which 
this was actualized in their diplomatic encounters during the negotiations 
which preceded the signing of the Simonstovm Agreements in July 1955cand 
in the period following the Sharpeville shootings in 1960 9 in vThich Anglo~ 
South African ~elations were placed under such strain. The argument of 
this Chapter will be conducted in a manner guided by the criteria for 
assessing putative economic power marshalled and systematise~if not 
originally developed, by Knorr. 
'Economic strength' is 9 of course, the most crucial element of putative 
economic power, or at least the most important of the necessary conditions 
for its existence, and, on the face of it 9 Britain excelled South Africa 
in this respect during both of the significant diplomatic encounters of 
the 1951-1964 period. The first indicator which seems to bear out 
this point is provided by a comparison between the two countries in 
terms of their absolute wealth and the sheer size of their foreign 
economic transactions; that is to say 9 by a comparison between them 
in terms of their respective importance as agents in the world economy. 
81. 
Thus Britain's gross domestic product (GDP) was~ throughout the 1951-1964 
period9 roughly nine times as large as that of South Africa 9 whilst her 
imports in 1960 9 for instance, accounted for 10.9 per cent of total 
world imports compared to only 1.4 per cent in the case of South Africa 
(see App. B, Tables 1 and 2). Britain was, in fact, second only to the 
USA as a world trading nation at this tim~ though it is true that by 
the turn of the 1960s her position as an exporter of manufactured goods 
had9 as vre have seen 9 slipped badly. Moreover, despite persistent 
weakness in her balance of overseas payments and an enduring shortage 
of domestic investment capital, it was not long after the war before 
Britain was re-established as one of the world's leading exporters of 
1 long-term capital. South Africa, on the other hand 9 was a major net 
importer of lon~term capital. Finally, sterling9 made de facto 
convertible in February 1955 9 remained second only to the dollar as 
a world reserve currency. Not surprisingly, therefore, Britain9 in 
marked contrast to South Africa, was a leading world economic power 
throughout the years in question and this was reflected in her position 
as first lieutenant of the USA in the most important inter-governmental 
economic councils of the non-communist world. 
Moreover, the discrepancy in economic str~ngth between the two countri~~ 
seems equally marked when the nature of their bilateral economic relations 
is subjected to cursory inspection. Thus, whilst South Africa \~S 
certainly amongst Britain's top five export markets in every year except 
1961 and 1962 of the 1951-1964 period (App. B9 Table 4), Britain's ex• 
ports to South Africa amounted only on average to just under 6 per cent 
of total United Kingdom exports in each year (App. B, Table 3). For 
South Africa, on the other hand 9 Britain was by far the most important 
market throughout the period9 taking on average 28.7 per cent of total 
non-gold exports in each year, a proportion which in most years represent-
ed more than double that absorbed by South Africa's second largest market 
and which was slowly increasing (App. B, Tables 3 and 5). In the case 
of imports, the picture of apparent South African economic weakness 
vis-a=vis Britain was broadly similar. Thus 9 whilst it is true that, 
in contrast to exports, import dependence evinced a significant decline 
over the period, even by the end, in 1964, Britain supplied 28.4 per 
cent of the South African market, leaving the USA trailing in second 
place with only a 19 per cent share (App. B9 Tables 3 and 6). Finally, 
the superficial imbalance of economic dependence appears even more 
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striking when capital flovlS are considered for, whilst South Africa 
exported no capital of real significance to Britain9 the United Kingdom 
held about 60 per cent of South Africa's foreign liabilities throughout 
the period (App. B, Table 7), and ranked with the Dollar Area as a major 
contributor of fresh capital to the Union until the general panic induced 
by racial disturbances began to spread amongst all investors in the 
second half of the 1950s (App. B, Table 8). 
Of course, the significance of these facts, suggesting as they do much 
greater South African economic dependence on, or economic weakness vis-a-
vis, Britain than vice versa, would be seriously qualified, if not complete-
ly overturned, if foreign economic transactions were of enormous relative 
importance to the British economy during these years but unimportant in 
terms of that of South Africa. However, this was by no means fuhe case. 
It is certainly true, as we established in Chapter I, that foreign 
economic transactions were of considerable relative significance for the 
British economy at this time but the same was also true of South Africa. 
In fact, the Union's visible imports in 1960 represented 23.2 per cent 
of its GDP (App. B, Table 2) 9 whilst net capital inflows amounted to 
about one-fifth of gross domestic investment in South Africa's rapidly 
expanding economy in the first half of the 1950s (App. B, Table 9). 
On the basis of these broad relativities, then 9 the impression is created 
of two countries, both relatively heavily engaged in foreign trade and 
finance and both significantly committed to an economic relationship 
with the other but with, nevertheless, the dependence on this relation= 
ship of the one- South Africa - being strikingly greater than the dependence 
upon it of the other; that, in short, if there was one partner which was 
likely to be the most economically 'strong' in its dealings with the other, 
then this v1as most probably Britain. And when it is also considered 
that Britain's status as a world economic power theoretically, at any rate, 
provided it with the ability to forward or obstruct South African ambitions 
in the inter-governmental context (such as the much-coveted increase in the 
official price of gold) in a manner which South Africa could not hope to 
equal, the impression of Britain's economic strength vis-a-vis South Africa 
is further enhanced. Indeed, though her conclusions are of little histor-
ical significance for the 1951-1964 period, it was on the basis of calcul-
ations resembling these that Barbara Rogers formed the opinion that, in 
1971, it v1as the British economy which could most easily withstand the 
blow if Anglo~South African relations were to be severed. 2 
Nevertheless 9 as we recorded in the Introduction, 'economic strength' 
is not merely a question of broad magnitudes; nor even of broad 
relativities. These are certainly important but so too is the 
structure of the economic relations between the countries in question = 
the extent of monopoly and monopsony, of urgency of demand and, indeed, 
of disposal 9 in connection with the items involved - and 9 as well 9 the 
nature and extent of their realizable reserves. Moreover, and most 
importantly, putative economic power 9 as Knorr rightly insists 9 does 
not even reside in all of these bases of 'economic strength' but has 
'non~economic' foundations as well. When these questions are taken 
into account 9 it will be evident 9 therefore 9 that this initial impression 
of South African weakness is but a poor guide to the real nature of the 
putative economic power relationship which obtained between Britain and 
South Africa during the 1951-1964 period. 
Let us begin 9 then 9 by examining in greater detail the economic strength 
which each country could dispose of vis-a-vis the other and leave for 
later consideration the question of their respective non-economic bases 
of putative economic power. And let us commence this initial task, 
quite arbitrarily9 with the economic flows from Britain to South Africa. 
How really dependent \vas South Africa on its imports of merchandise and 
capital from the United Kingdom during these years? Is it possible that 
the comparative smallness of these items in the context of Britain's 
total exports belies their real importance to Britain and thus the 
degree to which they contributed to a counter-dependence of the United 
Kingdom on South Africa? These are the principal questions to which the 
first part of this Seption will be addressed. 
PART A 
'ECONOMIC ST~TGTH' AS A BASIS OF PUTATIVE ECONOMIC POWER 
1. British economic flows to. and assets in. South Africa. 
If South Africa could really be said to have been dependent in any signifi= 
cant degree on its supplies of merchandise and capital from Britain9 then 
two points (as we have established) would have to be demonstrated: first 9 
that its demand for them was urgent; second, that the United Kingdom 
had a strong monopoly position with regard to their supplyo How far 
was this in fact the case? 
As we can see from Appendix B9 Table 10, South Africa's imports from 
Britain consisted almost entirely of more or less sophisticated 
manufactured goods (92 per cent of total imports from Britain at 
least in each of the selected years) 9 including arms. No;.1 South 
Africa's demand for these goods was certainly urgento Her own 
manufacturing base was narrm.,3 and she was in no position to engage in 
the domestic production of capital equipment on the scale required by 
the massive development programme on which she commenced in the 1950s -
in both mines and manufacturing itself~ Thus one=third of her total 
imports from Britain during this period consisted of machinery alone 
(Appo B9 Table 10)o In the case of armaments, her demand was, of 
course, made increasingly urgent by mounting racial unrest at home and 
by the grov1ing threat of international sanctions against her = directed 
especially at armaments - after the Sharpeville shootings in 1960o But 
is it equally true that Britain held a monopoly position with regard to 
the supplyto South Africa of any of these crucial items? 
Unfortunately for Britain, this condition did not obtain., Manufactured 
goods, by the circumstances of their creation, are a commodity in which = 
except in special circumstances 9 such as those in which the United States 
found itself in the years immediately following the second World War - it 
is almost impossible to achieve any kind of monopoly position in a highly 
industrialized VTorld, and this was soon brought home to the United 
Kingdom by the course taken by its exports to South Africa towards the 
end of the 1950so Thus, whilst it is true that South Africa's mines, 
factories and armed forces had been traditionally •tooled up' from British 
workshops and that, given the complexity of the products involved, they 
could not have switched to alternative sources of supply overnight without 
considerable inconvenience, expense and temporary loss of efficiency 
(especially in the case of the armed forces) 9 nevertheless, there were 
alternative sources of supply and these were anxious to move in on .the 
growing South African market. 
Indeed, in 1948 the Union had gone on a massive dollar spending spree 9 
with the result that the United States had temporarily supplanted Britain 
as South Africa's major supplier9 providing 33.5 per cent of all imports 
into the Union (App. B9 Table 6) 9 and it was only under pressure from 
Britain and as a result of its own growing 'dollar gap' that South 
Africa was obliged to introduce a measure of anti-dollar discrimination 
during the course of 1949 and thus produce a dramatic reversal in the 
fortunes of British and American exporters to the South African market. 
By 1950 9 the US share had fallen to only 14.2 per cent whilst Britain 
was comfortably in the ascendent once more with 37.1 per cent of the 
market (App. B9 Table 6). The significance of these enormous swings 
resides principally in the fact that they were only possible because 9 
to a very large extent, Britain and America supplied the Union with the 
same kind of goods - manufactures. By 1954 South Africa had stopped 
discriminating against dollar imports5 and, as the 1950s wore on, strong 
competition vras also being offered to Britain in the South African market 
by West German and Japanese manufactures. In November 1955 it was 
reported that British manufacturing interests were worried at their 
declining share of the South African market~ and in the spring of 1957 
this anxiety was translated into a major British trade drive in the 
Union.7 Despite this, the year 1960 saw Britain's share of the South 
African market falling to an all-time post-war low of 28.4 per cent and 
remained little higher than this for the duration of the period 
(App. B, Tables 3 and 6). Monopolists, it need hardly be observed, do 
not launch trade drives. 
It may be held 9 hmvever 9 that this is to overlook one particularly critical 
item in Britain's exports of manufactures to South Africa in which her 
share of the South African market was sufficiently large to suggest a mono= 
poly condition: the reference, of course 9 is to arms supplies. Neverthe-
less9 this need not detain us long since here 9 too 9 alternative sources 
of supply were fast making· themselves available to South Africa and 
Pretoria lost little time in actively courting them. 
Commenting on British arms supplies to the Union in the 1950s 9 the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute observes that 
"Traditionally, there had been close cooperation with Britain in military 
matters. South Africa's Army, Navy 9 and Air Force were created with 
British assistance and patterned on the British model. The equipment", 
they continue 9 "was almost entirely of British origin".
8 And, indeed 9 
it is possible to calculate from SIPRI figures that, over the 1950s, 
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Britain supplied the Union with roughly 70 per cent (by value) of its 
new major weapons purchased abroad9 and 100 per cent in the case of 
naval vessels ~lone over the entire period (App. B9 Table 11). Never-
theless, times were changing: the USA had already supplied one third 
of the Union's military aircraft bet\veen 1950 and 1955 and, largely 
under the aegis of the MDA agreement signed with Pretoria in 1951 9
10 
had broken into the market for armoured fighting vehicles at the beginning 
of the decade (App. B9 Table 11)o Indeed, by 1955 the pace of the inter= 
national arms trade as a whole had perceptibly quickened, and Britain was 
finding it necessary to inject both more· energy and more professionalism 
into its sales efforts in order to fight the growing competitione 11 The 
position with regard to naval vessels was, as we have seen 9 held in the 
South African market throughout the period but by the turn of the 1960s 
South Africa was not only by now able to purchase aircraft 9 missiles and 
armoured fighting vehicles from the USA (as well as from Britain) but 
also from Canada and France 9 in particular, and even, in small quantities, 
from West Germany and Israel (App. B9 Table 11). Moreover, South Africa 
was also by this time increasing its domestic production of small arms 
and armoured fighting vehicles (albeit many under foreign licence). 12 
Rather than being exceptional 9 therefore, the fate of Britain's arms 
supply position. in South Africa merely reflected the general \veakness 
of her supply position in the South African market as a whole. Macmillan 9 
as \·le shall see in Chapter IV 9 was acutely aware of this during this 
period. 
All this, however, is not to deny that South Africa attached importance 
to its British arms source and that it would 9 accordingly, have been 
unmoved by any threat to cut it off. On the contrary, it is clear that 
the Nationalist government in Fretoria regarded the continuation of 
British arms supplies as a matter of considerable symbolic significance 
because of the substance \vhich they appeared to give to its claim to be 
an integral part of the Western security system in Southern Africa and 
the Southern oceans (see Chapter III belm-J). The point, remains, how-
ever that Britain had no monopoly in this department. 
Therefore, once the structure of trade is taken into account, it cannot 
be held with any conviction that Britain's position as major supplier 
of the South African market constituted an ingredient of real dependence 
on the United Kingdom (the symbolic importance of arms 9 especially post-
I 
I 
1960, excepted) and that a long standing South African policy to create 
this condition had substantially come to fruition. 13 Perhaps 9 hov1ever, 
the case is different with regard to Britain's supply of capital to 
South Africa. For, as we have seen, Britain was by far the most 
important holder of South African liabilities over this period and a 
major contributor of ne,.,r capital. 
South Africa certainly attached importance to attracting foreign capital 
to its mines and factories, though whether this demand had quite the 
same quality of urgency as possessed by its requirements for foreign 
capital goods and arms is open to doubt. The main reason for the 
demand for foreign capital was, of course, the inability of gross 
domestic savings to sustain the desired rate of expansion in manufac~ 
turing capacity, the opening up of the new goldfields in the Or~nge Free 
State and the simultaneous development of a fledgling uranium industry. 
As can be seen from Appendix B, Table 9, the Union's net capital inflow 
from 1946 until 1955 averaged 25 per cent annually of gross domestic in= 
vestment and, though the first half of the 1950s could not compare in this 
respect vri th the immediate post-war years, net capital inflm-1 still repre-
sented 21.2 per cent· of GDI in 1954. 14 Indeed, the new and important 
uranium industry had to be financed almost exclusively by foreign capita1. 15 
Furthermore, foreign capital investment in South Africa was predominantly 
direct, rather than portfolio, and the tendency of fresh capital invest= 
ment was to take increasingly this form (App. B, Tables 13 and 14). This 
was particularly valuable to South Africa since, first, it provided the at 
least equally useful assets of "technical ability and managerial skill"16 
and, second, it suggested a much firmer commitment to South Africa's 
future which was of considerable political benefit to the Nationalist 
government. 17 Not surprisingly, though nevertheless significantly, direct 
investments in South Africa were run down far less drastically after 1959 
than v1ere portfolio holdings, as can be seen from Appendix B, Table 14. 
Finally, it is important to note that foreign capital inflows had a very 
advantageous balance of payments effect for South Africa, and not only because 
they allovmd it to run, in almost every post-war year until 1955 (App. B, 
Table 15), a much more substantial deficit on current account than would 
otherwise have been possible. 18 For since this was for the most part a 
deficit with the Sterling Area and since most of the capital inflow~ 
sterling9 they further provided the Union with the ability to settle 
the bulk of this deficit in that currency. The significance of this 
is that thus \'las freed the major part of the Union's annual gold 
production for direct settlement with the Dollar Area, to the consid-
erable chagrin of 'hard-currency'-conscious post-war British govern-
mentso This suited the Nationalist government very well indeed 9 for 
it enabled it to demonstrate its independence of the financial 
'imperialism' of the British dominated Sterling Area and, ipso facto, 
win favour in Hall Street, \'fhere it hoped to tap additional sources of 
development capital. 19 
Foreign capital thus had clear advantages for South Africa but it is 
equally evident that doing \oJi thout it did not involve the payment of 
an unacceptably high priceo In fact 9 as can be seen from Appendix B, 
Table 99 the net capital inflm..r slowed drastically after 1954 and 9 
after 1958 9 became a massive and sustained net capital exodus and 
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yet the South African economy did not collapse! Gross domestic invest= 
ment certainly levelled off after 1958 and 11 caused" 9 as Hobart Houghton 
records 9 "a recession in certain sectors 9 particularly in building and 
construction11 , 20 but gross domestic savings continued to rise sharply 
and the previous rate of growth was resumed after 1961. The South 
African balance of payments certainly took a pounding in 1960-61 but 
rising exports and a degree of administrative interference fairly rapid= 
1 t d ·1·b · 21 M th th t th y res ore equ1 1 r1umo oreover 9 ere were ose amongs e 
•verkrampte' element in the Nationalist Party government in South Africa 
who had no time for foreign investment at all 9
22 
and even the official 
line was cool towards 'funk' moneyo 23 In short, then 9 foreign capital 
seems to have been important but by no means indispensable to South 
Africa during this periodo Certainly it was not indispensable in the 
second half 9 at any rate, by which time 9 moreover 9 the major tasks of 
financing the new Orange Free State goldfields and the new uranium 
industry had been largely completedo 24 Since foreign capital still had 
certain advantages for South Africa, however, it is still relevant to 
consider the degree to \vhich Britain occupied a monopoly position with 
regard to its supply. 
\Vhen the South African Reserve Bank conducted its first census of 
foreign investment in the Union in 1956 9 it was revealed that the United 
Kingdom accounted for 62 per cent of all foreign-owned investment stocks 
and subsequent surveys demonstrated that this proportion was roughly 
maintained by Britain for the remainder of the period (App. B9 Table 7). 
Conan explains this dominance not only by reference to the traditional 
political links between Britain and South Africa but because sterling 
still had advantages over other forms of capital to members of the 
Sterling Area 9 amongst \vhich 9 of course 9 South Africa loomed large. 
It was normally easier to negotiate 9 cheaper to fund 9 and subsequently 9 
in general, less troublesomeg in short 9 it brought with it all the 
benefits of an intra-area arrangement. 25 Nevertheless, three consider-
ations must be held to seriously qualify any claim that this gave the 
United Kingdom any kind of real monopoly power over South Africa with 
regard to foreign capital. 
In the first place 9 irrespective of assets already located in South Africa, 
the fact remains that 9 in only half of the years in the 1950s in which 
there was a net capital inflow into the Union 9 Has more than fifty per 
cent of this supplied by the Sterling Area. Indeed 9 as the 1950s pro= 
gressed 9 it is evident that dollar capital, in particular 9 \·!as being made 
more freely available to South Africa 9 accounting for sixty per cent or 
over of net capital inflow into the Union in 1953 9 1955 and 1956 (App. B9 
Table 8). American capital accounted for the lion's share of the outlay 
of the new uranium industry 9 26 and in 1958 the American-South African 
Investment Corporation was founded by Charles Engelhard. 27 Certain West= 
ern European countries, notably France and Switzerland9 were also begin-
ning to supply capital to South Africa in significant quantities during 
these years and so, too, \vas the vJorld Bank, for whom the Union was by 
far the largest recipient in the African continent of its capital assist-
ance in the 1950s. 28 Significantly, Britain's hold on South Africa's 
external public debt had been reduced from one hundred per cent in 1949 
to only 55.4 per cent in 1955 (App. B9 Table 16). It is not surprising 9 
therefore, that 9 commenting on the Union's decision in February 1956 to 
restrict the outflow of resident capital which was seeking the higher 
interest rates obtaining at that time in London 9 The Banker should have 
observed that this was a sympton of South Africa's reduced dependence 
on the London capital market. 29 
In the second place, of course 9 sterling capital began to flee South 
if Africa after 1956 and 9 with the isolated exception of 1958 7 continued 
to do so at a high rate until the end of the period. In the first instance 
this seems to have been caused by a shri~age in the profits of the gold 
mines3° but the principal subsequent cause was obviously alarm at the 
prospects for political stability in the southern part of the African 
continento For most of the period, therefore, the question of a 
British monopoly of foreign capital supplies to South Africa is rendered 
largely irrelevant by a negative flowo 
In the third place 9 as He have seen, with regard to Britain's dominant 
position in investment stocks located in South Africa, the increasingly 
direct shape which these were assuming- quite apart from the question of 
their control -made it unlikely that they could be removed easilyo As 
the British representative pointed .out at the 17th meeting of the UN 
Committee on Sanctions against South Africa (which met between July 1964 
and February 1965) "Foreign capital has played its role by making it 
possible to create physical assets which are themselves a source of 
further capital and an inalienable part of the South African economy and 
¥rhich can not be greatly affected by a ban on foreign investmento Even 
if monetary assets are liquidated, the factories will remain11 o31 As 
South Africa's demand for capital had become less urgent as the period 
progressed, therefore, so too had Britain's position as its dominant 
holder and supplier been weakenedo 
If on closer inspection, then9 the broad magnitudes of the Anglo=South 
African economic relationship exaggerate the degree to which South 
Africa was import dependent on Britain 9 perhaps they also understate the 
United Kingdom's export dependence on that countryo It will be recalled 
that Britain's export markets throughout the period were far more widely 
dispersed than South Africa's and that the Sputh African market, in 
particular, accounted for only just under 6 per cent 9 on average 9 of 
total British exports in each yearo On the face of it, therefore, 
Britain was not irrevocably committed to its South African marketo Such 
a conclusion, however, does not stand up to detailed examinationo 
Being a major trading nation, as we saw in Chapter I 9 Britain attached 
increasing importance to exports as its position amongst world exporters 
of manufactures slipped more and more during the period, and as its 
balance of payments became more and more precariously poisedo South 
Africa, therefor~ may have accounted for only 6 per cent of total British 
exports but this had placed it regularly either second or third amongst 
Britain's leading markets after the Har and 9 under mounting challenge 
from the USA 9 Canada 9 Hest Germany and Japan 9 Britain could not 9 in 
such circumstances, have regarded its position in that market with 
equanimity. 
In certain sectors of British industry 9 moreover 9 the importance of 
the South African market was especially pronounced. Thus, as can be 
seen from Appendix B, Table 17(a), in 1954, for instance 9 South Africa 
took 11 • 1 per cent of British wood and cork exports, .tO. 5 per cent of 
cotton yarns and woven fabrics, 10.1 per cent of synthetic fibres and 
woven fabrics, 10.5 per cent of electrical machinery 9 apparatus and 
9L 
appliances and almost 21 per cent of railway vehicle exports. Further-
more, in response to a questionnaire submitted to the British govern= 
rnent, amongst others 9 by the UN Committee on Sancti.ons in 1965 9 it was 
explicitly indicated that the situation was no different at the end of 
the _periodo According to this information, South Africa represented the 
principal customer (by value) for six important SITC categories of 
British exports, second largest customer for nine, and third largest for 
six in the year ending 1993.32 In the case of arms, South Africa account= 
ed for 9 per cent (by value) of all of Britain's arms exports to the 
'third world' between 1950 and 1955 9 a fact of particular significance 
since a viable arms industry was regarded in Britain (as in many other 
countries) as an essential component of national security and was corning 
to depend increasingly for that viability on the success of its exports.33 
In short, Britain would have found considerable difficulty in discovering 
alternative outlets to South Africa for a significant proportion of its 
exports in certain categories (see below). 
That Britain's declining share of the South African market and, ipso facto, 
the market itself, were not in fact regarded with equanimity in London is 
amply testified to, as we have already noted, by the major British trade 
drive which was launched in the Union in the spring of 1957. Two years 
later, British concern had clearly not abated, for the President of the 
Board of Trade felt it necessary to journey to South Africa in order to 
open the Rand Easter Shov1 9 v1here Britain had just built its first perman-
ent exhibition hall abroad.34 But with Britain's exports to South Africa 
remaining static in the first few years of the 1960s and its share of the 
mark~t falling even further, anxiety continued.35 Against this background, 
it is thus by no means surprising to find that 9 asked to contemplate the 
loss of its South African markets by the UN Committee on Sanctions in 
1965 (albeit at a time when Britain \vas in even more straightened 
circumstances and its exports to South Africa were picking up fast)~ 
the British government should have replied by saying~ inter alia~ that: 
"The net loss of export trade would have important direct effects on the 
level of British economic activity~ especially in those industries for 
which South Africa represents a significant proportion of total exports. 
These include slips~ railway and motor vehicles~ electrical machinery 9 
telecommunications equipment~ glass and textiles. Redundancies could 
be expected in these trades. In the case of ships" 9 it continued 9 
"for example 9 the combined loss of South African orders and orders from 
British owners engaged in the South African trade would put 15 9 000 jobs 
at risk in the shipyards and ancillary industries11 o36 
Furthermore~ Britain did a flourishing trade in 'invisibles'- with South 
Africa and of particular significance here were the growing returns on 
British capital invested with it.37 As we have already seen 9 despite 
the marked intrusion of alternative suppliers of fresh capital to the 
Union during the course of the 1950s~ Britain remained~ throughout the 
period~ the major holder of foreign capital stock in South Africa. 
Indeed 9 as a result of the massive outflow of sterling capital from 
Britain to the Union in the first post-war decade~ this stock had in-
creased its nominal value by 45 per cent between 1945 and 1955, whilst 9 
over the same period, Britain's total overseas stock of capital assets 
had diminished by over 11 per cent.38 At the end of 1956, the SA Res-
erve Bank census placed the market value of British stock in the Union 
at £865m (¢2423.7m). Thus it is not surprising that, as can be seen 
from Appendix B, Table 19 9 South Africa was the fourth largest host to 
British capital abroad in 1955~ accounting for 7o5 per cent of the total 
and, despite hazards of comparability,39 it seems reasonable to conclude 
that South Africa remained in a position of at least equal, if not greater, 
importance in this respect for the remainder of the period. 40 On a very 
rough calculation, British investments in South Africa represented about 
1 per c~nt of Britain's total national wealth. 41 
The real significance of this only becomes clear~ however 9 when the 
abnormal profitability of South African investments is considered. As can 
be seen from Appendix B~ Table 20, the annual average rate of return on 
British direct investments averaged between 1960 and 1964 8 per cent in 
the world as a whole~ 9o1 per cent in the Overseas Sterling Area as a 
whole and 12.1 per cent (and increasing) in South Africa. It follO\ffl 
that Britain's investment stock in South Africa was significantly more 
lucrative than those in countries which were hosts to larger stocks of 
British capital but where the rate of return was lower and that, as a 
result, whilst South Africa may have been only fourth largest host to 
British capital over this period, it was regularly either first or 
second amongst earners (App. B9 Table 22). Furthermore 9 South Africa's 
importance as a source of direct investment earnings was also increasing 
during the second half of the period and even in the more nervous port-
folio sector South African earnings dipped only slightly in their 
position of dominance (App. B, Table 21). Against the background of 
the worsening position on Britain's overall invisible account which was 
noted in Chapter I 9 South African investment returns must have seemed 
particularly valuable to the British government at the end of the 1950s. 
Finally 9 it is also relevant to note in this context that direct invest-
ments as a proportion of British stock in South Africa were increasingly 
significant over the period, rising from 64.2 per cent of the total in 
1956 to 72.1 per cent by 1964 (App.B, Table 23) 9 whilst the drop in the 
share absorbed by mining signified an increasingly balanced spread of 
British business, commercial and financial interests with a commitment 
in South Africa. As can be seen from Appendix B9 Table 24 9 almost all 
sectors of British economic life were directly involved in the South 
African economy at this time, from mining-finance, through manufacturing 9 
to distribution, banking and finance, whilst in 1965, at ~Y rate, earnings 
from these investments were particularly important for a number of them. 
The construction industry, for example, drew 33.4 per cent of its total 
net foreign earnings from South Africa (App. B, Table 25). 
If the South African market for both visible and invisible British exports 
was thus more important than the simple magnitudes would seem to imply, 
it assumed even greater consequence as a result of the simple but compell~ 
ing fact that South Africa was the world's largest gold producer and, in 
the right circumstances, could be obliged to settle its trading deficits 
in that most valuable medium. To appreciate the early significance of 
this point, it is necessal~f to begin by looking at the phenomenon of the 
'dollar gap'. 
The so-called 'dollar gap' was in fact the most serious and obstinate 
impediment to British reconstruction in the decade follo\'Jing the end of 
the second World vJar and it was a situation which could only be allevi-
ated in the short run by massive and humiliating loans from the Dollar 
Area itself. 42 The extent of the dollar deficit experienced by the 
Sterling Area averaged over ¢1 9 600m. annually from 1946 until 1952-
the worst period - and \·Tas not eliminated as an enduring problem until 
at least 1958 (App. B9 Table 27). 43 The perilous gold and dollar re-
serve position, which this situation both produced and sustained, was 
further exacerbated by the enormous accumulation of short=term sterling 
, debt by the United Kingdom during the recent war 9 \vhich 9 when set against 
these meagre reserves, produced a ratio of short-term assets to short= 
term liabilities Hhich was a.o low that almost every temporary wealcening 
of the balance of payments or whisper against st~rling was capable of 
precipitating a crisis 9 as we saw in the previous Chapter. In short 9 the 
dollar gap shackled Britain's reconstruction by reducing its ability to 
purchase essential dollar imports, demanded the assumption of an even 
greater burden of debt 9 and undermined confidence in sterling. Accord-
ingly, the rectification of the Sterling Area's balance of payments 
deficit44 with the Dollar Area - by both expanding exports to the 'hard 
currency' countries and cutting down on non-essential dollar imports -
was treated in Britain as a matter of the highestnational importance in 
the first post-war decade. It is against this background 9 therefore, that 
the importance of Britain's exports to South Africa must be finally 
assessed. 
The simple fact was, then, that the greater the United Kingdom's surplus 
on commercial account vTith the Union 9 the larger would be the share of the 
Union's annual gold output which entered the Sterling Area's central 
reserves and9 ipso facto, the lesser would be the problem of the 
'dollar gap 1 • Two problems, however 9 had dogged the efforts of the 
British monetary authorities to ensure that they maximised their share 
of the Union's gold ever since the end of the war:45 first 9 South Africa's 
own trading deficit with the Dollar Area 9 which had made it desirable for 
Pretoria to exploit its membership of the Sterling club to withdraw from, 
as ivell as pay into 9 the central reserves (or 'dollar pool' ) 9 and ivhich 
had produced the much=resented anomaly of the world's largest gold producer 
actually making a net withdrawal from the central reserves over the 1946-
1947 period; 46 second, the fact that the huge sterling capital outflow 
95. 
from London to the Union 9 which characterized the early post=war years~ 
frequently eliminated the surplus vrhich Britain regularly made on its 
current account with South Africa~ so enabling the latter to settle its 
deficit with Britain in sterling rather than in gold. 47 
British policy was directed 9 as a result, towards persuading the Union 
government to refrain from exercising its privileges as a member of the 
Sterling Area at the expense of the dollar pool (to recognise~ as it was 
put at the time, that membership involved obligations as well as rights), 
and by the end of 1949 a combination of threatened refusal of access to 
the London capital market48 together with a pronounced weakening in 
South Africa's own external position, had produced a situation in which 
Britain was now guaranteed a substantial net contribution to the dollar 
pool from the Union's annual gold output. Indeed, as early as 1948, the 
doomed Smuts government had agreed 9 inter alia, to henceforth settle 
directly its own Dollar Area deficit49 and, under the Cripps-Havenga 
Agreement of 1949, the Union agreed further to pay for all of its imports 
of 'essential' goods from the United Kingdom in gold, irrespective of the 
size of its sterling balances / 0 As amended later the following year, 
this agreement provided a minimum guarantee of £50m. in gold to the 
dollar pool and thus firmly established the Union's support for the 
central reserves of the Sterling Area in return for continued access to 
the London capital market.51 
Britain had, however9 to export the goods to the Union in order to ensure 
that this minimum was achieved and the government \fas also, of course, 
given every incentive to encourage the nation's exporters to maximise 
the surplus on current account \fi th South Africa in order to oblige 
Pretoria to settle even more of its overall deficit with the United 
Kingdom in gold. As the Economic Survey 1950 observed, "··· it is hoped 
that~ under new arrangements recently made by South Africa, it will be 
possible for the United Kingdom to earn a substantially larger proportion 
of the output of new South African gold than has been the case hitherto •••• 
As South Africa's gold production is valued at approximately ¢400m. a 
year 9 the importance of this reinforcement to the gold and dollar in= 
come of the sterling area needs no emphasis"~ it concluded. 52 Pointing 
the moral, The Financial Times observed that "The importance, in the new 
circumstances, of an all-out effort to re-capture the share of the South 
African market formerly enjoyed by Britain and other sterling area prod-
I 
L 
ucers can hardly be overrated". 53 Thus, although in October 1954 the 
Union government announced the end of its formal guarantee to the 
dollar pool from the beginning of 1955 (the significance of \·Thich \'Till 
be considered in Chapter III), South Africa effectively provided the 
United Kingdom government with an enormous incentive to cultivate its 
market, and the dollar pool was suitably rewarded. 
In fact, from 1950 onwards, South Africa made regular net contributions 
to the dollar pool \'rhich were well in excess of the guaranteed minimum 
of £50m. (¢140m). and which had by 1954 reached just over double this 
amount (App. B, Table 28). In 1955 the contribution slipped slightly 
but by the following year was back to ¢288m. After this year it is 
impossible to obtain precise figures on South Africa 9s net contribution 
to the dollar pool54 but it is possible to make rough estimates. 
In attempting to do this it is important to note 9 in the first place, 
that the Union's annual gold output increased massively during the 
following years9 largely as a result of the production from the new 
goldfields in the Orange Free State. As can be seen from Appendix B9 
Table 26, annual output had almost doubled during the 1950s, amounting 
to an increase (as a proportion of total non-communist world output) 
from 48 per cent in 1950 to 63.5 per cent {n 1960 and then) by 1964 9 
to 72.5 per cent. By 1960 9 annual output was worth ¢748m. at the 
official price and, in 1964 9 as much as ¢1,019m. 
The really important point, however 9 is that, despite a steady reduction 
in South Africa's traditional visible trading deficit with the Sterling 
Area over the 1950s (turning temporarily into a small surplus at the end 
of the decade), her invisible deficit with the area steadily increased 
and, to make matters much worse, her reserves of sterling Here most 
seriously eroded by the reversal of the net capital inflow after 1956, 
(App. ]3 9 Table 30). The upshot of all this \olas a steady and marked 
deterioration in South Africa 9s overall commercial deficit with the 
Sterling Area which almost certainly made necessary an increasing level 
of net contributions to the dollar pool until the end of the period. It 
is thus likely that South Africa's net contributions fluctuated at around 
¢300m. annually from 1957 until 1961 and then, against the background of 
continued sterling capital exodus and a sudden return to major visible 
1'. 
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account deficit in 1962 9 increased over the remaining years of the 
period to bet\oJeen ¢350m. and ¢450m.55 Thus 9 Hhilst South Africa's 
status as a 'hard currency' market for British exports had been ren~ 
dered largely academic in the late 1940s by the Union's ability to 
. . 
settle its Sterling Area deficit in sterling9 the 1950s and early 1960s 
13aw this situation sigh~ficantly modified. Not surprisingly 9 therefore~ 
whilst it 1:1as still politic to say so 9 Butler9 the British Chancellor9 
remarked in the House of Commons in February 1955 that "South Afi-ica 
remains a main feature of the Sterling Area. Her generosity in r~spect 
of gold '.has been quite unrivalled" .56 
·The real importance of South Africa's support for the Sterling Area's 
central-reserves can only be f~ly appreciated 9 ho,.Jever 9 when it is 
corit_rasted wi t:h: -that of the other members. According to 1tlright 9 who 
investigated. the 1939-52 pe:dod 9 the :Union was second only to. the 
... ·., 
co~~ined Colonies in this respect froin1946 until 1952 9 with a contrib~ 
ution amount_ing t 0 25 per cent of the;, t;otal. 57 Flitting this another 
\vay 9 it _can· b"e said that, after the major contributions made by the 
• • . J 
North ~i3rican loans and the forced dol1ar capital iinports from the 
Colonies, South JU'rican. gold filled almost 8 per .s:fel;').$ of the total net 
gold and dollar deficit of the entire Sterling Area over these same 
years up to 1952 ~-5S . After- thls ~year the Union's ~~nt:i'ibution assumed 
e!en greater importance, partly as a result of the increase in its O\~ 
net contribution and partly because the colonial contribution had passed 
its peak with the end of the Korean \var boqm in ravT material prices. By 
the mid~1950s 7 as :can be seen from Appendix B9 Table 29(a) 9 South Africa's 
ne.t contribution to the dollar pool "1as fluctuating between 40 and 50 .··•·. 
per cent and was thus very close indeed to that of the Colonies. In 
these years 9 as can be seen from the same Table 9 this contribution was 
especially valuable since Britain was once more back in serious dollar 
deficit on its ·own account. 
After 1956 9 however 9 and for the remainder of the period9 there can be 
absolutely no doubt that South Africa had become by far the most import-
ant supporter of the central reserves amongst me~bers of the Overseas 
Sterl·ing Area 9 59 both because of further increases· in the absolute level 
of its O\~ net contributions and because of the rapidly fading colonial 
contribution. The dramatic fall and subsequent dis~ppeara,nce of the 
colonial contribution after 1956 is to be explained by two factors: 
··:"'.=.:j:· .. 
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first 9 the continued deterioration in their terms of trade as primary 
commodity exporters which led them 9 for the first time since the war, 
into deficit with ·the non-sterling world; 60 and second, the political 
independence of the major colonial dollar earners, ~fulaya and Ghana, 
shortly to be followed by Nigeriao 61 As a result 9 then 9 by 1958 
Shonfield could already observe that "South Africa is ••o the most 
important single outside prop = that is 9 outside the UK - of the 
sterling area's balance of payments o o. o There has ••• been" 9 he 
continued, "a tendency in recent years to exaggerate the role of the 
colonies in the solution of the sterling area's dollar problems. An 
even bigger contribution th~ that made by all the colonies put togeth~ 
er to the sterling area's dollar income comes from South Africa;'. 62 
And Conan 9 writing in 1961, adds his testimony to that of Shonfield: 
"It is apparent", he remarks 9 "that the level of the central reserves 
has been largely governed by the expansion in South Africa's gold output 
. 63 
and the arrangements for its sale ••• 11 • 
South Africa's growing domination of world gold output in the 1950s;and 
early 1960s and Britain's increasing reliance on its contributions -to the 
central reserves of the Sterling Area constitute additional evidence, 
then 9 that here was a market of peculiar significance to the Un~ted 
Kingdom government. And we have already seen that British governments 
in the second half of the period \·Jere, as a result, particul::j.rl;y a...mtious 
about Britain's deqlining share in that market 9 the moreso because it 
meant that, with a steadily diminishing visible trade balance \vi th the 
Union9 Britain's gold~earning capacity was coming to depend increasingly 
... ;- . 
on the continuation of the net capital outflow- and that could not b~ 
expected to go on for ever. However9 since the 'dollar gap' effectively 
disappeared in 1958, the continued attachment of . peculiar importance 
to South ·Africa's gold contribution to the Sterling' Area's central re-
serves may be legitimately queried. Dependence on American aid by 
Britain had 9 after all 9 ended and serious thought vras op.ce more being 
given to repaying the dollar debt. 64 Furthermore, by the end of the 
1950s gold and dollars were pouring out of the United States 9 which vras 
shortly to find itself in balance of payments difficulties for the first 
time since the war. Indeed, it was partly for this reason that it had been 
possible for the major Western European countries (including Britain) to 
restore formal convertibility to their currencies in 1958. In these ne\v 
circumstances 9 therefore, was not gold simply one more 'convertible 
- ~-- . 
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currency' in a \vorld in which trade was coming to be conducted more and 
more in marks 9 francs and even sterling? And is it not therefore likely 
that Britain no longer needed South Africa's gold for the central 
reserves to the same extent that it clearly did in the first half of 
the period? Unfortunately for the British government, this development 
Has qualified by three consideration13. 
In the first place 9 certain restrictions still attached to the converti-
bility of most major currencies even after 1958 and, with the beginnings 
of the American balance of payments problem, uncertainty as to its value even 
befell the dollar.65 Accordingly 9 gold retained its magic as a reserve 
.. ·"" 
currency 9 as the extent to \vhich it \vas sought in the first major inter;.,. 
. 66 
national political crises of the 1960s amply demonstrated. 
In the second place, Britain needed South Africa's gold for the central 
•, 
re~serves as a result of its resolute commitment .. to the mairitenanc.e of a 
reserve role fo.r. sterling itself. For it was the British Treasury 
view ~ held against stiff American opposition ~ that if vras .. inappropriate 
for one reserve ~urrency to be backed by another (that is to'. say, for the 
pound to be backed by the dollar) and that, if .the dollar was to be 
backed wholly by gold 9 . then so was the pQund •. It \vas Treasury' pol.i,Qy as 
a result, to in~ist that the central reserves be held almost entirely 
in gold throughout the post-convertibility period up to 1964, when it 67 
could have held more mark!=J 9 for instance, or even dollars (App. B, Table 32). " 
Finally, of course, though the 1958=1960 years may have seen a considerable 
improvement in the Sterling Area's balance of payments as a whole with the 
non-sterling world, Britain was itself 11 as \ve have seen, back in serious 
external account trouble by the early 1960s and, despite the 'hot money' 
inflow which was engendered by the high interest rates necessarily prevail-
ing in London and despite massive ]}flr assistance,68 the central reserves 
themselves went into almost continuous decline after 1961 (App. B, Table 31). 
Following the assessment of British economic flows to, and assets in, 
South Africa over the 1951=1964 period which has been made in the first 
part of this Section, then, it seems fair to form the following conclusions. 
Firstly, though the symbolic importance of South African.arms purchases, 
and the psychological value of continuing investment from, Britain should 
;.,-: 
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not be underestimated 9 South Africa \.,ras by no me~s as dependent upon 
Britain for imports of goods or capital as it had once been and any 
remaining dependence deriving from this dimension of their relationship 
vias· being progressively \'leakened as the 1950s proceeded (arms excepted); 
demand for British flm.,rs was decreasingly urgent (and had political 
benefit's for Nationalist Party opinion) and any monopoly power which 
Britain had once enjoyed was fast disappearing. Secondly 9 though 
South Africa took only 6 per cent on average of Britain's total visible 
exports over the 1951-1964 period 9 this 9 together vli th the significant 
addition of invisible eamings 9 represented a market l.·rhich vTas far more 
important than this figure alone suggests. It meant a great deal to 
important sectors of British industr-y (itself committed in an increasi_ngly 
comprehensive and direct manner to the South A.:trican-economy) 9 to the so~ 
called ~.i:rl:visible earners' of the City of London who were so influential 
in the Tor,y governments of these years (as we saw in Gnapter !) 9 and to 
the British government itse1.f 9 as a result of the-peculiar signifipance 
for the central- reserves of South African gold. As far_. as tlie flm.,rs from 
Britain to South Africa were concerned 9 then 9 detailed examination reveals 
that this component of Britain's apparent 'economic strength' vis-a-vis 
South Africa \'las substantially illusory. 
2. So_uth African economic flows to Britain. 
At. this point ,.,e: mu~~ t:um our attention to the trade which flowed in the 
op_;pgsit~·'_direction 9 that is to say9- from So:uth A,.-fl;'~ca to Brit~:j.n. ivas 
Britain as-import dependent upon South Africa as it was evidently eXport 
dependent upon it during these years? Was South Africa 9 if not markedly 
import dependent upon the United Kingdom 9 at lea$t export dependent upon 
it to some degree? These are the questions to which 111e must now address 
ourselves 9 considering once' 'again the urgency of the demand for the 
goods or services involved 9 on the one hand 9 and the degree t:o which 
South Africa may have had a monopoly position with regard to their 
supply to Britain and Britain a monopsony position in respect of their 
importation from South Africa 9 on the other; and recollecting 9 too 9 that 
the broad figures with which this Chapter commenced suggest that South 
' -
Africa's export 'dependence upon Britain ,..,-as quite remarkable during this 
period 9 whilst British import dependence upon South Africa seemed almost 
··, .. 
,. 
" 
'-
insignificant. 
Indeed, to take the latter point first 9 Britain's imports from South 
Africa (excluding gold) represented 9 at their highest, only·,3o6 per 
lOlo 
·cent (in 1964) and at their lowest as little as 1o6 per cent 9 and 
averaged throughout the 1951-1964 period only 2.5 per cent of Britain's 
total visible imports (Appo B9 Table 3)o Even if the goods imported 
from South Africa were in urgent demand in the United Kingdom, there-
fore, it seems unlikely, on the basis of figures such as these, that 
South Africa could have had much in the way of a monopoly hold over their 
supply o Anyway 9 what sort of i terns \vere a<?tually involved in these 
economic flows from South Africa to Britain? 
Trade statistics conventionally exclude gold but \•Ie have already seen 
that South Africa ~an.apersistently large deficit on its commercial 
'· ' 
account with Britairi:over the 1951-1964 ·period, with the result-that 
gold, of rie_cessi ty,_ W1:lS one of its major exports to the United Kingdomo 
This, as \ve-haite established, amounted to about ¢180m. worth at the 
beginning of,the period and rose to something possibly in excess of 
rO .•• 
¢400m. worth by, the end o -- Now 9 since Britain's ·imports of merchandise from. 
South Africa Jiii~l1,1d;i.:ng diamonds) were iu tbe ord,~:r Qf. ¢2Qortl._ in 195l ~an1L 
re~ched over ¢500m.o b:y the end of -the period (App o B, ·Table 37) 9 it is 
clear that between 49 and 50 per cent of Britain's total visible imports 
from South Africa \•Jere regularly accounted for by gold and that, of course, 
the proportion of Britain's total visible imports represented by the 'soU:tp 
Af:rican trade as ·it appears from the conventional figures must ··be roughly 
doubledo In any event, the importance of South African gold for the 
British government has already been stressed and the further special 
significance of its merchanting in the London Gold Market will be 
discussed shortlyo 
from South Africa? 
For the moment, what of Britain's non-gold imports 
As can be seen from the Board of Trade's typically unrevealing figures, 
reproduced as Appendix B1,~ Table 34, these consisted in. the main of food~ 
stuffs' especially fruit and vegetables' cereals and sugaJ;_'' a.l1d basic 
materials, in particular "'ool and non-ferrous base met€Ll ores and 
cpncentrates, th(;>Ugh wool was declining significantlY,' as a proportion of 
this latter category over the period. Uranium and diamonds - being the 
most important - are not, of course, included in these figures although, 
. " .. '
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as we shall see 9 their quantitative and strategic significance for 
Britain 1.vas considerable. Imports of mineral fuels and lubricants 
were naturally insignificant throughout the period and even by 1963 
imports of manufactured goods {excluding diamonds) represented only 
11 per cent of total British imports from South Africa. Hov1 urgent 
-: 
was British demand for these goods? To what extent did South Africa 
monopolize their supply? Let us consider these two questions for 
each major commodity, or category of commodities 9 in turn. 
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The possible significance of British imports of foodstuffs and9 indeed9 
of 't-lOol from South Africa can be quickly dismissed. As is v1ell kno\'m 9 
Britain imported goods of this kind from all ove;r- the v10rld and primary 
commodities such as these were 9 in any case 9 facing increasingly 
depressed international markets after the mid-1950s. By 1960-1961 the 
\vorld market for pririlary commodities in general 9~ and foodstuffs in 
particular 9 had reached the bottom of a general · decline· in prices 1.·rhich 
had set in really sharply in 1957.69 Prices in the . vJOol market were 
also being increasingly depressed by competition from synthetic fibres.7° 
It is thus obvious that Britain vras in no sense dependent upon South 
Africa for its imports of foodstuffs and wool. The case 9 however 9 is 
some\-that different ,;. and a good deal more complicated - \vi th regard to 
Britain's imports of non-ferrous ores and concentrates from South Africa 
at this time. 
To begin vr.ith 9 because of the importance of these minerals to industry in 
general and_especially to that concerned with defence production 9 71 -demand 
for mahy of them ,.,_as certainly urgent in the first half of the period. 
As 1.ve noted in Chapter I 9 the stockpiling of 'strategic' materials such 
as these which was inspired by the Korean War was not discontinued ~til 
the 1951=1958 period 9 though after this it seems probable that 9 as was ar-
gued earlier, changing strategic doctrines and the success of the stock-
piling itself? amongst other factors 9 had contributed to a lessening of 
anxiety on the part of Britain concerning the security of foreign sources 
of supply. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if 9 even in the second 
half of the period 9 there \vas no anxiety on this score vri thin military 
and political circles in Britain and 9 as can be seen from Appendix B9 
Table -34(b) 9 Britain obtained roughly 10 per cent of its imports of non-
ferrous mine~als from South Africa during this period 9 being partidlllarly 
reliant upon this source for antimony 9 chromium 9 vanadium 9 titanium and 9 
. ; ~· :·-,· . 
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in all likelihood9 for platinum as \·Tell (App. B 9 Table 36) ~72 
Now 9 whilst it is clear that 9 even in the case.of these particular 
minerals 9 the presence of alternative suppliers73 removed the possi= 
bili ty of South African monopoly po\'mr over Bri tain 9 :i:t seems probable 
that the United Kingdom government must nevertheless have viewed South 
Africa as an extremely valuable source in this regard. Jn the first 
place 9 South Africa might not have had an especially significant 
position in terms of the world production of traditionally important 
non-ferrous metals = copper 9 lead~ tin9 zinc and aluminium - b'\l.t it 
possessed reserves of all of them except the latter9 and abounded.in 
many of the lesser ones (App. B 9 Table 35) 9 for some of which 9 such as 
ti tanium 9 demand was increasing rapidly during _.the cours'e . of the t950s: 
and early 1960s. As the South Africa. Foundation (earlier establi::Jh~cC · 
to publicize inf9rmation sucP, as this) boasted in 1965 9 "Except that 
no .natural oil and bauxite have been discovered9 South Afrj_ca has at 
her disposal sources of almost all the base metal's and no:p.-metailic 
minerals of significance in world commerce and in modern industry 9 in 
addition to her exc~ptioiial gold and diamond.mines 11 .~4 .In the.second 
place 9 it is evident t:tJ_at'many of the major world producers of these 
minerals ed ther absorbed most of their production in domestic industry 
(for example 9 the USA) or possessed political attributes '\'Thich rendered 
them an unreliable source of supply (for. example 9 the Belgian Congo 9 
Indonesia 9 and Northern Rhodesia). South Africa 9 on the other hand 9 
.\ 
had a substantial·surplus of most of its minerals for export75 aild was. 
notoriously 1 secure' • Finally 9 South African reserves of cer"\;ai:p., of ~_lie~e 
- ·' ' - ..... · -
minerals were particularly extensive£ c~rtainl;y this was true of Uiailgan-
esep antimony 9 chrome 9 platinum9 vanadium 9 titanium and vermiculite.?
6 
In short, although Britain could almost certainly have found alternative' 
sources for the non-ferrous minerals which it imported from South Africa 
during this period 9 it seems unlikely 9 for the above reasons, that it 
would have countenanced their loss with equanimity. 
1f.he position with regard to Britain's importation of diamonds from South 
Africa \'las broadly similar - in its complexity as 1.>1ell as its significance l 
As we can see from Appendix B9 Table 37 9 the Board of Trade's belated 
frankness makes it possible to deduce that diamonds represented between 
one=quarter and one=third of Britain 1 s total· ·imports from South Africa 
(excluding gold and uranium) over the second half 9 at any rate 9 of the 
'~ . -_· 
1951~1964 period and '·Jere rising as a proportion towards the end. 
The poverty of the statistical information 9 however, still makes it 
impossible to determine how many of the diamonds represented by these 
figures were actually retained in Britain and how many re-exported, 
since 9 as we shall see in a moment, Hatton Garden in London Has then 
- and still is - the principal entrepot for the \vorld diamond trade. 
Nevertheless, since these figures are nothing like as high as those 
for the value of total world exports of rough diamonds77 and since, 
furthermore 9 Britain's exports of diamonds as recorded by the Board 
of Trade after 1963 never exceeded 26 per cent of diamond imports 9 7
8 
it seems safe to conclude that the bulk of the diamonds described as 
'British imports' in Table 37 went into domestic consumption. How 
important were they to Britain? 
Diamonds come in t\..ro main types 9 'gems' and 1 industrials' 9 and one 
notable authority suggested in 1959 that the latter "are so important 
that a deficiency •••• would cause a breakdown in the modern metal= 
\vorking industry and devastate mass. production" a 79 \vi th the military 
significance of industrials being 9 as a result 9 considerable 9 it is 
hardly surprising that they had been an important item in economic 
vrarfare during the second World War. 80 Moreover, they were a 
104. 
particular objective of US stockpiling during the early and mid-1950s 
and the Americans went to great lengths to develop a synthetic substit= 
ute at the same time. 81 The Russians vrere keen buyers on the black 
market.82 With testimonials such as these, therefore 9 it is inconceiv-
able that the British government could have regarded a secure supply of 
industrial diamonds as anything less than indispensable during the 
1951-1964 period. To what extent was it at the mercy of a South African 
monopoly? 
From the time of the great discoveries at Kimb~rley in the middle of the 
19th Century until the eve of the first 1-/orld \>Jar South Africa had, in 
fact, held an almost complete monopoly over the production and thus the 
distribution of the world's diamonds.8 3 Despite further discoveries in 
the Union itself 9 hm..rever, the subsequent years saw finds in other parts 
of Africa which were of major importance - especially in the Belgian 
Congo, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Angola, Tanganyika and the French 
colonies - and the Union's monopoly over production was broken for good. 
However 9 as a result of the much greater value of her own production 
105. 
(South Africa had an above average share of 'gems')~ of the tradition 
of monopoly disposal which was well established by the beginning of the 
20th Century in the 'Diamond Syndicate'~ and of the enormous financial 
reserves of the South African marketing organization (subsequently 
dominated by the Anglo=American Corporation and dubbed by friend and 
foe alike as the 'Diamond Cartel')~ South Africa was able to maintain 
a monopoly over diamond distribution rig'ht through into the post-war 
period.84 
The main objective of the Diamond Cartel~ of course~ was to maintain a 
high and stable price for diamondso It achieved this by the simple 
expedient of offering the 'outside producers' a guaranteed price for 
thei_r diamonds when the market was depressed, provided that th~y would 
contract to sell only through the single channel of the Cartel when the 
market was- buoyant. Impressed by the advantages of this arrangement 
during the 1930s, the 0 outside producers' signed sales contracts with the 
Diamond Cartel at roughly five year intervals and thus the Cartel achieved 
its objective by stockpiling the world's diamonds in depressed times and 
by carefully controlling their disposal in years of booming demando The 
disposition of the 'outside producers' to go along 1-.ri th the Cartel was 
encouraged, of course, by Anglg-Am~rican's poliqy of buying into their 
operating companies.85 It is not surprising~ then 9 that the Dia.niond Cartel's 
control of world distribution was regularly placed at 95 per cent in the 
- 86 
early 1950s and at "over 80 per cent of total production" as late as 
1957.87 
If, thenp 'industrial' diamonds, in particular, were indispensable to 
Britain and if the Diamond Cartel had a nea~monopoly over their distribu= 
tion (which 9 incidentally, brought additional benefit to Britain in the 
shape of the prestige and commissions which derived from the Cartel's 
employme~t of London for the marketing mf its entire sales),88 to what 
extent can this be said to represent a 'South African' monopoly? 
The first point to be noted in this context is that the Diamond Cartel 
was not commonly thought of as the 'South African Diamond Cartel' at all 
but rather~ at least by the Americans, as the 'British Diamond Cartel 1 • 89 
This 9 of course 9 \vas not only testimony to the fact that its selling 
organization was based in London~ as 1ve have jus~ no:ted~ but also to 
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the consideration that British financial influence (especially through 
Anglo-American Corporation) was heavily felt within the Cartel. The 
'Diamond Ring' was 9 therefore, in no sense a South African government 
organization, nor even one in ,.,hich Afrikaner capital Has significant in 
these years, though it is true that the South African government, as a 
producer in its own right in Namaqualand, v.ras one of the partners to 
the Diamond Producer's Association within South Africa.90 Furthermore, 
for most of the 1950s a number of the most important 'outside producers' 
were, in fact, British colonies, namely Sierre Leone, Gold Coast and 
Tanganyika, which averaged between them 30 per cent of the world's exports 
of rough diamonds in each year betvreen 1955 and 1960. 91 It is thus obvious 
that, though it could probably have caused considerable difficulties, the 
South African government ,.,auld have found it impossible to deny diamonds 
to Britain through the mechanism of the Diamond Cartel, which 9 indeed 9 
flourished as much with British connivance as against it. The South 
African government, moreover, had its own interests at stake in this 
arrangement, since it took a five per cent cut of the value of all dia-
monds exported from South Africa under the aegis of the Cartel.92 
On top of this, the Cartel itself was beginning to show signs of strain 
by the end of the 195Qs. Thus, if the prospect of the loss of its 
diamond-bearing colonies in Africa at this time v1as not 9 perhaps 9 a happy 
one for the British government, it spelled even greater travail for the 
Diamond Cartel, since independent African states were not expected to have 
much truck with what they = if not the Americans - regarded as a 'South 
African' creature.93 Furthermore, synthetic diamonds were at last being 
produced in the United States94 and large discoveries were heralded in the 
Soviet Union. 95 And though, in the face of these umpromising circumstances 
the Cartel demonstrated remarkable resilience, 96 it is clear that its 
grasp on the market had been significantly vreakened by the early 1960s. 
If Britain ever experienced anything approaching 'dependence' on South Afica 
for the supply of diamonds, therefore, it was certainly not in the second 
half of the 1951-1964 period. In the early and mid=1950s 9 however, in 
the atmosphere reflected by frantic American stockpiling and in the 
circumstances of unchallenged Cartel hegemony, it is likely that it came 
as near to it as at any time since the end of the second ivorld War. Just 
how near this was, hov.1ever 9 is an impossible question to ansv-1er. Bearing 
in mind the extent of both colonial production and British financial influ= 
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ence within the Diamond Cartel, it seems likely that even then a position 
of significant dependence was not closely approached. On the face of it, 
however, Britain's imports of South African uranium would seem to suggest 
a different story. 
Though official British sources have always been even more coy about 
releasing information on trade in fissile materials than on that in 
diamonds = or, for that matter, gold - (Donald Maclean~ amongst others, 
notwithstanding) 97 it was no secret at the time and has been confirmed 
by an official history since, 98 that Britain was a partner to the purchase 
of increasingly large quantities of uranium oxide from South Africa, be~ 
ginning in 1953. The partner was, of course, the United States and the 
medium through which the buying was conducted \·las the so-called Combined 
Development Agency (CDA). Before we delve more closely into these matters, 
however, it is necessa~J to assess the urgency which was attached to uran-
ium supplies by the British governments of these years. 
As the broad details of the trade itself Here no secret, neither were the 
reasons for its importance. Uranium was above all other ingredients the 
one most essential to the generation of atomic energy.99 Furthermore, 
there can be little doubt that, by 1955 at the latest, this form of energy 
had come to be seen in Britain as important not only to the country's 
security problem (as 1:1e sa,.,. in Chapter I) but also to its future sources 
of electrical power. Indeed, it may have been in 1955 that the decision 
to proceed with the manufacture of the H-bomb was announced but this Has 
also the year in which it was proclaimed that, two years hence, work would 
simultaneously begin on Britain's first generation of nuclear power 
stations. In fact, in the mid-1950s enthusiasm for, and confidence in, 
a nuclear future for Britain were at a peak. 
Enough has already been said in Chapter I to demonstrate the military 
significance of uranium supplies to Britain during this period (certainly 
in the early and mid-1950s) but why did atomic power for electricity 
generation make these supplies equally, if not more, significant at this 
time? As Dr. Brono,.,.ski observed in 1954, "Until recently 9 the preoccupation 
of the large powers with uranium~ and their anxiety to monopolize ne,.,.ly 
found deposits, were predominantly military. But in the last year the 
climate has changed •••• It is now plain", he continued, "that nuclear 
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power 9 in spite of earlier pessimism 9 is. indeed close". 
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vJhy had the 
climate changed? Why 9 especially in the case of the British government, 
were such high hopes attached to the early development of nuclear power 
stations \vhich Bronowski predicted? 
this should have been so. 
The following reasons explain why 
In the first place 9 rising costs in the early 1950s, combined \vi th static 
production in the coal industry, were leading the government's economic 
and scientific advisers to predict an energy crisis by the 1960s if new 
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sources of energy \vere not tapped. In the second place 9 Britain's 
increasing demand for energy was having to be met by larger and larger 
imports of oil, the insecurity of whose supply weighed as heavily on the 
nerves of the Foreign Office as its exchange costs did on those of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England. In the third place 9 it v1as also hoped 
that Britain's pioneering role in many aspects of atomic power generation 
. ht . . t . t . d t 1 02 d 1 t b t b m1g g1ve r1se o a maJor new expor 1n us ry an as 9 u y no 
means least 9 it is almost certainly true that the British government regard-
ed United Kingdom development of the 'peaceful' use of the atom as most 
useful sustenance to the 'special relationship' with the United States. 
The la~at point is particu~arly important because it is \vell known that 
this relationship had suffered a considerable blow by the passage of the 
f1acMahon Act at the end of the war and that 9 thereafter, successive 
British governments had gone to considerable lengths to persuade the 
Americans to restore the intimacy of their war-time collaboration in 
atomic matters. 103 One lever on the Americans \vhich was employed in 
this bid, as we shall see in a moment, \vas Britain's usefulness in the 
acquisition of uranium supplies but it seems clear from Eden's memoirs 
- revealing on this, if on little else - that his government 9 at any rate, 
regarded British pioneering in atomic power stations as a potentially 
crucial quid pro quo for the restoration of Anglo-American cooperation 
in the military field; as a most dramatic demonstration, that is to say, 
of the manner in \vhich the 1 special re::t.ationship' could be of great 
future value to the Americans as well as to the British. For Eden, it 
seems clear, the lead which Britain had over the United States in civil~ 
ian nuclear power developments underlined the division of labour between 
intimate allies which was of the essence of the 'special relationship' and 
which, in this area, was only temporarily estranged by an intemperate and 
xenophobic Congress. Accordingly, it was of enormous diplomatic value to 
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his government. 104 
For all of these reasons 9 therefore 9 it is not surprising that 9 though 
Eden was faced with the necessity for deflationary measures shortly after 
\oJinning the election of May 1955 9 he should have recorded that 11 I was 
insistent that the atomic energy programme must not be hampered. We had 
established a lead in nuclear power and \·Te must keep it • o •• 11 ; 105 that 
in 1956 9 Sir George Thomson 9 one of the government's leading specialists 
in this area 9 should have remarked that 11The discovery of nuclear energy 
and its application to power on a large scale has come like the answer to 
a prayer11 ; 106 and that 9 finally 7 demonstrating that these sentiments were 
still shared at the highest level 9 the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan 9 
should have informed the First General Conference of the International 
Atomic Agency in 1957 that "the United Kingdom is faced with acute short-
age of domestic sources of pO>oJer • • • • 'vle have therefore bent out efforts 
to the speedy development of atomic energy as an economic source of 
electricity • • • vle foresee in only a few years11 9 ha concluded, "the day 
vThen the vast majority of our ne\v power stations will be driven by atomic 
energy" o 1 07 
Against such a background, then 9 there can be no doubt but that uranium -
the essential raw material of atomic pm-1er - was considered to be indispen-
sable to Britain: the bridging of the future energy gap together with the 
sustenance of the 'special relationship' with the United States, amongst 
other things 9 seemed to depend upon it as much as did the successful 
development of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. But how reliant 
was Britain on South Africa for its supplies of uranium? Did Britain in 
fact receive any of the CDA uranium obtained from the South African source? 
If not, was South African uranium of any significance at all to the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and military establishment? This is 9 of 
course, a murky area but fortunately we are provided with some assistance 
for the earlier years from Margaret Gowing's official account of the 
development of atomic energy in Britain. 
Ever since the military potential of atomic energy had been realized during 
the second World War 9 the Americans and the British had been determined to 
pre-empt as much as possible of the existing supply of uranium and9 since 
known workable deposits were comparatively rare 9 to give every encourage-
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ment to the search for ne\·l sources. It was for this purpose that the 
CDA was established by the principal allied powers during the course of 
the war. Certainly the most notable of its ,.,ar-time successes \vas the 
acquisition of first refusal on all uranium production from Katanga but 9 
as Nargaret Gowing rela:tes 9 this was merely "the beginning of a prospect-
ing effort that was to be 9 in the next fifteen years or so, one of the 
biggest in recorded history". 108 Furthermore, in these early post-\var 
years of shortage and feverish prospecting 7 Canadian supplies \<Tere 
cornered by the Americans 9 109 Australian production was still only a dim 
and uncertain prospect, and the major North American discoveries were yet 
to be made. 110 It vTas in such circumstances that South African uranium 
came to seem such a valuable proposition to the British government. 
It Has lrno\vn that the Union's ore was of lmv grade but 9 being closely 
associated with South Africa's gold-bearing reefs 9 the happy circumstance 
was that this ore was already being brought to the surface by the gold-
mining companies of the Hitwatersrand. As a result, it was the belief 
of the early post-war period that the South African goldfields contained 
the largest realizable uranium deposits 'then in existence. 111 As the 
South African government recorded in 1957 9 with unmistakeable satisfaction9 
"South Africa was fortunate 9 in that the extent of its uranium de:pos,its 
became lrnown at a ·time v1hen no other major field in the \vorld had yet 
been discovered 9 \vhile the \o/estern powers vlere in urgent need of atomic 
material. The British and American governments 9 therefore, took the keen-
est interest in the development of the South African uranium industry11 • 112 
Both of these propositions are undeniable. 
The full details of the contract which was eventually signed by the CDA 
with South Africa's gold-mining companies in November 1950 (and subsequent-
ly revised on more than one occasion in a very short space of time under 
American pressure for even greater South African production) have been 
amply described elsewhere. 11 3 Suffice it to record here that i t3 terms 
were lavish and that 9 in addition, the CDA agreed to inject the full 
amount of capital into South Africa which was required for tl1e development 
of the nevT industry. 11 4 But vlhat was Britain's stake in this arrangement? 
\Vhy should South African uranium production have seemed such a valuable 
proposition to the British government? 
111. 
According to Margaret Gowingp the entire British atomic energy programme 
(which had a very 101 .. 1 uranium consumption rate) was in fact supplied by 
an early stockpile of Congolese uranium until 1955. 11 5 This is not sur-
prising~ of course 9 since South African uranium did not come on tap until 
1953 and was not exported in large quantities until 1955 itself (App. B, 
Table 40) • In the light of Gowing 1 s evidence P however 9 it 1vould seem 
difficult to claim that South Africa's uranium could have been particu= 
larly valuable to the British authorities before the middle of the 1950s 
at any rate. Nevertheless, this is by no means the end of this particular 
s.tory 9 since 9 as Margaret Gowing also points out, Britain clung desperate-
ly to its position in the CDA as the only remaining element in its pre-
MacMahon atomic collaboration with the United States 9 whilst the Americans, 
for their partp appear to have tolerated this because of the value which 
they placed on what they took to be Britain's singular ability to secure 
uranium which was located 1·Ti thin the Commom-1eal th - "Britain ••• was 
believed" 9 records Margaret Gowing, "to hold the key to the Commom·mal th" 116 
And British influence in South Africa was, of course, regarded by the 
Americans as the most outstanding contribution \V'hich Britain could make 
to the efforts of the CDA in this regard. 117 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
even though Britain seems to have required no South African uranium her-
self before 1955P "Britain" nevertheless "regarded South Afriqan urapium 
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as her trump card" in her atomic dealings with the United States govern-
ment in the immediate post-war decade. 
Furthermore, though the CDA~sponsored prospecting for uranium v1as begin-
ning to expand world output in the early 1950s, demand (especially from 
the USA) was increasing even faster. 11 9 Simultaneo~sly 9 Congo production 
was fading rapidly120 and the result was that by the mid~1950s South 
Africa's burgeoning output was placing the Union in an extremely strong 
supplier position (App. B9 Table 39) 9 a circumstance which had been in 
prospect for some years. Now, although Margaret Gowing's official history 
is of no use to us after this point, it seems clear that Britain's own 
demand for crude uranium must have been increasing in the mid-1950s; 
the military and civil developments in atomic energy concerning which 
there was such enthusiasm at this time and which have already been docu-
mented, ensure that this must have been the case. Therefore, though by 
1955 the value of South Africa's uranium to Britain as an offering to the 
Americans may have disappeared (the gilded box had, after all 9 long been 
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opened and the gifts dispensed) 9 it seems probable that it was by now 
becoming valuable to Britain's atomic programme in its own right 9 albeit 
still via the CDA mechanism (an important proviso 9 as ,.,.e shall have 
occasion to discuss in Chapter III). In 1957 9 at any rate 9 Harold 
Hacmillan acknm·Jledged in the House of Commons that during the course 
of that year "much the greater part of the Authority's supplies will have 
been secured from South Africa". 121 
If this evidence suggests 9 therefore 9 that 9 for one reason or another 9 
the British government was e~tremely reliant on South Africa's uranium 
for most of the post-war period up to at least 1956-57 9 further evidence 
suggests that this rapidly ceased to be the case thereafter. This was a 
result of a decline in British demand for uranium 9 on the one hand 9 and 
of a mounting world surplus on the other. How did this come about? Was 
this not an extremely rapid reversal 9 especially in the case of British 
demand? The fact is that the late 1950s witnessed a significant deteri~ 
oration in the economics of atomic energy vis-a=vis fossil fuel energy 9
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and as early as 1958 it \vas announced that Britain 1 s atomic pmver station 
programme was being slmved do\m. 123 The mounting capital costs of atomic 
power 9 on the one hand 9 together with the rising availability of cheap 
imported oil and the increasing efficiency of coal~fired power stations, 
on the other 9 combined 9 in fact 9 to signally deflate the earlier optimism 
which had attended nuclear energy and it did not re-emerge until at least 
1965. 124 As a result 9 there was a substantial do\m,.,rard revision in estim= 
ates of future uranium requirements. Though it is difficult to establish 9 
it also seems likely that by 1960 Britain also had sufficient uranium to 
meet the small demands of its nuclear defence policy. 125 Significantly, 
in 196 2 it vJas announced that Britain 1 s own urani urn enrichment plant at 
Capenhurst would cease production of high-enriched material for military 
purposes, and reduce the production of slightly enriched material for 
civil use to the minimum level required to maintain gaseous diffusion 
126 technology. 
If British demand for uranium had thus begun to tail off sharply after 
1958 and remain minimal until at least the middle of the following decade 9 
the difficulty for the suppliers of this material -not least among them 
South Africa= was compounded by the rapid increase in world uranium prod-
uction which occurred simultaneously. As early as 1956, the first signs 
that the CDA-sponsored search for uranium was finishing the seller's 
ll3o 
market which had prevailed hitherto had begun to appear. 127 In the early 
part of the year a surplus of enriched uranium appeared for the first time 
in the USA9
128 the UK Atomic Energy Authority dispensed with the monopsony 
shield of the CDA to conclude its first direct uranium contract, 129 and 
in its Second Annual Report the UKAEA announced that discoveries of 
uranium on the North American continent had been so great during the last 
year "that they have removed the danger of a world-wide shortage ooo As 
the world supply position grows easier", it continued, "more attention has 
to be paid to the relative cost of production from new deposits: there is 
no question of paying almost any price for uranium". 13° 
As this trend to\'Tards surplus continued, its effects began to be felt in 
South Africa, as in other producer countrieso Thus, in the autumn of 1957 
the CDA refused to take uranium from a potential new source in the Union 
~ an action which could, observed the Economist, "mark an important step 
towards a buyer's market". 131 And in May 1958 the CDA actually negoti-
ated a ceiling in its joint purchases from South Africa, as well as 
permitting, for the first time, the private disposal of any surplus 
produced over this amount by the Union's mineso 132 Finally, this year 
also witnessed the amendment of the MacMahon Act in favour of the United 
Kingdom and, by. marking the beginning of a new era of nuclear cooperation 
between Britain and the United States, almost certainly further eroded 
any remaining British dependence on South African uraniumo 133 
The net result of these two developments which began early in the second 
half of the 1950s - the contraction in British demand for uranium, together 
with the mounting world surplus -was, of course, to produce an entirely 
new situation in Britain's uranium supply relations with South Africa 
for the remainder of the 1951-1964 period. Thus, whilst the early and 
mid=1950s had seen the height of the Union's influence over the United 
Kingdom government from this source, the subsequent years witnessed a 
complete reversal of fortuneo In what had by now become a pronounced 
buyer's market 9 Britain (along \vi th other major consumers 9 notably the 
United States) now held the whip hand. It is thus not surprising that in the 
late 1950s, with both Britain and America embarrassed by huge stockpiles 
of uranium134 and chafing at their continuing obligation to the high-
priced ten=y.ear contracts of the earlier shortage years, it was decided to 
re-negotiate many of these contracts on a 'stretch-out' basis. 135 In 1960 
it \·Tas South Africa's turno Negotiations began in February and when, in 
January 1961 9 agreement was finally reached9 it became clear that the 
1950 CDA contract had been completely scrapped and that the UK Atomic 
Energy Authority and the US Atomic Energy Commission had entered into 
new and separate agreements with the South African government. In Britain's 
case 9 deferment of the delivery of 6 9 000 tons of uranium until 1967=70 was 
secured 9 together with more favourable pricing arrangements. 136 Early in 
1963 a further deferment of South African uranium deliveries to the United 
Kingdom was announced: 137 the wheel had truly come full circle. 
In looking at the extent to which Britain was import dependent on South 
African supplies 9 then 9 it remains finally for us to consider once more 
the question of gold. We have already investigated the degree to which 
South Africa's gold contribution was important to the Sterling Area's 
'dollar gap' and its subsequent significance for the central reserves. 
vihen the London Gold Market re-opened in 1954 9 however 9 the Union immedi-
~tely began to send the bulk of its remaining annual gold production to 
London. What was the significance of this development? 
Until the outbreak of war in 1939 9 the London Gold Market had been the 
world's pre=eminent 'free' gold market. As a result, it had been of 
con~iderable importance to London's reputation as an international 
financial centre, as well as a useful contributor to the invisible earn= 
ings of the City. With the exception of a brief interlude at the end of 
1946 and the first half of 1947, 138 however, it had remained shackled by 
wartime restrictions on sterling convertibility and, in addition 9 by an 
IMF request of July 1947 which was designed to prevent 'premium' trading 
in gold from threatening the par value of the dollar. 139 As one of the 
City's leading bullion merchants lamented in 1949: "This continued 
prohibition, superimposed on all the extended wartime restrictions still 
considered necessary for the protection of this country's economic position9 
effectively muzzled the London market and drove it back to the obscurity 
in which it had languished during the long war years 11 • 14° As a result, 
though severe restrictions remained on sterling dealing against gold 
until convertibility was restored in 1958 and though a forward market was 
not permitted until March 1959 9 there was widespread relief in the City 
(and amongst bullion dealers in particular) 141 when, on March 22 9 1954 9 
following the disappearance of the free market premium, the London Gold 
Market was re-opened for trading in 'hard currencies' against gold. 142 
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In no time at all, the London market was dominating the world trade~ 
handling 85 per cent of fresh gold supplies coming onto the international 
free markets by 1955 ~ 4 3 \vi th obvious satisfaction~ and not a little 
justification, Samuel Montagu & Co. v1ere able to claim in early 1956 
that the London Gold Market had "more than regained its pre=war emin-
ence".144 This position was retained for the duration of the 1951=1964 
period. vfuat had made such instant and sustained success possible? 
Obviously, established skills and tradition \•/ere important factors 145 
but these would have been of little account had it not been for the 
virtually simultaneous decision of the South African government to 
require the Union's gold producers to henceforward direct their entire 
output146 to the SA Reserve Bank, which~ in turn, stated its intention 
to make the fullest use of the re-opened London Gold Market. 147 This 
it did and~ with the exception of a temporary change of policy in 1959-
1960 (the significance of v1hich will be considered later) 9 continued 
to do so for the rest of the period. 
Now 9 South Africa, as we already know 9 was the vrorld' s leading gold 
producer in 1954. It \vas~ however, in precisely this same year that 
its annual output began the dramatic inc:cease caused by production from the 
ne\v mines in the Orange Free State. Whilst in 1954~ therefore, its annual 
production was valued at 51.5 per cent of total non-communist world prod-
uction, by 1960 it was equivalent to 63.5 per cent and by 1964 to 72.5 
per cent. It is thus clear that the success of the London Gold Market 
was almost entirely a result of the South African government's decision 
to market almost all of its gold through London, at the expense, in part= 
icular, of Nevi York. As a result, as we can see from Appendix B, Table 41 9 
75.2 per cent of all of London's gold came from South Africa in 1954 9 
rising to almost 90 per cent by 1956 and, whilst it is true that Russian 
sales had become substantial by the turn of the decade and that the USA 
did, in fact, temporarily displace South Africa as chief supplier to the 
London Market in 1961 9 South African gold remained its mainstay. Supplies 
from the Soviet Union, after all 9 \•Jere known to depend on the state of the 
wheat harvest and th~s to be uncertain~ 148 whilst the American sales from 
reserves in the early 1960s were due to exceptional circumstances (see 
below) and thus not likely to be often repeated. Without South African 
gold, therefore, the London market would have been as nothing~ a mere 
backwater in the international gold market. Wholly alive to this, 
C. Gordon Tether, one of Britain's leading financial journalists, observed 
that "The predominant importance of South Africa in the vrorld gold market 
made its reaction to the reopening of the London market especially 
important. In the event,that reaction constituted one of the most encour-
aging aspects of the freeing". 149 
It has already been recorded that the London Gold Market Has important to 
Britain as a major source of financial prestige and as a useful contribu-
tor of invisible earnings. 15° The United Kingdom, hO\vever, had more 
cause than this - important though it was - to be thankful for South 
Africa's decision to re-channel its gold sales through London. For 
the SA Reserve Bank had also agreed to employ the Bank of England as agent 
for the disposal of its gold on the market and this, in effect, gave the 
British government almost absolute control over the day-by-day, hour-by-
hour, supply of the world's key gold market. 151 The significance of this 
was that the Bank could, as a result, adjust the supply of the market to 
prevailing forces of demand and thus have a powerful weapon with which to 
defend the official dollar/gold parity of ~35 per troy ounce, a rate which 
was regarded by central bankers on both sides of the Atlantic as the lynch-
pin of the entire Bretton Woods sy.stem152 and by successive incumbents of 
the ltlhi te House as second only in honour to the memory of George \l[ashing-
ton. And since, furthermore 9 the fate of the perennially \·Teak pound \vas 
irrevocably linked to the Bretton Woods system, South Africa's decision 
not only undoubtedly strengthened the hand of the British government in 
its dealings with the US Treasury153 but contributed to the ultimate 
strength of sterling itself. As the ~lidland Bank Review commented on the 
re-opening of the London Gold Market: "through the close association of 
the market price of gold \vi th the dollar-pound exchange rate it has con-
tribute~, not only to stability in gold prices, but to the international 
status of sterling11 • 154 
Though the reserve currencies v1ere never under serious pressure on the 
London Gold Market for the rest of the 1950s, it is certain that from 
the beginning enormous importance was attached to the ability of the 
Bank of England to control the disposal of South Africa's ne\v-mined 
gold. Any major political uncertainty could precipitate a flight from 
the reserve currencies into gold, as the Korean War had recently demon-
strated,155 and such occurrences could not be predicted. Furthermore, 
by the late 1950s it was evident that flights into gold provoked by such 
uncertainty would be the more serious as a result of diminishing confi-
dence in the two main reserve currencies themselves. The American 
balance of payments began its prolonged deterioration after 1957 and 
produced a growing drain on US gold stocks156 &~d 9 although the pound 
had, as we have seen, been made convertible in 1958 9 the British balance 
of payments was soon in difficulties again. With such a background 9 
then, it is not surprising that the Congo crisis 9 which began in 1960, 
and the Cuban missiles of 1962, should have produced intense speculative 
pressure on the dollar on the London Gold ~~rket, thus dramatising the 
Bank's role as defender of the Western exchange structure and the import= 
ance to that role of its agency for the disposal of South Africa 1 s nelt! 
mined gold. vfuether South African cooperation could be relied upon at 
the critical moment, hmv-ever 9 was another matter. 
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At this point, therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that, though 
Britain's imports from South Africa as a vThole Here relatively insignifi-
cant judged as a proportion of total imports, it is clear that they 
contained, in fact 9 i terns which ivere of enormous consequence for Britain 1 s 
industry, its energy and defence policies, and for the Bank of England's 
financial role. Moreover 9 in the case of some of the commodities which 
v1ere so critical in these respects 9 there \·Jere important elements of 
monopoly in the supply situation of South Africa. Here 9 then 9 \vas a 
substantial degree of British import dependence on South Africa. Has it 
in any sense neutralized by a reciprocal 'export dependence' on the 
United Kingdom? 
On the face of it 9 this seems to be eminently likely. It has 9 after all, 
been early noted that Britain was by far South Africa's largest export 
market over the period, taking on average 28.7 per cent of its total 
non-gold exports (page 81 above). In most years this represented more 
than double that absorbed by South Africa's second largest market and 
was, moreover 9 slowly increasing during the period. \'Jhen to this is added 
the fact that South Africa \vas very keen to sell the products of its grow-
ing manufacturing sector in sub~Saharan Africa (19.5 per cent of total 
non-gold exports in 1955) 9 158 its export dependence on Britain would 
seem to have been complete, for in the mid- and late 1950s at any rate 
well over 80 per cent of these exports were going to importers in what 
remained British colonies, principally the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Kenya and the Gold Coast. 159 
Exports (including gold) were also very important to the South African 
economy, being throughout the period equivalent to roughly one-quarter 
of GDP 9 as vJe have already seen. Moreover, \'Ti th industrialization both 
raising the expectations of its inhabitants and requiring the services 
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of increasingly sophisticated capital equipment, South Africa had devel-
a high propensity to import in the post-war period which, on more than 
one occasion, had brought it into acute balance of payments difficulties. 
Thus in 1948-49, 1953-54, 1957-58 and especially in 1960~61 (vlhen the 
capital exodus was at its height) varying degrees of currency and import 
controls were required to hold the situation, 160 and hence the importance 
of exports was magnified. As a South African publication of quasi-offi-
cial status remarked in 1960: "The country has become export-conscious". 161 
Hhat \vere South Africa's most important exports over the 1951-1964 period? 
As we can see from Appendix B, Table 42, though manufactures (including 
chemicals and machinery and transport equipment) had come by 1960 to re-
present almost one-third of total non-gold exports (most of which, exclud-
ing diamonds, went to the British colonies in Africa, where South Africa 
claimed to have special marketing advantages), 162 South Africa remained 
principally an exporter of primary commodities to the developed Western 
economies = Britain 9 USA, France and, increasingly, Western Germany and 
Japan (App. B, Table 5). In 1960 these commodities consisted in the 
main of foodstuffs such as maize, fruit and vegetables, sugar and fish 
(21.3 per .aent of total non-gold exportsL wool (13 per centL uranium 
(13.5 per cent), diamonds (8.6 per cent), 163 and non=ferrous ores and 
concentrates (4.6 per cent). 
This is the conventional method of presenting South Africa's exports, 
that is to say, with each category calculated as a proportion of total 
merchandise exports, excluding gold. If gold is included, however, a 
very different picture emerges, as can be seen in the first instance 
from Appendix B, Table 26. Thus, in the same year (though 1960 WqS 
admittedly exceptional in the case of gold), gold exports amounted to 
39.2 per cent of South Africa's total gold-included exports and was 
obviously the dominant export 'commodity'. Over the 1951-1964 period 
as a whole, it was equivalent to 35 per cent of total gold-included 
exports in an average year. Calculated on this basis, then, food exp-
orts in 1960 only came to 11.8 per cent (instead of 21.3), wool to 7.2 
per cent (instead of 13), uranium to 7.5 per cent (instead of 13.5), 
diamonds to 4.8 per cent (instead of 8e6) 9 and non-ferrous ores and 
concentrates to 2.6 per cent (instead of 4.6). Hm.,r important was 
Britain as a market for these commodities? Could South Africa have 
found alternative markets for them? In short, to what extent did the 
United Kingdom have the degree of real monopsony power over Pretoria 
that the broad figures of South Africa's market reliance would seem 
to suggest? 
It is at once evident from Appendix B, Table 43, that, diamonds apart, 
South Africa was in no sense dependent upon metropolitan Britain (at 
least) as an export market for its increasingly important overseas 
sales of manufactured goods 9 which, as we have already noted, \vere direc~ 
ted mainly at sub-Saharan Africa. For its primary commodity exports, on 
the other hand, it is equally evident that Britain represented a market 
of enormous importance. In the case of foodstuffs (South Africa's 
second largest export after gold), Britain absorbed roughly two-thirds 
of South Africa's total exports in 1955 and probably not much less than 
this in 1960. IVJ:oreover 9 though it is true that there vras a marked down-
ward trend in the degree of this particular reliance on the British market 
over the period as a whole (from about three~quarters in 1952 to something 
under one-half in 1954), South Afric~D fruit and vegetables and South 
African sugar 1·Tere still finding about three-quarters of their overseas 
markets in the United Kingdom in 1960. The picture in respect of non-
ferrous ores and concentrates 1.,ras roughly similar and though the reliance 
on the British market for purchases of South African wool was somewhat 
less, even in this department Britain was still taking almost one-fifth 
of South Africa's total exports at the end of the period. There are, 
moreover, additional reasons for believing that this gave Britain real 
monopsony power over these principal South African primary uommodity exports 
and that, notwithstanding the decline in Britain's share of food and wool 
exports, this increased, if anything, over the period. 
To begin with, though complaints had been voiced by South Africans in the 
late 1950s that Britain was doing little to prevent the dilution of 
commonwealth preference, 164 it seems clear from a survey of 1962 that 
they continued to receive significant trading privileges in Britain as 
a result of the operation of this system. 165 In this year over two-
thirds of all of South Africa's exports to the British market received 
preference, with an average margin of 11.6 per cent. Taking non-prefer-
ential exports into account as well 9 this gave all South Africa's 
exports to the United Kingdom an average margin of preference of 
166 
almost 8 per cent, which was just above the Commonwealth average. 
South African foodstuffs were amongst those most generously treated. 
Thus fresh oranges and apples received seasonal and specific margins 
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of about 5 per cent, maize 10 per cent 9 tinned apricots, pears and 
peaches 12 per cent and sugar about 15 per cent. 167 Not only, therefore, 
was the British market for certain South African exports relatively 
large, it was also relatively sheltered. 
Next, though the market for primary commodities remained strong in the 
mid=1950s 9 with the result that Soutb Africa would probably not have 
had major difficulty in finding alternative markets for its foodstuffs, 
wool and non=ferrous ores and concentrates, this no longer obtained 
after the end of 1957 9 as we have already on more than one occasion 
remarked. Indeed, from this time until near the end of the period, 
these South African primary commodity exports to Britain took place 
against a background of weakening international demand and growing sur= 
pluses. Non-ferrous ores were particularly affected by the termination 
of US stockpiling in 1957-58 whilst wool prices, as we have seen, were 
also being depressed by the challenge from synthetic fibres e A.nd thmlgh, 
in the key year of 1960 9 food prices had fallen less rapidly than those 
of other primary commodities, they showed the largest declines in 1961. 
Particularly affected were course grains (notably maize), sugar (which 
saw the lowest free market prices for 25 years in 1961) 9 and both decid-
d •t f •t 168 A~ • t h . t t• 1 b k d uous an c1. rus ru1. • noa1.ns sue an 1.n erna 1.ona ac groun , 
therefore, it is not surprising that the Times Review of IndustEY should 
have observed in May, 1960, that: "At the moment at least 9 there do not 
appear to be any alternative markets where any loss of sales in the UK 
market could be made good •••• Efforts have been made to enter the 
European market, but apart from citrus fruits, sales of South African 
products have not been big. Scandinavia is a possible alternative out-
let", it continued, "but there is little likelihood that it could replace 
Britain11 • 169 In such circumstances, moreover, the Commonwealth preference 
obtained by South Africa in the British market made that market even more 
important. 17° 
Finally 9 the difficulty which South Africa "10uld have faced in securing 
alternative markets to Britain as a result of this development was com-
pounded by the appearance of other problems in the summer of 1960 in 
some of its hitherto expanding markets: first, in the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where the Union \·Jas obliged to sign such an 
unfavourable trade pact171 that the share of South Africa's total non-
gold exports taken by the Federation shrank from 13.5 per cent in 
1959 to only 8.2 per cent by 1963 (App. B9 Table 5); second, in 
independent Africa and Asia, where the Sharpeville shootings pro-
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voked a trade boycott on South Africa v1hich quickly gained significant, 
if not comprehensive, support. 172 Although it is true that the indepen-
dent states of Africa, Asia and, indeed, the F·liddle East, took betv1een 
them less than 6 per cent of South Africa's total non-gold exports in 
1959-1960 and v1ere not, in any case, likely purchasers of the kind of 
primary commodities v1hich South Africa exported to Britain, their 
action and especially their attempts at the United Nations to press 
South Africa's leading Western trading partners into following suit, 
together with the unfavourable developments in trade \·Ti th the Federation, 
clearly worsened a situation which had already been rendered unpropitious 
for South African exports by the depressed international comLnodity markets. 
All things considered then, it seems fair to conclude that, although 
South Africa \..ras making some limited progress in finding new markets, 
especially in Japan (App. B9 Table 5), the attractions of the British 
market together with the general difficulties of the international 
situation fa-eing South African commodity exports after 1957, made 
Pretoria at least as dependent on Britain in this department at the 
end of the period as it was at the beginning (1vhen the United Kingdom 
Has absorbing a higher proportion of the Union's exports of foodstuffs 
and wool), if not moreso. Furthermore, this dependence was clearly 
considerable. 1Vhat was the situation with regard to South Africa's 
more specialized exports to Britain? Let us look first at uranium. 
It v1ill quickly be apparent that the situation here vras, in fact, very 
similar. 
To begin vli th, as vre have seen, exports of uranium rapidly assumed con-
siderable importance in the ranks of South Africa's major export commod-
ities, accounting for 7.5 per cent of gold~included exports in 1960 (more 
than \vool). Uranium production also constituted a priceless lifeline 
to many of South Africa's marginal gold mines, which were constantly 
being squeezed bet1..reen rising costs and the officially fixed price for 
gold and, in addition, it is evident that a domestic uranilun industry 
developed in close cooperation with the atomic agencies of Britain and 
America was essential to the South African government's own nuclear 
plans for the future. 173 
It is impossible 9 of course, to discover in just what proportion South 
Africa 1 s annual uranium output v1as absorbed by Britain during this 
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period but what we do know is that until 1958 the Union was contract-
ually obliged to sell its entire production to the explicitly monopson-
ist Combined Development Agency. Moreover, it was only released from 
this arrangement in 1958 as a result of a developing world surplus of 
uranium which made the subsequent search for alternative markets almost 
hopeless in any case. Even in the early shortage years, therefore, 
South Africa was bound to sell its uranium to a closed and secretive 
inter-governmental agency which left it no say in the ultimate destin-
ation of its production. In particular, it is unthinkable that the 
Nationalist government could have successfully insisted on selling its 
uranium exclusively to the US government since American concurrence in 
such an arrangements wound have contradicted the ivhole rationale of the 
CDA and made Britain's position in that organization untenable. Britain's 
rleparture, furthermore, \vould not, as vie have seen, have sui ted America 1 s 
purpose. Finally, the monopsony power of the CDA itself over South 
Africa was reinforced by the fact that, outside the Soviet Bloc, only 
Britain and the USA possessed the capacity for large-scale enrichment, 
without vlhich uraniuJn oxide \·laS useless in its major military and civil 
applications. In short, British/CDA monopsony power over South Africa in 
the purchase of uranium was more or less complete throughout the whole 
period and, given the importance attached by the Nationalist govel~ent 
to the development of its uranium industry, it is likely that this amount-
ed to a substantial increment of South African export dependence upon 
Britain. Has South Africa equally dependent upon Britain for the market-
ing of its gold? 
It is clear from Appendix B, Table 44 9 that in the early 1950s South 
Africa did not send to Britain much more gold than was required to off-
set its regular commercial deficit \vi th the Sterling Area and, \vi th the 
London Gold Market operating under war-time restrictions until J.VIarch 1954, 
found it advantageous to send gold direct to New York in settlement of its 
dollar deficit and market the remainder on the world's 'free markets', 
\vhere~ after the scare created by the outbreak of war in Korea, it Has 
able to obtain a substantial premium over the official price and where 
operations were much easier after the softening in the Il1F's attitude 
tmv-ards such dealings which occurred in late 1951. 174 Already by 1952, 
however, the free markets \·rere less buoyant and by 1954 the free market 
premium had disappeared altogether. Indeed, it Has this fact vrhich, as 
\·!e have seen, made possible the re-opening of the London Gold :rviarket in 
:rviarch of that year, an event which was swiftly followed by the re-direc= 
tion of almost the entire output of South Africa's gold mines to London 
until 1959 (App. B, Table 44). How important, then, was the London 
Gold f1arket to South Africa's gold marketing policy? 
It is probably fair to say that the very fact which made possible the 
re-opening of the London Gold Market - the disappearance of the free 
market premium - made London an especially valuable entrepot for South 
Africa, for the loss of the premium constituted a double blovr to the 
profitability of the Union's gold mines: first~ in the direct sense 
that forty per cent of annual production could no longer be sold for 
more than ¢35 per troy ounce; second and indirectly, because it 
effectively finished off earlier optimism that a high free market premium 
might force the US government to countenance an increase in the official 
price. 175 With production costs rising, therefore, this development 
clearly meant that the special rates offered for bullion shipments 
from the Union to the United Ilingdom by the Union-Castle Line, the low 
insurru1ce premiums available in London, and the traditional expertise 
of the London bullion houses, had become particularly important to 
South Africa's gold=mining industry. In short, London was the cheapest 
and most convenient entrepot at a time vrhen such things had to be weighed 
very seriously. With little excitement in the free markets until the end 
of the decade, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that access to 
the London Gold l\1arket was valuable to South Africa; that it was not 
indispensable, hm·Tever~ is confirmed by the events from 1959 to 1961. 
In early 1959, for reasons which were probably initially rooted in re-
ne\ved Afrikaner economic nationalism coupled \vi th a desire to undermine 
the official price of gold? rather than in immediate commerical consid-
erations, the Union government announced its intention to allow the 
South African Reserve Bailie to sell gold direct to private purchasers 
outside the Sterling Area if the price offered \·ras better than that on 
the London Gold Market. 176 By the end of the year, a local gold mar-
ket Has also taking shape. 177 The results of this nevr 'direct sales' 
policy, as it was called, can be clearly seen from App. B, T~ble 44, 
where it is revealed that in 1959 about 14 per cent of South Africa's 
net sales abroad by-passed London, rising to over 30 per cent in the 
follO\'ling year - most of it air-freighted direct to Zurich. 178 
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The success of the direct sales policy, especially in 1960 9 was clear= 
ly assisted by the exceptional upsurge in demand for gold in the second 
half of that year created as a result of the political uncertainties 
surrounding the Congo crisis together with the continuing American bal-
ance of payments deficit (see page 98 above) o HO\·Tever 9 the air route 
to Zurich remained uncompeti ti ve \·Ti th the shipping service to London 179 
and, \·Ti th the subsequent stabilization of the free market price close to 
the earlier level and the American decision at the end of 1960 to start 
supporting the Bank of England in the London Gold Market, South Africa 
began to re-direct its gold sales to London in 1961. In that year only 
about 11 per cent of its net sales abroad by-passed London and by 1962 
the London Gold Market v1as once more South Africa's exclusive outlet 
(App. B, Table 44). Nevertheless, South Africa had demonstrated that, 
although valuable, London \•Tas not indispensable to the marketing of_ 
its annual gold output and that, indeed, the by~passing of this market 
was far more damaging to Britain and, for that matter, its chief econo-
mic ally, the United States, than it was to the South African government 
and the gold-mining companies, as vTe shall see in 8hapter IV o 
Finally~ then,what of South Africa's dependence on Britain as a market 
for its diamonds? Like nearly all other diamond-producing countries, 
South Africa's entire annual output was, of course, sent to the 
London diamond market via the selling organization of the Diamond Cartel, 
as \·Te have already had occasion to note o It is vTell known, hoVTever, 
that the bulk of this production was destined for ultimate consumption 
in the United States. 180 Again, therefore, it is important to distin-
guish bet\'leen Britain as a market and Britain. as an entrepot for South 
Africa's exports and, as a market, Britain's monopsony power over 
South Africa's diamond sales \'las limited not only by its smallness in 
comparison to that of the USA but also by the fact that diamonds were 
the one major commodity exported by South Africa (gold e~cepted) which 
did not suffer from a significant slump in world demand at the end of 
the 1950s. 181 
On the other hand, since the London diamond market viaS by far the most 
important in the entire world diamond trade and \·laS 9 furthermore 9 con-
trolled by the British=South African Diamond Cartel, any attempt by the 
Nationalist government to interfere Hith the marketing of South Africa's 
domestic production through this traditional channel would have repre-
sented a direct challenge to the principle upon which this enormously 
po,.,erful organization reposed. As a result 9 it vTOuld have met Hi th 
enormous resistance as well as suffering a commercial loss in its O\'lll 
right (see page 106 above) had it been ultimately successful. It 
seems likely, therefore, that this represented another significant 
South African entanglement in 'the British connection' throughout the 
period. 
Further to this assessment of the economic flows from South Africa to 
Britain vrhich has been made for the 1951~1964 period in the second part 
of this Section, then, it is possible to summarize the argument as 
follovJS. To begin with, as was earlier concluded, Britain was much more 
dependent upon its imports from South Africa than the broad figures of this 
particular bi-lateral relationship initially suggested. But in the second 
place, detailed examination of both the significance of, and the avail-
ability of alternative markets or entrepots for, South Africa's princi-
pal exports to Britain indicates that the initial impression of very 
considerable South African export dependence upon the United Kingdom is 
substantially vindicated. This was especially true with regard to food-
stuffs, uranium and, perhaps, diamonds and was, if anything, increasing 
over the period. Nevertheless, one rider of extreme significance must 
be attached to this second broad conclusion, for there is no doubt that 
South Africa's export dependence upon Britain was strongly off-set by the 
fact that, especially after 1958, the strengthening in demand for gold on 
the free markets made it feasible for South Africa to by-pass the London 
Gold IVIarket. Noreover, gold, it cannot be emphasized too strongly 9 
accounted for 35 per cent, on average, of South Africa's total exports 
over the period as a \'lhole and for as much as 40· per cent in 1960 - a 
crucial year, as '"e shall see. 
vle have so far been considering only ,.,hat Knorr calls the 1 economic strength' 
dimension of Anglo-South African economic relationships over the 1951~1964 
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period but before all the different strands of this are pulled together, 
and before any final assessment can be made of the putative economic 
power relationship \vhich obtained behmen the t;.,ro countries on the two 
occasions during this period in which \ve are most interested, it is 
necessaryf as was indicated at the beginning of this Chapter, to take 
into account the 'non-economic bases' of putative economic power poss= 
essed by Britain and South Africa respectively. It is to this question 
that attention \vill next be directed, follovJed by the final assessment 
(in which gold and foreign currency reserves will also be included) of 
putative economic power during the period of the Simonstown negotiations 
and the aftermath of the Sharpeville shootings. 
PART B. 
THE 'NON-ECONONIC BASES' OF PUTATIVE ECONOHIC POVIER 
Knorr, it will be recalled, suggests that 'economic strength' can only 
be transformed into putative economic power if the states in question 
possess certain relevant non-economic attributes, in particular, the 
will to use such strength in diplomatic negotiation, the skill to 
exert it, and the reputation for its successful employment. Let us 
consider, first, the degree to which these were possessed by the 
British government on the occasions in question during the 1951-1964 
period. 
1o The case of the British governm~nt. 
"As is true of the resort to military strength", Knorr remarks, "govern= 
perceptions of the need for, or advantage of, bringing economic povrer to 
bear, depend crucially on the emergence of particular interstate situ-
ations", 182 and it is 9 of course, possible that \vha t the British govern-
ments of these years held to be Britain's non-economic interests in 
South Africa, that is to say, concern for the High Commission Territor-
ies (South Africa's'hostages'), security at the Cape and ties of 'kith 
and kin', 183 may well have eroded the will to employ any possible economic 
strength vis=a-vis the Nationalist party government for fear of the reper-
cussions \·Jhich this might have had on these other interests. This is an 
important consideration and, in terms of governmentpe1Ceptions, should 
not be summarily dismissed as involving self-evident rationalizations. 
127. 
HoVJever~ it seems more appropriate to consider these questions in the 
context of the predominantly political chapters to follow and they \-Jill 9 
as a result, be postponed until then. 
As far as the strictly conceived 'non-economic bases' of putative econ-
omic pm-Ier (apropos Knorr) are concerned, it is at once apparent that the 
British government was 9 throughout the 1951-1964 period, proudly wanting 
in all of them. Though it is true that a Labour Chancellor (Stafford 
Cripps) had, for instance, threatened to refuse South Africa access to 
the London capital market in the early post-war years, this move had a 
strictly limited economic purpose (to extract more favourable gold sale 
arrangements out of the Union government - see page 95 above) and, in 
any case~ a Conservative government ~ under successive ministries - held 
pO\ver in Britain for the duration of the period under reviev1. F'or a 
variety of reasons, these ministries lacked the will, first of all, to 
apply any possible economic strength in their diplomatic dealings with 
the South African government and it will soon be apparent that, without 
implying any sort of economic reductionism, it is not altogether illumin-
ating to describe some of the more important of them as 'non-economic'. 
To begin vJith, it must naturally be recorded that, though the Conservative 
governments of these years were reluctantly coming to tenns vii th the 
'mixed economy' 9 at any rate, they remained, by and large, idologically 
committed to a minimum of state interference in economic affairs in 
general. This, indeed, was one of the most insistent themes of Tory 
economic policy from the return of the first post~war Conservative 
government at the end of 1951: that is to say, the 'dismantling' of war-
imposed and Labour-encouraged 'collectivism' = the new Conservative econ-
omic 1freedom•. 184 When to this is added the fact, which we had occasion 
to note in Chapter ! 9 that it viaS also their habit to defer to the Bank 
of England and to "judge policy in general according to the confidence 
it inspired abroad11 , 185 it is not surprising that there was little Tory 
stomach for politically-inspired'meddling' with economic relationships 
with such an important trading partner as South Africa. 
In his study of the foreign policy=making process in Britain 9 Wallace 
has, in fact, drawn explicit attention to the influence of what he calls 
"the dominant economic ideology of British policy-makers both before and 
after \•lorld War II" in contributing to the unthinkability of allo\ving 
political considerations to interfere Hith the free Horking of the 
international market. Quoting the example of Treasury and ministerial 
opposition to Foreign Office and Board of Trade proposals "to expand 
British economic influence in the Balkru1s, as a cotmter to German 
economic and political penetration" in the immediate pre-1var years 
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on these grounds, he concludes that this attitude persisted into the 
post-vJar period vli th the result that "Large areas of foreign economic 
policy were therefore taken as given: not closely linked with foreign 
policy because t~ey were not seen as proper or as available instruments 
of foreign policy11 • 186 
Of course, in this respect the "dominant economic ideology" merely 
reinforced a long-standing feature of the •style' of British foreign 
policy, which, as vre saw in Chapter I 9 had nothing to do with any sort 
of economic ideology but merely with the fact that the British economy 
was, relatively, very heavily engaged in international trade and 
finance. As the British spokesman representing the vlilson government 
on the UoN. Committee on Sanctions against South Africa actually said: 
"the United Kingdom economy depended on maintaining an increasing vol-
ume of trade 1·ri th all countrieR and on keepine all the chap.nels of 
trade as free as possible. The interruption of one sector of trade", 
he continued, "might do cumulative damage to an economy geared to 
foreign markets and could be contemplated only in the gravest circum-
stances". 187 Furthermore, as we also smr in Chapter I, the refusal of 
the Conservatives to contemplate the intrusion of political consider~ 
ations into international trading and financial relationships was 
stubbornly maintained despite rising diplomatic costs towards the end 
of the period. 
If these reasons alone, then, were insufficient to erode the will of 
these Conservative governments to employ any possible economic strength 
vis-a-vis South Africa, the weight within the government party's ranks 
188 
of businessmen and financiers in general, and of those vli th personal 
economic stakes in the continuing prosperity of that country in particu-
1 t · l Th" · ll t f the House of Lords. 189 ar, cer a1n y was. _1S was espec1a y rue o 
Furthermore 9 beyond the Tory party in Parliantent (though very closely 
connected with it, of course) 9 19° 1·1ere the various powerful pro=Sou th 
African business and financial lobbies. 
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Knorr, quite rightly 9 lays particular stress on the point that the will 
of a government to diplomatically utilize economic strength may be 
undermined by pressure from sectional interests Hhich stand to lose 
from its exertion, though, as he also points out, this may be off-set 
by counter-pressure from those which stand to gain: the net result being 
determined by the respective political weight of the t\vo groups. 191 He 
adds, ho\·Jever, that the disadvantaged groups (such as consumers in the 
case of a proposed import ban on a particular country supplying cheap 
goods) tend to start with a handicap since they are normally more diffuse 
and less conscious of the detrimental effects \·Jhich the economic power-
play will have on them. 192 
It is clear, hoHever, that, in the case of Anglo-South African economic 
relations over the period in question, there vmuld have been very fm.,r 
economic gainers from a breach in these relations (South Africa's 
principal exports to the United Kingdom not being in direct competition 
vlith domestically produced goods, for example) and that, on the other 
hand, the losers would have lost very heavily and were, furthermore, 
if not quasi-government agencies such as the U.K.A.E.A. and the Bank of 
England, those with the most intimate access to, and influence upon, 
the Conservative govern~ents of these years; that is to say, the 
business and financial communities, acting either directly or through 
their representative groups. 193 
The full strength and ferocity of these sectional interests was naturally 
never revealed during the 1951-1964 period because it was never remotely 
likely that any Conservative government Hould attempt to exert economic 
pressure against South Africa, despite increasingly shrill demands for 
such action from leading Asian and African states over the question of 
apartheid, It did, however, become fully visible - and much better 
organized (especially through illCSATA, the United Ilingdom-South Africa 
Trade Association) 194- after the Labour party was returned to office 
in October 1964 on the basis of a programme which had included heavily 
qualified promises to truce a tougher line towards South Africa. 195 The 
ne\'1 \vilson government did, in fact, translate I'"'acmillan' s belated and, in 
any case, wholly disingenuous, partial arms ban on South Africa196 into 
a total arms ban but since, after some initial fumbling over Buccaneer 
aircraft, it was agreed to honour existing contracts, 197 the new policy 
was not put to serious test until the end of 1967, when the South African 
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government began touting a new and particularly lengthy shopping list 
for arms in Britain. On this occasion, the pro-South African business 
lobby in the United Kingdom was especially active and clearly represent-
ed a major factor in the nearness to vlhich the Cabinet came in lifting 
the embargo. 198 As the Chairman of UKSATA and of the Southern Africa 
Committee of the British National Export Council reported to his coll-
eagues after the event, "I believe that the battle on the decision on 
the supply of arms was t-ri thin an ace of being tvon". 199 
1:Ti th the will to employ economic strength in their diplomatic dealings 
with the South African governments of these years, for all of these 
reasons, thus signally lacking, a consideration of the degree to which 
the British governments possessed the remaining 'non~economic bases' 
of putative economic power- to whit, skill in exerting economic strength 
and reputation for its successful employment - becomes strictly academic. 
It would thus be an exercise of extraordinary pedantry to measure the 
Britain of these years against the catalogue of administrative and 
social attributes Hhich Knorr holds to be germane to the possession of 
skill in the exercise of economic strength200 and then proceed to 
'reputation'. Nevertheless, at the remaining risk of appearing to take 
a sledgehammer to crack a nut, the follm-ring observations seem briefly 
-v10rth recording, partly because they assist in relating this Section to 
the points made in Chapter I and partly because they help in highlight-
ing the contrast between the British and South African governments and 
social systems \vhich are so relevant to this part of the argument. 
Amongst the national attributes \vhich Knorr lists as being relevant to 
the skill required for the diplomatic exploitation of economic strength 
are three in which Britain was clearly lacking during the 1951-1964 
period: first, a high degree of bureaucratic co-ordination; second, a 
command economy; and third, easy manipulation of domestic opinion - in 
short, the typical attributes of a totalitarian, or quasi-totalitarian, 
society, \>lith a wholly nationalized economy. 
As far as the first point is concerned, \'Tallace has stressed the degree 
to which the activities of the economic ministries, on the one hand, and 
the foreign political ministries on the other, were 'compartmentalized' 
in Whitehall over the 1951-1964 period, as v1e saw in Chapter I 9 and 
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although on Beloff's evidence (see pages 63-64 above) things seemed to 
be changing in this respect in the later years of the period, this 
constituted rather evidence of the relative rise in economic priorities 
in British foreign policy at this time than of really significant 
improvement in inter-departmental co-ordination. As for the second 
attribute, though it is true that the British government was directly 
involved in the South African trade through the import of gold, it was 
only otherwise involved indirectly, that is to say 9 through public 
corporations, and one of the most significant of these in this context, 
the UKAEA 9 l·Tas 9 as \·1e have seen, obliged to purchase its uranium from 
South Africa through an intermediary organization (the CDA) which was 
dominated by the United States government. Furthermore, as J.E. Spence 
points out 9 since South Africa was a member of the Sterling Area, Treas-
ury permission was not required for the capital outflow. 201 Finally, 
as for the third attribute, it would be difficult indeed to hold that 
the British governments of these years could have easily persuaded a 
people just beginning to enjoy the fruits of post-war prosperity to 
bear the costs of economic warfare, especially since the theme of 
1affluence 9 was of such electoral significance to the Tory party at 
this time. 
In view of all this 9 therefore, it is hardly surprising that the British 
governments of this period had no reputation at all for the successful 
diplomatic exploitation of economic strength. As the Wilson government's 
Sanctions Committee spokesman also told his fellow members, "Except on 
the occasion of action taken by the League of Nations against Italy in 
1935, and except as regards restrictions of a strategic character made 
necessary by considerations of national security, Britain had only inter-
rupted trade in the past where her national survival was at stake11 • 202 
Furthermore 9 in view of what actually happened on these occasions,
203 the 
least he could do was to remark (albeit at an earlier meeting) that 
"the United Kingdom's experience had given it cause to believe that what 
was termed 'economic \o/arfare' had serious limitations". 204 Subsequent 
events with regard to Britain's relations with Southern Rhodesia proved 
this nothing if not prophetic. 
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2o The case of the South African government. 
With the same rider attached to this part as that prefixing the treat-
ment of the British government's 'non-economic bases' of putative economic 
power~ that is to say, that the South African government's non-economic 
interests in the British connection (such as the security link 9 \vhich may 
legitimately be held to have eroded its will to employ economic strength 
against the United Kingdom) 9 vrill be dealt \vi th in the following poli t= 
ical chapters~ we can no\v proceed to contrast the 'non-economic bases' 
of the South African government's putative economic power with those 
of the British over the 1951-1964 period. It will soon be apparent that 
the contrast was quite pronounced. vfuat, first of all, then~ of the will 
of the South African governments of these years to build up and then to 
exploit economic strength in its dealings vrith Britain? 
To begin with, the Nationalist party government which achieved office in 
the Union in 1948 and was to remain in possession of it for the remainder 
of the period - under Malan~ Strijdom and Ven1oerd in succession - did not 
share the British Conservative party's ideological distaste for state 
intervention in the economy; quite the contrary~ in fact. It has 
already been noted that it Has the Nat-Lab 'Pact 1 government v1hich 9 as 
early as 1928~ was responsible for the creation of ISCOR 9 the state-
O\med steel corporation205 but~ as Horwitz indicates~ this vTas only one 
of the earlier manifestations of the determination of the militant sec-
tion of Afrikaans-speaking South African society, that is to say, of 
'Afrikanerdom', to ensure that the market economy was firmly under the 
control of "the political factor". The initial and enduring reason for 
this is clear: it was to ensure that economic development under the 
prompting of purely market imperatives did not unde1~ine Afrikaans 
culture and white supremacy in South Africa. 206 "Hith the political 
factor restored to ·parliamentary po1:mr in the 1948 General Election" 9 
as Hor\·li tz records of the post-Smuts interlude, "Dr. Malan set his 
entirely Afrikaner Government to the complete realization of its 
objective - the unchallengeable, unalterable control of South African 
society in general and the South African economy in particular ••• ". 207 
This ideologically-inspired determination of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
party to control the South African economy \·Jas further encouraged, of course 9 
because the very economic development which threatened to mix the races 
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was directed and exploited by the traditonal twin enemies of Afrikanerdom 9 
to Hhit 9 the British=based companies and the English-speaking section of 
the white population vri th v1hich they -vrere naturally most closely allied. 208 
It is thus not surprising that what in this regard encouraged state inter-
vention in the economy in general should also have provided a positive 
enthusiasm - certainly on the extreme wing of the Nationalist party - for 
the development of 'passive', if not 'active', economic strength vis-a-
vis Britain. For the British connection, even under dominion status with-
in the Commonwealth, still signified to the Nationalist party 'imperialist 
domination' - political and economic = and was regarded by it, as such 9 
as an anathema to be cast off as rapidly as vras electorally expedient 
(given the size of the English-speaking voting public) and as was 
militarily and diplomatically convenient. 209 In the event, as we shall 
see in Chapters III and IV, this was to be a rather lengthier process 
than was originally envisaged but, for the moment 9 it is only necessary 
to note that this repugnance towards the British connection (which 9 as 
is well kno1m 9 had placed a number of subsequent Nationalist party lead-
ers in Smuts' gaols during the second World War for pro-German sentiment) 
generated in full measure the first condition which Knorr suggests as 
necessary to the vlill to use economic strength, that is to say, "the 
disposition to favour an aggressive use of national power vis-a-vis 
foreign countries which act to frustrate the pursuit of 'national 
interests 111 • 210 
The drive towards an increased measure of economic self-sufficiency in 
general and especially towards reduced economic dependence upon Britain, 
\vhich was the natural outcome of this feeling = a feeling which thus in-
creased economic strength itself as well as making it more likely that 
it v10uld be exerted - \vas, in fact, well under i"ray long before it became 
a South African imperative under the mounting threat of Afro-Asian and, 
possibly, United Nations economic sanctions against South Africa (as a 
result of the apartheid policy) in the early 1960s. This was to be 
seen especially in the Nationalist government's encouragement of manu-
facturing industry in the 1950s (in order that imports might be replaced 
by domestic production) 211 but so too in the search for alternative 
trading partners to Britain (which, as we have seen earlier in this 
Chapter 9 had achieved a measure of success by the turn of the 1960s) 
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and in such developments as the production of oil from coal. Against 
the background of an economy which was held by certain sections of 
Afrikaner economic opinion to be achieving self-sustaining growth, 
it was also to be seen in the ill-concealed satisfaction of this same 
body of opinion at the flight of portfolio capital from South Africa 
at the end of the 1950s and in the simultaneous appearance of demands 
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for more indigenous share-holding in the British-dominated companies. 21 3 
As the South African contributor to the Oxford symposium on the Sterling 
Area observed in 1959, "Growing national consciousness makes a course 
designed to .diminish the country's dependence on Britain, to weaken 
the imperial connection, and to make it move more independently in 
financial matters and less as a member of a group, politically attractive 
in the existing climate of opinion". 21 4 
If the Nationalist party governments of the 1951-1964 period were thus 
determined to assert the supremacy of the political factor in the 
economy in general and given no disincentive to employ it against the 
British government as a result of its feelings about 'British imperial-
ism', it becomes relevant to consider the extent to which the other 
characteristics of South African society measure up to the remaining 
dispositions which Knorr considers germane to the will to employ econo-
mic strength in diplomacy, amongst which is "the degree of national 
solidarity to which a government can appeal in the exercise oc- bu:iJ.d-llp 
of economic poHer 11 • 21 5 
In view of the effects which Nationalist government policy was having 
or threatening to have216- on the position of the hitherto dominant 
English-speaking section of South African society, and on the evidence 
of the reaction which it was provoking (the 'Torch Commando', for instance), 
it seems safe to conclude that the government in Pretoria might have had 
certain difficulties in this respect in the early and mid-1950so At 
this time, moreover, the legislative and para-military apparatus for 
ensuring 'solidarity' amongst the 'non-white' population was not as 
d d h . l't b tl t b 21 7 a vance , or as compre ens1ve, as was su sequen y o ecome. By 
the late 1950s and especially in the early 1960s, hmoJever 9 this position 
had significantly altered. 
By this time, it is clear that the English-speaking population of South 
Africa had, by and large, reached a stage of accommodation \·Ji th the 
Nationalist government 9 if not \vi th 1 Afrikanerdom 1 as suche This was 
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certainly true of most sections of the business community218 and even 
its political representatives in the United Party seemed to be finding 
it increasingly difficult to differ with the government in the area 
of foreign policy? at any rate. 219 Indeed 1 as foreign condemnation 
of the Nationalist government's apartheid policy became more ferocious 
at the beginning of the 1960sp as 'non-white' unrest continued to 
simmer and occasionally explode, and as events such as those in the 
Congo served to confirm white prejudice in South Africa.concerning the 
consequences of black political power? it became apparent that there 
was a closing of ranks - or at least a temporary marriage of conveni-
ence - between the two sections of the white community in South Africao 
The appropriately termed 'white laager' wasp in factp consciously 
220 
cultivated by Dro Verwoerd, who 9 moreover? had held unquestioned 
authority within his own party since his replacement of Strijdom in 1958o 221 
The building of v1hi te solidarity in South Africa in the course of this 
period was also made easierp of coursep by the increasing control which 
was being exercised by the government over the dissemination of ideas 
within the countryo This was occurring in the press, despite the 
influence and resilience of the English-language newspapers, and partic-
ularly through the government's absolute control over .the. SA .Broadcast= 
ing Company. Not surprisingly, the Nationalist government refused to 
countenance the introduction of television into South Africa. 222 Against 
such a background, it is the least which could have been said by the 
British spokesman on the UN Sanctions Committee, when he observed that 
"The psychological effects of sanctions should also be considered 1122.3 0 0 0 0 
and for the same reason appropriate that Spence should have recorded, 
at the end of the period under review, that "the present government has 
had some success in creating in the minds of its supporters a conviction 
that extraordinary measures are justified to protect South Africa from 
internal subversion and external attack11 • 224 
In view of the foregoing argument, it follows - apropos Knorr's third 
will=sustaining disposition225 = that there was, in the early 1960s 
at any rate, a strengthening in white backing for the Nationalist govern= 
t ' d t f f . 1· 226 If th· t 1 1 d men s con uc o ore1gn po 1CYo 1s was no c ear y emon-
strated as far as the English=speaking whites were concerned by the 
result of the referendum on the Republic in October 1960,227 it became 
slowly more obvious after the new republic's departure from the Common-
228 
wealth early in the follmving year and in the increasing size of 
the poll for the Nationalist party in subsequent elections. 229 The 
support of the vast majority of Afrikaners for their government's 
lead in foreign policy was, of course, axiomatic 7 \·Thilst the attitude 
of the 'non-\vhi te 1 population was, naturally 9 of no consequence. 
Finally, then 9 as regards the will of the Nationalist governments mf 
these years to build up and to employ economic strength in their 
diplomatic relations Hith the United Kingdom, what of the respective 
1:reights of the sectional interests in South Africa Hhich stood to 
either gain or lose from such courses? For 9 as 1:1e saH in the case 
of the British government, the net product of political influence in 
terms of this equation can be a critical factor in the support or 
erosion of will in this regard. 
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This is a complex question in the South African context and is perhaps in 
any case not so consequential in comparison 1:1i th the British government 
as a result of the well knovm predeliction of the Nationalist party for 
the politics of ideology rather than for the politics of accommodation. 
Nevertheless, few authorities - even the most hostile - seem to hold 
that South African society was wholly in the thrall of a totalitarian 
regime during the 1951-1964 period and this question must, therefore, be 
tackled. It seems most sensible to divide the task by looking first at 
the sectional and 9 indeed, aggregate consequences of the build-up of 
~assive' economic strength vis-a-vis Britain and then to give some 
indication of the most important of the likely sectional reactions to its 
actualization in an encounter with the British government from such a 
base~ 23° 
As vle have already for the most part noted, the search for alternative 
foreign sources and the mobilization of more domestic capital, the 
diversification of trading patterns and the development of local 
manufacturing industry 9 vlere all part of the process by Hhich the 
Nationalist governments of these years sought to develop passive 
economic strength vis-a-vis the world in general and the British economy 
in particular 9 though this 9 of course 9 \vas by no means the only motive for 
these various courses of action. 231 Now in all of these developments it 
seems clear that the groups within South African society which stood to 
137. 
gain most were also those l·li th most political influence on the National~ 
ist government 9 that is to say 9 the rising sectors of Afrikaner economic 
enterprise232 and the swelling ranks of white voters in the growing 
state and semi-state corporations. 233 For it was precisely in the 
alteration of existing· economic patterns and thus in the provision of 
neH opportunities that it 1·ras most easy for the previously excluded 
Afrikaner to break into the hitherto English-dominated sectors of 
government administration, commerce, industry, finance, a..nd even, ultimate-
ly, mining itself. 234 It can be assumed that farmers, too, of great 
political significance to the Nationalist party, as He shall have 
occasion to further discuss, were not averse to finding other export 
markets to Britain, though it is true that they 1·1ere happy \·ri th the 
preference \vi th \vhich they vrere endO\ved in that particular sphere. 
On the other hand, of course, the groups most likely to lose as a result 
of these developments - to the extent that there would be sectional losses 
-Here those of the traditionally English- and JeHish-dominated business 
world (the 'Roggenheimer' complex), \vhich were least liked by the 
Nationalist party and vrhose opinions, therefore, could be expected to 
carry least weight \·lith it. In this connection, the Chamber of Mines 
had ahrays complained that the tariff p.'t'otection of South Africa 1 s 
1 infant 1 manufacturing industry vias damaging to its interests since it 
indirectly increased the costs of gold-mining. 235 
Having said this, hO\·rever, it is apparent that the English-speaking 
business community in South Africa had quite a lot to gain from the 
remainder of these policies themselves. They, too, were interested 
in getting as much capital as possible for domestic expansion and in 
the early 1950s - the period of massive investment in the ne1v Orange 
Free State goldfields and in uranium plants, as well as in manufac-
turing- Britain was clearly unable to provide all that vms required. 
They, too, were interested in expanding export markets in all parts 
of the world. vfuy should they not have been? 
Finally, in this connection, the aggregate costs imposed by the build-
up of passive economic strength can be briefly mentioned. To the extent 
that these resulted from the tariff protection of domestic manufacturing~ 36 
they do not seem to have impressed themselves particularly strongly on 
the white voting population of South Africa and especially not on its 
politically most significant Afrikaner component. Indeed the latter 
group \vas being told ivi th mounting pride by its economic leaders 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s of the steady grovJth in its 
incomes relative to those of the English-speaking \vhi tes. 237 Hmv 
(probably) apposite to this situation, therefore 9 is Knorr's obser-
vation that "slanted information and evaluation may prove effective 
as the policy in question is being carried out because the distribu-
tion of the accruing costs is diffuse or because the country concern-
ed is experiencing rapid grm·Jth \vhich 9 though in fact less than it 
v10uld have been vii thout the cultivation of economic povl8r 9 may be 
attributed to it". 238 
If the economic consequences of the build-up of passive economic 
strength vis-a-vis Britain for South Africa's most significant 
sectional interests do not seem to have been such as to deter the 
Nationalist government from following this course - but rather the 
reverse = ivha t of the significance in this regard of sectional re-
actions to government actualization of this strength (assuming it 
an active component as well) in its diplomatic dealings with the 
had 
British government? This question ivill be considered in the light 
of possible Nationalist moves rather than on the totally unrealistic 
supposition of a complete severance of economic relations between the 
two countries. 
On the further assumption that the South African government possessed 
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a measure of putative economic power vis-a-vis the British government in 
varying degrees during the 1951-1964 period (a point which has yet to be 
concluded), then 9 its actualization would have been most likely to in= 
volve the use of gold: partly because this was overwhelmingly South 
Africa's largest export to Britain, as we have seen 9 and partly because 
its disposal was 9 as vJe shall see later, one of the easiest to manipu-
late. The attitude of the gold-mining companies, hm·rever 9 vJas hardly 
likely to have deterred the Nationalist government from employing this 
weapon. 
If, on the one hand, the companies had opposed interference with the 
disposal of output through the London Gold Market in general, and via 
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the agency of the Bank of England in particular, this would have been 
of little consequence since, as we have already seen, they were not a 
part of the Nationalist government's political constituency. Moreover, 
if their opposition had been taken to any length, they would merely have 
invited the wholesale nationalization of their assets Hhich the extreme 
wing of the Nationalist party had so long desired. 239 If, on the other 
hand, they had supported such a move or simply remained neutral, so much 
the better for the government's singlemindedness of purpose at the 
critical moment and there is every reason to suppose that the latter 
attitude (that is to say~ of neutrality~ at the least) was the one 
which \'las in fact adopted by the gold-mining companies. Why should 
this have been so? 
The answer resides simply in the fact that both the companies and the 
South African government had been pressing for an increase in the 
official price of gold ever since the end of the war but had been met 
by unwavering and conclusive resistance from the American aoEinistra-
tion and from the IMF, which was dominated by the United States. It 
was not long, therefore, before it became apparent to both the National= 
ist government and the great Rand houses that only a weakening of the 
dollar itself could force the United States government into cotUltenan-
cing its de facto devaluation thxough an increase in the offical price 
of gold. Disruption of the normal channels, as He shall see in Chapter 
IV, was \-Tell designed to do this if other circumstances ~,omre propitious 9 
and political interference with the annual output of South Africa's gold 
mines thus served the interests of the Chamber of Mines as well as the 
Nationalist government. Having said this, however~ it is perhaps true 
that this coincidence of interests \·Tas less apparent in the mid-1950s 
than it Has in the later 1950s and early 1960s, for on the earlier 
occasion the free markets for gold were depressed and the economic ad-
vantages of gold marketing through London were thus more important to 
the ultimate profits of the companies. At this time, moreover, 
Afrikaner economic povTer within the Union did not represent such a 
strong countervailing force to the great Rand houses as it had become 
by the later years. 
Against this apparent paradox of Rand support for, or at least neutral-
ity in respect of, the actualization of economic strength through gold 
disposal by the Nationalist government, must be set the influence with-
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in the Nationalist party of South Africa's farming community 9 for this 
was traditionally dominated by Afrikaners and constituted in fact the 
very roots of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. 240 South African 
farmers P moreover 9 \'rere 9 as we established earlier in the present 
Chapter 9 particularly dependent upon the British market for their 
prosperity 9 the moreso as a result of the protection v1hich \vas afford-
ed many of their products in this market by Commonwealth preference and 
which continued even after South Africa ,.,i thdret.,r from the Commommal th 
itself in 1961. 241 On the face of it, therefore, it ,.,ould seem that 
the will of any Nationalist party government during this period to 
overtly and drastically exert economic pressure on Britain for diplo-
matic purposes (by blocking the repatriation of profits from British 
investments 9 for example) would have been substantially weakened by 
the fear of its repercussions on the heartland of its electoral support 
since 9 at the least 9 such a course of action would be likely to raise 
the spectre of a loss of preference for South African farming products 
in the British market. The potency of this consideration should not be 
underestimated but it is interesting to record the number of factors 
\•Thich probably allm·red the Nationalist government to give it less 
weight than might at first be supposed. 
In the first place, wool was quite an important agricultural export to 
242 Britain but this commodity was excluded from preference. Secondly, 
sugar was produced extensively in Natal and this was hardly an area in 
which the Nationalists had fe\11 votes to lose in any case. 243 Thirdly, 
the \'!hole burden of Afrikaner economic aspirations in the period under 
review was to reduce the dependence of the Afrikaner on agriculture and 
to move increasingly into commerce 9 finance, industry and mining, as 
we have seen. Fourthly, as a result of the progress of secondary 
industry in particular, agriculture provided a diminishing contribution 
to South Africa's gross domestic product 9 declining from 18 per cent 
in 1950 to only 10 per cent by 1965. 244 And finally, of course, the 
very fact that the 'platteland' farmer was the inspiration of Afrikan-
erdom at its most dogmatic and isolationist would have gone some con-
siderable way to reconcile him to a government policy \'lhich, though 
contrary to his immediate economic interests, would have provided him 
with gratifications of a different order. As Knorr observes, ngovern-
ments will receive support in the employment of economic pot·Ter even 
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though no over=all economic gains, or even economic losses 9 are antici-
pated as long as compensating non-economic gains are expected and 
sufficiently appreciated11 • 245 Amongst the most salient of the "non= 
economic gains" which he mentions as possibilities in this connection 
is "the satisfaction of punishing a disloyal ally". 246 As in the case 
of the gold-mining companies, hoHever, it must be added that the force of 
some of these qualifying points - with the particularly marked exception 
of the last one - was vreaker in the earlier than in the later years of the 
1951-1964 period. 
It is apparent, nonetheless, that 9 looking at the period as a vrhole 9 the 
South African Nationalist government was backed in good measure by the 
dispositions required to confer on it the will, or the determination, 
to apply any possible economic strength which it might have vis-a=vis 
the British government should it have felt the diplomatic necessity for 
such a course of action. Did it similarly possess the skill required for 
its exercise and the reputation for its successful exploitation in earlier, 
or other, encounters? 
There really can be little doubt that the Nationalist governments of 
these years possessed the necessary skill to transform economic strength 
into putative economic power. To begin 1vith, it was rapidly achieving 
(for reasons which we have already noted) a substantial measure of direct 
and indirect political control over the economy. As Horwitz appositely 
remarks, "In propagandist or leftist description, the South African 
political economy is so identified with capitalist exploitation that 
the extent of nationalized enterprise tends to go unperceived. In fact", 
he stresses, "South African governments took possession of the 'command-
ing heights' of the economy long before the concept \·Jas born in British 
Labour Party pamphleteering enthusiasm". 247 Indeed, the disposal of tvro 
of South Africa's most significant exports to Britain during the 1950s 
and early 1960s were under the absolute control of the government, uran-
ium through the SA Atomic Energy Board (created by the Atomic Energy Act, 
1948) 248 and gold through the SA Reserve Bank, 249 whilst, as He have seen, 
the government also had. some influence within the 'Diamond Cartel' through 
its position in the Diamond Producers Association (see page 106 above). 
It is clear, too, that the determination of 'Afrikanerdom' to break out 
of its agricultual redoubt and challenge the English-speaking population 
by moving into the business world in all of its spheres had also produced 
within its ranks businessmen, economists 9 and administrators of consider= 
able sophistication. 25° As ~tle have already had occasion to record 9 one 
of the reasons for the English-dominated business community's readiness 
to co-operate with the Nationalist government was in fact the greater 
efficiency of its ministries compared with those of the previous Smuts 
regime. 
As for co-ordination bet~tTeen the political and economic ministries which 9 
as He noted in the case of the British government 9 is so important to skill 
in this connection 9 it seems likely that at least three factors rendered 
this greater in the South African case. Firstly 9 the government machine 
' in South Africa ~tTas na tura.lly smaller than that in Britain; 251 secondly 9 
Eric Louw had had wide experience in both diplomatic and economic fields 
before he entered the Nalan cabinet in 1948 as Ninister for Economic 
Affairs 9 and when the Strij dom cabinet 1·1as formed at the end of 1954 he 
was given the portfolios of both Finance and External affairs (that is 
to say 9 during the final stages of the Simonstown negotiations) and 9 
though he dropped the former in 1956 9 he retained the latter for the 
~emainder of the period; 252 and thirdly, it seems safe to assume that 
any remaining failings of co-ordination were smoothed over by that notor-
ious freemasonry of 1Afrikanerdom 1 9 the Broederbond 7 tighter-knit by all 
accounts than any Tory party-City-business combination in Britain. 253 
Finally 7 then 7 did the South African governments of these years have any 
reputation for seeking to exploit economic strength which might, accord-
ingly, have induced British governments to make discrete diplomatic con-
cessions in anticipation of further action of this kind and, indeed 9 on 
the assumption that earlier exercises had been successful 9 encourage 
South African governments themselves to refain this weapon in their 
diplomatic armoury? This is not an easy question to ans\·Jer 9 partly 
because in so far as the post-Sharpeville period is concerned 9 any 
conclusion in this regard would be to pre-judge the subsequent analysis 
of what actually happened during the earlier negotiations over the 
Simonsto1m Agreements. In other words 9 it may be that a reputation for 
the successful employment of economic strength was acquired by the 
Nationalist government during the Simonstown negotiations which subsequent-
ly assisted it in its diplomatic dealings with the British government. 
Such a consideration 9 ho11rever 9 will have to wait until the later 
Chapters. A number of points on this question can nevertheless 
still be made at this stage. 
In the first place, if there is no evidence as yet to suggest that 
the Union government applied economic pressure on the British 
government to political ends during and immediately after the war, 
it is abundantly clear that- Smuts not\·.ri thstanding - it had achieved 
a marked reputation in the City of London by the later 1940s for 
being extremely 'unco-operative' with the rest of the Sterling Area 
in the manner of its dealings Hith the 'dollar pool'. Indeed, the 
whole history of the Union's war-time and immediate post-war relations 
with the Sterling Area demonstrated a highly developed indifference to 
being regarded as the odd man out, that is to say, as the richly-endovTed 
member which demanded all the privileges of membership but was less 
inclined to incur any obligations in return. No perusal of the City 
press during these years can mistake this reputation's reality. 
Now it is true that a reputation for tough dealing and an impatience 
with sentiment in the conduct of international economic relations is 
one thing; to employ such relations to political ends quite another. 
This, in fact, is illustrated by the British governments themselves of 
this period. On the other hand, it seems a reasonable supposition 
that if the anglophile Smuts had been prepared to countenance such an 
attitude (in such an important and sensitive matter as gold payments), 
then there may well have been apprehension in this regard in London when 
his control over the Union 1 s gold output \vas replaced by that of the 
notoriously anglophobe Nationalist party in 1948. This, however, must 
remain supposition. 
In any case, even if the Nationalist government inherited no reputation 
for 'active 1 economic pO\ver - and it is certainly true, too, that as 
the sanctions campaign began to mount against it from the beginning 
of the 1960s, the South African government had every reason to adopt 
a public posture similar in 'style' to that of the British government in 
the matter of 'mixing' business and politics = it is clear that as the 
1950s progressed it began to put increasing energies into the cultivation 
of a reputation for 'passive' economic power. The government's 0\offi 
Information Department played the leading role in this regard at this 
time but it was supplemented, if not outstripped, in the early 1960s 
by the lavishly private-funded activities of the South Africa Found-
ationo This 9 as Ruth First and her colleagues point out, was quickly 
to prove itself "one of the most effective propaganda organizations in 
the \'!estern \'I'Orld" o 254 How much is attributable to the efforts of this 
organization is an open question but the final report of the UN Comm-
ittee on Sanctions in early 1965 certainly shO\ved itself \vell appraised 
of the strength of the South African economyo 
PART C. 
THE PUTATIVE ECONOMIC PO\fER RELATIONSHIP 
Having considered in some detail both the economic and the non-economic 
bases of putative economic power possessed by the British and South 
African governments vis-a-vis each other over the 1951-1964 period in 
general, it is now necessary to draw all the various strands together 
and make a final assessment of the putative economic power relationship 
as a whole which obtained behmen them at the t\·TO junctures in the period 
during \vhich their political relations i•Tere put to most serious test and 
at \·lhich, as a result, any putative economic povrer is most likely to have 
been 1actualized 1 o This assessment must include, too 9 as was earlier 
indicated, a consideration of the liquid reserves which each country had 
at its disposal on these occasions and also some suggestion of the extent 
to i·rhich Britain 1 s position as a 'world economic power' 9 in contrast to 
South Africa, gave it an added edge over that country by placing the 
British government in a position to further or.obstruct coveted South 
African economic ambitions in the international forumo For it will be 
recalled that the introductory pages of this Chapter suggested that the 
discrepancy between them in this regard reinforced the impression 
created by a cursory inspection of the broad relativities of their bi-
lateral economic relations that, if there was putative economic power in 
the relationship betvTeen the hro countries, then it seemed most likely 
that it vmuld have been possessed by Bri taino 
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1 o Putative economic pm'ler during the Simons town negotiations 2 1254~1955. 
Let us begin our summary and assessment of this question by looking at 
South Africa's economic stake in Britain at this time. 
how export-dependent was South Africa on Bri t;:d.n? 
Hmv import- and 
As a source of supplyp it is clear that Britain was most important to 
South Africa on this occasion as a provider of arms and development 
capital, for in manufactures in general it is apparent that Britain 
had no monopoly whatsoever in the South African market. Equally 
·clearp ho\vever, is the fact that, even in these departments, Britain 
was no longer as indispensable to South Africa as it had been in the 
earlier post-vJar years. As \'le have seen, competition in the inter-
national market for arms vias already quite stiff by the mid-1950s and 
the Americans, in particular, had been edging strongly into Britain's 
position in the South African market since the first year of the decade. 
Furthermore, whilst the Nationalist government Has clearly intent on 
building up its military establislunent at this time 9 the urgency of 
its demand for foreign arms vias then nothing like as strong as it \vas 
later to become since the security problem did not seem so acute. And, 
as for British capital, Hhilst it is true that this continued to possess 
a variety of advantages for South Africa (the plus sign in~the balance 
of payments 9 for one thing) and \·Ihilst it \'las not at this stage even 
being claimed by Afrikaner economists that the country Has self-sustain-
ing in investment terms 9 nevertheless the financing of the new Orange 
Free State goldfield and the nevi uranium industry vias more or less com-
plete by this time and a continued infloH of British capital did not 
possess the political/psychological value to the Nationalist government 
which it was later to acquire. After all, despite motmting problems at 
the U.N. 9 from India and one or t•.,ro other countries, South Africa was not 
yet under the ferocious diplomatic assault \·Jhich it v1as to encounter in 
the post-Sharpeville period. Furthermore, Britain had by this time sub-
stantially lost its monopoly supply position in regard to long-term 
investment capital for the Union, in the face of considerable inflows 
from the United States 9 France and S111i tzerland, not to mention the 11/orld 
Bank. In short, South Africa's 'import dependence' upon Britain during 
1954~1955 was largely a statisical illusion. 1:/as export dependence more 
of a reality? 
11~. 
In this case the question is more complex. Indeed 9 it has already been 
suggested that detailed examination of South Africa's economic flows to 
Britain seems to confirm the broad impression of considerable South 
African export dependence upon the United Kingdom's markets and entrepot 
centres throughout the 1951-1964 period. This was almost certainly the 
case 9 in fact 9 with regard to the Union's exports of diamonds during the 
period of the Simonsto1~ negotiations as a result of the unchallengeable 
control which continued to be exerted at that time by the strongly 
British-influenced 'Diamond Cartel'. Furthermore 9 it is also true that 
this was the period of least activity and therefore least profit on the 
world's 'free' gold markets and thus the time when the ability to market 
gold through London \·Jas most valuable to the Union. 
Having acknowledged this, ho1"ever, there remained other 1 free 1 gold mar= 
kets and, though the profits would certainly have been lower, the Union 
had at least had plenty of recent experience in dealing vli th them. 
Moreover, whilst it is true that in the case of uranium the CDA mechanism 
would have made it difficult for the South African government to prevent 
Britain from the acquisition of its production in this regard during ~his 
period, the same mechanism would have have made it difficult - if not 
impossible~ for Britain to discriminate against South Africa. As for 
the Union's primary commodity exports to Britain - foodstuffs, wool and 
non-ferrous ores and concentrates - it is true that loss of the British 
market would also have meant the loss of a protected market for the first 
category but the last two did not enjoy preference and, in any case, dem-
and was still quite buoyant for primary commodities in general on the 
international market at this time. As a result, the Union vrould probably 
not have experienced major difficulties in finding alternative markets 
for most of the products '"hich fell '"i thin these groups. Finally, 
metropolitan Britain played no part in the Union's growing manufacturing 
exports trade and the vast bulk of this went to that part of its colonial 
empire in Africa - the Central African :F'ederation - in which London 1 s 
influence in matters of internal self-government was least strongly felt. 
To sum up so far, then, Britain's monopoly supply position vis-a-vis 
South Africa at the time of the Simonstown negotiations was considerably 
eroded and, perhaps even more significant, clearly continuing on this 
course, whilst its monopsony position with regard to South Africa's exports 
and entrepot commodities was significant but by no means overwhelming. 
Furthermore~ the South African government attached less urgency to the 
acquisition of some of its supplies from Britain than it had hitherto, 
though it remained obviously anxious about its exports to the British 
market. What next, then, of Britain's stake in South Africa during 
these particular years? 
There can be no question that Britain was in urgent demand of certain 
of its South African imports at this time. The significance of uranium 
imports must be seen against the background of extraordinary civil and 
military enthusiasm for atomic energy, whilst it is clear that the re-
direction of the Union's surplus gold output through the London Gold 
Market was vi tal to the success of this key City institution (as viell 
as to that of the Bank of England's managerial role in defence of the 
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key currency exchange rates) when it re-opened in March 1954. Also urgent 
was Britain's demand for the Union's non-ferrous ores and concentrate~ 
for 'strategic stockpiling' was still being conducted. Moreover, if 
not in the case of the last of these categories, then certainly in the 
first two, South Africa had some degree of monopoly power vis-a-vis the 
United Kingdom. 
This was especially true, of course, in so far as its domination of non-
communist world gold supply was concerned and it was obvious at the time 
that the nev1 output from the Orange Free State fields was going to make 
this position even more explicit as the decade progressed. As can be 
seen from Appendix B, Table 26, it was in fact in 1954 that the take-off 
in this reb~rd started. In the case of uranium, of course, as we have 
just noted, the situation is complicated by the fact that, though it \vas 
precisely in 1954-1955 that the Union's position in regard to Horld supply 
was so strong, its ability to discriminat~ against Britain \vas, on the 
fact of it at any rate, neutralized by the mechanism of the CDA. This is 
a question to which we shall return at the end of the following Chapter. 
As for Britain's export dependence on the South African market, it is 
obvious to begin with that the Union had no monopsony power over the 
disposal of British goods ( i·li th the possible exception of certain kinds 
of mining equipment). This, hm·1ever 9 as we have seen 9 is beside the 
point. For ivhat made the South African market critical to the British 
government (if not to its exporters, though they had strong views on the 
matter too) = and this includes invisible earnings at the time as well -
"t<ras the gold Hi th vlhich the Union government covered its commercial 
deficit \vi th the Sterling Area. And, as we lmow, it was at precisely 
the juncture at which the Simonstown negotiations occurred that the 
Union \•Ias coming to rival all of the Colonies put together as the 
major external prop of the Sterling Area's 'dollar pool' =and that, 
moreover, at the time when 9 after a narro-vling of the 'dollar gap 1 in 
the early 1950s, it was re-emerging in dangerous form (App. B, Table 27). 
Finally, though hardly necessarily, it must be recalled once more that 
in the 1954-1955, between 7 and 8 per cent of Britain's total overseas 
assets were located in South Africa, making it the fourth largest host 
to British capital at that time ( t1oT0 thirds committed directly). The 
above average rate of return, moreover, made it the top overseas earner 
in 1954, producing almost 10 per cent of Britain's total overseas invest-
ment income. 
Following this assessment, it is evident that both Britain and South 
Africa had an economic stake in its relations 1·li th the other which was 
of exceptional significance. Any attempt at an econometric calculation 
of the 'balance of economic strength' involved in these relations would, 
however, not only be impossible but beside the point. What matters for 
an explanation of events is that the governments in both countries, 
together with influential sections of opinion, recognized this mutual 
advantage and that each recognized, therefore, the ability of the other 
to inflict considerable economic damage upon it. 
Clearly, it was the structure of the trading and financial relations 
between the two countries which rendered the apparent economic domination 
of the Union by Britain- emphasized at the beginning of this Chapter-
an illusion at the time of the Simonsto11n negotiations. South Africa's 
exports to the United Kingdom might have been vastly in excess of the 
UK's exports to the Union relative to their respective total exports and 
just as important to its economy, that is to say, but this was dramatic-
ally off=set by two principal features of the bilateral economic relations 
bet\veen the two countries. Firstly, by the gold which Britain's share of 
the South African market earned for, and the lure of London brought to, 
the United Kingdom, for this was vital to the City, to the Bank of 
England and thus to the British government. Secondly, by the fact that 
Britain had massive assets locked in the Union whilst the reverse was not 
true of South Africa. Furthermore~ the situation with regard to liquid 
reserves also helped to economically strengthen the Union government 
vis-a=vis the British at this time, for whilst South Africa had pulled 
out of an external payments crisis by the middle of 1954 and managed to 
bring its reserves up to a higher point than at any end-year period 
since 1950 by the end of the year, exactly the reverse \vas happening 
in Britain. In the second half of 1954 the British balance of payments 
plunged into the red and continued in like manner into 1955. The con= 
sequence of this~ of course, Has that sterling came under serious 
pressure in February 1955 and again in the summer and the reserves, 
already held by the Treasury to be dangerously low (as \ve saw in 
Chapter I), fell even further. 255 
In circumstances such as these, therefore~ where t\vO countries have the 
economic strength to inflict significant harm on each other, or where 
economic strength is crudely 'balanced', the non-economic bases of 
putative economic power become especially decisive and the amenability 
of that strength to diplomatic leverage vi tal. If there was~ therefore, 
no decisive difference between the British and South African governments 
in crude terms of economic strength at the time of the Simonsto\m negoti-
ations9 there certainly was in these other respects. 
We have already seen that the British government of this period, as in 
the case of that in the later period, was wholly devoid of the i1ill 9 
substantially handicapped in terms of the skill~ and manifestly possessed 
of a reputation VThich VTas quite the opposite of that ivhich Has required 
for the transformation of economic strength into putative economic poHer. 
JVIoreover, if there was ever any question about the \•Jill of the British 
government at this juncture, it vwuld clearly have been definitively 
crushed by the importance of South African gold to the strength of 
sterling and position of the Sterling Area, for these 9 as v1e savT in 
Chapter I, were considered matters of 'high policy' at this time. On 
the other hand~ of course, it can admittedly be argued that the Nation-
alist government in Pretoria i·Tas not over-well endowed Hi th the non-
economic bases of putative economic pov10r at this particular juncture 
either. 
It is certainly true that the Nationalist government Has not in such 
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comprehensive possession of will-sustaining dispositions at the time of 
the Simonstmm negotiations as it was to become during the post=Sharpe= 
ville period. As \ve have noted above 9 the great Rand houses had less 
incentive to endorse political interference \vi th gold sales through 
London in the quiet free market conditions of 1954-1955 and probably 
possessed more political weight at that time. Farm products vJere also 
then more important to the Union's economy and the Afrikaner=dominated 
farming community more influential 1·Ti thin the ranks of the Nationalist 
party. Moreover 1 to the discouraging influence of important sectional 
'losers' following a serious economic povJer play vli th the British 
government, must be added the considerations that there was 9 at this 
time 9 far less solidarity within the white community and little bi-
partisan support for foreign policy. 
On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the Nationalist 
government lacked the skill to exert economic strength at this time, as 
we have seen, especially since gold and uranium were already directly under 
its control and since the former, in particular, was so amenable to man~ 
ipulation. Furthermore, apropos reputation, it can safely be assumed 
that memories were still extremely fresh in Britain of the Union govern-
ment's extremely unco-operative attitude tm.,ards the Sterline; Area's 
dollar pooling in the war and post-war periods. And, if the -vlill of the 
Nationalist government to transform economic strength vis-a-vis Britain 
into putative economic power was not encouraged as a result of the absence 
of the dispositions noted immediately above, the key disposition was then 
present, explicit and conclusive. That, of course 9 was the Nationalist 
government's determination to subordinate the South African economy in 
general to 'the political factor' and to break free from 'British imperial-
ism' in particular. Moreover, though he was not directly involved in the 
Simonstown negotiations 9 the arrival of Eric Louw at the Ministry of 
External Affairs in early 1955 signified a new assertiveness in South 
African foreign policy in general (see Chapter III below). 
On the face of it, therefore, South Africa's superiority in the possession 
of the non-economic bases of putative economic power gave it a significant 
edge over the British government in terms of putative economic po1·rer in 
general. Before a definitive conclusion in this regard can be reached 9 
hm·Iever 9 it is necessary, finally, to consider the significance in this 
complex equation of Britain's position vis-a-vis the South African 
l5lo 
government as a 1 ~tJorld economic poHer'. Perhaps~ after all~ British in-
fluence in the inter-governmental economic councils of the '\>!estern vJorld 
- ,.,here issues of crucial significance to -South Africa were decided - was 
so great as to give the British government an increment of economic 
strength over the Union so considerable that fear of its discrete exertion 
against its interests might have effectively neutralized any ability to 
1 actualize 1 the superior ;putative economic power '"hich was possessed by 
the Nationalist government over Britain as a result of the nature of 
their bi-lateral economic relations. That this was not in fact the case, 
however, can be demonstrated most effectively by the British government's 
policy towards, and degree of success with regard to, the question of the 
official price of gold. 
It has already been indicated that the Union government and the gold-
mining companies had been united in calling for an increase in the offi-
cial price of ¢35 per troy ounce since the end of the war. The Attlee 
government in Britain had, nevertheless, refused to lend its support to 
the South African government in this matter (though the Treasury was 
v1ell aware that '"ar-time inflation had reduced the purchasing power of 
new-mined gold at the official price to only one-third of what it had 
been in 1938) 256 and resolutflly endorsed the refus;_:~,J of the United States 
administration to countenance any such move. 257 It was, ho1·rever 9 a 
little remarked feature of the new Conservative administration to lose 
little time in reversing the Labour government's policy and throw its 
full weight behind the South African government's perennial demand for 
an increase in the official price at the regular meetings of the I.M.F. 258 
The United States government, hO\vever, remained unimpressed and British 
pressure thus proved singularly unavailing. Accordingly, Britain's 
extremely limited usefulness to the South African government as a 1 \vorld 
economic power' in the international question vJhich 1t1as most vi tal to 
the Union's interests was vividly demonstrated at the very time of the 
Simonsto\>m negotiations. In the second half of the 1950s, the unmove-
ability of the US administration on this question had become so obvious 
that the British policy of support for an increase in the official price 
was quietly dropped and~ by the early 1960s, clearly forgotten. 259 
It can safely be concluded, therefore, that, at the time of the Simonstown 
negotiations, the South African government possessed a significant margin 
of putative economic povJer over the British government: not because of 
152. 
any superiority in terms of 'economic strength' but rather through the 
greater amenability of its strength to power purposes and its manifestly 
more explicit possession of the 'non-economic 1 bases of such pmver. The 
question of the Nationalist government's 'actualization' of this power 
\·rill be the subject of the next Chapter but, first, let us see if the 
putative economic pov1er relationship bet\-Jeen the t"VJo countries had 
changed by the time of the 1960~1964 period. 
2. Putative economic pmver during the Post-Sharpeville period 2 1960=1964. 
Taking South Africa's stake in Britain firstp once more, it is in fact 
evident that certain changes had occurred in the years between the time 
of the Simonstown negotiations and the 1960-1964 period, though it seems 
unlikely that the net result produced a situation which "VJas that much 
different. 
On the import side~ it is clear that South Africa's demand for foreign 
arms was more urgent during these years as a result of the substantially 
more hostile \vorld \vhich it had to face. On the other hand, even more 
foreign suppliers had by this time appeared on the horizon, amongst them 
France (where De Gaulle had his eye on South Africa's gold), 260 West 
Germany, Canada and Israel. Britain's monopoly position in this depart-
ment was, as a result, quite destroyed. Paradoxically, howeverp the 
much more acute diplomatic isolation of the Nationalist government during 
the post-Sharpeville period probably made it more dependent upon British 
arms supplies at this time than during the Simonstown negotiations. 
Britain was still, after all, the second ranked NATO power and the contin-
uation of these supplies appeared to lend substance to the South African 
claim to be intimately- if not formally- liruced with the Western secur= 
ity system (see Chapter III belo\v) •. As for the net ·capital inflow from 
Britain, the size of the existing commitment of direct investment and the 
growth in domestic savings had rendered the principal significance of this 
its political demonstration of Britain's faith in the stability of the 
South African system; unfortunately for the Nationalist government, 
however, the net capital inflow had become a continuous net capital exodus 
since 1959. By the beginning of the 1960s, therefore, South Africa had 
learned to live without a large and regular inflow of British capita1. 261 
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On balance, therefore, South Africa's 'import dependence' upon Britain 
during the post-Sharpeville period was certainly no greater than it had 
been during the Simonstown negotiations and the degree on that occasion 
\vas 9 as we have seen, hardly large. 
The most marked change, however, appeared to have occurred in the degree 
of South Africa's export dependence upon Britain 9 \vhich, as He sa"'' was 
quite significant in the 1954-1955 period. If anything, this appeared to 
have increased significantly. Primary commodity markets "'ere by the post-
Sharpeville period badly depressed, foodstuffs being no exception. 
Furthermore 9 the difficulties vrhich South Africa 1 s exports were by now 
facing in the Central African Federation and in other parts of the world 
as a result of the boycott movement did not help the search for altern= 
ative markets. Perhaps the richest irony of all, ho,.mver 9 "'as that, if 
South Africa had been released from its contractual obligation to market 
all of its uranium through the CDA in 1958 9 the more powerful potential 
economic leverage with Hhich this neH freedom provided it Hith vis-a-vis 
the British government was totally negated by a collapse in the 1·10rld 
uranium market at the end of the 1950s 9 the early portents of which ha.d 9 
of course, been responsible for providing it Hith marketing freedom in 
the first place. Thus vias South Africa now quite dependent for a much 
larger proportion of its total exports upon the British market, as the 
'stretch~out' agreements of the early 1960s eloquently demonstrated. 
On the other hand, against the background of the dramatic increase in 
the Union's annual gold production figures over the 1950s 9 this commodity 
had increased as a proportion of South Africa's total exports from 32 per 
cent in 1954 to almost 40 per cent by 1960 and, as 1·1e have seen, the early 
1960s witnessed a renewed upsurge in demand for gold on the "'orld' s free 
markets -not least on that in London. This made it economically feasible 
for South Africa to sell its gold on other markets. It is perhaps fair 
to conclude, therefore, that South Africa's export dependence upon Britain 
was considerable in the post-Sharpeville period, although as a result of 
the changed conditions in the gold market, by no means as total as the 
other developments "'auld seem to suggest. 
If South Africa's economic stake in the British connection during the post-
Sharpeville period was thus centred principally upon the symbolic import-
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ance of continued arms supplies and upon Britain's greater monopsony 
pmver Hi th regard to its primary commodity exports (including uranium) 9 
what had happened to Britain's economic stake in South Africa since the 
time of the Simonstown negotiations? 
It must be at once recorded that the fears of the early and mid-1950s 
vlith regard to shortages in such strategic commodities as uranium~ 
non-ferrous ores and concentrates and even industrial diamonds' had all 
but gone by the early 1960s. Hence a key feature of Britain's import 
dependence on South Africa during the Simonsto'vn negotiations had disappear~ 
ed by the post-Sharpeville period; however 9 another had been considerably 
magnifiede For it was becoming more and more important to the British 
government that London be used as the exclusive en~repot for South 
Africa's· annual gold sales: first, because South Africa's proportion 
of total non-communist world gold production had increased from 51.5 
per cent in 1954 to 63.5 per cent by 1960 and then to 72.5 per cent by 
1964 and because the profits and prestige of the London Gold Market were, 
therefore, increasingly tied to it; second, because it was in the early 
1960s (1960 itself, in fact) that the reserve currencies were first 
coming under serious pressure on the London Gold I~rket and when 9 
therefore, the Bank of ~eland most needed its day-to-day control over 
the release of South Africangold deliveries. In view of the importance 
attached by the British government to its relations with the United 
States at this time, the latter point is the key to an understanding 
of the real nature of what might otherv;ise be considered a reduction in 
Britain's overall import dependence on South Africa during the post~ 
Sharpeville years. lfuat finally, then~ of the importance of the South 
African market to Britain at this juncture? 
If South Africa's export dependence upon Britain had increased since the 
Simonstown negotiations, this was even more true of Britain's export 
dependence upon South Africa. By the early 1960s 9 as vJe saw in Chapter I, 
the problem of Britain's declining share of world manufacturing exports 
had begun to \veigh heavily on the minds of Britain's foreign policy-
makers and the fortunes of Britain's exporters in the South African 
market were clearly symptomatic of this particularly worrying trend. 
As we have seen, Britain's share of the South African market declined 
from 35 per cent in 1954 to only 28.4 per cent in 1960. Noreover, 
though the 'dollar gap' had disappeared, the importance of holding the 
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central reserves largely in gold was still considered great by the 
Treasury and it is clear that by this time South Africa had become the 
on1y significant external prop of the Sterling Area's central reserves. 
British interest in the South African market was thus just as great as 
it had been in the earlier period ~nd anxiety over it considerably 
greater. vli th a large proportion of profits being re-invested 9 the size 
of Britain's hostage assets in South Africa had also grovm larger. 
It is thus clear that gold 9 together with the hostage investment assets 
~ but above all gold - were the great equalizers as far as the crude 
balance of economic strength bet,.,reen the British and South African 
governments was concerned in the post-Sharpeville period. If South 
Africa could not brandish its uranium reserves vli th any credibi1i ty 
in the faces of British defence ministers and UKAEA officials during 
these years (assuming even that it could have done so in the earlier ones) 9 
the increased sharpness of the gold weapon was more than compensation for 
this development 9 and the investment stock just kept grov1ing in the back-
ground. Once again 9 moreover, the South African government was strength-
ened vis-a-vis Britain by the condition of their respective liquid res-
erves 9 as a comparison bet'\>Teen Tables 31 and 33 in Appendix B makes clear, 
bearing in mind the fact that Britain's reserve positionin 1960 Has-most 
precariously poised on the 'hot money' inflO't-1 generated by the relatively 
high interest rates prevailing in London against the background of funda-
mental external payments \'leakness. That the Nationalist government vias 
aware of the importance of strong reserves and 9 as the \'IOrld' s leading 
gold producer, had the ability to build them up 9
262 is amply demonstrated 
by the figures in Table 33· Bet\veen January 1960 (,.,rhich was by no means 
an abnormal month in this respect) and January 1964 9 the SA Reserve Bank 
had increased its holdings of gold bullion by just over two-and-a-half 
times. 
During the post-Sharpeville period, therefore 9 there was once more a 
crude balance of economic strength between Britain and South Africa, 
though its nature \vas some\vhat different from that of the earlier period. 
Once more, therefore, it was clearly in the non-economic bases of putative 
economic power that the decisive factor in this regard had to reside. 
And it is even more clear that on this occasion the overv1helming advantage 
lay with the Nationalist government in Pretoria. 
As will be evident by now, the Nationalist government had behind it on 
this occasion all of the will-sustaining dispositions, it had retained 
the skill for exercising economic strength if not increased it 9 and it 
was rapidly acquiring the reputation for 'passive' if not necessarily 
'active 1 , economic po"I'Jer. The white community, in particular 9 \vas 
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much more solidly behind it at this time and' the balance of sectional 
interests was more in its favour. The British government, on the other 
hand, found itself confirmed even more firmly in its tradesman's posture 
in foreign policy at this time by a pattern of increasingly problematical 
and absorbing external payments problems. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the margin of putative economic pm·Jer vJhich Has possessed by the 
Nationalist government over that under Macmillan in London 1vas even 
greater on this occasion than it had been over the administration of 
Churchill/Eden in the years of the negotiations which led up to the 
signing of the Simonstovm Agreements. 
vlhy should the Nationalist governments of these periods have wanted to 
'actualize' this putative economic power over Britain? Did they in fact 
do so and, if so 9 how? Could other interests account for the pattern of 
political relations which obtained between the two countries at the 
junctures over the 1951-1964 period \vhich are in question? These are 
the matters to Hhich the folloHing Chapters vJill be addressed. 
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England, proved an easy convert. On a visit to South Africa in. 
early 1963, he Has reported by The Times (Feb. 13, 1963) as obser-
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CHAPTER III 
THE Sll10NSTOvn~ NEGOTIATIONS: SOUTH AFRICA'S PUTATIVE 
ECONOHIC P01t!ER 1 ACTUALIZED' 
Addressing the Security Council of the United Nations on August 69 
1963 9 in the context of a by then familiar debate on apartheid, the 
United Kingdom representative 9 Sir Patrick Dean, felt obliged to 
explain that four considerations peculiar to Britain affected the 
attitude of his government towards South Africa: a strategic 
interest at the Cape, responsibility for the High Commission 
Territories (which lay within the Republic's sphere of economic, 
if not political, influence) 9 an economic interest and q1long his tori= 
cal connexion, ties of kin and ties forged in times of danger". 1 
Thus baldly stated, this vJas the traditional catalogue of Britain's 
'interests 1 in South Africa and one v!hich has been generally accept-
ed at face value as explaining the policy of successive post=vrar 
British gove!'!Ullents of general friendship toHards, and many-sided 
co-operation with, whatever regime held pO\·Ter in that country. 2 
Moreover, since the Simonstown Agreements, 1vhich Here signed between 
:Sri tain and South Africa in July 1955 9 1vere principally concerned Hi th 
defence arrangements, it has been the conventional assumption that 
Britain's strategic interest at the Cape was the major factor in the 
negotiations 1vhich led up to them and in the final shape which they 
assmned. The further assumption is common, as vie shall see, that the 
British government had got the better of the Nationalists in the deal 
vlhich lay at the heart of these Agreements. 'vias security :Sri tain' s 
main consideration in these negotiations? Did the balance of advan-
tage in the final Agreements favour Britain rather than South Africa? 
If both of these points are 9 in fact 9 highly questionable - as 1·1ill be 
argued - is there any evidence to suggest that sentiment or concern 
for the High Commission Territories prompted British concessions or, 
indeed, that the explanation lies, in part at least, in the 
'actualization' of the margin of putative economic povrer vJhich the 
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Nationalist government was shown~ in the previous Chapter 9 to have 
possessed over the British government at this critical historical 
juncture? Let us begin 9 then, by examining the background to the 
Simonstown Agreements, the ~greements themselves 9 and then subject 
the orthodox interpretation of them to detailed criticism. 
1. The failure of multilateralism 
It is clear that the Nationalist party had not been long in office 
in South Africa after the 1948 General Election before it found 
itself obliged to mute its traditional hostility to Britain and the 
Empire's military causes, and publicly declare for the Western 
Alliance of \-lhich Britain was a leading member. 3 In official policy 
'world communism' had become the great threat to the Union's secur-
ity and it was therefore declared to be in South Africa's best inter-
ests to assist in keeping this menace as far away from its doorstep 
as possible. This intent soon found expression in the Union's 
agreement to participate in an 'Allied' r~ddle East Command Organi-
zation, which was proposed (though to no subsequent effect) at the 
London Conference of Commonwealth Defence Ministers in June 1951, in 
response to nationalist stirrings in Egypt. 4 Though the Union probably 
did have some interest in the defence of the Middle East - the 0gateway 
to Africa' in contemporary thinking - this vias evidently not, hmvever 9 
its major security priority. It is obvious, therefore, that its willing-
ness in the early 1950s to participate in the defence of this area 
(uhich vias, hmvever, vi tal to Bri tain)5 was designed more to demonstrate 
the strength of its commitment to the side of the Vlest in the cold war 
and thus to bolstering its worthiness as a key member in the NATO-style 
regional defence pact for central and southern Africa for i·rhich it had 
been campaigning since 1949, 6 and for which the blessing of Britain 
(the leading colonial pov1er in this area) ivas obviously vi tal. 
A proposal for an African Defence Pact (esentially multilateral in South 
Africa's conception, given Nationalist sensitivities about the 'British 
connection') was in fact discussed at a conference which assembled at 
Nairobi in August 1951 on joint Anglo-South African initiative but it 
came to nothing ostensibly because of the Union's refusal to countenance 
the arming of black troops. 7 Since 9 however 9 opinion in London was 
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divided on this matter, the Har Office itself being resolutely opposed 
to any extended use of 'colonial forces•, 8 it seems possible that this 
point was exploited by the British government as a pretext for refusing 
to fall in with the Union's plan as a result of a rapidly crystallizing 
appreciation of the use to which the Nationalist government hoped to put 
such a southern and central African 'NATO'. For it is likely that the 
racialist ideology of the Nationalist regime in South Africa had already 
made it clear to the British government that what the Union really 
wanted an African Defence Pact for was to act as a counter~insurgency 
agency against black nationalism and that, by embroiling the European 
colonial powers more formally in Africa (together with the United 
States, if possible), it hoped to freeze the colonial status quo to the 
north of its borders and thus safeguard white supremacy throughout the 
entire central and southern parts of the continent. Accordingly, the 
external and internal 'communist threat' to which the Nationalist 
government persisted in pointing as justification for the continuing 
necessity of such an arrangement was dismissed in Britain as nothing 
but a self-serving Nationalist myth.9 
As a result, whilst Britain continued to appear after 1951 prepared to 
enter formal defence artangements in central and southern Africa with 
the other European colonial powers and with the Nationalist government 
itself (as long as this was confined to the purpose of supplementing 
the defence of the primary Middle East region), 10 it remained at best 
luke\varm to the Union's ambitions for an African Defence Pact. For, as 
the 1950s progressed, it became increasingly clear that falling in with 
the Union's plan would not only have run counter to Colonial Office 
ideas for the development of the 'indigenous' colonies in Africa11 but 
also have distracted the Foreign Office from its primary concern with 
the Middle East, damaged Britain's relations with the 'new Commonwealth' 
countries (especially India) and facilitated inevitably the northward 
. 12 
spread of Afrikaner influence to which Britain was opposed. Subsequent 
events, however, \vere hardly such as to cool the Union's ardour for this 
scheme. 
By the mid=1950s, indeed, the concessions granted to the black national~ 
ists in Nigeria and the Gold Coast in particular, the significantly firmer 
British opposition to the Union's desire to incorporate the High Commission 
Territories, 13 as well as British sponsorship of the anti-Afrikaner Central 
African Federation, had all served to make the South African government 
"profoundly disturbed at the direction of British colonial policy11 • 14 
As the 'quit Africa' policy of the greatest African colonial power thus 
appeared to be gathering momentum, the threat of black nationalism to 
the Union's security naturally came to be even more sharply perceived. 
As a result, the Nationalist government intensified its cam~aign in 
London and the other \·!estern capitals for the extension of the NATO 
embrace to southern and central Africa, the moreso since by 1954 it was 
apparent that all the other regions of major 1tlestern interest had been 
organized into the cold war alliance system. The Union's position 
thus stood, as Spence remarks, "in marked contrast to the other old 
Dominions 11 • 15 
A further round of multilateral talks was therefore held on the subject 
of an African Defence Pact in Dakar in 1954 but this also proved abortive, 
and neither did the Union have any success in its supplementary campaign 
for the establishment of multilateral treaty organizations for the 
South Atlantic and \vestern Indian Ocean areas. 16 It was against this 
background of failure in the multilateral arena, therefore, that the 
Nationalist government decided to exert further pressure on Britain in 
the second half of 1954, if not to secure a regional defence organization 
(though it had by no mea..r1s given up hope on this score, as \·Je shall see), 
then at least to salvage a bilateral defence agreement Hith the United 
Kingdom. 
2. The success of bilateralism. 
In July, 1954, it was reported that Erasmus, the South African Minister 
of Defence, had himself requested a wide-ranging conference on defence 
matters with the British government. 17 Moreover, added urgency was 
given to the Union's request by the announcement, in the same month, 
of Britain's impending Hithdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, 
which Has seen in the Union as the most dramatic manifestation to date 
of Britain's 'quit Africa' policy. 18 The British government acceded 
to this request on the understanding that South African help in the 
Middle East would be a high priority on the agenda and the meeting vias 
scheduled for August 1954. 
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The subjects which were thought to be most likely topics of discussion 
in the August talks between Erasmus and the two British f·linisters in 
London~ Lord Alexander (Minister of Defence) and Lord Swinton (Common-
wealth Secretary), were in fact the nature of the Union's contribution 
to Middle East defence and its continuing desire for an African Defence 
Pact. 19 Indeed, it was not until the talks Here due to begin, in the 
middle of August 9 that it 1·las revealed 9 by the Nationalist press in 
the Union, that the status of the Simonstown naval base t.Jould also be 
on the agenda and that transfer negotiations had in fact been opened 
20 
with the British Admiralty "some time ago" Moreover, since, as 
the Johannesburg Star recorded, "Simonstovm no longer generates any 
political heat to speak of"~ 21 it seems clear that it was not irresis-
tible party pressure to which the Nationalist government was responding 
in raising this issue but, rather 9 the need for additional leverage 
over London. For it soon became apparent that British opinion about 
the transfer of this traditional imperial base to Afrikaner control was 
by no means so universally complacent as some contemporary accounts 
suggested and nearly all subsequent assessments have maintained. 22 
In the event 9 the talks dragged on into September
23 and were kept 
tightly secret. The British side was noticeably reticent in commenting 
on their progress and, as a result 9 rumour became rife. On September 8 
The Daily Telegraph reported that Britain had been asked to leave the 
Simonstown naval base and reiterated that newspapervs opposition to 
any such move~ whilst on September 11 the Nationalist press in the 
Union gave big headlines to the story that a "blueprint" for an African 
defence pact had been provisionally agreed and a\vai ted only the highest 
approval in both capitals. 24 British officials refused to comment on 
this25 and Erasmus subsequently denied that his proposal in this regard 
. 26 had reached such an advru1ced stage. Almost certainly nearer the truth, 
however (since it closely resembled the ultimate shape of the July 1955 
Agreements) was the SAPA report carried in the Johannesburg Star of 
September 13~ which claimed that Erasmus vras bringing back to the Union 
an agreement which embodied, first, a proposal that the UK and South 
Africa would jointly sponsor a conference on the subject of an African 
defence pact, and second 9 a proposal that there should be closer co-
operation between the South African Navy and the Royal Navy as part of 
a \vider sea defence arrangement in which Simonstmm would play a 
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bigger role. At any rate, the absence of any official pronouncements 
on progress at the end of the talks 9 together \vi th the observation of 
Erasmus in a major speech to the O.F.S. National Party Congress on his 
return to the Union that "Africa still has not got the benefit of 
regional defence planning and without it, it may fall an easy preyto 
those who have their eyes of Africa11 , 27 made it clear that the Union 
remained less than satisfied and that further negotiations \oJere 
inevitable. 
In mid-October 1954 an Admiralty mission arrived in South Africa for 
further discussions on naval cooperation and the Simonstmm base? by 
the end of the year it was.the firm impression of South Africans that 
transfer of the base had been conceded in principle by Britain and 
28 that only the details remained to be sorted out. Officially, 
however, nothing was announced, except that a report had been prepared 
and \·laS being studied by the two governments: further discussions 
would be necessary. 29 Nevertheless, in his defence policy statement 
to the Senate in March 1955, Erasmus amplified his earlier statement 
on the need for an African defence pact and added that he \·laS glad to say 
that this proposal \·laS being considered by Britain. 30 He also announced 
at this juncture that the Union government had decided on a major eight-
year expansion of the South African Navy "in view of the submarine 
danger" - a decision which \vas to be made much of by Britain as a 
South African 'concession' at a later stage.3 1 
In mid-June 1955, Erasmus returned to London admist press speculation 
that the major feature of this next round of Anglo-South African 
defence talks \oJould be the Union's demand for the handing over of the 
Simonstmm base. By now 9 many defence pundits had convinced themselves 
that the British government would go along with this since changes in 
strategy32 and in naval technology33 had rendered the base of less value 
to Britain than formerly. Moreover, it was k:novm that the Union \oTas 
giving firm assurances that the base would always be available to the 
Royal Navy in any case in any future East-vlest conflict. 34 As for the 
African Defence Pact, it was not thought that Erasmus had much to hope 
for on this score. 
When, therefore, the exchange of letters between Erasmus and Sehryn Lloyd35 
formally constitutirrg.the agreements which had been arrived at as a 
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result of these final negotiations in June, was published on July 4, 1955, 
and revealed in the House of Commons by Sir Anthony Eden (and simultaneous-
ly in the Union House of Assembly by Strijdom), there were no great 
surprises. The new 'Simonstown Agreements', as thus embodied, fell into 
three parts, the first dealing with "The need for international discussions 
with regard to regional defence against external aggression", the second 
Hith "The defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa", and the 
third vri th the "Transfer of the Simonsto,m Naval Base and arrangements 
for its future use".36 
In the first part of the Agreements, Britain clearly condoned the need 
for a regional defence pact for South Africa and its surrounding sea 
routes. Nevertheless, it equally clearly spelled out that this could 
only be contemplated as a mechanism for defence against "external 
aggression". It \vas, indeed, quite emphatic in stating that "The 
internal security of the countries of Southern Africa must •••• remain 
a matter for each individual country concerned11 .37 Britain, in other 
words, was not to be made a party under any such regional defence pact 
to the bolstering of vrhi te supremacy against 'internal subversion 1 and 
this paragraph was widely interpreted in this light by the British press. 
Moreover, the British view of the major likely source of external 
aggression was given greater emphasis. Thus, said this part of the 
Agreements, "The defence of Southern Africa against external aggression 
lies not only in Africa but also in the gateways to Africa, namely in 
the Middle East".3B Both countries agreed to contribute forces to this 
proposed defence scheme though, significantly, the Union made its offer 
conditional "upon satisfactory arrangements being arrived at between the 
countries mainly concerned as to the nature and extent of the contribu-
tion which each will make 11 .39 Nevertheless, though Britain appeared 
to have ruled out at this stage the kind of regional defence pact which 
Pretoria wanted (in effect, of course, a counter-insurgency organization), 
there \·Tas an ambiguity in the phraseology and general tenor of this first 
part of the Agreements vrhich alloHed the Union, as vJe shall see, to 
interpret it as a British commitment to the defence of South Africa 
against external aggression at least. Both countries further agreed 
to jointly sponsor a conference on these matters to continue the Hork 
already begun at Nairobi, and the first part finished with the observa-
tion that "It is agreed that the United Kingdom and the Union will jointly 
endeavour, at this conference, to secure the setting up of suitable 
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machinery to pursue the aims of the conference on a continuing basis".40 
Under the second part of the Agreements("The defence of the sea routes 
round Southern Africa"), the two countries agreed to both improve and 
formalize their naval cooperation in order the better to defend the 
Cape Route and, to this end? the Royal Navy C. in C. South Atlantic 
Station t·las designated, for purposes of peace-time planning and operation= 
al command in vJar, C. in C. 0f a ne1v maritime zone roughly approximating 
the Royal Navy's then existing South Atlantic Station. Moreover? in 
order that the Union's contribution to the joint naval defence scheme 
should be made positive, South Africa agreed (sic) to expand its Navy 
in an appropriate direction; 41 the orders, worth £18m, were to go to 
British yards. 42 
Finally, under the third part of the Agreements, the Simonstown Naval 
Base \·!as to be transferred to the Union at a date not later than 
t1arch 1957 9 though Britain was to be guaranteed continued use of the 
base in both peace and (along with its allies) in war, even if the 
Union should remain neutral. South Africa also agreed to both expand 
the base and maintain it in at least its present state of efficiency 
and gave assurances that apartheid policies would not be applied to 
the base area. 43 Ostensibly, the base -vras transferred to the Union 
"in order that the Union Government may be able to provide adequate 
logistic support for their expanded Navy".44 
3. The Simonstmm Agreements: a one-sided bargain. 
The official British view of the bargain, which these three separate 
agreements expressed, was that Britain had handed over the Simonstown 
base to the Union in return for which South Africa had agreed to expand 
its Navy and thus increase the contribution which it could make to the 
defence of the Cape Route - all in the context of a new, NATO-style 
command structure (in vThich Britain was predominant) via which South 
African co-belligerency was implicit. As Eden, who was now Prime 
flinister, said, in personally introducing the Agreement in the House 
of Commons, "The important point, as the House will realize,is that (sic) 
the fact that the Union Government are building a Navy ••••• is something 
which should be of real value for military collaboration between the 
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countries in the future.45 
Now 9 whilst this South African 'agreement' to expand its NaV'J \vas 
paraded by Britain as a very significant concession, which Hould help 
to alleviate the economic burden of Britain's defence effort in a 
particularly trying period, Britain's concession over the base \·las 
represented as hardly any concession at all as a result of the 
generous provisions made for its continued use, in any eventuality, 
by the Royal Navyo Moreover, though guaranteed its full use, 
Britain would no longer have either the trouble or expense of running 
the Simonstown base and, on top of this, the Union government had 
agreed to expand it! Hhen 9 added to this, £18m. worth of naval 
orders could be pointed to it is not difficult to see how easily was 
the Eden government able to disarm actual and potential criticism from 
the Suez Group in Parliament and the right~wing press in Bri tain 9 v1ho 
\vere other\vise sure to have been exercised by this further instance 
of the hauling dovm of the Union Jack over a traditional. imperial base. 
Finally, it was claimed that a further source of satisfaction afforded by 
the Agreements was the explicit dissociation of the United Kingdom from 
any promise of commitment to the internal security of southern Africa, 
whilst it was held in the British and in the English-language press in 
South Africa that the proposal for a conference on African defence was 
nothing more than an anodyne solution with which the British had fobbed 
off the Union government and \·lhich 9 as a result, signalled the end of 
Pretoria's major ambition for an African 1 NAT0•. 46 The main emphasis 
of the proposed conference 9 moreover, i•Jas towards the defence of the 
Middle East! 
Thus presented by the Eden government, and embellished by the British 
and the English-language press in South Africa, the Simonstown Agree-
ments came to be accepted by most later British observers as a very 
one-sided bargain indeed. Tunstall, for instance, observes that "To 
have secured effective use of Simonsto1vn for the Royal Navy, together 
with possible allies, in a war in which the Union might be neutral, 
must be regarded as a considerable gain for Britain". 47 \·Jhilst Barber 
states that "It is ironic that the only defence agreement achieved by 
the Nationalist government was with the old imperial enemy, and the 
overall balance of the agreement favoured Britain. She continued to 
have facilities in South Africa 9 which could be used even if Britain 
and not South Africa \>laS at war 9 while the South Africans made a great-
er contribution to joint defence 9 and had signed m.,ray their right to 
break the arrangement unilaterally. The doubt about the agreement 
for Britain lay in the future". 4S Even Spence, \>Those treatment is 
in general more alive to the Union's gains from this Agreement 9 feels 
obliged to give prominence to the view that, on a number of points, 
"Britain got the best of both 1.,rorlds". 49 
In sum, then, the orthodox interpretation of the Simonsto"m Agreements 
rests heavily on the British government's own dressing=up of it and it 
is not surprising, therefore 9 that it seriously misconceives the true 
nature of the bargain between the tuo governments 11hich lay at its 
heart. This is so because it vast~y exaggerates the concessions made 
by South Africa and virtually ignores those made by Britain- also 
testimony in part, no doubt, to the ingenuity of the Agreement's 
construction. In what sense, then, first of all, were South Africa's 
concessions exaggerated? 
To be sure, Britain's guaranteed future use of Simonstown considerably 
mitigated the practical consequences of forfeited sovereignty over the 
base (as \•Tell as having certain small financial advantages). Neverthe-
less, it is mist~cen to regard this as a South African 'concession' which, 
by compromising Pretoria's neutrality, rendered hollow the blow against 
'British imperialism'. ostensibly represented by the 'return' of the 
base to the Union government. For the point is obviously that, as 1r1ith 
the similar assurances given by the Union over the use of its other 
ports and facilities in the event of war a:.n.d 11i th the general tenor of 
co-belligerency suggested by the Agreements, the Nationalists had no 
alternative, given the nature of their regime and its long standing 
public commitment to the side of the West in the cold war, 50 but to 
give these assurances \>Thether Britain surrendered sovereignty over 
Simonsto1rm or not. This line of argument is not nev1 no\v and - more 
important- was not new then. As early as 1951 9 Legum and Wight had 
pointed out "that South Africa is no more able to resist a request 
for port facilities advanced by the Western democracies than is Spaino 
The government of neither country can afford to embarrass the only 
countries capable of militarily resisting Communism. Firm negotiation~, 
they therefore concluded, "could obtain for the \·!estern democracies all 
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the strategic facilities they need in South Africa, >·li thout having to 
mruce political concessions or accepting an embarrassing alliance 
(emphasis added). It would be sufficient quid pro quo that the 
Western democracies and their associates undertook the effective 
defence of Africa and the oceans that flank it".51 In return for 
the surrender of sovereignty over the base, then~ the British government 
received no guarantees of future co-belligerency from South Africa of 
\vhich it \oJas not already assured. \:Jha t of the Union's other 
'concessions'? 
As \Ve have seen~ the Union's vagreement' to expand its Navy and so 
'increase its contribution to the defence of the Cape Route', is 
identified in the orthodox interpretation as the major gain accruing 
to Britain under the terms of the Simonstown Agreement~ But in fact 
there can be little doubt that~ as with the Union's assurances of 
future co-belligerency in the event of cold war turning hot, so was 
the Union in any case already determined on a programme of naval 
expansion. For reasons of its own it had, in fact, announced this 
decision well before the final round of Simonsto~nn negotiations in 
June 1955! 
From the early 1950s the Nationalist government had been purchasing 
and re-naming Royal Navy vessels already in service on the South 
Atlantic station and, indeed, one of the arguments ~rhich it used to 
support its demand for the return of the Simonsto~m base was that 
its ovm Navy uas outgrowing its existing base at Salisbury Island, 
Durban Bay. 52 In September 1954 the Union's Naval and ~~rine Chief 
of Staff announced that "It is our intention to modernise our fleet 
particularly 11i th regard to anti-submarine equipment". 53 And, in 
early March 1955~ this uas spelled out in detail by the Defence 
~linister, Erasmus, in his policy statement on defence to the Senate, 
in the course of which he said: "It has been decided, in vieu of the 
submarine danger, to expand the Navy over an eight-year period~ 
starting this year vli th the purchase of two coastal minemveepers and 
t\·m harbour defence ships, all electronically equipped". 54 In short 9 
the Nationalist government in Pretoria had publicly committed itself 
to the full £18m. eight-year naval expansion programme geared to sub-
marine and mine defence at least four months before the Simonstovm 
Agreement 1·1as concluded, and had given an official intimation that 
this was on the cards even earlier. 
NoVT 9 \vhilst it is t:r'!Ie that Britain had probably already conceded 
transfer of the Simonstovm base to the Union in principle during the 
August-September negotiations in 1954 (see page 179 above) and that 9 
as a result 9 the Union had not gratuitously discarded a bargaining 
counter on this score by premature announcement of the naval expan~ 
sion programrne 9 it is equally evident that South Africa had not 
similarly achieved its other major objectives by this time. 
This \,Jas particularly true, of course, of the African Defence Pact 9 
the particular terms favoured by it for the scheme of naval cooperation 
and 9 indeed, those on \'!hich the Simonstovm base itself vTas actually to 
be transferred. \'lith these points still at issue Hhen the final 
round of negotiations took place in June 1955 9 therefore 9 it is 
difficult to believe that the Union's ability to 'increase its 
contribution to the defence of the Cape Route' by a major programme of 
naval expansion could have been its main bargaining counter 9 or even a 
particularly significant one. Moreover 9 even if it was a concession, 
it is unlikely that it could have been regarded in London as an 
especially valuable one 9 since even Tunstall feels obliged to remark 
that the planned expansion i·Tas of "a very restricted operational kind" 
and useful only as an "inshore contribution to the defence of the focal 
vraters as a whole". 55 
In fact, though it is true that the announcement of the naval expansion 
served to provide earnest of the Union's commitment to the side of the 
West in the cold ivar 9 it is not difficult to see why Pretoria should 
have resolved to embark on it even in the absence of any concessions 
from Britain. For, in the first place, South Africa ivas itself as 
dependent as Britain - if not more so - on the security of the sea 
lanes around the Cape (especially on the eastern seaboard) and 9 if the 
threat to it from the Soviet Union and even India vras as great as 
Pretoria insisted, then it clearly required an expanded Navy in its own 
interests. Erasmus himself admitted as much in the course of his 
defence of the Simonstown Agreements in the House of Assembly in 
January 1956, when he observed that "South Africa especially is 
dependent on oil and 60 per cent of our oil comes from the J'vliddle East". 
As a result, he emphasised, the Union attached great importance to 
keeping open the sea lanes.56 Secondly, the Union desired an expanded 
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Navy for the additional political weight \vhich this gave it in African 
diplomacy. Once more, Erasmus leaves us in no doubt, subtlely remarking 
in the House of Assembly in March 1956 that the Nationalist government 
had "built up a nice fleet \vhich is earning the respect of the other 
territories in Africa i'li th \vhom vre negotiate ".57 Finally 9 there 
is no doubt that the Union was also alive to the value of announcing a 
large programme of naval expansion in bolstering its arguments for the 
return of the Simonstown base and, equally, in dramatizing its o\vn 
belief in the strategic importance of the Cape Route upon which so much 
of its diplomacy towards the West hinged. Since, therefore, the Union 
had its own reasons for expanding its Navy and had, indeed, announced 
as much before the final round of Simonstm-m negotiations in June 1955, 
it is clear that, once more, the orthodox interpretation is incorrect 
in identifying this as a major - indeed, the major - South African 
•~concession' under the SimonstO\vn Agreements~ 
So far, then, it can be seen that, as a result of the Union's 
unavoidable commitment to the \\fest in any future world conflict with 
the Eastern bloc and its own need for an expanded Navy, neither its 
assurances of future military cooperation nor its promise of an 
increa.Red. contribution to the defence of the~- Cape Route Here 
'concessions' to Britain in any but the most nominal sense. ~1lrther­
more, even if they had been, they would only have been valuable to 
Britain if defence of the Cape Route in a future general war remained 
a strategic priority 9 and by the beginning of 1955 there \vere widespread 
doubts in certain circles in London on this score. If defence of the 
Cape Route was no longer realistic in a general war, then both sets of 
South African 'concessions' became doubly spuriouso 
The doubt which had been cast over the whole of existing maritime 
strategy \·laS a result of the realization during the course of 1954 of 
the full destructive potential of the H-bomb. Already, in the first 
half of the 1950s the role of the Navy in a future general atomic war 
had been the subject of intense debate. In the so-called. 'Global 
Strategy Paper', produced in 1952 by the Chiefs of Staff under 
Churchill's prompting and \vhich became the basis for British defence 
policy in the 1950s as a whole, pride of place ivas given to the nuclear 
deterrent in a future general uar. Since, hmvever, it was considered 
that the initial nuclear exchange might not be decisive (owing to the 
relatively low destructive capacity of the A-bomb and the limited 
numbers and delivery capabilities then availabl~ to both sides), "the 
notion of 'broken-backed 1 warfare \vas grafted onto the main concept" o 58 
This implied that it still remained necessary "to make provision for 
continuing operations~ particularly at sea"~ though it is described 
by Darby~ even at this early stage, as "a concession to the Navy" 
which the Air and Army Chiefs were obliged to grant in order to 
secure the Navy's acceptance of the paper.59 If the chief architects 
of British defence policy had~ therefore, been sceptical of the Navy's 
role in a general war during the atomic age 9 they had no doubts at all 
once the full po1.·1er of the H-bomb was appreciated in 1954 o The result 
vms that, by 1955, with the belief now current that the initial nuclear 
exchanges in a general 'dar v!Ould be decisive 9 the notion of 1 broken-
backed' vJarfare was generally discredited, i·Tith the corollary that, 
in the Defence \1.hi te Paper of February 1955, even greater emphasis vlas 
placed on the deterrent, the decision to build the H-bomb was announced, 
and across the board cut-backs were announced in conventional defence 
d •t 60 expen J. ure • 
The significance of these developments for the Simonstown Agreements, it 
is clear, is that they v1ere predicated on a strategic theory which had 
become obsolete at least half a year before they were signed (though not, 
it is true, before the negotiations leading up to them had reached an 
advanced stage). For it viaS only on the assumption that a 'broken-
backed' stage of warfare would follow Qn the first - and indecisive -
nuclear exchanges, that it made sense to provide for the defence of the 
Cape Route {or any other strategic point in the chain of imperial 
communications, for that matter) in the event of general war. Never~ 
theless, even if an influential section of opinion in and around the 
British government regarded it as obsolete, the Board of Admiralty 
itself had no choice but to cling to the notion of 0broken-backed' 
warfare and it demonstrated its political strength in employing the 
concept to justify full retention of its share of the Defence Budget 
in 1955.61 
It is thus highly likely that the strategic assumptions upon which the 
Simonstovm Agreements i·Tere based 1.vere similarly the product of Admiralty 
special pleading and represented, as a result, a particularly good 
example of the general failure of British governments in this period to 
188. 
relate their overall political and strategic conceptions to their 
practical military dispositions. Darby has drawn particular attention 
to this phenomenon. 62 Spence, directing his comments explicitly to the 
Simonstown Agreements, supports this interpretation in a some,·rhat more 
tactful manner by observing that "it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the strategic advice each Government received drew heavily 
on the experience of World \·/ar II •••• 11 • 6 3 
Since, therefore, it clearly fitted in vrith the Navy interest to 
emphasise the importance of the Cape route and since the Board of 
Admiralty appears to have had the last word in deciding on its 
strategic value to Britain, it might be held to be an unpardonable 
historical rationalization to suggest that this rendered the Union's 
'concessions' in terms of military co-operation and m1 increased 
contribution to the defence of the Cape "doubly spurious". After all, 
• it is clearly perceptions and influence which were current at the time 
which account for the shape of events. Having acknowledged this, 
hm·Jever, it is equally clear that the revolution in strategic thinking 
which was occurring simultaneously had dravm a fairly substantial 
question mark over the Admiralty's views about the Cape route and that 
other sections '"i thin the British government \vi th an interest in 
relations with South Africa (either directly or indirectly), such as 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, and the 
Foreign Office, not to mention the I1inistry of Defence itself, 64 were, 
therefore, for this reason, tUllikely to attach the same degree of weight 
to the strategic argument. At the least, therefore, this must have 
vJeakened the Admiralty/South African case. 
If, then, the British government received nothing of which it vras not 
already assured in the way of future co-belligerency or an increased 
naval contribution to the defence of the Cape route, and if these 
'concessions' were rendered more, if not "doubly", spurious_by the 
question mark which lingered over their strategic value in any case, 
vrhat of the remaining 'gain 1 '"hich Britain is supposed to have 
obtained from the Simonstown Agreements? What, that is to say, of the 
£18 million-worth of naval orders for British yards? 
The view that this, too, was a South African concession is necessarily 
based on the assumptions that, in the absence of the Agreements, either 
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the Union would not have expanded its Navy and therefore had no orders 
to place or that it would have expanded its Navy in any event and placed 
the orders elsewhere. Since, hm·Jever, the former assumption has 
already been shmm to be false, it follmrs that the orders vrould have 
existed irrespective of the fate of the Simonsto\m negotiations. This 
question therefore turns on the possibility that the Nationalist 
government might have given them to other suppliers as retaliation in 
the event of an unfavourable outcome and used this threat as an 
inducement to insure against such an eventuality during the course of 
the negotiations. Since this is of the stuff of 'actualized' economic 
pOiver, hm.,rever, and since this will be the major preoccupation of the 
final part of this Chapter, a consideration of the Union's employment 
of its al~s market in the Simonstown negotiations will be postponed 
until then. 
In any event, it will be clear by now that South.Africa gave very little 
away under the formal terms of the Simonstmm Agreements. At the most, 
it can be said that the British government received formal confirmation 
of the Union's military cooperation in the event of 1var and Has able, 
in addition, to make one or two small economies on the Navy estimates 
at a time when the burden of the Defence Budget \vas being partic:~ularly 
fe1t. 65 But even on the count of military cooperation, the Nationalist 
government had not conceded unconditional support for Britain in the 
area Hhich British policy-makers regarded as the most important of all, 
that is to say, in the Middle East.· This, moreover, was in spite of the 
British stipulation for high priority on this topic on the agenda as a 
condition for commencing the 19-54-55 negotiations in the first place. 
As the final Agreements explicitly stated, "the Union's contribution will 
depend upon satisfactory arrangements being arrived at between the 
countries mainly concerned as to the nature and extent of the 
contribution which each will make", 66 or, in other vJOrds, on the 
success of further discussions on the Nationalists' ambition for an 
African Defence Pact. 67 In the circumstances, this Has a weighty 
condition! As The Times subsequently complained, "In 1951 South Africa 
did undertake to send ground and air forces to the }fiddle East in time 
of war, but the undertaking seems to have lapsed because some form of 
Middle East (sic) defence organization was not set up 11 • 68 
If closer inspection therefore reveals that the South African government 
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gave aHay ver>J little indeed in the Simons town Agreements 9 the same 
cannot 9 hOi·mver, be said for the British government. \IJha t then did 
Britain give to the South African government in July 1955? 
It is clear that, in the first place, by laying stress on the 
financial cost vrhich the Union vras obliged to assume in regaining 
sovereignty over the Simonstovm base and then on the fact that the 
Union had 'thrown away' this gain by compromising its neutrality 
under the terms of the understanding on future use of the base'} the 
conventional interpretation seriously glosses over the political 
implications of the sovereignty issue - both for Britain and South 
Africa. It is, in fact, obvious that the terms on which the 
Simonstovm base \oJas returned to South Africa could not have sui ted 
Pretoria's interests more perfectly. For there is no doubt that, 
though the issue of the base had lain relatively dormant for some years, 
great importance was attached by the Nationalist government to its 
return. It was, after all, the most tangible remaining symbol of the 
country's long subservience to the interests of the British Empire and, 
as the preceding years Of Nationalist rule well testified, the 
Nationalists -vmre very attached to the importance of symbolic forms. 
FUrthermore, since Pretoria had been obliged to delay removal of the 
most loathsome symbol of all ~ formal attachment to the British Crown -
the return of the base was obviously a most useful political compensationo 69 
As Lawrie is bound to observe, "It was British willingness 'to hand over 
to the Union Government the administration and control of the Naval Base 
at Simonstown' • o. \vhich made an emotional appeal to nationalist opinion 
and \·Thich consequently obscured the other provisions of this Agreement 
and the significance of the Correspondence as a \·Thole o It is not too 
much to say that in 1955 this single phrase constituted the whole 
'agreement' for the South African public". 7° Fittingly, in a state-
ment issued on the day that the Agreements were announced, Strijdom 
vTas able to say that "it represents a logical continuation of South 
Africavs development towards full independence 11 • 71 
However, if the return of the base to the Union was a triumph for 
Nationalist emotion, the terms on 1vhich it was returned 1:1ere a triumph 
for Nationalist diplomacy. For, as will by now be clear7 the Union 
government had no intention to give the impression to Britain, or the 
\•/estern pO\vers in general, that its desire for the return of the base 
signified an indifference to the contribution 1:rhich its strategic 
position could make to the Hestern defence effort in any future 
confrontation \'lith the communist states. On the contrary, as we 
have seen, it was the major plank in the Union's diplomacy to 
emphasise its commitment 9 as \<Tell as its indispensability, in such 
an eventuality. As a result, the Union \'las bound to make it clear, 
in the Simonstown Agreement, that it wished its neutrality to be 
compromised. It is, therefore, nonsense to suggest that this 
point involved a sacrifice for South Africa. Indeed, though some 
l9lo 
anti-Nationalist opinion in the Union has taken the partisan vievl that, 
for the transfer of the base, "the price paid was dear"~ 72 it "Yras, 
quite correctly, regarded in no such light by the Nationalist 
government itself. On the contrary, it was clearly pleased to have 
been able to reconcile the rarely compatible goals of gratifying 
popular national feeling l·Ti thout at the same time irretrievably 
offending an imperial pOl·Ter. It is for this reason, of course, that 
official United Party opposition to the Agreements was notably muted 
on this score.73 
From the British point of view, nevertheless, the fact remained that 
the Union Jack had been hHulecl down over a..l'lother British base less tha..."l 
a. year after the announcement of withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone base 
and against a background of nationalist pressure on other British bases 
in Cyprus, Ceylon and Singpore.74 There \vas, therefore, the danger 
for Britain that I retreat I from SimonstO\ID - however nominal - \'lOUld 
encourage encroachments on British power in more important areas, as 
v1ell as in Southern Africa. As Elizabeth Monroe points out: "Modern 
imperialism, vThether by sea or land, is a game of spillikins in \V"hich 
the moving of one piece is difficult without disturbing the others". 75 
Consistent with this, the Economist observed after the announcement 
of the Agreements that "There vJere no shouts of 1 Abadan 1 or 'Suez' in 
the House of Commons; but the fact has to be faced that some people in 
South Africa, and others elsewhere, will interpret the transfer as yet 
another proof of British weakness",76 whilst Macmillan himself records 
that he had feared "certain political dangers" from the Agreements- "from 
the Right as 'another surrender"' as well as "rfi'rom the Left as an immoral 
compact with the 'reactionary' South Africans".77 Moreover, on top of 
this, it seems that there \<laS also resistance in the Admiralty to the 
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arrangements for the transfer of the base, probably based on doubts 
about the efficiency with \oJhich it vmuld be run by the Nationalist 
government which had been engendered by Pretoria's policy of 
Afrikanerization of the Union's defence forces since 1948.79 
Thus~ despite the unique characteristics of the transfer of 
Simonsto\oJn to South Africa (which obviously explains the lack of 
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real hostility to it on the Tory back benches- in the House of 
Commons)~ it is misleading to imply that~ provided the Royal Navy 
had continuing use of the base~ the British government was indiffer-
ent to the question of sovereignty over it. In the conditions of the 
mid-1950s, surrender of sovereignty over Simonstmm to the South 
African govenLment involved certain potential costs for Britain. 
Accordingly~ it represented a real concession \oJhich certainly \oJould 
not have been granted unsolicited~ or unrequited, by a Conservative 
government in these years, and one Hhich equally brought substantial 
satisfaction to the Nationalist party government in Pretoria. 
The return of the base to the Union on terms which enabled the 
Nationalist party to curry favour Hith its domestic constituency 
as Hell as to avoid giving excessive hurt in London and arousing 
apprehension amongst English-speaki-ng voters in the Union~ v:as 
undoubtedly the Nationalist government's most obvious immediate gain 
from the Simonsto1o1n Agreement. But it must also have been a cause 
of some satisfaction in Pretoria that this part of the Agreemen~~ 
together with that dealing with naval cooperation, clearly endorsed 
the continuing importance of the Cape Route in the general Har 
strategy of the IV estern po1..rers. This Has especially significant since~ 
as we have seen, the implications of the H-bomb had recently cast a 
large doubt over the rationality of providing for the defence of 
lines of communication in the event of general war. Since the 
strategic importance of its position on the Cape Route constituted, on 
the face of it, one of the Union's strongest bargaining counters in its 
relations \·Ji th Britain and the other \'lestern pmoJers 9 it vJas naturally 
of the greatest consequence to Pretoria that the continuing need to 
defend the Cape Route be aclmowledged. 
Simonstovm Agreements. 
This was provided by the 
Finally 9 hoHever 9 ~md 1..ri thout doubt most importantly of all~ South Africa 
gained from the Simonstovm Agreemen~a close formal military association 
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\vi th Britain~ i·Thich~ though it i·Tas less than an alliance was more than 
'just good friendship'~ and gave the Union that outward appearance of 
British military support which, though imprecise enough to be denied 
in London i'lith a semblance of plausibility, was clear enough to give 
pause to South Africa's enemies. It is this aspect of the Agreemen~, 
moreover, which tends to be overlooked in conventional interpretation~, 
mainly because it does not find expression in any specific textual 
provision and because heavy emphasis tends to be paid instead on the 
Union's failure to secure British acceptance of a formal African 
Defence Pact. Though it is true that Simonstown did not deliver 
this highly unrealistic South African ambition (nor did it give it 
an open rebuff- see below), it did produce this extremely useful 
second-best solution to the Union's security problem; that is to say, 
the Agreements provided the Nationalist regime, in effect, YTith an 
implicit British guarantee of its external security. 
That this guarantee was at least implicit in the .Agreements follm1ed, 
as Spence points out, from "British acceptance of the vieiv that Anglo-
s th Af . . t . th s th . d" . "bl II 8° F ou r1can secur1 y 1n e ou· ern oceans was 1n lVlSl e • or 
any attack on the Union - landwar(l_ as ivell as seavmrd - 1.,ras bound to 
threaten British ~ea power at the Cape and thus ensure that Britain 
\•las involved. This, in fact, explains why no provision \'las made in 
the Agreement5for British neutrality in the event of South African 
belligerency, though provision was made for the reverse situation 
(Britain's far-flung interests making it possible that it would be 
involved in a 1var in i-Thich South Africa had no stake). In short 9 as 
Spence rightly argues, this aspect of the Agreemen~gave substance to 
the Union's "hopeful assumption that any threat to its external 
security by a third party would of necessity be of concern to Britain, 
and this would be so regardless of how much validity >·Tas ascribed to 
any Commonwealth obligation on the part of Britain towards South 
Africa arising out of the latter's membership of that body11 • 81 
Though Britain subsequently attempted to distinguish between the 
necessity of defending the Cape Route and South Africa's wider external 
security needs, thus trying to formally dissociate itself from any 
responsibility for the latter, it remains clear that in 1955 an 
implicit guarantee was given. Erasmus certainly thought so. Indeed, 
he exploited the wording of the first part of the Agreements to argue 
that this guarantee was explicit. Thus 9 in defending the Agreements in 
the House of Assembly in Januaryp 1956, he observed that "In the agree-
ment we have for the first time in history obtained an undertaking in 
peacetime that Britain will also make armed forces available for the 
defence of Africa (interjection). It may be that Britain vras ah·rays 
\villing, but I prefer it when an agreement is in vJri ting. The agreement 
says ~ 'It is the declared policy: (a) that the United Kingdom should 
contribute forces for the defence of Africa, including Southern Africa 
And in March, he reiterated this belief even more strongly. 8 3 
This suggestion that the first part of the Simonstmm Agreements contained 
'substantive obligations' on the part of Britain to regional defence 
was, in fact, rejected by the British government in a formal reservation 
attached to the Correspondence when it was registered as a Treaty at the 
United Nations in the following August. 84 However, since, as we have 
seen, the British guarantee derived implicitly from aclmowledgement 
of the"indivisibility" of Anglo~South African security in the Southern 
oceans (which was contained elsewhere in the Agreements), this reserv~ 
ation was some\·Jhat lame - as Hell as belated. Erasmus had clearly 
chosen to emphasise the first part of the Agreements since the wording 
lent itself better to~ his puruose and sJnce it condoned the principle 
of the Union's major ambition for an African Defence Pact. And, in 
the event, by stating that the first part \·las only "registered in 
order to facilitate the understanding of the other tvJO agreements", 
the formal reservation made by Britain at the United Nations simply 
served to confirm the existence of this implicit guarantee, since 
paragraph 1 of the first part states that nsouthern Africa and the 
sea routes round Southern Africa must be secured against aggression 
from vli thout". 
Textual argument of this kind is, in any case, merepedantry. i'fhat made 
Britain's implicit guarantee of South Africa's external security real 
were the practical schemes of cooperation in which it agreed to engage 
with the Nationalist government. To begin 'tli th, Britain had agreed to 
a scheme for naval cooperation \·Thich, if it vJas on the bilateral basis 
which the Union had originally sought to avoid, was at least in the 
style of NATO. Next, Britain agreed to jointly sponsor with the Union 
a conference on African regional defence which, though it may have been 
merely a sop to Bretoria' s sensibilities \·Jhich Britain never intended 
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to follow upp as Spence suggests, 85 nevertheless condoned the principle of 
such a scheme (though not on counte~insurgency lines) and enabled the 
Union to claim at least until 1957 that it was still cooperating closely 
with London in pursuit of this goa1.86 Whilst finally~ the seal was 
placed on the newly formalized military association between the two 
countries by the Agreemen~'s provision for the supply of navalequipment 
to the Union from Britain up to 1963 9 and for what could plausibly be 
interpreted as a 'moral obligation' to continue the supply of arms for 
'external defence' thereafter for as long as the Agreemen~should last.87 
Though Spence describes this future guarantee to the Union as a direct 
gain,88 the temptation to make an anachronistic judgement must be 
avoided. The supply of arms to the Union was not 9 after all, so highly 
charged a subject in the mid-1950s as it was to subsequently become. 
Nevertheless, at least by adding a further practical dimension to the 
military association between Britain and South Africa~ this served to 
publicise its reality and thus to serve the Union's interest in this 
manner.89 
Altogether, the~,it is not surprising that Erasmus should have des= 
cribed this new military association as "an important step forward for 
whi<?h V!e are ve_r;r tl!a.nkfu.J.". 90 For although j;l].e Nati_ont~J:J.~is_ ~vo:u],d 
obviously have preferred full and formal inclusion in the Western security 
system on a multilateral basis, this was a good second-best solution to its 
security and diplomatic needs. As Spence remarks: "The 1955 Agreement 
represented a lifeline of sorts, in so far as it could be interpreted as 
conferring on South Africa a degree of quasi-formal association within 
the \{estern alliance". 91 "From South Africa's point of view", as he 
comments at another place, "the Simonstown Agreement represented the 
best that could be hoped for in a world which found its domestic policies 
increasingly objectionable 11 ,92 and 9 he might have added~ the strategic 
significance of its neighbouring sea lanes increasingly questionable. 
To sum up the Nationalist regime's gains from the Simonstown Agreements 
as a whole, therefore, they provided it with a symbolic victory over the 
base sovereignty issue which was of considerable value vis=a-vis 
'verkrampte' opinion within the ranks of Afrikanerdom, the formal en= 
shrinement of the strategic importance of the Cape route and, inter alia, 
an implicit British guarantee of its external security within the context 
of "quasi-formal association within the Western alliance". Thus was the 
sting dra>m from the United 'Party's claim that apartheid policies 
were forcing the Union into isolation from the 1;J'est and thus was the 
Nationalist regime given a clearly discernible - if noteably uneasy -
British stamp of approval. 
It is, therefore 9 quite t~le that the Simonstown Agreements represented 
a very one~sided affair: they were >·Jholly in the Union government's 
favour. Perhaps, hovJever 9 Britain was prepared to give so much away 
because the favours cost it so little. If this Has so, the Union's 
gains need occasion no surprise. i'las this in fact the case? 
We have already seen that the concession of sovereignty over the naval 
base to the Nationalist regime was not without its dangers (real or imagined) 
to the Conservative government of Anthony Eden but 1-.rhat of this ne1vly 
formalized military association Hith the 'apartheid' regime? Did 
this not also involve very real dangers for Britain 9 especially in 
its policy tmvards the 'new Commonwealth 1 in Asia (Hhere Indian 
hostility to the Union as a result of discriminatory policies towards 
the Natal Indians was a fact of long standing - see belo\·J) and, shortly 
to emerge, in Africa itself? Barber affirms that "The doubt about the 
agreement for Britain lay in the future" (see. pagel83 above) and 
certainly there is here, too, the danger of making an anachronistic 
judgement. For it is true that the danger to Britain 1 s 'ne\·! Common-
vJeal th' policy from close identification \vi th South Africa was not as 
great in the mid-1950s as it was in the post-Sharpeville period. Never-
theless, it seems likely that there 1vere some dangers even then and that 
the greater ones may have been dimly visible. 
To begin vlith, hov!ever, it must be certainly admitted that Britain's 
action over the Simonstown Agreements was in no vJay inconsistent vTith 
previous British policy in Africa, or indeed with the general style 
and practice of foreign policy under the imprint of Sir Anthony Eden. 
Most obviously, it in no sense represented a new and dramatic shift in 
British support from the black nationalist to the \'Jhi te nationalist 
side of the racial equation in Africa v1hich 9 if had be@n the case, 
would certainly have involved very major costs to Britain's colonial 
and 'new Commonwealth' policies.93 In short 9 it was quite consistent 
Hi th the long-standing British policy of 1 dualism 1 in Africa to \vhich 
attention \vas drawn at the end of Chapter I. 
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Furthermore, the Simonstm·m Agreements \vere g.lso consistent with the 
~--
Eden policy of creating alliances VJith pro-Vlestern governments in areas 
of traditional British influence, despite the fact that these were regard-
ed as anathema by nationalist leaders on the contemporary non-aligned 
circuit. After the Baghdad Pact, for instance (joined by Britain 
only four months before the announcement of the Simonstmm Agreement), 
Simonstovm could have come as no real shock. Moreover, in his memoirs, 
\vritten in 1959, Eden states that "A danger to the free world lies in the 
incompleteness of its alliances. In Europe N.A.T.O., and in South-East 
Asia S.E.A.T.O., are both fulfilling after a fashion the purpose for 
which they 1-.rere originally created. At least there is no vacuum 
there. But in the vital intervening continents of central and western 
Asia and Africa, there is no common policy, plan or propaganda. 
Alliances cannot be limited geographically in a cold VJar which is 
global ••••" (emph.added). 94 Bearing in mind, then, Eden's well 
lanown predilection for paper agreements95 and counter-productive 
policies, this observation must cast doubt, at the least, on Spence's 
contention that, under Eden at any rate, Britain's promise to sponsor 
discussions VIi th a vievT to establishing an African Defence Pact under 
the first part of the Simonstmm Agreement \vas insincere. In short, 
both the fo1~al military association VJith South Africa as it emerged 
from the Agreements and the embryonic African Defence Pact 1vere con-
sistent Hith Eden's style, as well as with his vision of Hhat was 
necessary for the protection of Britain's interests in the non-European 
world. 
Finally, the SimonstO\m Agreements Here consistent with the fact that 
the Eden administration (returned 1vi th an enlarged majority at the 
general election in May) was generally thought to be "more conserva-
tive in outlook thari its predecessor".96 In foreign policy, the 
earliest expression of this was perhaps the newly declared open 
support for France's colonial \var in Algeria, made by the Eden govern~ 
ment in April. 97 Significantly, "the only other country l•lhich came 
out unreservedly in support of France", according to Barraclough and 
Wall, "happened to be the Union of South Africa". 98 Perhaps the 
tendency which this illustrated is partly attributable to the 
pressures to vrhich Eden was being subjected from the right-wing of 
the Conservative party in Parliament as a result of his identification 
in its eyes 1·Ji th the Suez Canal Zone 'scuttle', 99 which also, as we 
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have seen 9 alarmed the South African government. According to 
NcDe:rmott 9 however, Eden himself \-laS essentially an 'inner-circle 1 
diplomat \'lith little sympathy for Black Africa, in particular, Hhich 
he "never bothered to visit 11 • 100 
If 9 however, the Simons town Agreements \·Jere consistent vii th these features 
of the Conservative governments and their policies in these years to 
this degree, it remains clear that the Agreements did involve potential 
costs for Britain, that the British governments were a\..rare of this at 
the time, and that there vTas one crucial respect in which the Agreements 
111ere not consistent \oJi th Conservative foreign policy during this period. 
There is no doubt that the very formality which the Simonstovm Agreements 
introduced into the military association between Britain and South 
Africa (already close, in any case, on an intra-Commonwealth basis) 
served to highlight once more Britain's highly equivocal attitude on 
racial matters within the Commom1eal th. Coming when they did, this made 
them potentially dangerous. For already the shape \'lhich the Conserva~ 
tive government under Churchill had allm·Ted the Central African Feder-
ation to asst~e (created in 1953) was causing alarm and unrest in 
Northen1 Rhodesia and in~Nyasaland and thus ~reated a massiye p~oblem 
for the Colonial Office. 101 In April 1955 the Bandung Conference had 
created another forum for the expression of anti~colonialist, as well 
as neutralist, sentiment. But above all, perhaps, the Indian govern-
ment had finally severed relations 1-1ith the Nationalist regime in 
Pretoria in 1954 over the latter's treatment of the Natal Indians. 102 
This \·Tas especially significant, moreover, because Indian disaffection 
with Britain as a result of too open identification ,.,i th the 1 apartheid 
regime' could have led to Nehru's withdraual from the Commonwealth. In 
that event, this essential prop of Britain's great pm..rer status vJOuld have 
shrunk quanti ta ti vely to its 1 vJhi te dominion 1 core (and remained as such 
when the African colonies became independent) and Britain's claim to 
be the leader of a 'multi-racial' world association would also, by the 
same token, have been destroyed. 103 Furthermore 1 Nehru Has regarded as 
a highly useful adjunct to British diplomacy tm·mrds China and to the 
new states outside, as 1t1ell as inside, the Commonwealth. 104 
Clearly, it was an appreciation of the dangers of identification with 
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South Africa's racial policies represented by this background, amongst 
other things, which, as indicated at the beginning of the Chapter 9 had 
prompted British coolness tovJards the Nationalists' scheme for an 
African Defence Pact from the beginning. That m·mreness of the 
heightened dangers in 1955 Has also present in Britain vras similarly 
demonstrated, of course, by those parts of the Simonsto~m Agreements 
which explicitly discountenanced a British commitment to internal 
security arrangements for Southern Africa (that is to say, to an 
African Defence Pact along the lines originally envisaged by the 
Nationalist government) and which provided for the ban on the applic-
ation of apartheid policies in the base area itsel£. 105 Finally, 
testifying to the fact that diplomatic costs had probably already 
been incurred 106 and that greater ones were in vievJ, there v1as the 
reservation which the Eden govel~ent felt obliged to attach to the 
Correspondence when it was registered as a Treaty at the United 
Nations just over one year after it had originally been initialled 
by both governments = and after Erasmus had been unable to resist 
boasting openly about its implications. 107 
It is thus evident that in the final shape assumed by the Simonsto'vn 
Agreements 9 the British goverpmer;tt gave quite a lot a\·/ay to the 
Nationalist regime and that these favours \vere not 9 in fact 9 vii thout 
costs \·lhich vJere clearly discernible to the British government at 
the time. Furthermore, as we have seen, under the formal terms 
of the Agreements, Britain 9 contrary to many accounts of this affair, 
received nothing of any significance in return. This is the real 
anomaly of the Simonstmvn Agreements; this is the i'lay in uhich they 
were in fact inconsistent with the practice of current Conservative 
foreig·n policy. For the British governments of this period vJere 
prepared to pursue policies Hhich ran the risk of being branded 
'reactionary' in the 'non-white' Commonwealth and in the foru.m of the 
United Nations General Assembly; it was rare, hov~ever, for them to 
be gratuitously reactionary. A substantial quid pro quo v1as, in 
other words, normally sought, as in the case, for instance, of the 
Eden government's declaration of support for the French policy in 
Algeria which has already been mentioned. 108 
If, therefore, the British government had no need to return the 
Simonstovm naval base to the Nationalist government or to give it 
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"quasi=formal association \·Ti thin the He stem alliance" in order to 
assure its questionable security interests at the Cape (since these 
were already guaranteed by the nature of the Nationalist regime in 
South Africa and its ovm ambitions), the question is: why did Britain 
grant these very substantial concessions? vJhat 9 in other v1ords, was 
the real South African quid pro quo? The Times of London, shovring 
a scepticism towards the official British justification of the 
Simonstovm Agreements ,..,hich uas almost unique at the time and has 
remained almost equally unique since, suggested that the true explan-
ation ,..,as probably that Britain wished to avoid "putting a needless 
strain on friendship (with South Africa) in the future 19 • 109 Could 
it have been the case 9 then, that Britain's political interests in 
South Africa would have been jeopardised in the absence of British 
concessions under the Simonstmm Agreements? Let us consider the 
evidence for supposing that it was a concern for the High Commission 
Territories or for Britain's .'kith and kin' interests in the Union 
which prompted Britain's policy t01.·1ards the Nationalist regime at 
this juncture. 
4. Political. 'interests' 
The High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and 
Swaziland had been British protectorates since the second half of the 
19th Century and, in vie\v of their geographical location (the last 
two are physically encircled by South African territory) and the 
provisions of the Act of Union of 1910, it is hardly surprising 
that their incorporation into South Africa itself had been a long-
standing ambition of successive governments in Pretoria. 110 In 1951 9 
Dr. Malan publicly harangued a visiting British minister on the matter 
and in 1953 gave the British government an ultimatum to the effect 
that transfer of the territories would have to take place within five 
111 years. Britain, on the other hand, was committed by treaty to 
consult the inhabitants of the protectorates ~ef~;rrn agreement to such a 
transfer and, after the Nationalist election victory in 1948, it be-
came obvious that not only \vould such consultation be likely to meet 
with an embarrassing rebuff but that even its contemplation Hould have 
' TI •t• h 1 • 1 d C lth 1" 112 ser1ous repercussions on Drl 1s co on1a an ommom'!ea. po 1cy. 
Accordingly 9 as far as the British government was concerned, the 
possibility of transferring the protectorates to the Nationalist 
government ceased to be a matter of practical politics. Indeed~ 
in August 1954, that is to say, in the same month that the formal 
negotiations on Simonsto\m commenced, Churchill Hent significantly 
further than usual in rebutting the Union's claim. 11 3 Against this 
background, then~ and in vie\·! of the undoubted economic dependence 
of these neglected and thus impoverished territories on the Union, 
is it in fact possible that the Nationalist government used them as 
a lever on Britain during the Simonstovm negotiations? 
The suggestion clearly has to be taken seriously. After all~ since 
incorporation was by this time out of the question, the British 
government could no longer hold it out as an inducement to good 
behaviour on the Union's part, as formerly appears to have been 
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the case. 114 Instead of being a British ace, therefore~ the High 
Commission Territories seem to have become by this time, in Halpern's 
phrase, "South Africa's hostages 11 • 11 5 Theoretically, the Nationalist 
government could have threatened to apply to them economic pressure, 
for instance, if not in order to secure their incorporation, then in 
order to obtain the kind of concessions vrhich it sought and~ as we 
have seen, in substantial measure obtained, during the Simon.stown 
negotiations. Furthermore~ the possibility that this threat was in 
fact used successfully during these negotiations with Britain is 
supported by the fact that the replacement of Malan by the reputedly 
more extreme Nationalist, Strijdom, in December 1954, did not lead to 
more militant public demands on this matter= as might have been 
expected - but rather the reverse. As Barber records: "At the 
beginning of his premiership Strijdom reaffirmed the government's 
intention of incorporating the Territories, but he never threatened 
direct action as Malan had done. He and Louw continued to mruce public 
claims and kept up negotiations with Britain, but there was a suspicion 
that they did this more to satisfy demands \vi thin the Nationalist Party 
116 than with any real hope of persuading the British Government". In 
short, therefore, it might be held that the British government exchanged 
military and diplomatic concessions under the Simonsto\m Agreements in 
return for a Nationalist promise to leave the 'hostages' unharmed and 
perhaps even for helping in their subsequent economic development. 11 7 
That this was part of the Simonstown deal cannot be ruled out. On the 
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other hand, the point about hostages is that they are only useful if 
the threat to do them harm, or the promise to do them good, is credible to 
the other partner in the negotiations. N0\·1, whilst the latter clearly was 
credible, the former is less likely to have been the case. As The Round 
Table Has quick to point out when the subject Has under discussion in the 
early 1950s, the Union would also have lost seriously in any economic 
confrontation Hith the High Commission Territories since it relied on 
them as an important reservoir of cheap labour for its mines and 
developing industries. 118 On balance, therefore, it is not likely 
that the protectorates vrere particularly significant in the Simons town 
negotiations, though it vrould be surprising if they had not had some 
marginal impact on the outcome. 
\Vhat, finally, then, of the 'kith and kin' agreement? It would, in 
fact, be equally foolish to rule this out altogether. The idea of 
•South Africa' seems to have had a fairly strong romantic hold over 
certain sections of the Tory party in Parliament during these years, 
for \vhich the novels of John Buchan must be held in large measure 
accountable. 11 9 It can be safely assu~ed that memories of the Union's 
war-time assistance against the Axis Powers were still quite fresh and 
that the contribution which Smuts had made to the 'philosophy', at any 
rate, of the Commomreal th had not yet been forgotten. And then, of 
course, there \¥as the large and somewhat embattled English-speaking 
population in the Union for which the British government presumably 
had the same sort of feelings that Nehru had for the Natal Lndians. 
Perhaps, therefore, these things were of some consequence. After all, 
failure on the part of the British government to be forthcoming during 
the Simonsto1m negotiations might have stiffened the resolve of the 
Nationalists to declare a republic and even withdra\•J fr.om the Common-
wealth 9 thus severing the 'family link'. On the other hand, it is 
clear that the Nationalist government had a variety of excellent 
reasons, domestic as well as external, for not pressing the republican 
issue at this time and is thus not likely to have been able to make this 
threat very credible at this juncture. 120 Above all, however, the South 
Africa of Malan and Strijdom was hardly the South Africa of Smuts of 
fond memory. On the contrary 9 as we have seen, it v1as ruled by an 
increasingly well entrenched group of people whose hostility to the 
British and their causes v1as notorious. It does not seem unreasonable 
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to hold, therefore, that the disposition of the British government 
to be generous to the Nationalists during the Simonstown negotiations, 
which might'have been produced by feelings of 'kith and kin' for the 
population 1·Thich they ostensibly represented, must have been in large 
measure off-set by the effects of the people and traditions which 
they actually represented. 
\'le have thus established that the Nationalist government had serious 
diplomatic and military ambitions during the early and mid-1950s 
towards which, after the Union had been thwarted in their pursuit in 
the multilateral arena, the British government \·rent a long 1vay in 
gratifying on a bilateral basis in the Simonstown Agreements. We 
have also seen that it is difficult to believe that the clearly 
discernible costs which this involved for Britain could have been 
borne as a result of the security 1 concessions 1 1;1hich the Union 
government is purported to have made in return (since these ·Here 
spurious) or by Britain's other 'interests' in South Africa. In 
circumstances of mounting hostility to the Nationalist regime (albeit 
nothing like the post-Sharpeville hysteria of criticism), therefore, 
the British gove1~ent had come closer to meeting the Nationalists' 
demands than at any time since their acc~ss:j_on to poHer, despite a 
customary avoidance of gratuitously reactionary policies. On the 
other hand, we have also seen that the Nationalist regime possessed 
a significant margin of putative economic pm-rer over the British 
government at this time. It is thus likely that this margin was the 
decisive factor. The argument should thus be clear: the outcome of 
the Simonstown negotiations represented the actualization of this 
putative pm.rer. The thesis that this must have been so, hovJever, 
does not rest merely on an acknowledged British government concern 
for the effects of an unfriendly attitude towards the Union on 
Britain's 'economic stake' in South Africa, nor even on the deductive 
reasoning which has so far characterised the development of the 
~rgument, though both are important. For there is, in fact, some 
fairly strong evidence which has a direct bearing on the manner in 
which the Nationalist government 'actualized' its putative economic 
power at this historical juncture. 
2· ~1e economic factor 
It vrill be recalled that at the time of the Simonstmm negotiations 
the Union's pu ta ti ve economic povrer vis-a-vis the British government 
was held to have rested principally on the superiority of the 
Nationalists in terms of the non~economic bases of such povrer, 
, especially in regard to the skill to exert and, above all, in the 
\vill to apply it. It will be further recalled that the most 
significant ingredients of the Union's economic strength vis-a~vis 
Britain was its importance as a contributor of gold to the Sterling 
Area's 'dollar pool' ("1-Jhich had to be earned above a ¢140m. minimum 
guarantee by visible and invisible exports to the Union) 9 the size 
of Britain's assets which were substantially locked in South Africa 
and, possibly (given the complicating factor of the CDA) 9 the Union's 
crucially important position at that time as a supplier of uranium. 
Let us consider the evidence, then 9 for suggesting that these items of 
economic strength were actually employed by the Nationalist government 
during the course of the Simonstmm negotiations. 
It must at once be conceded that there is no evidence to support the 
view that the Nationalists threatened any move against Britain's assets 
in the Union or to interfere in any i·iay with the repatriation of 
earnings from them. Furthermore 9 it is unlikely that this \vould have 
been contemplated, since, although the Union vras much less dependent 
upon British capital at this time, as we saw in Chapter II, the 
agitation of Afrikaner economic groups against the domination of the 
South African economy by foreign capital in general, and British 
capital in particular, had not yet begun to mount seriously and thus 
lend the credibility required to such a threat_. On the other hand, 
given the vast size of these assets and their overall importance to 
Britain's overseas investment earnings, it is obvious that they were 
a South African 'hostage' of much greater importance than the High 
Commission Territories and one which \'/as probably more vulnerable 9 too. 
After all, over the medium-term, at any rate, the Nationalist government 
could only gain economically by expropriating these assets and it is 
hardly likely to have found itself condemned for doing this by "the 
Afro-Asian cum-Communist cum-Hestern-socialist-humanist bloc in the 
United Nations Assembly"t 121 Anticipation of the consequences for 
these assets of an unforthcoming attitude during Simonstmm may well 
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have been a significant factor, therefore, but it has probably been 
exaggerated. The evidence suggests that the real leverage vJas exerted 
directly and employing different ingredients in South Africa's economic 
strength vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. 
The first round of formal bi-lateral defence talks betHeen Britain 
and South Africa, it vrill be recalled, took place during August-
September 1954 and that they vrere inconclusive. Though it seems clear 
that, as was suggested above (see page 178), the British government 
had by this time already moved a good deal of the way tm-rards the 
point at \vhich it was untimately to stick in these negotiations 9 the 
Nationalists had clearly still not got a firm British commitment to 
the African Defence Pact which they so desired and were thus dissatis-
fied vli th existing progress in the talks. It is against this back-
ground, therefore, that the Union's decision to \·lithdraw its ¢140 million 
minimum gold guarantee to the Sterling Area's 'dollar pool' must be seen. 
For this decision was communicated to the British government in October 
1954, 122 knovm to the City by at least mid-December123 and announced to 
the world not by the British government but by Eric Louw on February 4, 
1955. 124 
Of course, the British Chancellor, R.A. Butler, maintained that this 
move would occasion no harm to the Sterling Area since the South 
African authorities had been obliged to contribute substantially 
more thru1 the minimum in gold to the 'dollar pool', in any case, as a 
result of the size of the Union's commercial deficit with the Sterling 
Area since the guarantee was first given. This development, he held, 
had rendered the guarantee irrelevant and it had therefore been with-
drmm by mutual agreement. As a result, he insisted, it suggested no 
weakening of South Africa's ties with the Sterline Area. Gaitskell, 
who queried Butler on this point, 1vas not able to substantially 
challenge this interpretation. 125 
This is not surprising, since Butler's account Has not in fact wholly 
disingenuous. As can be seen from Appendix B, Table 28, the Union's 
commercial deficit \vi th the Sterling Area had in fact been in excess of 
the ¢140 million gold guarantee in three of the five years since 1950 
when it v1as first given and, in 1954 itself, \·ras more than double this 
~~aunt. On the other hand, it is manifestly obvious that the National-
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ist government had Hithdra\>m this crucial guarantee to the dollar 
pool in precisely the circumstances which had made it initially 
necessary to the British monetary authorities in the late 1940s. For 
by October 1954, when the guarantee was withdra,.m, British manufacturers 
had already been obliged to face dollar competition in the Union market 
across the board for eight months 126 and the net sterling capital infloH 
was once more assuming large proportions (App. B, Table 8). Not surprising~ 
ly, therefore, the SA Reserve Bank's holdings of foreign exchange (mainly 
sterling) were by this time substantial, standing at just about double 
their level in the previous October and rising rapidly, (App. B, 
Table 33). In short, the eagerness of the South Africans to spend 
their gold on non=Sterling Area commodities and their ability to off-
set their current account deficit \vi th the Sterling Area with their 
capital account surplus with it, were both combining once more to threat-
en the Union's gold contribution to the 'dollar pool' at the very time at 
which the minimum guarantee was \>Ji thdrmm. As a result 9 Butler \•Jas 
either misinformed or simply putting a brave face on things. 
\'111en the Nationalist government had actually announced the ending of 
anti=dollar discrimination in the South African market (effective as 
of January 1, 1954) on October 16 9 1953, there had naturally been some 
alarm in Britain. 127 Moreover, ~n- t~i~ occasion Butler was quick to 
point to the value of the ¢140 million minimum gold guarantee \'lhich, 
he said, "the South African Government has agreed to rene\.,r • • • • in 
1954".128 If, on the later occasion, then, Butler was constrained to 
be politic when the decision to \·Ji thdra,.,r the guarantee had been made 
public by the South African government 9 this \>Tas not true to quite 
the same extent of the City press. The Economist, for instance, 
explicitly contradicting Butler, observed that "Under the new 
dispensation South Afd.ca \fill become even more the odd member 
of the Sterling Area, being more than ever dissociated from the Pool 
and more and more identified with the hard currency area11 • 129 Whilst 
The Banker went even further, suggesting that, if an increase in the 
net sterling capital inflow to the Union should result in the South 
Afric&~ authorities using this currency - rather than gold = to cover 
their current account deficit \vi th the Sterling Area, the "United 
Kingdom authorities might find it necessary to end the concession, 
no\>J wholly unregui ted, that gives South Africa free access to the 
London capital market" (emphasis added). 13° Unfortunately for the 
British government~ the potency of this counter~threat had been all 
but removed by the vastly diminished dependence of the Union on 
British capital compared to the time in 1949 when Cripps had employed 
this weapon with such marked success (see page 145 above). 
Against the background of such gloomy gold-earning prospects for the 
'dollar pool' in the South African market at this time (Britain's 
share of the SA market actually fell from 37.5 per cent at the end 
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of 1953 to only 31.6 per cent by the end of 1956 (App. B9 Table 6), 
coming, too, at the juncture Hhich it did in the Simonstovm negoti-
ations and being publicly announced by Eric Louw, the Union government's 
ne1v and aggressive Finance .§!E.£ External Affairs ~linister, it 1vould be 
surprising indeed if the \vi thdra\·Jal of the minimum gold guarantee by 
the Nationalists was not intended as a signal to the British government 
that the Union's golden favours had to be earned. 
Of course, the gold guarantee was not re-instated after the Simonstown 
Agreements had been signed but it never became an issue after the mid-
1950s in any case because the 1954 revival in sterling investment in 
the Union did in fact turn out to be a 'flash~in~the-pan' (App. B, 
Table 8). Together Hi th a deteriorating invisible balance 11:!. th tlle 
Sterling Area, this ensured that the Union remained short of sterling 
for the remainder of the period and thus had no alternative but to 
settle its commercial deficit \vi th the Sterling Area in gold (see 
Chapter II, Part A 9 Sec. 1). Thus Butler's prognosis turned out to 
be correct after all but the point is that this could not have been 
foreseen in October 1954, nor even in the first half of 1955. 131 
It is also against the background of these gloomy gold-earning prospects 
in the Union that the importa...l'lce to the British government (as 1:1ell to 
British ship-builders) of the naval orders, 1:rhich 1vere made an explicit 
part of the SimonstO\m deal, must be seen. vle have already established 
that the Union intended to develop its Navy irrespective of the outcome 
of these negotiations. Is the Nationalist government likely to have 
threatened to buy elsewhere in order to bring additional pressure to 
bear on Britain at this time? 
Given Britain's sliding position in the South African market in general 
at this time and the quickening pace of the international arms market 
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(see Chapter II, Part A, Sec.1), it does indeed seem possible, on the 
face of it, that the British government might have been concerned that 
a failure to be forthcoming during the Simonstm·m negotiations might 
have induced the South African government to turn elsewhere for its 
naval equipment, even if no explicit threat was made. After all, it 
was already doing this ivi th its air force, as He have seen. On the 
other hand, the existing SA Navy was ivholly of British production and 
Britain's reputation in this field stood particularly high at this 
time. 132 Moreover, actually being supplied by Britain appeared to 
lend_ greater substance to the Union's military association with 
Britain which was of such importance to the Nationalist government 
at this time, as we have also seen. On balm1ce, therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the Union government used these orders as an explicit 
bargaining counter during the negotiations (and there 1vas not the 
slightest hint in the contemporary press that it was threatening to 
turn elsewhere), though the possibility of such a firm and substantial 
advance commitment was no doubt pleasing to Britain's ship-builders 
and, against the general background which has just been painted, some 
small inducement to the British government - if only because it \oTOuld 
assist it in selling the package to the House of Commons. 
If, hov1ever, it is unlikely that the Nationalist government threatened 
to turn else11There for supplies of naval equipment as a bargaining ploy 
in the Simonstown negotiations, it seems that they did attempt to 
extract some negotiating mileage out of their uranium supply position. 
As ive established earlier (see Chapter II, Part A, Sec. 2), it was at 
precisely the time of the Simonstown negotiations that South Africa's 
uranium was beginning to become so important to the CDA and sometime 
yet before it became evident that there would soon be a substantial 
excess of supply over dem~~d in the world market. 
The Nationalist government did, of course, use its uranium plants to 
bolster the general argument of the South Africa-Admiralty alliance 
concerning the strategic importance of the southern part of the 
continent in a general war133 but this had nothing to do with the 
'actualization' of putative economic power. Indeed, given the fact 
that South Africa i·ras contractually bound to sell all of its uranium 
to the CDA until ten years after each plant came on stream (11hich 
effectively meant 1963 although, as we hav~ seen, the appearance of 
surplus in 1957 enabled the CDA to release the SAAEB from this 
obligation in 1958) and given the further fact that it had to sell 
to the CDA itself, rather than directly to the British government, 
it must have been fairly obvious to the South Afric~~ government 
at this time that uranium did not provide it Hith a great deal of 
putative economic power to play vTi th. 
Nevertheless, since it was lmmm in Britain that tfu.e South African 
goven1ment was dissatisfied with the Ahgust=September talks in 1954, 
that almost certainly as a result it had 1·Ji thdra1m the gold guarantee 
in the follm·ring month, and that it vms vridely believed that a ne1:r 
hard-line element had been injected into the leadership of the 
Nationalist government by the changes at the top in December 1954, it 
seems probable that there may \oJell have been apprehensions 1vi thin the 
British government concerning the Union's future attitude tm.,rards 
uranium supplies ~ CDA or no. It is also possible (though admittedly, 
by this stage, unlikely) that the British were apprehensive concerning 
the effects of a deterioration in their general atomic relationship 
with the South African goveTilillent, especially with regard to the 
development of uranium resources, as a result of the importance which 
this had hitherto had for their 01m fragile atomic relationship 1·rith 
the United States (see page 111 above~ 
Against this background, therefore, it is intriguing, to say the least, 
that, in early June 1955, on the eve of the departure of Erasmus for 
the final round of negotiations 1vi th the B±i tish government 9 an article 
vrhich \oTas syndic a ted in both the J o 'burg Star and The Times of London 
should have observed that "Britain has less need to retain Simonstmm 
than in the past, and more reason not to cavil now that much of her 
uraniu1n ·comes from mines in the Transvaal and the Free State" •134 Even 
more intriguing, Erasmus did not journey directly to London but went 
instead via Paris, where he remained for five days and presumably spent 
much time attempting to drum up support for the African Defen~e Pact. 135 
Hmvever, it appears that he vTas entertained during this interval by 
M. Gaston Palm.,rski, 1vho vras not only Deputy Prime Minister in the 
government of Edgar Faure but also French J'llinister in charge of Atomic 
Affairs. 136 Nmv, this may well have been entirely innocuous in the 
context of the Simonstovrn negotiations but the background already des-
cribed and the history of France's relations with Britain in atomic energy 
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matters suggests othenrise. 
French offers of atomic collaboration Hith the British at the end of 
the second l·Jorld Har had, in fact, been rebuffed because of the feared 
effects of such a proposition on the critical Anglo-American relation~ 
ship in this field. 137 Nevertheless, France had thereafter made 
considerable progress on her 0\~1 38 and as early as 1952-53 the 
manufacture of a French bomb was under discussion. 139 Furthermore, 
it was also at this juncture that the French were seeking other partners 
for atomic collaboration Hithin Hestern Europe and that, as a result, 
Euratom was in the process of gestation. 140 In these circumstances, 
therefore, and despite the fact that the French are known to have had 
access to some small quantities of uranium of their own (see App. B, 
Table 39) 9 the visit of Erasmus to M. Pale\·lSki may well have been inten-
ded by the South African government as yet another signal to the British 
negotiators that Britain had something to lose in the event of an 
unsatisfactory outcome to the Simonstovm negotiations: in particular 
future difficulties over uranium supplies and South African sustenance 
of a \-!estern European atomic energy effort which -vras developing quite 
separately from, and probably in competition Hith 9 that of Britain.
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Conclusion 
The Nationalist government did not, of course, get everything which 
it wanted out of the Simonstown negotiations with Britaino This, in 
any case, was impossible since its scheme for an African Defence Pact 
\vas essentially a multilateral conception and, as such, \·ras by no means 
entirely in Britain's gift. Its success required, in other words, the 
assent of the other colonial pm·Jers in Africa as well as the tacit 
support of the United States. On the other hand, as we have seen, 
it secured the return of the naval base to South African sovereignty, 
the formal enshrinement of the strategic importance of the Cape route 
in general \·Jar at a time 1-1hen developments in strategic thought. Here 
rendering this questionable, British endorsement of the principle (at 
any rate) of the need for an African Defence Pact and, above all, an impli-
cit British guarantee of South Africa's external security in the context 
of a "quasi-formal association vli thin the \·!estern alliance". These 
significant British concesGions vJere not 9 furthermore, requited in any 
degree whatsoever in security terms and thus the conventional inter-
pretation of the Simonstown Agreements 9 as exemplified by writers 
such as Barber9 stands refuted. 
It is also difficult to believe that concern for the High Commission 
Territories or for Britain 9 s 'kith and kin' interest in South Africa 
could have been decisive factors in explaining this anomaly. As a 
result, the logic of the analysis forces us to the conclusion that 
the real South African q~pro quo in the Simonstown negotiations was 
economic. 
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It is true that the Nationalist government never subjected the British 
government to any crude economic carrot-and-stick treatment in the 
public domain during the course of these negotiations, tho~gh 9 as we 
shall see 9 this was to become a more marked feature of its diplomacy 
towards Britain in the post-Sharpeville period. On the other hand 9 
the Union government's will to exploit economic strength was evident 
to the British government, its skill in this respect substantial and. 
the evidence not overwhelming by any means but highly suggestive 
nevertheless seems to indicate that economic pressure was actually 
--- -·-.--
applied during the negotiations. Furthermore, though the size of 
Britain's assets in South Africa no doubt weighed heavily on the minds 
of the highly City- and Bank of England-influenced Conservative 
government of this period 9 it seems likely that the Union's most 
immediately effective economic weapon was its direct control over the 
size of South Africa's gold contribution to the 'dollar pool'. All 
things considered9 therefore 9 the conclusion seems inescapable: the 
outcome of the Simoristown negotiations constituted a particularly 
significant actualization of putative economic power vis-a-vis Britain by 
the post-1948 Nationalist regime in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POST-SHARPEVILLE PERIOD: SOUTH AFRICA'S PUTATIVE 
ECONOMIC POvrnR 'ACTUALIZED' ONCE MORE 
In the period which intervened between the Simonstown Agreements in 
July 1955 and the shootings at Sharpeville on March 21, 19609 Anglo-
South African relations remained largely unruffled. Despite the 
reservation which the British government attached to the Simonstown 
Agreements at the UN 9 it was not until the end of 1957 that the 
South African government realized that its hopes for an African 
DSfence Pact were finally deado For as late as September of that 
yea~, ~fter yet _a,pot:her v;i..sit by Er_asmus to London, the British 
government had once more endorsed the South African proposal for 
a multilateral conference on regional defence in southern Africa. 
"In the meantime", concluded the Ministry of Defence statement 
issued as a result of these talks, "the Union and the U.K. vrould 
develop cooperation on a bilateral basis in respect of the 
territories for which they are responsible". 1 
In view of the fact that two well-known right=wingers were respon-
sible for handling Britain's relations with South Africa in these 
matters (Douglas-Home at the Commonwealth Relations Office and 
Duncan Sandys at the Ministry of Defence)2 and in view of the 
commitment made by Britain to sponsor such a conference under 
Nationalist pressure in the Simonstown Agreements, it is perhaps 
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not surprising that this scheme should have been further endorsed by 
the British government in 1957. Nevertheless, no conference was ever 
held and nothing more was heard of the scheme.3 
No detailed explanation of this development has been offered, though 
it seems clear that the departure of Eden (who was so keen on this 
sort of thing) at the beginning of 1957 and his replacement by the 
more liberal :fo'Iacmillan as British Prime Minister, the gathering 
momentum of African nationalism, 4 the continuing coolness of the 
other African colonial powers, and the post-Suez determination of 
the United States government to place still further distance between 
itself and European colonialism 9 5 together provide sufficient explan= 
ation of the failure of the Nationalist government to achieve this 
long-standing ambition. It might also be added that its economic 
leverage over the British government was also particularly weak at 
this juncture as a result of the seriously weakened uranium market 
and the continued strength of the dollar vis-a-vis gold. vfuat 9 then 9 
of Anglo-South African relations during the post-Sharpeville period? 
For this \vas the next occasion on which they were put to most severe 
test over the years between 1951 and 1964 and on which 9 accordingly 9 
it might be expected that the Nationalist government would be most 
likely to try and actualize the putative economic power which it has 
been shown to have possessed in substantial measure over the British 
government at this time. 
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Though it preceded the shootings by some weeks 9 the post-Sharpeville 
period in AngYo-South African relations was effectively announced by 
Harold Macmillan's famous 'wind of change' speech at Cape Town on 
February 39 1960 9 which was widely interpreted as signalling a major 
new departure in British policy towards South Africa.6 This was 
suppos~d _t_o consist in a more hostile attitude towards the National= 
ist regime as a result of its stubborn retention of apartheid and to 
disabuse it of any idea that the previous British policy of support 
for the Union in the matter of outside 'interference' in its internal 
affairs (either at the UN or within the Commonwealth) could be 
henceforth regarded as axiomatic. 7 It was to be an expression of 
what Macmillan liked to call his "middle course" between the conflict-
ing demands of the 'new' and the 'old' Commonwealth countries. 8 
Let us examine the nature of this new policy and consider the evidence 
for the official British claim that it did in fact represent a new 
departure in Britain's political relations with the South African 
Nationalist party regime. If - as will be argued - this amounted to 
nothing more than diplomatic window-dressing and that 9 on the contrary 9 
the British government did in fact adopt a highly protective attitude 
towards South Africa both at the UN and within the Commonwealths let 
us next consider (as in the case of the Simonstown Agreements) the 
evidence for suggesting that Britain's non-economic interests in 
South Africa were responsible for this attitude. And then 9 finally 9 
examine the evidence for supposing that an integral part of the 
explanation lies in South African actualization of putative economic 
power. 
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In the Cape To~m speech9 in February 1960 9 it is true that Macmillan 
explicitly dissociated Britain from the practice of apartheid and 
added the warning that since "in this shrinking world ••• the internal 
policies of one nation may have effects outside it11 9 Britain could no 
longer be relied upon to give automatic and unqualified support to 
the Union in defence of its right to order its internal affairs as 
its leaders saw fit. This shift in British policy - for such it 
clearly was ~ was evidently prompted by a desire on the part of 
Macmillan's government to avoid compromising its colonial and 
Commonwealth policies by too close identification with the National~ 
· ist regime; it is also clear9 however9 that it was designed to bring 
some pressure to bear on, Dr. Verwoerd to modify at least the more 
blatant aspects of apartheid. For South Africa 9 after all 9 was a 
leading member of what was supposed to be a 'multi-racial' Commonwealth 
and apartheid represented a striking contradiction of this ideal 9 to 
say the least. Racial 'partnership'was also a key element in the 
Conservative justificati.on of the Central African-Federation. 10 
Moreover 9 it was at precisely this juncture that a number of African 
colonies were on the verge of being granted independence by Britain 
and were thus faced with the imminent decision of either choos·ing or 
rejecting the Commonwealth. 
1. Britains South Africa and the United Nations 
After the Sharpsville shootings on March 21st 9 1960 9 which followed 
so hot on the heels of Macmillan's speech and which occasioned such 
tb t f ld ·a a t· 11 th f" t · f th an ou urs o wor -w~ e con emna ~on, e ~rs s~gn o e new 
British policy towards South Africa emerged on March 24 in an amend-
ment which was tabled by the government to an official opposition 
motion strongly condemning the Nationa;List regime. 11This House", 
read the government amendmentp "while recognizing that it has no 
responsibility or jurisdiction over the independent countries of the 
Commonwealth 9 at the same time wishes to record its deep sympathy 
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with all the people of South Africa at the recent tragic events which 
have taken place at Vereeniging and Langa11 • 12 Moreover, on March 30 9 
the day on which the shootings led to South Africa's racial policies 
being discussed in the Security Council of the United Nations for the 
first time, the British government also announced that it had agreed 
to the inscription of an anti-South African motion on the agenda on 
the grounds that "discussion" of an internal affair of a UN member 
did not constitute "interference" in that affair and thus was not in 
contradiction of Article 2(1) of the Charter, which expressly forbad 
such action. 13 In endorsing inscription 9 furthermore, the British 
government rejected an explicit request from Dr. Verwoerd to resist 
this move on his behalf. 14 
The motion which emerged from this meeting of the Security Council 
had strong words for apartheid in South Africa, declared that the 
situation in that country had "led to international friction and, 
if continued 9 might encl:anger international peace and security", and 
requested the Secretary-General (in consultation with the South 
African government) "to make such arrangements as would adequately 
help in upholding the purposes and the principles of the Charter11 • 15 
The British government failed to veto this motion, as Dr. Verwoerd 
would no doubt have liked, but instead abstained. The French govern-
ment did likewise 9 and the result was that it was passed by nine 
votes to nil. 16 Of the British abstention 9 Macmillan subsequently 
recorded that this was the "not very noble, but very sensible" course 
which Commonwealth unity demanded. 17 
As the Security Council had requested 9 the Secretary-General visited 
South Africa in January 1961 but, Calvororessi records, nhis visit 
was as fruitless as the (General) Assembly's resolutions 11 • 18 As a 
result 9 in March 9 the General Assembly's Special Political Committee 
once more debated apartheid and on this occasion the British govern-
ment's attitude towards the Nationalist regime seemed to have hardened 
still further. Affirming once more his government's continued attach-
ment to the importance of non-interference by the UN in matters of 
domestic jurisdictionp the British representative nevertheless declared 
that Britain now "regarded apartheid as being 0 0. so exceptional as to 
be sui generis". As a result, he continued, the British government 
felt free from now on to consider any resolution on its merits: he 
then cast the first British vote in favour of an anti-apartheid 
resolution~ 1 9 
In August, 1963, after General Assembly exhortations to members 
to bring individual pressure to bear on South Africa had proved 
futile, the question of apartheid \lras once more brought before the 
Security Council. The Afro~Asian states who were, of course, South 
Africa's chief antagonists in this matter, had by now decided that 
the only possible course of actfon was to persuade the Security 
Council that apartheid constituted a threat to the peace and that, 
accordingly, it was an appropriate subject for UN enforcement action 
binding on all member nations. 20 In this they failed but the British 
government was sufficiently persuaded by the extent and the force of 
opinion which had by this time built up against the South African 
Nationalist regime's apartheid politics to announce an embargo on the 
export of any armaments from Britain which could be used by the 
Nationalist government for internal repression. 21 In the autumn of 
1963 the British government also supported nea~unanimous motions in 
the General Assembly calling on South Africa to end the persecution of 
internal opponents of apartheid22 and in June of the following year, 
shortly before the Conservative party left office, Britain similarly 
endorsed a Security Council resolution to establish a committee to 
investigate the feasibility of applying economic sanctions against the 
Nationalist regime. 23 
As in the case of the general question of apartheid, Britain's official 
attitude towards other contentious issues involving South Africa at the 
United Nations also demonstrated a ne\v coolness after Macmillan v s 
'wind of change' speech in February 1960. For instance, until October, 
1959, Britain had solidly defended the Union government in the UN's 
Fourth Committee (Trusteeship) over the question of South Africa 9 s 
jurisdiction in the old League of Nations mandate of South-West Africa. 24 
At the Committee's next session in October-December 1960, however, the 
British representative, though maintaining his government's view that 
negotiation remained the only practical solutionp abstained on the 
question of the hearing of petitioners and abstained similarly on the 
resolutions which, inter alia, condemned South Africa 8 s administration 
of the mandate, rejected the possibility of success through negotiation 
and announced the UN's decision to send the South West Africa Co~ittee 
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into the mandated territory. Tabled by Afro-Asian members 9 these 
resolutions were successfully adopted with the combined support of 
the USA and the Soviet Union. 25 Though the British government 
refused to have any truck with a resolution passed by the Fourth 
Committee's next session in March 1961 9 which called for the 
Committee to fnter the mandate witha or without South Africa's co~ 
t · 
25 (a · t · t · d · t b t t · · t t · 1 th · opera ~on 9 ~ ma~n a~ne ~ s a s en ~on1s pos ure 1n genera on ~s 
question despite the increasingly forceful nature of the resolutions 
which were put to the Committee. 
Such 9 then 9 were the broad contours of the British government's new 
policy towards the Nationalist regime subsequent to Macmillan's 
'wind of change' speech to the South African Parliament in 1960. Such 9 
then 9 was the result of Macmillan's "middle course" between the 'new' 
and the 'old'. Commonwealth 9 at least in so far as it affected Britain's 
attitude towards the Nationalist regime in the UN forum. Was it a 
policy which had substantial implications for Anglo-South African 
relations? Of course it was not. Was it really no more than diplo= 
matic window-dressing? Of course it was. 
It is true that Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech came as something 
of a shock to the South African government and to white opinion in 
the Union in general, especially since it was the year of South 
Africa's half-centenary and the speech \vas originally expected to b.e 
a congratulatory one. 26 On the other hand9 Macmillan had gone to con-
siderable lengths in the speech itself to emphasise that the points 
of difference between Britain and South Africa were small - though 
not insignificant - compared to "the many practical interests which we 
share in common" 9
27 and the manner as well as the content of the 
delivery served to emphasise that the British government had no inten-
tion of leaving South Africa to the wolves. As Macmillan's biographer 
observes 9 "It was a speech of masterly construction and phrasing 9 
beautifully spoken 9 combining a sweep of history with UQambiguous 
political points. It was probably the finest of Macmillan's career •••• 
The House applauded it 9 Dr. Verwoerd politely agreed to differ 9 and 
in the lobby afterwards the M.P.s were very enthusiastic about the 
28 
oratory". 
It was 9 in fact 9 the press reaction to the key phrase - the 'wind of 
change' = and especially the encouragement which this gave to African 
nationalists, which subsequently created concern in South Africa and 
made the reaction something of a "double-take".29 Macmillan, too, 
soon showed signs of alarm and insisted on his return to England 
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that a wind of change was one thing; "a howling tempest" quite 
another.3° And only a few days later, he was reassuring the Common-
wealth and Empire Industries Association of his government's determin= 
ation to prevent the difference on racial policy between Britain and 
South Africa from sweeping aside the friendship that existed between the 
two countries, employing much the same language that he had used in 
the Cape Town speech.31 
It swiftly became apparent, therefore, that no profound alteration in 
Anglo-South African relations was foreshadowed by this sp~echg indeed 9 
the 'wind of change' had given birth to no more than a breeze of 
adjustment in British policy towards South Africao It was an adjust= 
ment, moreover 9 which was so marginal, so inconsequential for the 
position of the Nationalist regime, that the "middle course" which 
Macmillan hoped to be able to steer between white and black nationalism 
in Africa (and in the Commonwea:J.that l.arge) was soon left high and dry 
on the white side of the divide. The events at Sharpsville, coming so 
soon after the Cape Town speech, made it inevitable that no British 
government = and certainly not a Conservative one (even under the 
liberal Macmillan) - would be able to place sufficient distance between 
itself and the South African Nationalist regime to satisfy Asian and 
especially black African opinion. This particular British government 
also had to bear in mind the likely consequences of a too hostile pos-
ture towards South Africa on Roy Welensky's Central African Federation. 
For, as S~pson points out, Sharpsville or no 9 as far as Africa was 
concerned in 1960, "Macmillan's main problem was still Welensky")2 
If the real substance of Macmillan's speech, together with his subsequent 
disclaimers, had left anyone in any doubt about its implications for 
British policy towards South Africa, the nature of the British govern= 
ment's reaction to the Sharpeville shootings very rapidly dispelled 
them. In marked contrast to the attitude of hostility towards South 
Africa which was demonstrated by most other Western governments (includ-
ing the United States)~3 by the Labour Party in the House of Commons, and 
by the great bulk of the British press during the week which intervened 
between the killings and the meeting of the Security Council, 
Macmillan's government seemed to find great difficulty in facing the 
logic of the Cape Town speech. In fact, it refused to condemn the 
shootings and displayed a pronounced reluctance to say anything at 
all about wh~t had happened. When, under intense pressure, the 
government finally brought itself to comment (three days after the 
event) in the amendment to the opposition motion which we have al~ 
ready noted (see page 222 above), its posture was revealed to be one 
studied neutrality. As for endorsing inscription of the anti-South 
African motion on the Security Council agenda on March 30 9 this 
already had such a degree of support amongst the Council's members 
that it would have been procedurally impossible for Britain to pre-
vent. Macmillan therefore decided to go along with this course, 
he explains in his memoirs, in order to avoid the bad odour of 
opposition and inevitable defeat and yet to retain some influence 
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"for steering a later discussion in a reasonable fashion".34 Mac-
millan had also agreed with his Foreign Secretary (Selwyn Lloyd) that 
Article 2(7) "would not serve us in our own troubles" and that, there-
fore, the price to be paid for this small sacrifice of principle over 
outside 'interference' in matters of domestic jurisdiction would not 
be high.35 In any case, as Macmillan also records of this decision 
in his memoirs, "I kept Dr. Verwoerd closely informed of our tactics 
and the reasons for them 11 .36 
In view of this, it is hardly surprising that in the subsequent dis-
cussion in the Security Council the British government should have taken 
a very conciliatory line towards South Africa. At the outset, the 
British representative emphasised that, notwithstanding his government's 
concurrence in inscription, Britain "maintains its strong view that 
nothing in the Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State11 .37 Thereafter, his speech on the substance of the issue was 
little more than a pale reflection of that made earlier by the 
Nationalist regrume's representative. He emphasised that the Security 
Council must not be seen to condone law~breaking - whatever the law38 
- and that the use of violent language at the UN would only exacerbate 
racial tensions in South Africa and, indeed, harden the attitude of the 
Nationalist government. As a result, the Security Council was urged 
by the British representative to see its major role as contributing 
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"to an alleviation of tension •••• in the hope that the lessons will 
be learned". 39 In the event 9 as 'VIe have seen (page223 above L the majority 
disagreed with the British viewpoint and Britain was obliged to abstain 
on the vote. 
Thus was established the pattern of the British government's disposition 
towards South African questions at the United Nations for the remainder 
of the Conservative party's tenure of power. Discussion was conceded 
but opposition to any form of direct interference in South Africa's 
internal affairs made explicit; instead9 a course of discreet 
remonstration and negotiation with the Nationalist goven1ment was 
advocated. Since 9 however, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian 
states in the General Assembly not only refused to accept the efficacy 
of Britain's proposals but also doubted the sincerity which prompted 
them 9 40 and since they were invariably supported in the Security 
Council by the Soviet Union and 9 increasingly 9 by the Kennedy adminis-
tration in the United States (which had no desire to be outdone in the 
competition for Afro-Asian approval), 41 they commonly demanded strong-
er action in their resolutions than Britain was prepared to countenance. 
In such circumstances 9 British abstention became the rule unless the 
resolutions were so threatening to South Afric~~ interests that failure 
to vote against them would have done irreparable harm to Anglo-South 
African relations. Only when the resolutions appeared "reasonable" -
sometimes the result of British lobbying amongst the various delegations 
assembled at New York - was the British government prepared to endorse 
an anti-South African attitude. Instead 9 therefore, of withdrawing 
support from the Nationalist regime at the UN 9 it is clear that the 
British government became the chief obstructionist of Afro-Asian schemes 
to bring an end to apartheid and South African sway over the territory 
of South-West Africa; in short 9 the South African government's most 
powerful ally in this forum. 
This posture was also illustrated by the British delegation's attitude 
in the March 1961 meeting of the Special Political Committee at which 
Britain had declared apartheid to be a domestic question "sui generis" 
(see page223 above). For it voted against the African resolution 
which demanded economic boycott action against South Africa along the 
lines of the Addis Ababa resolution of the previous year and, unlike 
the United States 9 abstained on the mild operative paragraphs of the 
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'moderate' Asian resolution which 9 as a whole~ it subsequently endorsed. 42 
It was thus by now clear beyond question that the British government had 
gone just about as far as it was prepared to go in publicly dissociating 
itself from Dr. Verwoerd's government at the United Nations: the 
resistance to collective UN economic action against South Africa, in 
particular9 was made quite unequivocal. 43 
This was all the more unfortunate for the British Conservative govern= 
ment 9 however 9 since in 1961 the Afro-Asian campaign at the United 
Nations t-ras only just beginning and 9 in the remaining three years of 
the Conservative administration 9 reached a crescendo of indignation 
in which demands for collectively enforced sanctions against the 
Nationalist regime in Pretoria became a regular and highly publicized 
feature of the UN's sessions. In June 1962 the US government imposed 
a partial arms ban on the South African regime44 and in the autumn the 
UN General Assembly "asked members to break off diplomatic relations 
with South Africa 9 close their ports to South African shipping and their 
airports to South African aircraft 9 prevent their own ships from calling 
at South African ports 9 boycott all South African products and suspend 
exports to South Africa".45 Britain9 needless to say 9 voted against 
this resolution. 46 And at the Security Council meeting in Augu.st 1963 
the British representative was once more South Africa's best friend 9 
though it is true that exceedingly strong competition for this role was 
offered it by the French delegation. 
In this meeting9 the background to which has already been described 
(see page224 above) 9 a resolution proposed by Ghana9 Morocco and the 
Philippines demanded both a total economic boycott on South Africa and 9 
in particular9 a total ban on the sale of arms to the Republic. This 
was justified9 they held 9 on the grounds that the Nationalist regime's 
apartheid policy constituted a "threat to the peace" and was thus an 
appropriate object of mandatory_UN sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. 
The US government for once actually took the lead in opposing this 
resolution on the view that the adoption of such a resolution by the 
Security Council would be both "bad law" and "bad policy" but disarmed 
criticism of its position to a degree by immediately announcing the 
decision of the United States to transform its existing partial arms 
ban on South Africa into a total arms embargo.47 After listening 
(presumably) to a lengthy and partially accurate Soviet analysis of 
Western reluctance to endorse collective UN action against South 
Africa, the United Kingdom representative then stated his government's 
positiono Largely echoing the sentiments of his American colleague 94
8 
Sir Patrick Dean observed that "We must distinguish between a situation 
which has engendered international friction and one which constitutes 
a threat to the peace. There is no evidence before us" 9 he continued9 
10 that the actions of the South African Republic •••••• are actions which 
threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
member country". And then 9 having indicated the nature of Britain's 
interests in South Africa which disposed it to take a dim view of UN 
intervention (see pagel74 above) 9 he urged that the Security Council 
content itself with a strong moral censure of South Africa and leave 
the rest to the governments of the member countries, which, he held, 
should "continue to exert the maximum pressure possible and to use 
whatever methods they think appropriate and which are consistent with 
the Charter, to persuade the Government of South Africa to change its 
racial policies before it is too late". He did, however, concede, 
as we have seen 9 that the British government would no longer supply arms 
to South Africa "which would enable the policy of apartheid to be 
enforcedn.49 
At the final meeting of the Security Council on August 79 1963 9 the 
American representative asked for a separate vote on the paragraph 
calling for an economic boycott of South Africa and, with the Western 
members abstaining en masse, it failed to get the necessary number of 
affirmative votes and was, as a result, thrown out. But although 
Britain and the other Western members had refused to accept that 
apartheid constituted a "threat to the peace", they had been obliged 
(in order to avoid the embarrassment of using the veto) to make the 
uncomfortable semantic concession that "the situation in South Africa 
is seriously disturbing international peace and security11 .50 Under 
this heading and with the paragraph demanding a total (but non~mandatory) 
arms embargo on South Africa left intact 9 the amended resolution was 
passed by the Security Council by nine votes to nil. Britain 9 together 
with France, abstained.51 
Justifying his governmentvs refusal to endorse this anti-South African 
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resolution 9 the British representative observed that 9 whilst it agreed 
"with the underlying purpose" 9 it could not accept the insinuation in 
the resolution that Britain was one of the states which were 
"indirectly providing encouragement 11 to South Africa 9 and nor could 
it concur in the blanket nature of the arms ban. For this 9 he held, 
would deny South Africa the right of self-defence and undermine 
Britain's ability to sustain her 11arrangements of cooperation with 
South Africa for the protection of the sea routes 11 around the Cape.52 
And from this position Britain refused to be moved at the subsequent 
Security Council discussions of apartheid in November=December 1963 
and again in June 1964. 
Though 9 on the latter occasion 9 it is true that the British government 
voted in favour of the establishment of a committee to inquire into the 
feasibility of applying economic sanctions (see page 224above) 9 it 
equally stressed that this in no way committed Britain to their use if 
feasibility was proven.53 Moreover 9 in view of the British government's 
well known attitude toward the efficacy of economic sanctions in 
situations such as this 9 it seems reasonable to speculate that it 
concurred in this move not only through fear of causing gratuitous 
offence to Afro-Asian sensitivities54 but also because it had a shrewd 
suspicion that such an inquiry would vindicate the British policy as 9 in 
effect 9 subsequently proved to be the case.55 
With the solitary if significant exception of France 9 56 therefore, Britain 
remained unique amongst the leading members of the Security Council 
throughout this period in setting its face firmly against ~economic 
sanctions against South Africa and a total arms ban. The Security 
Council resolution of August 1963 had 9 moreover9 been non-mandatory 
in any casee But surely the decision of the Conservative government to 
place a ban on the sale to South Africa of arms for internal purposes 
was a significant mark of hostility towards the Nationalist regime, a 
real sign that Britain was beginning to succumb to Afro=Asian pressure 
and American example at the UN. Was this in fact the case? There are 
two convincing reasons for supposing that it was not. 
To begin with it is clear that 9 by the end of 1963 9 when the ban was 
to come into effect 9 South Africa was already fast approaching self~ 
sufficiency in the kind of counter-insurgency arms (small arms 9 tear gas 
and armoured cars 9 for example) which Britain had agreed to withholdo 
This \o~as 9 of course 9 the fruit of the policy of local munitions 
manufacture on which the Nationalist government had embarked after the 
major scares of 1960 and which had been greatly assisted by the local 
manufacture of many weapons under foreign licence.57 
Furthermorep it is notoriously difficult to make a practical distinction 
of the kind which Britain adhered to on this occasion between weapons 
which can be used only against external attack and those which can be 
used for the suppression of internal disorder. Thus, whilst in 
June 1963 the South African Minister of Defence had claimed that he 
wanted helicopters from Britain for "joint seaward defence"~ 58 the 
Americans shortly demonstrated in Vietnam that such weapons made an 
excellent counter-insurgency armo Furthermore 9 as Spence points out 9 
the distinction is hardly less difficult to make in theory 9 since it 
is inconceivable that either internal disorder would not have generated 
external support or that 9 alternatively9 external attack on South 
Africa would not have aroused domestic 'non-white 0 opposition to the 
regimeo "Thus" 9 says Spence 9 "the Republic's security is indivisible, 
and it follows that weapons supplied to the Republic must of necessity 
have a dual function 9 as any serious threat to it mus~ in~vit~bly be 
seen as having both an internal and external dimension 9 requiring the 
mobilization of all the state's resources",59 
In short 9 therefore, Britain's agreement to a partial arms ban on the 
Nationalist regime was incapable of inflicting any damage on the 
Republic's internal security whatsoever and is hardly likely to have 
been interpreted as a particularly hostile gesture in Pretoria. It is 
true that after a brief interlude the Nationalist government issued 
some rather loud threats about the possible abrogation of the Simons= 
town Agreements and other things (which we shall discuss at the end of 
this Chapter) but it seems likely that these were directed rather more 
at the Americans than the British and that they were designed to say: 
0 thus far with the Afro-Asian cum-Communist cum-Western=socialist-
humanist bloc in the United Nations and no further'. 60 The British 
government had 9 after all 9 only agreed to sell the Nationalist 
government arms which it no longer required (and which did not have 
significance for the military relationship between the two countries) 9 
whilst many of the weapons which it insisted on continuing to sell 
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(despite the Security Council resolution) ostensibly for external 
defence could equally well be turned to counter-insurgency purposes. 
Andp as Spence suggests 9 even those which could only operate externally 
(such as warships) could be used to prevent the arrival of external 
support for a domestic rising. 
All things considered9 therefore 9 it is clear that Britainvs partial 
arms ban on the Nationalist regime was nothing more than a public 
relations exercise 9 the quality of which was particularly underlined 
by the simultaneous American decision to impose a total arms ban on 
South Africa. Moreover 9 it was by no means without value for the 
South African government that Britain should have chosen the occasion 
of the Security Council debate on arms supply to re-state its attach~ 
ment to the strategic value of the Cape route as justification for 
continuing to supply arms for vexternal defence 0 to the Nationalist 
regimeo For this point was a valuable weapon in South Africa's 
propaganda offensive vis~a=vis the Western countries and it was 
clearly in much greater need of it in the early and mid-1960s than 
it had been at the time of the Simonstown Agreements in the mid-1950s. 
Britain's protective attitude towards the Nationalist regime at the 
United Nations during the post-Sharpeville period can be illustrated 
finally by its position on the South-West African affairo Although, 
as we have seen (page224above) 9 Britain had moved into an abstention-
ist posture on most of the more innocuous anti=South African resolu-
tions concerning the mandate in the U}J's Fourth Committee by 1960 9 
it continued to maintain a highly legalistic attitude towards the 
whole question. Consistent with its hostility to the Fourth 
Committee's notion that the Committee on South-West Africa should 
proceed to enter the territory with or without the South African 
government's consent 9 Britain was subsequently instrumental in 
denying the Committee access by obstructing its passage through 
Bechuanaland, 61 which 9 as we know 9 was at the time still a British 
protectorate. The result of this 9 not surprisingly 9 was that the 
British government \'ras charged with "collusion" with the South 
African regime at the Fourth Committee's next session at the end 
of 196162 and continued to be so accused in every session of the 
Fourth Committee until the end of the period. 
The charge of collusion with South Africa over the South-West affair9 
however 9 did not rest solely on Britain's refusal of passage to the 
Committee on South-West Africa through Bechuanaland. For Britain's 
view of the whole question was that - apart from further "study" of 
the problem- the Fourth Committee should propose no action until the 
International Court of Justice had produced a decision on the mandate. 
The problem with this 9 however9 was that 9 in the first place 9 the 
complexity of the issue promised to make the Court 0 s proceedings 
inordinately lengthy and that 9 in the second 9 the Nationalist regime 
openly refused to commit itself to prior acceptance of the Court's 
judgement in any case. South Africa 9 clearly, was not going to give 
up the mandate whatever the Court decided unless it could be subjected 
to an unacceptably high degree of political and economic pressure.63 
The charge of collusion thus had obvious substance. Writing in 1963 9 
Ruth First concluded that "The power behind conciliation of South Africa 
at the UN has been Britain ••• ", 64 whilst this judgement was confirmed 
by the resignation towards the end of 1962 by Sir Hugh Foot. This 
liberally-minded ex=colonial governor had been the British representa-
tive who had been obliged to face the charge of collusion in the Fourth 
Committee and 9 whilst it is clear that Britain's attitude on the South-
West affair was not the only aspect of the Conservative government's 
policy in central and southern Africa which exercised him, it is 
equally evident that it was for him a part of a whole. British policy, 
he believed, in the whole of this area, was characterised by procrastin-
ation and "drift" and was increasingly j.ec;>pardising all of the goodwill 
and sympathy for Britain which had been earned by the timing and the 
manner of Britain's de-colonization programme.65 
We have thus seen that, in spite of violently mounting demands from the 
Afro-Asian states for some form of positive action from the United 
Nations with regard to South Africa's racial policies· in general and 
the Nationalist government's administration of the South-West Africa 
mandate in particular, and in spite of the support which these 
demands received from the small but vocal body of concerned opinion 
at home66 and in spite, too 9 of the fellow-travelling posture adopted by 
the vast majority of non-colonial Western states (not least amongst them 
the United States), the Conservative government had by 1964 moved no 
further away from support for South Africa at the United Nations than 
had been promised by Macmillan in his 0wind of change' speech in 
February 1960 - and that, as we have seen, was not very far. 
Concurrence in discussion of South Africa's domestic affairs and 
British condemnation of the~9 together even with the partial arms 
embargo, were consistent with the policy which Macmillan had set 
out in this speech. This policy was to bring some small pressure 
to bear on Dr. Verwoerd to tone down his racial policies by these 
gestures but, at the same time, to prevent. any decisive action 
from being initiated against South Africa at the UN whilst attempt-
ing to minimise the odium which would inevitably attach to Britain 
as a result of this obstructive position should the pressure for 
action mount. 
The first objective of this British policy was manifestly not 
achieved and was never likely to have been. Apartheid was further 
developed during the post-Sharpsville period and it is clear that, 
as far as Dr. Verwoerd was concerned, Britain's new public attitude 
was merely an example of political opportunism. As he said of 
Macmillan shortly after the 'wind of change' speech, "He had to 
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contend with a great liberalistic tendency". 67 Even in this respect, 
however, the British policy also failed: the odium of identification 
with the Nationalist regime was not avoided. As Sir Hugh Foot was 
bound to report to his government shortly before his resignation in 
1962, "We are looked upon as the supporters, if not the friends, of 
Tshombe, Welensky, Salazar and Verwoerd •••• The Americans will not 
stay with us. We shall be isolated with Portugal and South Africa" 
(App. D). But in the key respect, of course, the policy was successful. 
Britain, that is to say, probably played the major role during this 
period in preventing any kind of decisive action from being taken by 
the United Nations against South Africa. Even the August 1963 
Security Council ban on the sale of all arms to the Nationalist regime 
was non-mandatory and, as a result, not very effective.68 All proposals 
for economic sanctions were effectively blocked and nothing was done 
about South-West Africa which was of any consequence. As the Economist 
remarked (though not entirely accurately in regard to the United States), 
"Dr. Ver"\lloerd has always been able to rely on London and Washington to 
take the smallest steps necessary to placate the Africans".69 
2o Britaino South Africa and the Commonwealth 
It is not only in the United Nations forump however 9 that vre find 
evidence of the British governmentvs singular disposition to afford as 
much diplomatic cover to the South African regime as it could possibly 
reconcile with its other external poliCies in the troubled aftermath 
of the Sharpeville shootings: this was equally evident in its attitude 
towards South Africavs continued membership of the Commonwealtho For 9 
from the first moment when it was mooted that the Union should be 
expelled on the grounds of its racial policiesp the Macmillan govern-
ment threw all its weight against the idea, "exhausting" 9 as Macmillan 
later recalled9 rvevery effort to preserve South Africa in the Common-
wealth".70 Moreover9 in view of the absolute refusal of Dr. Verwoerd 
to do the slightest thing to simplify his task 9 the lengths to which 
Macmillan went in pursuit of this goal are 9 on the face of it 9 surprising 
to say the least. 
On January 20p 1960 9 Dr. Verwoerd had announced that a referendum was 
to be held in the Union on the question of the Nationalist partyvs · 
longstanding ambition to transform South Africa into a republic. He 
had also 9 furthermore 9 refused to indicate whether or not his go~er.n~ 
ment would use the opportunity of an affirmative vote to take South 
Africa out of the Commonwealth and thus complete the constitutional 
severance from Britaino This 9 he said9 would be left to the latest 
possible moment before the referendum 9 since conditions in Britain 
and in the Commonwealth at large might have changed by then and thus 
altered the calculation of national interest which South Africa would 
have to make before deciding whether or not to remain a member. 71 This 
announcement and these observations were made by Dr. Verwoerd? it should 
be notedp a fortnight before Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech in 
Cape Town. 
Following the Sharpeville shootings and the world reaction to them 9 it 
seems clear that Dr. Verwoerd had little difficulty in deciding that 9 
on such a calculation of national intere~t? it was obviously in 
South Africavs interest to pursue the goal of a republic vrithin the 
Commonwealth. Indeed? it was in order to secure a promise that South 
Africa would be allowed to remain within the Commonwealth in the event 
of an affirmative vote on the republic that Eric Louw travelled to 
London for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in May.72 
The reasons for this decision to try and remain inside the Common= 
wealth have never been made explicit but they are not difficult to 
deduce. An important short=run consideration 7 to begin with, was 
obviously Dr. Verv1oerd's fear that the English-speaking population 
of the Union might suspect that a vote for the republic would repre= 
sent a vote against the Commonwealth and thus not give him the 
affirmative vote in the referendum which he so desired.?3 Straw-
vote figures in early 1960 indicated the possibility of defeat and, 
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in the event, the affirmative vote was only achieved by a small margin.74 
However, it also seems likely that Dr. Verwoerd feared that expulsion 
from the Commonwealth after South Africa became a republic might make 
it less easy for Britain to defend it against UN 'interference' 
(being thenceforv1ard a 0foreign 9 country rather than a member of the 
Commonwealth 'family') and that the retention of °Commonwealth 
preference 0 on South African goods in Britain's market might also be 
less easy to justify. Furthermore, the successful expulsion of South 
Africa from the Commonwealth would have represented a major triumph 
for the Afro=Asian members and perhaps encouraged them in their mount= 
ing campaign against the Union at the United Nations. 
In any event, whatever Dr. Verwoerd 9s principal motives, he clearly 
desired to remain within the Commonwealth: certainly in 1960, at any 
rate. And this made things somewhat difficult for the Macmillan 
government (which clearly wanted to gratify this desire, as we have 
already seen) because even before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
assembled in London in May, 1960, it was being suggested in some 
quarters that the South African request should be either uncondition= 
ally rejected or, more commonly, that it should be held over until the 
Union could show evidence that it had begun to mend its apartheid ways.75 
Against the background of highly vocal but largely ineffectual anti-
apartheid lobbying in Britain (an unofficial boycott of South African 
goods had started even before the Sharpsville shootings) on the one 
hand 7 76 and near unamimous support for his South African policy amongst 
his own back-benchers on the other,?? Macmillan rebutted the first of 
these suggestions on the following grounds. To begin with, he argued, 
expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth as a result of its 
domestic policies would set a most dangerous precedent; the Common= 
wealth would become a centre of recrimination on other matters and 
this might eventually lead to its total disintegration. In any 
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case, argued Macmillan, the Commonwealth was composed of peoples 
rather than governments and would "outlast the particular people who 
preside over the fortunes of any country at any given time". Since, 
therefore, it was impossible to expel a government without also 
expelling its people (many of whom would be blameless), such an act 
would be both irrational and churlish.78 Finally, insisted Macmillan, 
since the Nationalist government could only be brought to change its 
racial policies through persuasion, it would be equally irrational 
to discard the enormous opportunities which were presented for such 
persuasion by the intimacy of the Commonwealth connection. His 
government managed to secure widespread acceptance of these arguments 
in the House of Commons and in the debate on apartheid which had been 
occasioned by the Sharpsville shootings (but delayed by the Budget) 
not a voice was raised demanding the expulsion of South Ai'rica from 
the Commonwealth.79 
Macmillan's task, however 9 was more uphill when the Commonwealth 
Conference actually assembled in the following month. The m~etings 
which occurred on this occasion witnessed some acrimonious exchanges 
involving Eric Louw and South Africa failed to secure agreement from 
the assembled prime ministers that its application for Commonwealth 
membership should be granted hypothetical assent. On the other hand, 
neither was it given a hypothetical refusa1.80 Macmillan clearly 
implies in his memoirs that Britain's own response to South Africa's 
request on this occasion was non-committalp81 obviously hoping that, 
as with Britain's new public distance at the UN, this would give his 
government (together with those of the other Commonwealth countries) 
some leverage over Dr. Verwoerd in trying to persuade him to make 
token adjustments to the Union's apartheid policies. Such a deal, 
however 9 was clearly out of the question for, as The Times observed, 
"Mr. Louw has roundly and publicly declared the implacable determination 
of his Government to maintain every jot and tittle of their quasi-
religious dogma11 0 82 r.tracmillan could nevertheless console- himself 
with the thought.thatp though nothing had been resolved, his mediation 
had kept the Commonwealth at least "for the time being from being 
broken up". S3 
It seems clear9 however 9 that Macmillan had been encouraged by the 
"restraint" shown by some of the more radical 'new Commonwealth' 
members (especially Nkrumah) at this meetingp as well as by the 
strength of Pretoria's perceived need for continued membership 9 
to believe that he could force some token adjustments in apartheid 
and still prevent the Unionvs expulsion~ even if it should become 
a republica Clearly, however9 his chances would be vastly improved 
if the Afro-Asian members could be deprived of the pretext for 
raising this question which would be presented by the Union's 
assumption of this ne\v constitutional status. As a resul t 9 
Macmillan set himself two tasks: first, to persuade Dr. Verwoerd to 
postpone the referendum on the republican issue84 "until times in Africa 
are calmer",85 as well as to remind him that, if the question could not 
be avoided, certain concessions on apartheid would be necessary if 
- 86 South Africa's membership were not to be opposedp secondly, to 
persuade the Afro~Asian members in particular not to adopt any firm 
postures of opposition to South African membership prior to the next 
meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.87 In the latter task 
he was assisted to some extent by the diversion created by the 
eruption of the Congo crisis in June. 
As was to be expedted9 however9 Verv1oerd 9 though protesting to Macmillan 
his continuing desire to remain a Commonwealth member, informed him that 
the republic came first and that, as Louw had already made clear in May, 
he refused to doctor his internal policies if this was the price which 
would have to be paid for continued membership.88 Moreover, despite 
the fact that the Afro-Asian members ultimately agreed to withhold 
comment until the next meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 
London, now scheduled for Mareh 1961 9 the summer of 1960 had witnessed 
a call from the Second Conference of Independent African States meeting 
at Addis Ababa for a complete economic boycott of South Africa, as well 
as for the African members of the Commonwealth to press for the expul~ · 
sion of the Union from that body.89 Shortly afterwards, both Ghana 
and Malaya announced that they could commence an economic boycott of 
South Africa on August 1 1960. On October 59 the white voters of the 
Union elected for a republic by a narrow majority.90 
Nevertheless, Macmillan's determination to prevent the expulsion of 
South Africa remained firmo 91 Neither was he entirely without confidenceg 
"At a similar conference in the previous year we hadp at the last moment 9 
been able to devise an acceptable formulao There seemed a fair chance 
of finding a similar solution nowo Nor was this confidence Unreasonableo 
Even a small ~ almost a trivial - concession by Dro Verwoerd would have 
been accepted with relief10 o92 
However, if Macmillan had succeeded in achieving a substantial measure 
of bi=partisan support for the rention of South Africa in the Common= 
wealth in the House of Commons debate in April of the previous year, 
and managed to carry some of the leading Afro-Asian members with him 
over the subsequent winter, it was clear by the time that the Common~ 
wealth Prime Ministers assembled in London for their next conference 
in March 1961 that his position no longer placed him on the side of the 
angelso Liberal opinion in both South Africa and Britain was now calling 
for membership to be withheld indefinitely as a lever on Pretoria9 that 
is to say 9 to be granted only in return for a substantial modification in 
its racial policyo For9 it was pointed out, the rigours of apartheid had 
increased, rather than decreased, under the impact of 'moral pressure' 
from within the Commonwealth, and South Africa had found important 
support under its protective wing at the United Nationso Moreover, 
it was now argtJ.eCl, thf3.t it was the retention of South Africa in tb.e 
Commonwealthp rather than its expulsion 9 which was now more likely to 
lead to the latter's disintegrationo93 
Macmillan, however, remained initially unmoved by these arguments, and 
it seemed at first that he might contrive yet another compromise formula 
which would have allowed South Africa's application to be passedo94 In 
the end, however, the Afro-Asian members (together with Canada) refused 
to go along,95 and when Macmillan realized that the opposition would be 
overwhelming he decided to "induce" Dro Verwoerd to withdraw his applic-
ation and thus avoid the personal humiliation of a formal voteo 96 With 
only Australia and New Zealand likely to join Britain in supporting 
South Africa, such a course could also have led ~ Macmillan belatedly 
realized ~ to 11a possible dissolution of the whole Commonwealth11 o97 
Despite the bitterness which the Macmillan government felt ~ and made 
little attempt to conceal - at the refusal by Dro Verwoerd to make even 
the slightest concession on apartheid and so assist i~ in its attempt 
to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth,98 it seems clear that Mac= 
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millan had assured Dro Ven10erd that withdrawal would not in any way 
affect the substance of Anglo-South African relationso And that, in 
particular9 the benefits which the Nationalist regime received from 
membership of the Sterling Area (sic) and the Preference Area9 on the 
one hand, and under the terms of the Simonstown Agreement, on the 
other, would remain essentially intacto This was suggested by 
Dro Verwoerd himself when, on the day after the Union's departure 9 
he claimed that bilateral arrangements would continue both unamended 
and "untrammelled by the former problems", 99 and confirmed by the 
course of action which the Conservative government took in adjusting 
to South Africa's departureo 
To begin with 9 the Conservative government announced a decision to 
promote temporary legislation through parliament in order to freeze 
the status quo in all constitutional and other relations with South 
Africa for a period of up to one year in order, so it was claimed, for 
the complicated legal issues produced by the Union's departure to be 
sorted outo 100 As an Opposition critic pointed out in the committee 
0 0. 0 stage of this Bill, this was, of course, "a straight political move 
an attempt to minimise the impact, the psychological and political 
impact, in South Africa of their severance from the Commonwealth"; 
furthe~orep as the same critic also added9 the government was simply 
"preparing the \vay for the development of a new kind of special 
association between South Africa and the Commonwealth11 o101 
It is thus by no means surprising that Duncan Sandys 9 in his opening 
statement on the South Africa Bill 9 should have agreed with Dro Verwoerd 
inasmuch as, though the special relations in economic and defence 
affairs between Britain and South Africa would certainly have to be 
"revie\ved" 11 their foundation in essentially bilateral arrangements made 
it formally impossible for the Union's departure from the Commonwealth 
to have any effect upon themo Furthermore, after paying lip-service tc 
the point of view to which both he and Gaitskell had subscribed in the 
Departure debate - that Commonwealth membership would be devalued if 
South Africa was not -to be deprived of some privileges = Sandys con= 
eluded by saying: "At the same time, we have had an intimate and many= 
sided association with South Africa for more than a centuryo Our affairs 
have become closely inter\Voven in numerous ways, and we have developed 
between one another valuable connections in trade and other sphereso 
The relationships between Britain and South Africa will, of course, 
not be the same as before, but I should like to emphasise that we 
have no desire needlessly to destroy links which are of mutual benefit 
102 to both our peoples". 
Thus it was that, upon becoming a republic on May 31 1961, South Africa 
was not deprived of any of the important privileges of her former 
financial, commercial and military arrangements with Britain; that 
is to say 9 the new republic was ousted from neither the Sterling Area 
nor from the Preference Area, whilst the sanqtity of the Simonstown 
Agreement was re=affirmed. 103 The continued flow of British arms to 
South Africa was also assured. 104 
Thus guaranteed the continuation of the.status quo in Anglo~South 
African relations (and with the problem of the referendum behind him), 
0 
Dr. Verwoerd had some justification for the complacency with which he 
very shortly came to regard South Africa's withdrawal from the Common= 
wealth. For the 'privileges' of membership of which the new republic 
was ultimately deprived (citizenship rights, and so on), 105 were largely 
the symbolic legacy of British imperialism and thus hardly consonant 
with the prejudices of M'rikanerdom in any case. Indeed, as <r-'Iacmillan 
somewhat bitterly recounts, the gratitude which Dr. Verwoerd conveyed 
to him for doing his utmost to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth 
"did not 9 of course, preclude him from organizing a hero's welcome 
by the Nationalist Party· on his return home • • • • Verwoerd9 who \vas a 
brilliant politician, was easily able to transform a reverse into a 
triumph". 106 As Hepple points out, "For the Nationalists, breaking the 
British connexion was a major victory11 • 107 As in the case of the 
Simonstown Agreement 9 therefore, where the Nationalists has succeeded 
in gratifying domestic Afrikaner opinion on an Imperial question 
without offending the Imperial power, so in the case of Commonwealth 
withdrawal. For Dr. Verwoerd could present it as accomplishment of 
the final stage in the Nationalist ideal of independence from Britain, 
without, at the same time 9 having given the British government public 
cause to believe that he undervalued the Commonwealth. South Africa 
had, after all, applied for continued membership but had been forced 
out. 
Although it seems clear, therefore, that, on balance, Dr. Verwoerd would 
have preferred to remain within the Commonwealth, he was obviously alive 
to the compensations of wi thdrawalo Indeed 9 in his January 19~0 
address to the House of Assembly on the o·ccasicin of his announce-
ment of the referendum decision 9 he had observed that "it will be 
in the interests of South Africa to remain friends with Britain 
and also with the other countries in Africao If a situation were 
to develop"p he nevertheless continued 9 "in which we can best retain 
our friendship with both of them by not bei~ a member (of the 
Commonwealth)p but by negotiatingwith each.of them on a·suitable 
basis without quarrelling with anybody around one table P we \'lould 
have tq decide to do that 11 • 108 Such a situation had 9 in fact 9 
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arisen and.South Africa had not fourid it difficult to make the 
necessary - and in some ways advantageous = adjustment o Dr o Verwoerd 
had scored another victory with Afrikanerdom and seen. Anglo-South 
African relations placed on a basis on which the solid business 
1
of 
commerce and defence could proceed nuntrammelled by the former 
problems"o Moreoverp it seems safe to assume that Dro Verwoerd 
remained happy with the attitude ~hich had been adopted by the Mac= 
millan government onthis question throlighout the periodo ·Britain 
had done lts utmost to gratify his desire to remain within the 
Commonwealth and Macmillan had ensured that he was kept informed at 
every stage of the reasons behind Britain's tactics 9 as he had dong 
with regard to the British delegation's manoeuvrings in the Security 
Council at the ~o 
3o Political and security 'interests'. 
We have thus seen that over the period from early 1960 until it left 
office in October 19649 the Conservative government in Britain hadp in 
spite of the development of a massive weight of hostility towards 
South Africa throughout the Afro-Asian world and beyond 9 refused to 
make more than nominal adjustments to its policy of friendship towards 
that country in an attempt to avoid diplomatic identification with its 
regime. Thusp although Britain had m10St reluctantly concurred 9 by 
degreep in the view that South Africa 0s racial policy was a legitimate 
matter of United Nations concern 9 it had permitted 1 tself to. become 
the most significant opponent of external UN pressure on the Nationalist 
party government and had 9 furthermor~ 9 supported the retention of South 
Africa in the Commonwealth until the eleventh houro 
Admitting that certain traditional characteristics of :British 
- . . 
diplomacy form a small part of the explanation of this policy, 
especially in the UN context, 109 could the importaneeof :Britain's 
political and security interests have contributed in significant 
measure to :Britain's support for South Af~ica during the~e years? 
The so-called 9 kith and kin v interest was one such interest 9 as 
we saw in Chapter III, and, since this was obviously wrapped up 
in the Commonwealth link which we have just discussed, let us take 
this firsto 
In fact, until South Africa left the Commonwealth in March 1961 
it was, as already noted, Macmillan's consistently paraded view that 
it was necessary ;for :Britain to steer a 'middle course' between the 
demands of the Afro~Asian states for acti~n-a.gainst Sout~ Africa, on 
the one hand, and the Union's insistence on non-interference in its 
domestic affairs, on the other, in order to avoid not only losing 
South Africa to the 0family 0 but the uomplete disintegration of the 
Commonwealtho Thus Britain, on this argument, had t.o support South 
Africa in order to prevent the Commonwealth -from becoming a centre of 
recrimination but to qualify this support by nominal anti=aparthe.i.d 
ges~ures an~ 9moral pressure 0 on· the Union government in order ~!?""'""'· 
avoid dividing the Commonwealth along racial lineso If :Britain had 
not supported South Africa but given in to the demands of the Afro-
Asian states 9 argued Macmillan 9 ·the Union itself would have 0 seceded' 
from the Commonwealth and probably taken Welensky's Rhodesia along in 
its wake; 110 Australia would have been considerably disaffected at the 
least and grist would have been provided to the mill of all those iri 
the Tory Party who were turning away from the 'new' Commonwealth-
either 'back' towards the old white dominions, or 'forward' towards 
Europeo Alternatively, if Britain had. given South Africa \vholehearted 
support, the existing Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth and 
potential new members, such as Tanganyika, would have refused to joino 
Thus, on this argument, if Britain had pursued any alternative to the 
'middle course', the multi-racial Commonwealth itself would-have been 
doomed, let alone the ties of Britain .to its 'kith and-kin' in South 
Africao 
The plausibility of this justification is considerableg however, it 
soon evaporates upon closer scruticyo In the first place, then,though 
there seems no reason to doubt the genuiness of Macmillan°s concern 
about the effects of failure to support South Africa on Welensky 9 111 
it is difficult to believe that~ if Britain had taken a tougher line 
on South Africa9 Australia would have riske~ the diplomatic odium of 
following Dro Verwoerd out of the Commonwealth on such an issue or 
that New Zealandp with its liberal traditions 9 would have failed to 
follow a British leado Canada9 as we have seen9 was already as 
hostile to Dr o Verwoerd as any Afro-Asian member of the Commonwealth 9 
whilst a more hostile attitude towards South Africa would hardly have 
given Macmillan tactical grounds (at any rate) f.or fearing the pros-
pects of a rightwing revolt in Parliament 9 since the Labour opposition 
would obviously have supported him and 9 in any case 9 ~is own right wing 
were notably muted in the aftermath of Sharpevilleo 112 
However 9 if it is by no means clear that a stronger British line towards 
the Nationalist regime would have resulted in any more than the loss of 
South Africa itself= and perhaps Southern Rhodesia= to the Commonwealth 9 
what is certain is that a favourable line surely would have very soon led 
to the complete break-up of that organization9 with the departure of most 
of the Afro-Asian members (and perhaps even Canada) 9 together with the 
refusal of potential new members to joino And 9 ~~ we -~~ve seen9 
contrary to the rhetoric of the 9middle course 1 9 Macmillan did in fact 
pursue such a line towards Dro Verwoerd 9 s government 9 dissembling on 
his behalf at the United Nations and arguing 9 in particular 9 for the 
retention of South Africa in the Commonwealth until it became evident 
to him that he was on the verge of precipitating the very collapse 
which it was ostensibly his paramount purpose to prevento 11 3 It i:s 
thus clear that the dimension of Macmillan 9s so-called 'middle course' 
which involved support for South Africa was either misguided = which is 
unlikely = or ~ms prompted by considerations other than the desire to 
prevent the Commonwealth itself from disintegratingo Indeed 9 since 
Macmillan 9s Cabinet had taken the decision to swing closer to Europe 
at least by the beginning of 1960 9 it is clear that the Commonwealth had 
already been down-graded in British government thinking as a vehicle of 
British influence 9 prestige and prosperityo 114 Finallyp if British 
support for South Africa had been prompted above all by concern for the 
Commonwealth during this period 9 the I~cmillan government would presumably 
have ensured that Dro Verwoerd 9s eventual withdrawal was seen to be more 
consequential in terms of deprived privileges than subsequently proved to 
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be the case. 115 Perhaps~ however, if it was not the Commonwealth as 
such which explains Britainvs posture it was more specifically British 
9kith and kin 9 in South Africa. After all 9 referring to South Africa's 
departure from the Commonwealth in his memoirs, Macmillan recalls that 
"I felt the heavy responsibility of presiding over so tragic a break, 
especially remembering the many loyal British people in the Union91 • 116 
As at the time of the Simonstown negotiations in 1954=1955 (see Chapter 
III 9 Sec. 4 above), this cannot really be taken too seriously as far as 
the post-Sharpsville period is concerned. The same characteristic~ of 
the South African government which substantially off-set sentimental 
concern for the English-speaking population of the Union on the earlier 
occasion applied with equal force on the later one. Indeed, by this 
time Afrikanerdom was even more firmly entrenched in South Africa and the 
contours of its culture stamped more comprehensively on the whole of the 
South African way of life. It is evident, moreover9 that there was no 
personal love lost between Macmillan and Verwoerd (or Eric Louw, for 
that matter): their political styles, as well as their individual 
ideals, were poles apart. 11 7 During this period, too, it cannot be 
held that British generosity to Pretoria was prompted by a desire to 
deprive the Nationalist government of any pretext for further alienating 
the English-speaking population in South Africa9 for by this time 9 as 
we have already seen (Chapter II, Part B9 Sec. 2 above), Dr. Verwoerd 
was more anxious to win their support and create a vwhite laager0 
against the Common Black Enemy. And, finally, if the 9kith and kin 9 
argument meant a desire to keep the English=speaking population of 
South Africa within their own Commonwealth 9 then this could hardly 
have applied after March 1961. If the 9kith and kin' interest had any 
force at all during this period9 therefore 9 it is more likely that it 
resided in 9 and was, therefore, a euphemism for 9 a generalized feeling 
of sympathy on the Tory right-wing for a small, white and· sta'q!lchly 
anti=communist state which found itself embattled against a very 
different world- "the Israelis 11 9 as someone has said 9 "of southern 
Africa". This sentiment 9 however 9 was not saving the Kenyan settlers 
and 9 if it was to help in saving Welensky,
118 it was not at this time 
in the process of saving his Federation. 
What next 9 then, of Britain's security interest in South Africa? Had 
this assumed new and compelling importance in the post-Sharpeville 
period? For we have seen that it was of little account during the 
Simonstov!Il negotiations themselves (Chapter III9 Seco 3 above), though 
it was 9 nevertheless, constantly emphasised by the British government on 
the later occasiono In fact, any semblance of plausibility attaching 
to the British government's official justification for the necessity of 
retaining the Simonstown Agreements in the mid- and late 1950s had 
virtually disappeared without traee by the time of the post~Sharpeville 
periodo 
It is true that the diversion of shipping to the Cape ports as a result 
of the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 had temporarily dramatized the 
usefulness of the Cape route as an alternative to the Mediterranean in 
this sort of circumstanceo However, as the flood of suggestions 
produced by Britain's military strategists demonstrated (following 
Louw's incredible threat to unilaterally abrogate the Simonstown 
Agreements after the August 1963 Security Council resolution recommending 
a total arms ban on So~th Africa), 11 9 there were also alternatives to 
120 the Cape route. Moreover 9 it remained true that the presumably 
brief duration of a general H-bomb conflict made pointless any major 
provision for such conventional and protracted manoueYres as the naval 
defence of sea laneso 121 And, despite the post-Dull~s shift away from 
'massive retaliation' with nuclear weapons towards a re-emphasis in 
American strategic thought on a preliminary conventional stage, Britain, 
along with the other Western European members of NATO, remained committed 
t ·rt h t th l threshold. 122 Th R 1 N o a very sw~ approac o e nuc ear e oya avy 9 
moreover, no longer required to claim a general war role in the defence 
of the sea lanes in order to justify its continued existence, for it had 
not only discovered for itself a new 'limited war' role123but the develop= 
ment of nuclear submarines and Polaris missiles in the United States was 
promising it a key role in general war itself in the future. 124 Finally, 
it could not be reasonably argued that Britain needed to safeguard its 
naval position at the Cape as a back-up for possible imvolvement in an 
anti-communist limited \var in southern Africa in co-operation with the 
Nationalist government, since such a commitment had obviously been ruled 
out by Britain in so far as it had allowed the proposal for an African 
Defence Pact to lapse. 
But the main point 9 of course, is that in the post-Sharpeville period 
South Africa experienced its maximum degree of diplomatic isolation and 
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military insecurity and was~ therefore, in even less of a position to 
extract a political price from the British government as a quid pro 
quo for strategic favours than it had been in 1954-1955o As the Legums 
recorded at the end of the period, "Experts in \fui tehall admit that o o o o 
existing joint defence arrangements are now almost exclusively to South 
Africa9 s advantage"o 125 If the point needed confirmation~ then this was 
amply provided by South Africa 0 s refusal to abrogate the Simonsto~m 
Agreements after the Wilson government in Britain transformed Macmillan's 
partial arms ban into a total arms ban under the terms of the Security 
Council's resolution, even though by this time the Nationalist regime 0 s 
security position had significantly improvedo 126 Evidently, therefore, 
rather than providing a framework within which vital British security 
interests were assured, the Simonstown Agreements were merely another 
. facet of the protective policy which Britain adhered to vis=a=vis the 
Nationalist regime during the post=Sharpeville periodo 
Finally, then,what of Britain's remaining 9 interest 0 in South Africa 9 
that is to say, its concern for the High Commission Territories? Were 
these territories any more real South African °hostages 0 in the post-
Sharpeville period than they had been during the Simonstown negotiations 
(see Chapter III~ Seco 4 above) and for fear for whose safety, there~ore, 
the British government was obliged to adopt a protective policy towards the 
Nationalist regime? On the face of it~ this would seem to be the case, 
for South Africa's post-Sharpeville reputation was such that incorporation 
was by this time wholly out of the question and~ in fact, received its 
legal quietus when South Africa became a republic outside the Commonwealth 
in 1961o 127 In terms of formal incorporation~ therefore,the South African 
' government had even less to lose by applying pressure on Britain via the 
High Commission Territories in 1960=64 than it had in 1954=55o But how 
could Dro Ven~oerd's government have actually applied pressure on Britain 
through the protectorates? 
Military intervention was clearly out of the questiono As ~funger pointed 
out in 1964 9 "Nothing would give South Africa 0 s foes greater pleasure 
than for the Republic to make an overt and aggressive move outside its 
own borders 11 o128 For~ obviously, this would have given the Afro-Asian 
states an unanswerable case for UN intervention under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, 129 from consideration in the terms of which the British and 
American governments v1ere 9 as we have already seen, having some difficulty 
=,__,; ____________ ---··- . 
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in excluding apartheid within South Africa itself. Economic pressure 
would have been slightly more credible13° but this would have entailed 
economic costs for South Africa too131 and may also have intensified 
Afro-Asian demands for UN intervention. However, after 1961, at any 
. 
rate 9 it it clear that speculation of this sort is no longer of any 
relevance 9 for it is apparent that 9 if formal incorporation of the 
High Commission Territories was by then out of the question 9 Dr. Verwoerd 
had determined on his own kind of vincorporation' of these areas = and 
this meant making friends 9 rather than enemies 9 of influential sections 
of black opinion within them. 
In short, by 1962 at least, the first signs of South Africa's famous 
'outward policy0 towards its black northern neighbours were dimly visible. 
Er. Verwoerd evidently saw the High Commission Territories as Vgreater 
bantustans' and9 by promises of economic development assistance and 
direct financial subventions to "the traditionalists" in the protector= 
ates 9
132 was resolved to bring them within South Africa's general sphere 
of influence, if not a formal part of his separate development scheme 
as a whole. 133 This being the case, threatening to harm the High 
Commission Territories in order to put pressure on the British govern= 
ment is hardly likely to have, been employed by the Nationalist regime 
during the post=Sharpeville period and, if employed 9 less likely to have 
been believed. 
4. The economic factor. 
It will by now be apparent, therefore, that the argument of this Chapter, 
as in the case of that of Chapter III 9 is thisg that Britain's politic= 
al and security interests were at the most of marginal importance in 
shaping Britainvs South Africa policy; and that 9 as a result, the 
British government's freely acknowledged economic interest in South 
Africa was not simply one amongst many but manifestly the decisive 
factor in producing British support for the Nationalist regime on the 
diplomatic level. This conclusion is further supported by the evidence 
of Chapter II (Part C, Sec. 2) 9 where it was demonstrated that, though 
a crude balance of economic strength obtained between the British and 
South African governments during the post=Sharpeville period (as it had 
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during the years of the Simonsto\vn negotiations) 9 the latter government 
had a substantial advantage in terms of putative economic power as a 
result of its immeasurably increased superiority in the non-economic 
bases of such powero It will be further recalled that it was Britain's 
dependence on South African gold and on its earnings (invisible as well as 
visible) from the South African market which were the chief ingredients 
of the Nationalist government's economic strength over the 1960-64 
periodo How was this putative economic power 'actualized'? 
Since it has been argued that gold was the Nationalist government's most 
powerful economic lever over Britain during the post=Sharpeville period 9 
it is perhaps not surprising that the gold weapon was the first to be 
invoked in the second half of 1960 when the Nationalists had been disturbed 
by the small shift made by the British government towards the Afro=Asian 
point of view at the United Nations and by the mounting pressure to 
which Britain was been subjected to exclude South Africa from the 
Commonwealtho Of coursep as a result of South Africa 0 s continuing 
commercial account deficit with the Sterling Area9 the Nationalist 
government could not seriously threaten Britain with a severance in9 
or reduction of 0 gold deliveries to the central reserves as it had been 
able to do in the 1954=1955 periodo What it could do 9 however 9 was_ to 
threaten thep~estige and profits of the City and 9 above all 0 the Bank 
of England's control of the key currency exchange rates on the London 
Gold market by the relatively simple expedient of diverting its surplus 
gold elsewhereo 
As we have seen (Chapter !!9 Part A9 Seco 2)9 South Africa had already 
begun 9 in 1959 9 a policy of selling a small portion of its new=mined 
gold direct to private purchasers outside the Sterling Area if the 
price offered was higher than that prevailing on the London Gold Marketo 
Though the original motive behind the new policy 9 as suggested earlier9 
was probably not to bring pressure on the British government 9 the ground 
was nevertheless well prepared by 1960 for a more vigorous attempt to 
by-pass London should the Nationalist government deem this necessary 
in order to remind Britain (as it had during the Simonstown negotiations) 
that South Africa's golden favours had to be earnedo 
Since quarterly figures on British gold imports by country of origin are 
not available 9 it is not possible to discern the short=term levels of 
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South African gold sales to the United KirigQ.()rn during the course of 
1960o What is clear, however, is that, tho~h ·,the fall in the absolute 
level of deliveries over the year as a 1.vhole ·was not. great (App. B9 
Table 41) 9 nevertheless almost one=third,of South Africa's total net 
sales abroad in this year by-passed the-Londo:p. market (Appg B, Table 44). 
. . 
As the same Table reveals,_ this ,.fas more than doub:::j.e the los~ to London 
in the previous yearo On August 16 9 '1960 9 Eric Louw. publicly declared 
that it would be "a tremendous blow to Britain and to the Bank of 
England" if South Africa were (sic) to sell her gold through Switzerland 
or the United States. 134 
This threat was immediately met by brave noises from the Cityg the 
London Gold Market 1...rould get its gold from elsewhere (Austra],ia 9 for 
instance~); South Africa would be cutting off its riose to spi t'e its 
face since the London market remained its most_profitable outlet, and 
so ono "The only advantage (sic~) to'' the United Kingdom" 9 disclaimed the 
London Correspondent of the Joha.nri~sburg Star, 135 "in having ~hese sales 
in London is that it enables the Bank of England to sell gold secretly 
when Sterling·needs support". 136 Unwittingly, this reporter had9 of 
cotirse 9 'put his finger on the point, as events were shortly to confirmo 
For the interesting thing is that 9 if the Nationalist government was keep? 
ing the London market short of almost one=third of its total net gold 
sales in 1960 9 it was keeping the Bank ·of E:ngland itself even shor.ter 9 
allowing it to handle at the most forty per cent of its total salef3. 137 
The effect of this deprivation became dramatica~ly evident when, in 
September 1960 9 a combination of political uncertainty resultirtg from 
events in the Congo and the belief that the continuing lossof gold 
from US stocks would lead to an increase in the offiq~al price, led to 
a massive upsurge in speculative demand for gold on the London Gold 
Market. The result was that, by mid=October9 the Ba.nk.had9 for the 
first time since the post=war reopening of the market, lost control 
of the price, which 9 on October 20 9 soared to over ¢40 per otince.
138 
And the point is that, though strong demand was clearly·at the basis of 
this dramatic price increase, this \vas precisely the kind of situation 
in which the Bank of England's ability to dispose of large q~tities 
of South African gold had previously enabled it to match demand with 
supply and thus defend the official price at or near ¢35·per ounce. 
During September and October of 1960p however, not orily does the 
evidence suggest that the Bank was being deprived of more and more 
South African gold 9 139 but it was reluctant to sell wha~ gold it 
did possess against dollars as a result of the abnormally large 
quantity of dollars which it was already being obliged to hold. 14° 
It is thus clear that the Bank's plight, already unenviable, was made 
drastically worse by the Nationalist government 0 s gold sales policy 
and that South Africa had, as a result, made a direct contribution 
to the gold price crisis of October 1960 - a crisis which the Bank 
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of England was to later describe as threatening "the· whole structure 
of exchange relationships in the Western world"141 =and thus, almost 
nonchalantly, demonstrated the power of its gold weapon. No doubt 
the Nationalist government was well appraised of the straight forward 
economic advantages of its action, especially in so far as this might 
. . 142 have forced-an increase in the official price of gold but, in the 
context of its current relations \vi th the Bri ti·sh government, it is 
difficult to believe that the political motive was not also urgent. 
In the following year, having made its point 9 South Africa reversed its 
direct sales policy and re=routed almost all of its gold through 
the London Gold Market (App~ B9 Table 44) and, as far as can be gathered, 
also through the agency of the Bar.Uc of England. 143 As a commercial 
g~bit 9 the direct sales policy had 9 in any case 9 failed in its major 
objective 9 for in January 1961 Kennedy re=stated the firm United 
States commitment to the existing parity of the dollar and s~eculative 
dem.and .for gold quickly tailed off. By the spring of 1961 9 helped by 
substantial Russian sales (App. B9 Table 41), the price of goldhB.d 
more or less returned to the official leve1.144 Moreover, in the 
immediate aftermath of the October crisis, the US Treasury 'had at last 
acknmvledged the legitimacy of the Bank of England's managerial role in 
the London market (in defending the official parity by meeting the 
hoarding demand) and had 9 as a result, made it known that it would 
replenish British gold lost in this exercise. Together with the 
subsequent announcement that the European central banks would hold off 
the market when the price was under pressure 9 the establishment of the 
0gold bridge 0 between New York and London certainly helped to thwart 
what can be assumed to have been South Africa's commercial interest in 
forcing an increase in the official price. 145 Finally 9 once the premium 
had disappeared it is not surprising that South Africa should have felt 
it necessary to return to what \o~as undeniably its most economic outlet 
for gold, 146 especially since by the spring of 1961 it was in the 
throes of an acute balance of payments crisiso 147 
On the political level, furthermore, it was clear that by March 1961 
the British government had gone just about as far as it was prepared 
to go in vwi thdrat-ring support v from South Africa at the United 
Nations (see page228above) and that Britain had no intention of making 
the Nationalist regime suffer as a result of its departure from the 
Commonweal tho 
Though 9 as can be seen from Appendix B, Table 44 9 the Nationalist 
government did not activate the gold weapon again during the post= 
Sharpeville period (that is to say, up to the end of the Conservative 
government in October 1964), it was publicly threatened once more in 
September 1963o This, of course, was after the Nationalists had 
been tvrattled", according to the Economist, 148 by the August. decision 
of the Security Council to recommend a total arms ban on South Africa 
but 9 in vie\-1 of the differences in the positions adopted by the 
~ British and American governments on this occasion (see page above), 
( 
it s~e:rn.s lllOre likely that the threa,t on this occasion was_ designed 
more for American than for British earso To the extent that it was 
directed at London as well as Washington, however, it remains 
necessary to consider its credibility 9 for the claims of the City 
press that South Africa could not harm the Bank's interests by a 
direct sales policy149 seemed to have been lent greater substance by 
the development of the 'gold bridge' into a fully=fledged central 
banker's gold selling and buying syndicate = thus confronting the 
Nationalist regime with a sort of gold equivalent of the CDAo 15° 
Certainly, the formation of the 'Gold Pool' in October 1961 in response 
to yet another imminent gold price crisis, 151 had helped to consolidate 
US and European central bank support behind the Bank of England's 
control of the London Gold Market and thus to reduce the Bank's 
dependency on its marketing agency for South Africa's new~mined goldo 
And there is evidence to suggest that the operation of the Gold Pool 
assisted the stabilization of the market in late 1961 and during 1962, 
when the official price was under heavy speculative pressure and the 
South African government was stockpiling a considerable proportion of 
•t 1 ld t t t f •t . 1. 152 ~ s annua go ou pu as par o ~ s se~ge economy po ~CYo On 
the other hand 9 the reluctance of the European central bankers to take 
the strain off the United States by pouring their own gold stocks into 
the pockets of the hoarders was well known 9 and eloquently testified to 
py the meagre contributions which they were prepared to make to the Poolo 153 
Further.more 9 with the US balance of payments still in the doldrums 9 it 
was clear that New York could not go on indefinitely losing ~old at 
the rate of the last few yearso 154 Ironically9 too 9 large Russian 
sales during the period had been of considerable assistance to the 
Gold Pool but these clearly could not be relied upon (see page 115 above); 
this was confirmed by their virtual disappearance from the London market 
after 1965 (Appo B9 Table 41)o 
In short 9 therefore 9 whilst the Gold PooJ derived a psychological 
advantage from the fact that it signalled a degree of central bank 
CO=Operation in the free market to potential speculators 9 its combined 
resources as an alternative to regular South African gold deliveries 
were by no means the impregnable defence of the official price that 
they might at first sight have appearedo This point was made quite 
evident when 9 under intense speculative attack over a prolonged period 
following the devaluation of sterling9 the Gcld_Pool collapsed in 
March 1968o 155 Moreover 9 the argument that the South African gold 
weapon would be ineffective because the operation of the Gold Pool 
would ensure that its gold would end up in London a:nyway 9 not only 
assumed that the Pool would hold under pressure but also that South 
Africa would necessarily have to sello As the events of 1968=69 
were also to demonstrate 9 neither of these assumptions was trueo
156 
Altpgether then9 it seems reasonable to conclude that South Africa's 
gold weapon waa effectively employed during 1960 and remained far from 
being an incredible threat during the Gold Pool period from 1961 to 
1964o 
If the Natignalist government made political capital out of Britain's 
need to have South African gold marketed ±n London {and especially via 
thg Bank of England) during the post=Sharpeville period9 it was 
evidently more circumspect in employing the economic strength which it 
derived from Britain's need to earn gold for the central reserveso 
For interference with Britain's export earnings from South Africa = both 
visible and invisible = might well have invited retaliation from Britain 
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in the two areas where South Africa'was most vulnerable; that is to 
say 9 in its own market in the United Kingdom 9 where the British 
government might have withdrawn 'Commonwealth' preferences on certain 
South African commodities 9 and in the matter of confidence in the 
security of investments in South Africa9 where British private investors 
might have been dissuaded from re-investing even in a re=stabilized 
political climateo 
On the other hand 9 it was not immediately necessary for the 
Nationalist government to ~ake explicit action on its own account 
to actualize its putative power vis-a-vis Britain in this respect 9 
for Britain's sliding grasp on the South African market had already 
been a matter of considerable concern to British exporters for some 
time before 1960 and 9 after 1960, ipso facto to the British foreign 
policy elite (vide Chapter I)o And it seems reasonable to assume 
that the South African government could rely on the voluntary 
inclinations of its supporters to intensify this concern by turning 
even further away from British goods in the event of any pronounced 
political hostility on the part of Britain towards South Africao 
Certainly 9 it was the firm belief of British business that this would 
be the case, as 'tias amply demonstrated by its almost hysterical re-
action towards the Wilson government's arms supply policy in 1967-68 
(see Chapter II 9 Part B, Seco1 above)o 
Indeed, the Nationalist government's intensification of its policy of 
external arms supply diversification after the events of 1960 was 
undoubtedly in part an indirect signal to British industry that it 
would suffer in this vital export sector if the British government 
would not afford it the necessary diplomatic cover, illn this connection 9 
the entry \.,rhich Macmillan made in his diary at the time of the August 
196 3 Security Council meeting is \vorth quoting in full: "vie all agree" 9 
he recorded, "to no arms for So Africa for internal oppression a \ve want 
to sell arms (such as submarimes 9 warships 9 aeroplanes) against external 
aggressiono But (sic) that's where the big money iso While Governor 
Stevenson was pontificating at UoNo 9 American arms interests -with full 
support of State Department and Pentagon = were making a desperate bid 
against our exporters for some huge contracts 11 o157Shortly after this 9 on 
the same occasion that Eric Louw publicly brandished the gold weapon 9 he 
also threatened both Britain and the United States with the closure of 
its markets to them in the event that they should countenance sanctions 
against South Africa. 158 It is also worth noting that by the end of 
1963 South Africa's passive economic power was immeasurably increased 
from its position in 1960-62: the South African economy had experienced 
a strong recovery, the voluntary Afro-Asian boycott had proved largely 
ineffectual and its gold reserves were huge (App. B9 Table 33). 
There is, then 9 some fairly strong evidence to suggest that South 
Africa exerted political pressure on the British government during this 
period through Britain's need to both market and earn the Union/Republic's 
gold. But what of Britain's most well=publicized economic interest in 
South Africa at this time, that is to say 9 the ever-growing investment 
stock? Was this similarly exploited as an economic lever by the 
Nationalist government over Britain? 
It has already been suggested that Pretoria would have risked destroying 
what British confidence was left in South African investments at this 
time if the government had moved against the unrestricted flow of 
repatriated profits and it can be safely assumed that this would have 
applied with even greater force to any hint of expropriation. In 
the early part of 1961 Dr. Verwoerd himself gave assurances to the 
outside world in general concerning both the safety and profitability 
of foreign investments in the Union, 159 and even in the worst moments 
of the 1961 balance of payments crisis the repatriation of profits was 
allowed to continue unchecked despite some scepticism in the City. 160 
It is significant, too, that there was no mention of investments when 
Eric Louw made his otherwise comprehensive statement of potential 
economic and, indeed, political reprisal threats in September 1963. 
Nevertheless, this attitude did not prevent the Nationalist government 
from placing a ban on the repatriation of all non-resident capital itself 
at the height of the June 1961 crisis, a ban which was, of course, of 
primary concern to British investors, (App. B, Table 8). Though this 
was effectively presented as a short=term defensive measure with no 
political implications, 161 it served to point up the fact that 
political instability in South Africa and foreign hostility to the 
Nationalist goverament were contrary to the interests of the British 
investor and, indeed, to the British government, since this prevented 
its 'commercial account' surplus with South Africa from increasing even 
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furthero Moreover 9 it underlined the determination of the South 
African government to interfere in some measure with British (and 
other foreign-owned) assets in that country if the occasion should 
be thought to require it. 
Conclusion 
As in the case of the Simonstown negotiations 9 the Nationalist 
government did not extract quite the full extent of concessions from 
the British government in the post-Sharpeville period which it would 
no doubt have likedo In the circumstances of the time, however, the 
diplomatic support which it did receive vwind of change' speech 
or no -was considerable, as we have seen, both at the UN and within 
the Commonwealth. It is also clear that Britainvs political and 
security 'interests' in South Africa were of even less consequence on 
this occasion than they had been in the period leading up to the 
Simonstown Agreementso 
As a result, the force of the economic factor in explaining Britain's 
South Africa policy during the post=Sharpeville period = what Horwitz 
has accurately described as "an undeclared but none the less pervading 
Monroe Doctrine11162 - can hardly be gainsaid. That this should have 
been the case, moreover, is hardly surprising. For, whilst the South 
African government's non-economic bases of putative economic power 
were considerably more substantial at this time than they had been 
during the 1954-55 period (the successful application of economic 
pressure by the Nationalists during the Simonstown negotiations having 
no doubt contributed to their reputation for the actualization of 
putative economic power, for instance) and Britainvs will to apply 
it even more reduced 9 the increased concern of the British foreign 
policy elite with economic questions during this period (vide Chapter I) 
made it even more vulnerable to economic pressUre. And that such 
pressure was applied - or putative economic power vactualizedv = by 
the South African government vis-a-vis Britain is even more evident in 
the post=Sharpeville period than it is in the case of the Simonstown 
negotiations. 
In particular, the evidence is convincing that the Nationalist regime 
not only privately and publicly threatened Britain (and America) 
with economic reprisals in the event of diplomatic hostilities -
merely bringing "into the open" 9 as the Economist observed of 
Louw's famous threats of September 1963 9 "all the aces South Africa 
has previously waved around in private arguments with Britain and 
America"163 = but actually realized the most potent of these threats 
at a moment in the second half of 1960 when there appear to have 
been doubts within the South African government concerning the 
resolve of the Macmillan government to withstand Afro-Asian pressure 
for some sort of effective action to bring an end to apartheid. This 9 
as had been argued 9 consisted in the deprival of the Bank of England 
of the bulk of South Africa's new-mined gold at the very moment in 
late 1960 when it was most needed to defend the key currency exchange 
rates in the London Gold Market; exchange rates 9 moreover 9 which were 
believed to be vital to the stability of the Bretton Woods system and 
to the ultimate status of sterling itself (see page above). The 
ban on the repatriation of non-resident capital in 1961 also caused 
temporary discomfort to British investors in South Africa as well as 
preventing the British central reserves from benefiting from South 
African gold to quite the degree to which they would have done in its 
absence~ South African policy during this period 11 therefore 9 demonstrated 
the 'actualization' of putative economic power with a vengeance. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The central preoccupation of this work is the hypothesis that economic 
power (resting on non~economic 9 as well as on economic 9 bases) has 
been an important factor in explaining the ability of states in the 
recent past to achieve their foreign policy objectives. In addition, 
however, attention is also directed to the hypothesis that economic 
considerations ~ relating to both prosperity and power - have also 
loomed large amongst these objectives themselves; attention thus 
directed partly because of the intrinsic interest of the subject but 
partly also because the extent to which this has been the case is 
likely to have influenced the efficacy of economic pressure applied in 
political diplomacy. 
In order to test the _latter of these hypotheses, the importance of 
economic considerations in British foreign policy as a whole has been 
investigated over the 1951=1964 period, and it has been found that the 
'conventional view' of this question ~ characteristically holding that 
economic considerations received relatively low priority during these 
years (see Chapter I, Seco 19 above)= is somewhat in need of revisiono 
It is evident, in particular, that this view of the question is weak 
on two main counts: first, in its failure to coherently articulate 
the changing nature of the economic considerations which influenced 
British foreign policy during these years; and second, in its 
assumptions concerning their impact on foreign policy in the later 
1950s and early 1960so 
On the former count, it is clear that, whilst a preoccupation with the 
status of sterling and the Sterling Area remained a pre~eminent 
consideration throughout the period, changes in the nature of 
strategic thought and in the condition of the world's primary commodity 
markets rendered concern with secure access to foreign sources of raw 
materials of much less account in the second half of the period than 
in the firsto The reverse, however, was the case with manufacturing 
exports and invisible earnings, as I~cmillan's anxiety concerning, and 
active personal involvement in, export promotion in 1960 so eloquently 
confirms (see Chapter I, Seco 2 above). 
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On the latter count 9 that is to sayp that concerning the conventional view 
of the influence of economic considerations on the shape and direction 
of British foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s and in the 
early 1960s, it is equally apparent that this was greater than is 
commonly supposed. That this was the case is to be explained by the 
economic shock of Suez 9 the powerful and widely acknowledged influence 
of banking, business and commercial interests on the Conservative 
governments of these years, the increasingly economic nature of the 
cold war, the perceptibly reduced anxiety over security once the major 
Western alliance systems had been constructed and it was apparent that 
the Soviet government was prepared to countenance some sort of modus 
vivendi with the West, and the slowly dawning understanding on the 
part of the British foreign policy elite that Britain's external econo-
mic problems in the later 1950s were somehow 'fundamental' rather than 
a temporary consequence of the second World War. That this was the case 
is confirmed by the evidence of the recorded anxiety of leading members 
of the foreign policy elite with regard to economic questions, by organ= 
izational changes within the Foreign Office at the end of the 1950s which 
gave more resources and status to the economic sections, and by the 
diplomatic implications (especially with regard to Germany) of the 
changes in Britain's defence policy beginning in 1956=57 and by the 
stubborn insistence on the retention of the tradesman's style abroad 
despite the increasing costs which this forced onto the British govern= 
menta in the increasingly idealistic international environment with 
which they were faced in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see Chapter I, 
Sec. 3 above). 
In sum, therefore, it can be safely concluded that, in the case of 
British foreign policy in the second half of the 1951-1964 period, 
economic considerations represented an increasingly high policy 
priority, whilst in the first half of the period they were, ~ if not, 
overallp as important as in the second - still very significant and as 
much coloured by traditional 'economic power' calculations as by pros= 
perity per se. 
In order to test the hypotheses concerning the exploitation of economic 
power in diplomacy, this work gave detailed consideration to the 
poli~ical economy of Anglo-South African relations during the Simons-
town negotiations (1954-55) and during the post-Sharpeville period 
(1960~64) 9 employing 9 inter alia9 a vital distinction made by Knorr 
between 1 putative 1 and 1 actualized' economic po111er. In this 
instance, it is clear that 9 though on both of these occasions a 
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crude balance of 'economic strength' obtained between the two govern-
ments (that is to say, that ·each was, amongst other things 9 economic~ 
ally dependent upon the other in the sense that each was theoretically 
in a position to grant or withhold economic favours in urgent demand and un-
obtainable elsewhere), the South African government possessed a very signi= 
icant margin of putative economic power vis~a-vis the British government 
as a result of its marked superiority in the non-economic bases of such 
power. This putative power was 'actualized' by the South African 
government in the extraction of political and security concessions from 
Britain at both of the historical junctures in question. How are these 
conclusions justified? 
During both the Simonstown negotiations and the post-Sharpeville period 
the difference in \veight bet\veen Britain and South Africa as agents in 
the world economy and the most obvious quantitative indices of the 
nature of their bilateral economic relations appears to suggest that the 
British government had far more economic strength to dispose of vis-a-vis 
the South AfTican government than vice versa. Unfortunately for the 
government of the United Kingdom, however~ the structure of those 
relations changed this picture dramatically. 
In particular9 Britain had very little monopoly power over South Africa 
in regard to the supply of goods or services to it (though its monopsony 
power was considerable 9 especially in the later period), whilst South 
Africa, though possessing little global monopsony pmver o':er British 
exporters, possessed considerable monopoly power over commodities which 
were regarded as vital by the British governments of these years. This 
was especially true in the case of gold, which was not only an increasing-
ly important bulwark of the Sterling Area's central reserves during the 
1950s but \·las also indispensable to the profits and prestige of the 
London Gold Market and, above all 9 to the Bank of England's control 
of the key currency exchange rates on that market. It was also true 
- though to a somewhat lesser extent as a r~sult of the CDA mechanism -
of South Africa's position in the world uranium market, in the mid=1950s 
at any rate. For uranium was vital to Britain's civil and military atomic 
programmes throughout the period. South Africa, moreover, contained huge 
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and lucrative British investments 9 whilst the reverse was not the case. 
On both occasions South Africa's reserve position was relatively 
stronger than that of Britain9 whilst the latter was incapable = in the 
face of unbending American opposition - of exploiting its greater weight 
as an agent in the world economy to further or obstruct the South 
African government's most coveted international economic ambition = an 
increase in the official price of gold. 
Indeed, though there is no logical relationship with this last point, 
the bearing of the British government's relations with South Africa on 
its relations with the United States (most vital of all to Britain 
throughout the post=war period) 9 was a most significant feature of the 
British government's structional economic weakness vis~a-vis the South 
African government. In the early 1950s 9 at any rate 9 South Africa's 
uranium not only lent credibility to Britain's position within the 
CDA but also seemed vital to the atomic power station programme which 
Eden clearly regarded as constituting an important claim for the 
retention of the 'special relationship' with the United States. But , 
more important even than this was the Bank of England's control of the 
disposal of South Africa's new-m~ned gold on the London Gold Market 9 
for this almost certainly strengthened the hand of the British govern-
ment in its economic dealings with the United States. 
\Vhat it comes down to 9 then 9 at the risk of some oversimplification, 
is this: that British monopsony power over South African exports and 
South African monopoly pO\ver over key British imports (plus its 
possession of huge British investments) constituted the essence of a 
crude balance of 'economic strength' which obtained between the two 
governments at both the time of the Simonstown negotiations and during 
the post-Sharpeville period. The decisive factag, therefore 9 in 
providing the South African government with a significant margin of 
putative economic povTer1'over the British government had 9 perforce 9 
to arise from a discrepancy between them in terms of the non-economic 
bases of such power. This discrepancy was manifest from the beginning 
of the period and widened as it progressed. 
For the British government's part, the will to employ economic strength 
in diplomacy with South Africa (or any other country for that matter) 
was clearly absent as a result of Conservative economic ideology and 
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the long-standing 'style' of British foreign policy to which Northedge 
has drawn such persuasive attention (see pages 68-69 and 126=128 above) 9 
to mention just two of the reasons germane to this issue. It was not a 
disposition9 either9 which was encouraged by the general increase in the 
importance which was attached to economic considerations in British 
foreign policy=rnaking in the later 1950s and early 1960s. This renders 
consideration of the other non-economic bases of putative economic 
power strictly academic in the case of the British government. 
For South Africa9 however9 though the strength and nature of certain 
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domestic interests (such as the gold=mining companies and the farming 
community) may not have contributed to the will to exploit economic 
strength in anti-British diplomacy in the economic circumstances of 
the mid=1950s 9 this was of less account in the post-Sharpsville period 
and 9 in any case 9 the determination of the Nationalist party government 
to subordinate the economy in general to political considerations and 
its loathing of the 'British connection' (economic and political) in 
particular9 was more than sufficient to provide the necessary Rwill=power' 
on both occasions. But this was even- more obviously the case in the 
later period as a result of the closing of ranks within the white 
commQnity in the face of mounting world-wide condemnation of apartheid 
and increasingly bi=partisan support for foreign policy. Furthermore 9 
the Nationalist regime possessed the skill to give effect to this deter-
rnination9 the moreso because of direct government control over the 
disposal of the two most vital commodities in its trade with the United 
Kingdom (gold through the SA Reserve Bank and uranium through the SA 
Atomic Energy Board) 9 as well as certainly something of a reputation 
for the exercise of economic pressure in diplomacy· during the post-
Sharpeville period (at the least) as a result of its employment against 
Britain during the Simonstown negotiations. 
Whilst each government had9 in consequence 9 the potential to inflict 
very considerable economic harm on the other9 only the South African 
government possessed the will, the skill and (in smaller measure, to 
be sure) the reputation to transform it into putative economic power. 
That this power was 'actualized' during the Simonstown negotiations and 
during the post-Sharpeville period is strongly suggested by the shape 
of British policy towards the South African regime on both of these 
occasions, by its inexplicability in terms of Britain's non-economic 
interests in South Africa~ and by the direct evidence that it was actually 
exerted. 
In the Simonstown Agreements the British government secured from South 
Africa nothing of which it was not already assured and gave many 
concessions to the Nationalist regime, not least amongst them being 
the return of the naval base to Union sovereignty and~ in Spence's 
telling formulation~ "quasi-formal association within the vlestern 
alliance". It is possible =but unlikely= that concern for the fate 
of the High Commission Territories and for the 'kith and kin' relation-
ship with the Union were important factors in explaining this otherwise 
gratuitously 'reactionary' policy (see Chapter III~ Sec. 3 above). 
The logic of the analysis thus forces us to conclude that the British 
government's freely acknowledged economic interests in South Africa 
were the most important factor in explaining the shape of the Agree-
ments. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that, at the critical stages 
in the negotiations which led up to them, the South African government 
actually took steps to threaten the British government with economic 
damage in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome: thus the withdrawal 
of the minimum gold guarantee in the inauspicious gold=earning circum-
stances of October 1954 and the discreet suggestions that there might 
be circumstances in which South African uranium might not find its way 
so readily to the United Kingdom (see Chapter III, Sec. 5 above). 
In the post=Sharpeville period, after the initial establishment of a 
degree of public distance between the British government and South 
Africa's racial policies by Macmillan, Britain went to inordinate lengths 
to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth, to prevent any kind of 
effective action against the Nationalist regime's apartheid policies 
or hold on South-West Africa by the United Nations and to defend the 
Simonstown Agreements in circumstances which made their strategic value 
to Britain even more questionable than those in which they had been 
first initialled. On this occasion, too, the possibility that concern 
for the High Commission Territories or for the 'kith and kin' relation-
ship might throw any light on these policies is not even plausible, let 
alone a reasonable hypothesis (see Chapter IV9 Sec. 3 above). Once more, 
therefore, we are forced to the conclusion that the most persuasive 
explanation is economic and the evidence is even more suggestive on this 
occasion that the Nationalist government exerted economic leverage on 
Britain after it had been shaken by the ~~cmillan government's new 
attitude in the spring of 1960o Hence, in particular, the diversion 
of South Africa's new-mined gold from the London Gold Market in general 
and from the Bank of England in particular in the latter half of the 
year, and the renewed threat (publicly issued) in September 1963. 
Table 44 in Appendix B9 read in conjunction with Table 26 in the same 
Appendix 9 is probably more revealing of the reasons for Britain's South 
Africa policy during these years than all of the Tables on British 
investments in South Africa put together. 
Accordingly 9 it is the argument of this v10rk that the principal 
hypothesis to which it is addressed, to whit, that economic power 
(resting on non-economic, as well as on economic, bases) has been an 
important factor in explaining the ability of states in the recent past 
to achieve their foreign policy objectives, is vindicated in an 
especially interesting and telling manner in the case of the South 
African government's relationship \·lith Britain during both the Simons-
tmm negotiations and the post-Sharpeville periodo '!:!hat implications 
do this empirical findings have for some of the other general questions 
discussed in the theoretical Introduction to this Hark? 
As far as the debate about the economic objectives of fore~gn policy is 
concerned, it is clear that, given the essentially non=empirical nature 
of the theory (see pages 15=16 above), the Leninist theory of imperial= 
ism is not - and nor could it be - either refuted or confirmed by the 
evidence which has been brought to light in the course of this work. 
Since, however, it is invariably offered as an empirical, indeed, as a 
'scientific', theory, it seems worthwhile to note the following points 
which emerge from this study. 
To begin with, then, for it is certainly true that the theory of imperial-
ism engenders empirical hypotheses, it seems clear that, in the case of 
British foreign policy in general over the 1951=1964 period, the influence 
of financial interests in securing the designation of the sterling parity 
and the Sterling Area as matters of 'high policy' \vas probably greater 
than non=marxists have commonly been prepared to concede (see pages 
58-60 above) o 
Secondly, on the other handp the obsession of marxists and fellow-travelling 
polemicists with overseas investments, high rates of return, markets per 
se 9 and so on 9 has, in the case of British foreign policy vis-a-vis 
South Africa, tended to have the historiographical drawback of 
distracting attention from aspects of Anglo-South African economic 
relations which fit less readily with the assumptions of the theory 
of imperialism: in particular9 the unusually significant and 
complicated issue of new-mined gold and the Bank of Englando 
Attention has invariably been concentrated on Britian's absolutely 
and relatively large investment stocks and markets in South Africa 
as the principal explanation of Britain's diplomatic posture towards 
the Nationalist regime 9 as a result of the crucial importance which 
such matters are assumed to possess in the overall calculations of 
Britain's 'capitalist' foreign policy eliteo In actual fact 9 as we 
have seen 9 though these interests were obviously important 9 the 
evidence 9 such as it is 9 suggests that they were not 9 as such9 the 
major economic conditioners of Britain's policy towards South Africa 
in either 1954-55 or 1960-64o It took a non-Marxist historian, 
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Peter Calvocoressi, to point out amidst the excitement of the latter 
period that •iGold deserves a special word" 9 1 whilst Roger Opie 9 in a 
paper specifically devoted to the question of gold and the importance 
of British and general Western access to South Africa's annual output 9 
completely missed the point about its value to the Bank of England in 
defending the key currency exchange rates 9 though it is true that he 
acknowledged its value to the Sterling Area's central reserves in the 
pre-convertibility periodo2 
Thirdly 9 the evidence brought to light in the course of this work also 
suggests that there was not invariably a unanimity of outlook in foreign 
economic matters between the British government and its domestic capital= 
ist and finance capitalist sectors, as tends to be regarded as axiomatic 
in the theory of imperialismo This was quite apparent in the early and 
mid-1950s when Treasury anxiety about Britain's ability to earn South 
African gold for the central reserves contrasted rather markedly with 
the preference of British manufacturers for concentrating on the easier 
home market at this timeo The same contrast vras also apparent in the 
October 1960 gold price crisis on the London Gold Marlceto By this time, 
as we have seen, the British government had relinquished its futile 
attempt to persuade the United States government to agree to an increase 
in the official price of gold and v1as unquestioningly committed to 
defending the existing parityo The City bullion houses 9 on the other 
?.7 .5. 
hand, remained as discreetly anxious as ever for an increase, as did 
the British holders of South African gold shares - somewhat less 
discreetlyo The South African government, moreover, was aware of this 
discrepancy in interest, appreciated the nature of its truest friends 
in London and, in the October crisis 9 was careful to hurt the Bank 
of England (and thus the British government) more than these sectors 
of the City (see pages 250-252 above)o Furthermore - and a point of 
considerable significance - these instances demonstrate not only the 
frequent lack of unanimity of economic interest between government 
ahQ sectional economic interests in the foreign sphere but also that 
it was especially 'British economic interests 1 \·lhich -v1ere peculiarly 
governmental which provided the South African Nationalists with their 
strongest leverage over Britain during these years. Except in so far as 
its initial exploitation boosted the value of gold-mining company shares, 
uranium was not of much immediate interest to British capitalists either. 
What next of the economic power theory of foreign policy, which was most 
closely associated -vli th the name of R.G. Hawtrey in the inter=war period? 
It has been argued, as we have seen, that such ideas do indeed seem to 
have influenced the shape of British foreign policy in the early 1950s, 
as well as in the late 1940s, for the idea of 'total war' still exer-
cised some influence over British strategic thought at this time; 
and that, in the new phase of the cold war heralded by Kruschev's 
announcement of the policy of peaceful co=existence in the mid-1950s, 
economic power in a new form had some small influence on the shape of 
policyo On the other hand, it was argued with regard to Britain's 
relations with South Africa in particular and apropos the 'style' of its 
relations with the outside world in general throughout the 1951=1964 
period9 that the British governments of these years were singularly 
lacking in the will to transform 'economic strength' into putative 
economic power and thus to make possible its 'actualization'. These 
two arguments, it might be reasonably suggested, are contradictoryg 
if the British government lacked the will to employ economic power in 
diplomacy, why cultivate it? 
The explanation of this paradox lies, in the first instance, in the 
distinction which Knorr makes between 'passive' and 'active' economic 
power (see page 26 above). For 9 clearly 9 whilst the British governments 
of the early years of our period may have been unwilling to pursue 
policies vihich were designed to provide them with the ability to inflict 
economic harm on a diplomatic adversary 9 that is to say 9 with 'active' 
economic power 9 the experience of total \·rar had shown them that it \vas 
expedient to pursue policies which would render it less easy for a 
diplomatic, or a military, adversa~J to inflict such economic harm upon 
them. In short 9 the economic po\ver considerations which influenced 
British foreign policy in some significant degree in the first post~war 
decade \·lere prompted by a desire to build up 1 passive 1 9 rather than 
'active 0 9 economic power and were thus not inconsistent with the 
absence of a desire on the part of Britain's foreign policy elite 
to exploit economic strength in diplomacy. 
On the other hand 9 it is difficult to apply the same argument to the 
kind of economic pOtver \vhich the British government began to feel 
rather important in the circumstances of the post=1956 cold war. 
Economic power as a goal of foreign policy no longer resided in self-
sufficiency (especially in conventional war=related materials) to the 
same degree as earlier 9 and the emphasis was placed instead on general 
domestic prosperity and international economic stability as the necessary 
conditions for extending economic aid to the overseas governments 
(normally \vi thin the Commonwealth) whose policies the :Sri t.i.sh goveTilment 
wished to influence. 'Active' economic power thus seems to have been 
much more obviously at stake in these circumstances. In fact 9 this 
did represent a real inconsistency in British foreign policy 9 with its 
traditional emphasis on the separation of politics and economics in 
foreign relations 9 though one which it would be unwise to exaggerate. 
It is no doubt true that the British government employed its so=called 
'aid programme' as an inducement to good behaviour on the part of its 
erstwhile African and Asian colonies 9 especially in so far as their 
attitudes towards the Commonw·eal th \·lere concerned and that 9 therefore 9 
this testifies in some small degree to the existence of a determination 
to employ economic strength to diplomatic ends. On the other hand, 
the British aid programme was miniscule when compared to the American 
effort and was never employed in anything like the blatantly political 
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manner of that country's government. 
more on rewards than on punishments.3 
The emphasis 9 moreover9 was much 
Indeed 9 by confining its aid 
programme largely to ex-colonies, the British government seems to have 
been largely successful in convincing the world at large of its non-
political nature and that it was merely a logical continuation of 
Britain's determination to bring the colonies to full 'maturity' and 
not to leave them in the lurch after independence.4 
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In sho~t 9 therefore, as already concluded, though economic power in the 
Hawtrey sense clearly continued to have a bearing on the overall 
priorities of British foreign policy in the first half of the 1950s, 
this was far less true of the remaining years of the period, vlhilst the 
very importance which continued to be attached by the foreign policy 
elite to the necessity of a strict separation of politics from economics 
in foreign relations ensured that economic power in the cold war sense 
never had a really serious impact on Britain's foreign policy priorities 
in the second post=war decade. The difficulties of realizing it in 
Britain's always fairly precarious economic position also acted as a 
damper in this respect. On the other hand 9 as was argued in 
Chapter I 9 the economic implications of the cold vrar certainly did 
make their own small contribution to the mounting ascendancy of economic 
priorities in British foreign policy at this time; alone 9 they would 
hardly have been sufficient. 
Ironically, it was South Africa, a non-imperi~l state in the territorial 
sense (South-West Africa and the Nationalist government's designs on the 
High Commission Territories notwithstanding) 9 which 9 faced after the 
early months of 1960 vii th the possibility of economic v1arfare in one 
form or another, was obliged to pursue a domestic and foreign policy 
which was much more squarely in line with Hawtrey's economic power 
theory than was the United Kingdom's. By emphasising in its propaganda 
the success of its racial policies and the pace of its economic growth 
and, indeed, by the offers of economic and technical assistance which 
it was beginning to make to the black states to the north, it could 
also be said w±th much justification that South Africa also better 
exemplified cold war economic power calculations in the overall shape 
of its foreign policy than did Britain. 
Perhaps the most substantial general lessons to be drawn from the empirical 
findings of this research 9 however, are those relating to the debate 
concerning the role of economic leverage in intercstate diplomacy. This, 
after all, has been the major preoccupation of this work and it is, 
therefore, only reasonable that this should be the case. 
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Knorr, it will be recalled from the Introduction, holds that putative 
economic power has both its economic and its non-economic bases and 
that the former resides in the absolute size of a state's foreign 
economic transactions, the proportion of its GNP represented by these 
transactions, their structure and the size of its international 
currency reserves; whilst the latter is held by Knorr to reside in 
the will to employ economic strength (thus constituted) in diplomacy, 
the skill available for its exercise and the reputation for its 
successful employment. It was also pointed out in the Introduction 
that Knorr's notion of 'economic strength' appeared to subsume the 
hardy concept of Veconomic dependence'o To what extent has this work 
confirmed the usefulness of these conceptual distinctions? Does it 
suggest that certain of the criteria for evaluating putative economic 
power are more important than others? 
Of course, too much cannot be concluded from one case study aloneo 
It does seem clear, however, that, to begin with, this work has 
particularly demonstrated the value of Knorr's distinction between 
the economic and the non-economic bases of putative economic power: 
first, because on methodological grounds, it greatly assists the 
organization of a welter of empirical detail (it was on this distinc-
tion that the division between Parts A and B in Chapter II was based); 
second, because it greatly reduces the risk of assuming that 'economic 
strength' automatically implies political influenceo5 As we have 
established, Britain's 'economic strength' vis-a-vis the South African 
government over the 1951-1964 period was considerable but was vitiated 
in diplomatic terms not only by the Nationalist regime's eqU4lly 
considerable economic strength vis-a-vis the United Kingdom govern-
ment but also by a firmly entrenched resolve on the part of the British 
foreign policy elite to avoid recourse to such action except in the 
most urgent of circumstanceso 
As for the four main criteria of economic strength suggested by Knorr, 
it also seems clear from this study of the political economy of Anglo-
South African relations that the structural criterion is by far the 
most importanto In the first place, Knorr's distinction between the 
absolute size of a state's foreign economic transactions and their size 
relative to GNP is not of much practical valueo For,clearly, what 
makes absolute size- as distinct from size -relative to GNP- important 
is only this quantum relative to the GNPs of potential economic victims 
of the state in question. If there are no potential victims (the state 
in question being concerned at most only with 'passive' economic power), 
the consideration of the absolute size of a state's foreign economic 
transactions is strictly academic and if there are, then Knorr's first 
criterion is subsumed by his second. No object (other than that of 
preliminary research) was served by considering the absolute size of 
Britain's economic transactions with South Africa, or vice versa; the 
assessment of the economic strength of each in regard to the other did not 
require such a calculation. As a result, we are left with three criteria 
rather than with four. 
Furthermore, our case study also demonstrated that international reserves 
were more important to 'passive', than to 9active'beconomic strength 
(the gold which the South African government employed to bludgeon 
Britain came largely from new-mined resources) whilst, as was also 
emphasised, South Africa possessed considerable active economic strength 
vis-a-vis the British government despite the fact that British trade and 
investments represented a vastly greater proportion of South Africa's GDP 
than was the case in the other direction. Ironically enough 9 the crucial 
significance of the remaining criterion - the structuxal one - wa~ 
demonstrated at South Africa's expense by the case of uranium, where 
South Africa's quasi-monopoly supply position in the mid-1950s (in 
prospect much earlier) was largely - if not wholly - offset by the 
monopsonist strength of the British government via the mechanism of 
the CDA. Amply compensating for this as far as the South African 
government was concerned, however, was the structure of Anglo-South 
African gold relations. 
The point is, then 9 that no matter how insignificant a country's 
economic transactions with another are in absolute or in crude relative 
terms, if the one possesses, for example, a monopoly, or near monopoly, 
in some one item of trade or finance which is considered vital to the success 
of some policy of the other = and is not offset by a reciprocal monopsony 
position- then that country will have a very considerable ingredient 
of economic strength vis-a-vis the other. Clearly, therefore, any 
study of bilateral relationships of 'economic strength' must = whilst 
not ignoring crude relativities and international reserves - give pride 
of place to the structural criterion. This is the point which empirical 
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research = as opposed to arm-chair conceptual speculation ~ most vividly 
brings out. 
It will also have become clear from this study that whether or not, in 
such an exercise, the term 'economic strength' or the term 'economic 
dependence' is employed is largely a matter of style or of syntax: the 
two are, to all intents and purposes, synonymous·. Both imply a condition 
in which State A is in urgent requirement of an economic . favour (be it 
a market, a raw material or capital, for example) which is unobtainable 
in sufficient measure from any other source than State Bo6 Equally 
clear, the empirical circumstances which the concept illuminates are 
matters of degree and 9 above all, of sectional interest and governmental 
perception. This is what matters to the historian. 
Finallyw then 9 what light has this work thrown on the question of the 
'actualization' of putative economic power as abstractly conceived? 
For Knorr, it will be recalled, holds quite rightly that there is no 
point in establishing the foundations upon which putative power rests 
unless it be to identify its principal uses. This is a key question. 
According to Knorr, "Putative economic power, like putative military 
power, can become actualized in particular relationships through three 
mechanisms: (1) 'A'~plies economic power purposely for weakening 'B' 
economically; (2) 'A' applies economic power by threatening 'B' with 
economic reprisals or by offering economic rewards for compliance with 
a request by 'A'; (3) 'B''s behaviour is influenced by the mere antici-
pation that, if he pursues actions detrimental to 'A''s interests, 'A' 
might resort to the exercise of economic power". He also adds that, 
once 'A' haa had frequent recourse to mechanisms (j) and (2), mechanism 
(3) may well suffice to keep 'B' in line.7 
~rom the evidence of Chapters III and IV of this work, it seems clear 
that the principal manner in which the South African government actual-
ized its putative economic power vis-a-vis the British government can 
quite adequately be conceived in terms of mechanism (2), most commonly 
- by surmise = in private but occasionally - by direct evidence = in 
publico The evidence also strongly suggests, however, that the National-
ist regime also employed mechanism (1) when it found the British goverrurrent 
particularly recalcitrant - thus the withdrawal of the minimum gold 
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guarantee after the first formal and (to South Africa) unsatisfactory 
round of defence talks in August-September 1954 and then 9 most 
dramatically, the diversion of ne\v-mined gold from London after the 
more distant public posture adopted by the Macmillan government towards 
Pretoria in early 1960. This having been the case 9 it is a highly 
reasonable supposition that Knorr's mechanism (3) encompasses most 
appropriately the manner in which South African economic leverage 
operated on the British government after the end of 1960. As we have 
seen, the gold returned to London in the following year and the British 
government subsequently refused to be forced into a posture of further 
diplomatic hostility towards the Nationalist regime. It seems fair to 
conclude, therefore 9 that this study of the political economy of Anglo-
South African relations demonstrates that Knorr's formulation of the 
mechanisms by which putative economic power can become 'actualized' 
is at once succinct and comprehensive. 
If the central thesis of this work is 9 indeed, that the South African 
government actualized its putative economic power vis-a=vis the British 
government through each of these three mechanisms identified by Knorr 9 
what of the method and what of the nature of the evidence by which it 
has been substantiated? For it would be grossly inappropriate to 
conclude a work of such an explicitly contemporary historical nature 
without a measure of self-criticism. 
The basic problem throughout, of course 9 has been that of attributing 
reasons for governmental policy (especially in the case of Britain) 
in the absence of 'hard evidence'; in the absence, that is to say 9 
of access in particular to the records of key government meetings in 
both South Africa and Britain which had a bearing on their economic and 
political relations. It is as yet impossible to know, for instance, 
exactly what was said during the highly secret meetings held between 
British and South African ministers and officials during the course of 
the Simonstown negotiations. This is the basic problem confronting 
all contemporary historians and it is one which is compounded by the 
fact that the 'soft evidence' (such as newspaper and periodical accounts, 
official statements in parliament chambers and at the UN, for instance, 
and notoriously partisan and self-justificatory 'insider works' - see 
Bibliographies below) is suffocatingly copious. As a result, getting 
at even an approximation of 'the truth' is enormously mifficult, though 
it is sometimes said that the contemporary historian does have one 
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compensating advantageo In particularp it is often held that he can actually 
talk to the key personalities who were involved in the decision-making 
process since there is a very good chance that they will still be alive. 
Let us consider some of these problems - as well as the theoretical 
compensating advantages = of writing contemporary historyo 
It is at once apparent that the 'drawbacks' of writing contemporary 
history are not much greater than those confronting 'non-contemporary' 
historians. If it was not clear before publication9 then certainly 
since the appearance of the Crossman Diaries it has become obvious that 
even British Cabinet minutes are neither comprehensive nor disinterested.8 
It is also a reasonable supposition that some of the most important 
meetings between the representatives of different governments -
especially within the ostentatiously informal Commonwealth context -have 
never been recorded anyway, in part because of their very importance.9 
This would seem to be especially true in the case of Britain's sensitive 
de§lings with such a routinely anathematised regime as that in South 
Africa. 
As far as the advantages of writing contemporary history, especially in 
so far as access to living personalities is concerned, this is an 
almost complete illusion. To begin with 9 interviewing the 'key actors' 
presupposes·a theory about who they were, which must necessarily be 
based on other sources; secondly, there is no guarantee that they are 
telling the truth and the memories of politicians are notoriously vague; 10 
and thirdly, there is a natural tendency to tone down any observations 
which the author subsequently makes in reference to his interviewees 
for fear of appearing churlish. Social distance, it is suggested here, 
is an important condition of what objectivity it is possible to achieve 
in the writing of contemporary history. 11 
In sum, therefore, the contemporary historian is probably neither so 
disadvantaged nor so advantaged when compared to other historians than 
is sometimes supposed. Moreover 9 whilst it is true that the materials 
on which he does have to rely are 'suffocatingly copious'P they at 
least provide him with a record of events and some extraordinarily 
well=informed commentaxy on motivation. This is especially true in 
the case of investigatory reporting in such newspapers as The Times, 
The Guardian and The Economist. Though not explicitly concerned with 
motivation in this context, it is nevertheless an extremely salutary 
fact that the figure which The Economist put on Britain 9 s contribution 
to the highly sec~et CDA financing of South Africa's new uranium 
industry in the early 1950s was confirmed roughly twenty years later 
by the publication of Margaret Gowing's official history of Britain's 
atomic energy programme for that periodo 
This study~ then 9 has rested largely on so-called 1 soft~evidence' of the 
kind which has been described above~ and is listed under 'Primary Sources' 
in the Bibliographies. How has it been marshalled; in short hoH have 
reasons been attributed in the absence of 'hard evidence'? 
Establishing the context of action has been crucial to this worko This1 
as already indicated, partly explains the length of Chapter I in 
documenting the place and nature of economic priorities in the hierarchy 
of Britain's general foreign policy calculations over the 1951~1964 
periodo Knowing from this that Britain's foreign policy was being 
increasingly shaped by economic considerations at the end of the 1950s 
makes it historiographically legitimate to infer that Britain's economic 
interests in South Africa would have greater impact on Britain's South 
Africa policy at this junctureo Again 9 for instance, knowing that the 
British goverruuent vias extraordinarily exercised by the 'dollar gap' in 
-the early and mid-1950s makes it a legitimate inference that great value 
was attached to South African gold; knmving that enormous importance 
v1as attached to the atomic energy programme at the same time throws telling 
light on South Africa's uranium supplies; and knowing that the Eden 
government did not engage in gratuitously 'reactionary' policies but 
normally sought a tangible quid pro quo helps to illuminate the 
Simonstown Agreements. 
Secondly 9 and obviously related to the last point, establishing the 
nature of inter-governmental perceptions has also been a major method 
employed in this studyo In this instance, the statistical record, 
though often incomplete (especially in the most interesting and 
important items of Anglo~South African economic relations, to whit, 
in gold,uranium and diamonds) and, over time, disjointed, constituted 
extremely valuable evidence. The moreso because it was 9 in the main, 
compiled by government ministries or agencies and was clearly the same 
evidence with which ministers and officials themselves operated. Auto-
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biography was also particularly valuable in this respect 9 of course 9 
as well as articles and books by people ivho had been on 'the inside' at~ 
or near, the times in question (see 'Insider Works' under Primary Sources 
in the Bibliographies). It is clear that it i·ras the world as interpreted 
by the politicians 9 officials and others involved which influenced their 
actions. Even if South African uranium \vas not a 'trump card' in 
Britain's atomic dealings with the United States, the British government 
clearly though that it was and this almost certainly influenced its 
attitude towards the Nationalist regime. 
Thirdly, there is what can only be described as the Erocess of elimination. 
Thus it was held publicly by the British government that Britain had other 
interests in South Africa besides the economic ones, and this vie\•1 has 
been endorsed by writers such as Dennis Austin (see page 174 above). 
On this view, it was the cumulat~ve weight of all of these interests 
which disposed Britain towards a friendly policy towards South Africa 
during the period in question. It will be clear that what has been 
done in the course of this work is to give serious consideration to each 
of these non-economic interests at each historical juncture (on the 
basis of the available evidence) and to largely - not wholly - eliminate 
them~as explanatory factors (even col·lectively) in compari__son wi_th the 
weight of the economic interests at stake. This is a matter of historical 
judgement and it has been acknowledged that they probably possessed 
greater weight during the Simonsto\Vll negotiations than in the post-
Sharpsville period. 
Finally 9 and most important in establishing that the South African 
government did in fact 'actualize' its putative economic power during 
both interludes~ has been observed action and reaction and their timing. 
Thus the importance of the stalemate in the Simonstovm negotiations in 
August-September 1954, followed by the withdrawal of the minimum gold 
guarantee in October, in turn followed by othe~vise unrequited British 
concessions in the shape of the Simonstown Agreements in the subsequent 
year. Thus, too 9 Macmillan's posture of public hostility to South 
Africa's racial policies in the early part of 1960, followed by the 
diversion of new-mined gold from London, in turn followed by the Macmillgn 
government's subsequent stalling operation vis~a=vis the Nationalist regime 
within the Commonwealth and at the United Nations - followed by the return 
of the gold to London. 
Of course 9 as has been acknowledged at various parts in this study, 
there are alternative explanations of Britain's South Africa policy during 
these yearso Marxists and fellow~travelling polemicists regard it as 
sufficient to point to the 'capitalist' nature of the British government, 
on the one hand, and to the size and lucrativeness of Britain's markets 
and investments in South Africa9 on the other. More conventional 
diplomatic historians emphasise Britain's non-economic interests in 
South Africa and point to the 'status quo' style of British foreign 
policy in general, of which Britainvs South Africa policy is asstuned 
to be a particular example. It will be apparent that the methodological 
premisses of this work are closer to the latter than to the former but 
that the emphasis of its argument and the particular economic reasons 
offered for British policy are somewhat at odds with botho The nature 
of the evidence and the comprehensiveness of the method 9 it is 
suggested, make this thesis more compelling than either. 
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3. It is notable that the Eden government, though under right=wing 
pressure to do sop was not the first to withdraw financial support 
from the Aswan High Dam project in 1956 in response to Nasser's 
flirtation \·lith the Soviet bloc. It vras particularly Dulles 1 s 
decision in this regard which forced Britain's hand, see E. Monroe, 
Britain's Moment in the Middle Easto 1914-1956, (1965), pp. 191-192. 
4. InT. Hayter's indictment of 'foreign aid', Aid as Imperialism, (1971) 11 
it is difficult to find a single mention of British aid. 
5. This common failing is emphasised by C. Reynolds in Theory and 
Explanation in International Politics, (1973), pp. 232-237. 
6. Reynolds complicates this issue unnecessarily by suggesting two 
definitions of the concept of 'economic dependence': "firstly, as 
the dependence of one country upon another for its major source of 
foreign exchange, derived either from capital investment, aid or 
exports, and secondly, as the dependence of a country on inter-
national trade or aid in tenns of its GNP", ibid. 11 p.232. To begin 
with, this begs the question as to what "dependence" means and, in 
the second place, merely represents different applications of the 
same concept. 
K. Knorr, Power and Wealth: 
Power 11 (1973) 11 P• 89. 
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8. See introductOI"J comments to the Bibliographies belO\'l. 
9. Another contemporary historian, David Nunnerley 11 is also of this 
opinion: "It is well lmown ••• that some of the steps in the making 
of government decisions are never, nor could ever be, fully doc~ented. 
Public records all to often tend to disclose reasons rather than 
motivations", President Kennedy and Britain 11 (1972), p. vii. 
10. This also applies to their diaries and autobiographies, of course 11 
but if they are prepared to go into print it is at least more likely 
that they will have done some checking back and not offer reasons 
which are clearly outrageous = if only because they will inevitably 
be attacked if such is the case. 
11. A particularly good example of a work of contemporary history in which 
the "chief source •••• has been the systematic interrogation of as maey 
as possible of the principals involved", is Nunnerley 9 op.cit.,(p.vii). 
There is no intention to suggest here, however, that his work is nee= 
essarily compromised. Only an authority on Anglo-American relations 
could det~rmine that. 
APPENDIX A 
Table 1. 
Britain's Visible Exports as per cent of G.D.P. compared with Selected 
Countries~ 1948~1964. 
UK USA Canada W.Germany France Japan 
1948 14.0 4.9 21.2 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 
1949 14o9 4o7 19.1 0 0. • 0 • 
1950 17.5 3o6 18.3 8.5 10.7 0 0. 
1951 18.7 4o6 19.0 12.2 12.0 0 0 0 
1952 17.5 4o4 18.4 12.3 9o7 7o4 
1953 15.8 4o3 17.0 12.5 9o3 6.5 
1954 15.8 4o2 16.2 13.9 9.4 7o5 
1955 16.1 3o9 16.5 14.2 10.1 8o4 
1956 16.3 4o6 16.4 15.5 8o5 9o3 
1957 15.7 4o8 15.8 16.6 8o9 9.3 
1958 14o9 4o0 15.3 16.0 8.8 9.0 
1959 14.8 3o7 15.2 16.4 10.2 9.6 
1960 14.9 4o 1 15.3 15.8 11.2 9o4 
1961 14.5 4o 1 16o2 15.3 10.9 8.0 
1962 14.2 3o9 16 01 16.7 10.0 8.3 
1963 14.4 4.0 15.9 15.1 9o8 8.,0 
1964 13.9 4.2 17.2 15.4 9.9 8.3 
AVE. 15.5 4.2 16.5 14.7 9.9 8.41 
Source: I.MoF., International Financial Statistics~ 1972 Supplement. 
Footnotes: 
1. Average for 1952=1964. 
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Table 2o 
Britain's Visible Imports as per cent of GoD.Po compared with Selected 
Countriesp 1948-19640 
UK USA Canada vloGermany France Japan 
1948 17o7 3.2 18.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1949 18.4 3o0 18o 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1950 20.2 3o4 18.9 11.6 10.6 
1951 27.0 3o6 20.0 12.3 13o 1 0 0 0 
1952 22.3 3o4 17o4 11o7 10o9 11.7 
1953 19o8 3.3- 18.3 10.8 9o6 12.4 
1954 19.2 3o1 11 o2 12o1 9o5 11.1 
1955 20.6 3.2 18o0 13o5 9.7 10.3 
1956 19o 1 3.4 19o4 14o0 10o4 12o0 
1957 18.5 3o3 18.4 14.6 10.7 13o9 
1958 16.8 3o3 16o4 13.8 9o6 9.5 
1959 17.0 3o5 11 oO 14.2 9o2 10.0 
1960 18.3 3o3 16.3 14.0 10.3 10o4 
1961 16.7 3o1 16.5 13.2 10 01 10.9 
1962 16.2 3o2 16o6 13.6 9.9 9.5 
1963 16.5 3o2 15o5 13o5 10.5 9.9 
1964 17o3 3o2 16.1 13o8 10.9 9.9 
AVE. 19.0 3o3 17o4 13.2 10.3 10.91 
Source: Ibid. 
Footnotes: 
1. Average for 1952-1964. 
Table 3. 
Britain's Imports by Main Category in selected years 9 1951-1964. Per cent. 
by value. 
Foodstuffs 1 Raw Materials Fuels Manufactures 2 TOT. 
1951 33 39 8 19 100 
1955 37 29 9 23 100 
1956 37 28 11 23 100 
1958 40 24 12 24 100 
1960 34 24 11 31 100 
1963 35 21 12 33 100 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
1. Includes beverages and tobacco. 
2. Includes both semi- and finished manufactures. 
Table 4. 
Britain's Primary Commodity Imports in selected years, 1951-1964: 
Principal Regional Sources by Main Categoriese Per cent by value. 
A. FOODSTUFFS. 1 
1951 1954 1958 
N. America 19e4 13.9 16.2 
s. America 10.8 8.4 10.0 
Sterling C'wealth 23.4 33o0 31o5 
UK Colonies 7.1 11.0 7.8 
Non-Sterling OEEC 25.0 19.8 21.2 
Middle East . . . 1.2 
B. BAH MATERIALS • 
1951 1954 1958 
N. America 10.5 15.2 16.7 
s. America 10.1 7.6 1 e 1 
Sterling C'wealth 19.1 23.9 27.5 
UK Colonies 22o0 16.8 10.1 
Non-Sterling OEEC 16.8 11.5 19.3 
Middle East eo • ... 2.3 
c. MINERAL FUELS. 
1951 1954 1958 
.N. America ... 7.9 4.5 
s. America ... 6.0 14.1 
Sterling C'wealth ... 
UK Colonies ... 6.0 5.7 
Non~Sterling OEEC ... 9.2 11.5 
Middle East . . . ... 59.0 
Source: Board of Trade, Report on Overseas Trade. 
Footnotes: 
1. Includes beverages and tobacco. 
1960 1964 
17-7 15.9 
8.7 6o5 
( 
( 43·3 45-7 
23.4 25.7 
1.1 ••• 
1960 1964 
17.7 18.0 
6.3 1.0 
~ 35.1 30.5 
20o9 27 .. 9 
2.6 • e e 
1960 1964 
1.9 1.4 
14.6 11.2 
( 
( ... 
14.2 13.4 
59.7 . .. 
::>91. 
Table 2_. 
The Importance of Invisible Earnings in general and of Overseas Invest-
ment Income in particular to Britain's total earnings on Current Account 
in Selected Years. Per Cent. 
Invisible Earnings· Total Investment Total Investment 
as % of ill Earn- Income as % of Income as % of 
ings on Current Total Invisible ill Earnings on 
Account Earnings Current Account 
1952 38.2 29o3 11.2 
1956 36.1 29.9 10.8 
1961 36.8 29.9 11.0 
Source: UK Balance of Payments 'Pink Book'. 
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Table 6. 
British Overseas Investment Stocks as per cent of 'National Wealth 1 9 1962. 
£thou. mill. except where stated. 
A 
Overseas Stocks 
B 
Domestic Stocks 
c 
National v/eal th 
(A+ B) 
A as % of C 
Source: JoH. Dunning9 Studies in International Investment 9 (1970) 9 
Table 4 and National Income and Expenditure 'Blue Book' 1971, 
Table 64. 
Table 7o 
Britain's Overseas Investment Stocks: per cent of total by Main Regions 
for selected years. 
1954 1960 1964 
Africa 17.8 21.1 1 19.1 1 
N. Africa 2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
w. Africa 2.0 4.9 4.1 
E. Africa 2.3 2.2 1o8 
c. Africa 5.6 2.7 2.1 
s. Africa 7.6 8.8 9.0 
Aus. & N. Zealand 19.7 17.8 19.9 
N. America 17.8 24.4 22.2 
w. Europe 8.54 12.03 14.63 
s. & C. America 7o3 4o9 5.1 
India, Pak. · & Ceylon 4.7 10 01 9.5 
S.E. Asia 4.5 5.5 5o 1 
o. S. A. 0 0 0 56.5 57.0 
OSA Developed 0 0 0 28.5 31.0 
OSA Developing 0 0 0 27.9 26.0 
Source: The figures for 1954 are derived from United Kingdom Overseas 
Investment 1955, (Bank of England, 1957), p.4: 'All securities' 
at nominal value. The figures for 1960 and 1964 are derived from 
the Board of Trade Journal 9 Jan.26, 1968, 'Book Values of Overseas 
Investments 1 9 p.vii. The latter figures exclude oil, banking and 
insurance; hence the exclusion of the Middle East from the Table. 
Footnotes: 
1. Includes 'Africa Other' n.s.d. 
2. Includes Sudan. 
3· Includes Irish Republic; excludes Turkey. 
4. All Europe. 
Table 8. 
Britain 1s Overseas Investment Earnings: per cent of total by Main Regions 
for selected years. 
Af'rica 
lll'o Africa 
Wo Af'rica 
E. Africa 
c. Africa 
s. Africa 
Aus. & No Zealand 
N. America 
vl. Europe 
s. & C. America 
India9 Pak. & Ceylon 
s. E. Asia 
O. S. A. 
OSA Developed 
OSA Developing 
1954 1960 1964 
21.7 23.0 27.0 
0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 
3o0 6.5 5.5 
1.4 0.5 0.7 
7o3 4.8 4o0 
9.8 11.2 16.7 
10.4 16.0 17.8 
15.3 15.2 20.1 
5.1 1 11~52 8.72 
2.6 5.8 5o2 
11o0 8.73 6.83 
6.1 10.7 7o5 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Source: The figures for 1954 are derived from United Kingdom Overseas 
Investment 1955, (Bank of England 9 1957) 9 p.4. The figures for 
1960 and 1964 are derived from the Board of Trade Journal 9 
June 30 9 1967 9 'Overseas Investment 9 1959-1966'9 p.xx-xxi. 
Footnotes: 
1 • All Europe • 
2. Includes Irish Republic. 
3. Excludes Ceylon. 
Table 9. 
Average Rates of Return on Britain's Direct Investment Overseas by Main 
Regions 9 1960 and 1964. 
w. Africa 
Eo Africa 
c. Africa 
s. Africa 
Australia 
New Zealand 
N. America 
w. Europe 
s. & c. America 
India 
Pakistan 
Ceylon 
Hong Kong 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
0. S. A. 
OSA Developed 
OSA Developing 
1960 
11.0 
5.4 
15o 1 
10.3 
7o3 
7.4 
5.2 
7·3 
9.6 
8.4 
8.0 
6.7 
22.4 
17.8 
·30.0 
9.6 
8.5 
10.8 
1964 
11.6 
6.4 
17.3 
14.8 
7.0 
8.1 
8.0 
5.0 
9.1 
6.9 
9o4 
3o3 
14.6 
15.8 
0 0 0 
Source: 'Book Values of Overseas Investments', Board of Trade Journal, 
Jan.26, 1968 9 p.xv-xvi. 
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Table 1. 
Trade as per cent of World Trade: Britain and South Africa compared, 
1948-1964 (selected years). 
Britain South Africa 
Exp. Imp. Exp. 1 Imp. 
1948 12.48 14.39 1.15 2.89 
1952 10.45 12.27 1 o35 1.62 
1954 10.27 12.08 1.23 1.71 
1955 10.32 12.44 1o26 1.67 
1958 9.98 10.69 1 017 1.70 
1960 9.37 10.91 1 011 1.43 
1961 9.36 10.20 1.13 1.24 
1962 9.17 9.78 1.08 1.19 
1963 8.98 9.70 1.04 1 o30 
1964 8.38 9.88 0.96 1.47 
Source: I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, 1972 Supplement, 
p.xxxii-xxxv. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes gold. 
297. 
Table 2. 
Gross Domestic Product, and Trade as per cent of G.D.P.: Britain and 
South Africa compared, 1948-1964 (selected years). 
Britain South Africa 
GDP Exp. as Imp. as GDP 1 Exp. as Imp. as 
(£m.) %GDP % GDP (£m.) % GDP % GDP 
1948 11,740 14.,0 17~7 1,017 13.7 37.9 
1952 12,930 17.5 22.3 1,600 22.1 28.7 
1954 17,760 15.8 19.2 1,944 17.3 24.9 
1955 19,110 16 01 20.6 2,061 18.1 25.7 
1958 22,770 14.9 16.8 2, 378 16.7 25.7 
1960 25,490 14.9 18.3 2,637 17 .o 23.2 
1961 27,220 14.5 16.7 2,773 17.2 20.0 
1962 28,530 14.2 16.2 2,956 16.2 19.1 
1963 30,280 14.4 16.5 3,277 15.4 20.3 
1964 32,930 13.9 17.3 3,604 14.6 23 .. 5 
Source: I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, 1972 Supplement, 
p.xxviii~xxxi, p~j02-103 and p.348. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes gold. 
Table 3_. 
Bilateral Trade Dependence: Britain and South Africa, 1948-1964. 
Britain South Africa 
Exp .. to Imp. from Expo to Imp .. from 
SA as% SA as % UK as% UK as% 
tot .. UK tot.., me tot. SA tot. SA 
Ex:p. Imp.1 Ex:p. 1 Imp. 
1948 7.6 1.5 27.6 33-5 
1949 7 .. 0 1.5 26 .. 0 41.7 
1950 5 .. 6 2.0 30.3 41.2 
1951 6.4 1.6 28.0 35·4 
1952 5.6 1.9 25.3 34.5 
1953 6.2 2 .. 2 26.5 37·5 
1954 5.9 2.7 33.0 34.9 
1955 5 .. 8 2.3 31.0 34.6 
1956 4 .. 9 2.6 29.4 31.6 
1957 5 .. 2 2.5 27.4 32.6 
1958 5 .. 9 2.7 29.8 33.8 
1959 4.5 2 .. 5 27.8 31.0 
1960 4 .. 4 2.3 27o9 28 .. 4 
1961 4.1 2.5 29.8 28.9 
1962 3.9 2.6 27.8 30.0 
1963 4.9 2.8 30.3 29.8 
1964 5 .. 4 3.6 31.5 28.4 
Ave., '51-
'64: 5o2 2.5 28.7 32.2 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes gold. 
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Table 4. 
Britain's Major Marketsp 1 1948-1964. 
1948 1949 1950 
1 0 Austral. 9o 1 Austral. 10.6 Austral. 11.8 
2. S.Africa 7.6 S.Africa 7.0 Canada 5.8 
3. India 6.1 India 6.6 S.Africa 5.6 
4. Ireland 4o8 Canada 4o4 USA 5.2 
5. Canada 4.4 Ireland 4.,3 India 4o5 
1951 1952 1953 
1 0 Austral. 12.6 AustraL 8.6 Austral. 8.2 
2. S.Africa 6.4 USA 5.7 USA 6.2 
3. Canada 5.3 S.Africa 5.6 S.Africa 6.2 
4. USA 5o3 Canada 5.0 Canada 6.1 
5o India 4o5 N.Zealand 4.5 India 4.4 
1954 1955 1956 
1 0 Austral. 10.4 Austral. 9.8 USA 7o7 
2. S.Africa 5.9 USA 6.3 Austral. 7.6 
3o USA 5o7 S.Africa 5.8 Canada 5.6 
4. Canada 4o9 Canada 4.8 India 5.3 
5o N.Zealand 4o7 N.Zealand 4.8 SoAfrica 4.9 
1957 1958 1959 
1 0 USA 7o4 USA 8.5 USA 10.9 
2o Austral. 7 01 Austral. 7.3 Austral. 6.7 
3. Canada 5.9 S.,Africa 5.9 Canada 6.2 
4. India 5o3 Canada 5.9 India 5.1 
5o S.Africa 5o2 India 5.0 S.Africa 4o5 
1960 1961 1962 
1 0 USA 9.2 USA 7.7 USA 8.7 
2. Austral. 7o3 Canada 6.0 Austral. 6.0 
3o Canada 6.0 Austral. 5.5 W.Germany 5o3 
4. W.Germany 4.6 W.Germany 4.6 Canada 5o0 
5o S.Africa 4o4 India 4o 1 Sweden 4o 1 
1963 1964 
1 0 USA 8.4 USA 9.2 
2. Austral. 5.8 Austral. 5.8 
3· W.Germany 5.2 S.Africa 5o4 
4. S.Africa 4.9 W.Germany 5.0 
5o France 4.4 Sweden 4o5 
Source: United Nations 9 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
1 0 Visible exports by destination as per cent of Britain's total vis-
ible exports (by value). 
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Table 5. 
South Africa's Major Markets,1 1948-1964. 
1948 1949 1950 
1 0 UK 27.4 UK 26.0 UK 26.2 
2. S.Rhod. 8.6 France 9.6 France 11.9 
3o France 8.3 SoRhod. 8.8. USA 8.7 
4o USA 7o2 USA 7.7 S.Rhod. 7o3 
5o SWA 4o4 Egypt 4.3 Switz. 5o0 
1951 1952 1953 
1. UK 24o3 UK 25o3 UK 26.0 
2. France 14.5 France 15.2 France 13.5 
3o USA 10o7 S.Rhodo 8.1 S.Rhod. BoO 
4o s.Rhod. 8o2 USA 6.7 W.Germany 6.4 
5o Switz. 5o 1 Netherlo 5o5 USA 6.3 
1954 1955 1956 
1 0 UK 33o0 UK 30.9 UK 29.4 
2. s.Rhod. 9o5 Fed.R&N 14.8 FedoR&N 14.9 
3o USA 9.0 USA s.o USA 7o8 
4o ~/.Germany 5o4 :Belgium 5o 1 :Belgium 5o7 
5o NoRhod. 5o2 W.Germany 4o9 W.Germany 5o0 
1957 1958 1959 
1 0 UK 27o4 UK 29.8 UK 27o8 
2. FedoR&N 14o5 Fed.R&N 13.7 Fed.R&N 13.5 
3o USA 6.3 USA 7 01 USA 8.9 
4o W.Germany 5.0 Italy 4.2 :Belgium 4o2 
5o :Belgium 4o5 W.Germany 3o9 W.Germany 4o2 
1960 1961 1962 
1. UK 27.9 UK 29.8 UK 27o8 
2. Fed.R&N 13.2 Fed.R&N 11.3 Fed.R&N 9o7 
3o USA 6.7 USA s.o USA 9o0 
4o W.Germany 4o4 Japan 6.0 Japan 8.3 
5o :Belgium 4o0 \>/.Germany 4.8 Italy 5o 1 
1963 1964 
1. UK 30e3 UK 31o5 
2. USA 8.9 Japan 8.,8 
3o Fed.R&N 8.2 USA 8.6 
4o Japan 7o7 W.Germany 6o0 
5o W.Germany 5o6 S.Rhod. 5o3 
Source~ United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
Footnotes~ 
1o Visible exports by destination as per cent of South Africa's total 
visible exports (by value) 9 excluding gold. 
Table 6. 
South Africa's Major Suppliers, 1 1948-1964 
1 0 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5· 
1 0 
2. 
3o 
4· 
5· 
1 0 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5o 
1 0 
2. 
3· 
4. 
5. 
USA 
UK 
Canada 
Belg-Lux 
Iran 
UK 
1948 
1951 
USA 
Canada 
Italy 
W.Germany 
1954 
UK 
USA 
W.Germany 
Canada 
Japan 
1957 
UK 
USA 
vl.Germany 
Iran 
Japan 
1960 
UK 
USA 
W.Germany 
Japan 
Canada 
UK 
USA 
W.Germany 
Japan 
Canada 
33-5 
29.3 
5.2 
2.6 
2.2 
35.3 
19 .. 0 
3.8 
3e7 
3.2 
35.0 
20.2 
5.3 
3.6 
2 .. 5 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
1949 
Iran 
Belg-Lux 
1952 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
W.Germany 
S.Arabia 
UK 
USA 
1955 
W .. Germany 
Canada 
Fed. R&N 
1958 
32.6 UK 
19.6 USA 
8.1 W.Germany 
3.6 Iran 
3.2 Canada 
28.4 
19.3 
10 .. 0 
3 .. 7 
3.5 
UK 
USA 
1961 
\v .. Germany 
Japan 
Iran 
UK 
41 .. 7 
25.8 
6.5 
2.6 
2.4 
34.5 
20.9 
4o4 
4.1 
2.5 
34.6 
20.8 
6.0 
4.0 
3.1 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
Iran 
Japan 
UK 
1950 
1953 
USA 
W.Germany 
Canada 
Japan 
1956 
UK 
USA 
W.Germany 
Canada 
Fed.R&N 
1959 
33.8 UK 
17.5 USA 
10.4 \•/.Germany 
4.1 Canada 
3.3 Iran 
28.9 
17.6 
10.8 
3.7 
3.2 
1962 
UK 
USA 
W.Germany 
Japan 
Iran 
29.8 
16.9 
10.8 
4.6 
3.4 
USA 
W.Germany 
Japan 
Canada 
28.4 
19.0 
10.7 
5.3 
3.0 
37.1 
14.2 
4.1 
3.6 
2.7 
37 ·5 
18.4 
5.9 
4.1 
2.4 
31.6 
20.0 
6.5 
4.6 
3.6 
31 .. 0 
17.1 
10.1 
4.0 
3.6 
30.0 
16.6 
10.1 
4.1 
3.6 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
301. 
1. Visible imports by source as per cent of South Africa's total vis-
ible imports (by value). 
302. 
Table 7. 
South Africa: Ownership of Foreign Liabilities, 1956-1964 (selected 
years). 
£m. 
1956 1959 1960 1962 1963 1964 
Sterling Area 935 977 986 997 1,020 1,049 
UK 866 903 899 909 928 952 
OSA 69 74 87 88 92 97 
Dollar Area 252 308 311 271 265 275 
W .. Europe 201 218 235 229 232 235 
Other 8 22 6 2 2 10 
TOTAL 1,396 1,528 1 ,538 1,508 1,526 1,568 
per cent 
1956 1959 1960 1962 1963 1964 
Sterling Area 67 64 64 66 67 67 
UK 62 59 59 60 61 61 
OSA 5 5 5 6 6 6 
Dollar Area 18 20 20 18 17 17.5 
W .. Europe 14 14 15 15 15 15 
Other 
_1 2 1 1 1 __Qo5 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 'The Foreign Liabilities and Ass-
ets of the Union (Republic) of South Africa', published as a 
supplement to the Quarterl~ Bulletin of Statistics, Dec.1958, 
Septo1960, Dec.1961, Dec.1963, Dec.1964 and Sept.1966. 
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Table 8. 
South Africag Net Capital Flows by Region, 1950-1964o 1 
£m. 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Sterling Area 50.0 55.0 24.0 9.0 26.0 2.0 2.0 -20.0 
Dollar Area 10.0 -2.0 12.0 17 .o 18.0 9.0 3.0 -10.0 
W. Europe ( 3.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 3.0 1.0 
( 1.0 Other 2.0 ....hQ - - - - -
- -- -- -- --
TOTAL 61.0 58.0 43.0 28.0 50.0 14.0 5.0 -29.0 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Sterling Area 7.0 -18.0 -50.5 -25.5 -22.0 -30.0 -23.5 
UK =24.0 -20.0 -32.5 -28.0 
OSA 
-1 .. 5 -2.,0 2.5 4.5 
Dollar Area 15.0 -3.0 =16.0 -0.5 -6.0 -7.5 
W. Europe 9.0 -1.0 -6.5 -4.5 =7.0 -10.5 =4.5 
Other 
--1.& - =.L:i -2.0 ....9..:.2 _k2 .=h2 
--
TOTAL 32.0 =22.0 -74.5 -32.5 -34.5 -46.5 -29.5 
per cent 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Sterling Area 82 95 56 32 52 14 40 -69 
Dollar Area 16 
-3 28 61 36 64 60 -35 
W. Europe ( 5 14 7 12 22 3 
Other ( 2 
---2 2 -- -
- - -
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Sterling Area 22 -82 -68 -78 -64 -64 -80 
UK 
-74 -58 -70 -95 
OSA 
-4 -6 6 15 
Dollar Area 47 -14 -21 -1 -17 -16 
W. Europe 28 
-5 -9 -14 -20 -23 -15 
Other _2 -2 -6 _1 
......2 --=.5. 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sourceg I.l1.F. 9 Balance of Pa~ents Yearbook. 
Footnotesg 
1 0 Private investment only. NB. Figures do not always add up to 100' 
as a result of rounding. 
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Table 9q 
South Africa: Net Capital Inflow as per cent of Gross Domestic Invest-
mentp 1946-1964. 
£m. 
Gross Dom- Net Cap- Change in Gross Dom- NCI as 
estic Sav- ital In- Gold and estic In- per cent 
ing flow(NCI) For.Curr- vestment GDI 
ency Res. (GDI) 
1946 109 40 43.5 192.5 20.8 
1947 89 176 1 266 66.2 
1948 118 82.5 86 286.5 28.8 
1949 155.5 52.5 68.5 276.5 19.0 
1950 258 91 ~71 o5 277.5 32.8 
1951 250.5 93.5 36 380 24.6 
1952 296 72 7.5 375.5 19.2 
1953 340.5 56.5 27 424 13.3 
1954 401.5 96.5 -44 454 21.2 
1955 434o5 25.,5 21 481 5.3 
1956 486.5 17.5 -12 492 3.6 
1957 5~9.5 =23.5 31.5 537.5 
1958 506 67 4 577 11.6 
1959 588o5 ~30.5 -53.5 504.5 
1960 592.5 -90 71.5 575 
1961 681 -64.5 -43 573.5 
1962 717.5 =44 -11.495 559 
1963 839o5 
' 
-40 -43 756.5 
1964 855 -20.5 44.5 879 
Source: South African Reserve Bank9 'A Statistical Presentation of 
South Africa's National Accounts for the period 1946 to 1970', 
Quarterly Bulletin, Supplement June 1971 9 Table 15. 
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Table 10. 
British Exports to South Africa 1 hy Main Category~ 1952-1963 (selected 
years). 
£m. 
1952 1954 1957 1960 19632 
A. Food~ Beverages & Tob. 1.71 1.88 3o 12 3· 14 3.29 
B. Basic Materials o.8o 1.62 1 .91 1.66 2.49 
c. Mineral Fuels & Lubricants 0.52 2.00 1.59 1.13 1.55 
D. Manufactured Goods 136.25 144.17 161.07 143.15 181.35 
(9,;b) (92%) (92%) (92%) (9,;b) 
Of which: 
Chemicals 10.05 9.74 12.80 12.93 12.85 
Leather 0.93 1.15 1 016 0.98 0.99 
Rubber 0.56 0.52 0.96 0.88 0.95 
Wood & Cork (exclo furn.) 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.29 0.44 
Paper 9 Paperboard etc. 3.29 2.68 3o39 3.23 3.16 
vloollens & Worsteds 5015 6.26 4.80 3-58 1 Cotton Yarns & Woven Fabrics 9.72 11.76 8.33 t~t 15.99 Synth.Fibre Yarns & Woven Fab. 3o 16 4.04 2.78 
Misc. Textiles 6.29 6.36 5.07 4.19 
Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral 
Manufactures 3·74 2.93 3.40 3.82 3.92 
Silver9 Plat. 9 & Jewellery 0.29 0.02 0 0 0 o. 12 
Iron & Steel 8.61 3.56 8.oo 5.66 5.78 
Non-ferrous Base Metals 1.72 1.09 2.09 1 011 2.26 
Ymnufactures of Metals3 8.93 11.26 9.05 6.91 6.62 
Machinery other than Elec. 28.20 28.70 34.80 30.53 42.58 
Elec. Machinery 9 Apparatus, 
& Appliances 18.63 17.94 17.91 15.29 22.90 
Railway Vehicles 2.06 9.17 7.20 5.98 3o47 
Road Vehicles 14.13 14.56 27.58 23.27 39.02 
Aircraft 0.39 0.79 0.37 o. 17 1.20 
Ships & Boats 0.08 2.07 0.20 0.16 8.47 
Building Fixtures 1.41 1.33 10 30 1.24 0.55 
Clothing~ Footwear etc. 2.61 2.27 2.11 1.72 0.94 
Scientific Instruments; photo-
graphic & Optical; Watches & 
Clocks 1.70 1.52 2.03 1.97 3o 10 
Miscellaneous 4·35 4.19 5.32 6.03 6.05 
E. Miscellaneous 5.62 6.45 4.92 4o95 6.903 
TOTAL 144.89 156.13 172.62 154.03 195.58 
plus B-e-exports 145.90 157.37 174.32 155.07 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. 9 Vols. 3 and 49 
19549 1958~ 1961 and 1963. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes South West Africa. 
2. In 1963 the basis of classification employed was different from 
that of the previous years. For the sake of comparability9 however 9 
an attempt has been made to fit the new SITC (rev.) categories into 
the earlier ones. Hence category A represents 0 and 1 of the SITC 
(rev.) 9 B represents 2 and 4~ C represents 39 and D includes 
categories 5 9 6 9 7 and 8 of the SITC (rev.). 
----., 
l 
Table 10. (contd.) 
3. Arms exports are included in "Manufactures of Metals" u:p to and 
including 1960 but are entered under "Miscellaneous" in 1963 .. 
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Table 11. 
South Africa's Arms Supplies 9 1950-1964. 
Date 
(1950) 
1952-54 
1952-54 
1955 
(1955) 
(1955) 
(1955) 
(1955) 
1956 
(1956) 
1957 
1957 
1958 
(1958) 
(1958) 
1959 
(1959) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1963 
1963 
1964 
1964 
(1956) 
1963 
( 196 3) 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1955 
1955-59 
1956 
1958-59 
1963 
1963 
1964 
Number 
(5) 
30 
20 
4 
9 
(5) 
2 
20 
36 
3 
1 
8 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
25 
30 
16 
7 
3 
4 
200 
(48) 
(96) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Item 
AIRCRAFT 
Lockheed P2V-5 Neptune 
DH Vampire FBo5 
DH Vampire To 55 
Sikorsky S-51 
DH Devon C :JVlk o 1 
Auster AOPo9 
.D.H. 114 Heron 
Douglas C-47 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre :JVlk o 6 
Sikorsky S-55 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre l"lk.6 
Avro Shackleton MR-3 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre l"lk.6 
Sikorsky S-55 
Dornier Do-27B 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre :JVlk. 6 
Vickers Viscount 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre :JVlk o 6 
Canadair CL-13 B 
Sabre l"lko6 
English Electric 
Canberra B.12 
Cessna 185 
Sud Alouette II 
Dassault Mirage III CZ 
Lockheed C-130B Hercules 
Dassault Mirage III BZ 
Westland Wasp AS.1 
MISSILES 
Sidewinder 
Nord AS-30 
Matra R-530 
NAVAL VESSELS 
Destroyer 9 "W" Class 
Destroyer9 "W" Class 
Seaward Defence Vessel, 
"Ford" Class 
Seaward Defence Vessel, 
"Ford" Class 
Coastal Mines\veeper 9 "ton" 
Class 
Anti-submarine Frigate 
Seaward Defence Vessel 9 
"Ford" Class 
Frigate 9 "Whitby" Class 
Frigate, "Whitby" Class 
Frigate 9 "Whitby" Class 
Supplier · 
USA 
UK 
UK 
USA 
UK 
UK 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
USA 
Canada 
UK 
Canada 
USA 
WoGermany 
Canada 
UK 
Canada 
Canada 
UK 
USA 
France 
France 
USA 
France • 
UK 
USA1 • 2o France2 • France 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
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Table 11. (contd.) 
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 
(1950-51) 
(1955-59) 
(1956-60) 
1962 
(1963-64) 
(1961-70) 
(15) 
(68) 
(45) 
(32) 
(45) 
(600) 
Staghound 
Centurion 
Saracen 
Centurion 
Ferret 
Panhard Model 245 
USA 
UK 
UK 
Israel 
UK 
.308. 
South Africa/ 
France 
Source: S.I.P.R.I.? The Arms Trade with the Third World? (Stockholm, 
1971)? Register 32, p.861. Brackets round an entry indicate 
a degree of uncertainty. 
Footnotes: 
1. For use with Sabre. 
2. For use with Mirage. 
Table 12. 
British Arms Exports to South Africa, 1946-1964. 1 
£m. 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
1.02 1.02 2.01 1.15 3.08 0.33 0.63 3.03 4o85 5.00 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
3.86 2.01 1.09 0.73 0.61 0.51 1.55 1.89 1.40 
Sourceg Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. 9 Vo1.4. From 
1946 until 1962 these entries were styled 'Arms 9 Ammuni-
tion and military stores and equipment' and from 1963 
until 1964 'Firearms of war and ammunition therefor'. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes explosives and sporting ammunition from 1951 until 1954 
and from 1954 until 1962 excludes revolver ammunition as well. 
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Table 13. 
Direct Investments and Portfolio Investments in South Africa's 
Total Foreign Liabilities 9
1 1956-1964. 
per cent 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Direct 58 59 60 61 61 61 63 65 65 
Portfolio £ .....41 _1Q _22 ...22 ...22 ...J1 _22 _2.2 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 'The Foreign Liabilities and Ass-
ets of the Union (Republic) of South Africa', published as a 
supplement to the Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, Dec.1958 9 
Sept.1960, Dec.1961, Dec.1963, Dec.1964 and Sept.1966. 
Footnotes: 
1o Includes private and official. 
Table 14. 
Net Changes in South Africa's Foreign Liabilities, 1956-1964. £m. 
Direct Investment Non-direct Inv. & Total net 
Stock Exch. Trans- change in 
actions liabilities 
Long Short Total Long Short Total 
term term term term 
1956 16.5 15.5 32.0 0.5 -2.0 -1.5 30.5 
1957 4o5 -5.0 -0.5 -11.5 -1.5 -13.0 -13.5 
1958 17.5 17.5 35.0 2.0 2.5 4.5 39.5 
1959 9.0 4.5 13.5 -22.5 -3.5 -26.0 -12.5 
1960 -12.0 
-7.5 -19.5 -45.5 7.0 -38.5 -58.0 
1961 -2.5 1.5 -1.0 -7.5 -1.5 -9.0 -10.0 
1962 4o0 0.5 4.5 -37.5 1.5 -36.0 =31.5 
1963 -11.0 13.0 2.0 -48.5 3.5 -45.0 -43.0 
1964 1.5 -3.5 -2.0 -24.0 -24.0 -26.0 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 'A Statistical Presentation of 
South Africa's Balance of Payments, for the period 1946 to 
19701, Q,uarterly Bulletin, Mar. 1971 Supplement, Table 7. 
.31L 
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Table 12_. 
Net Capital Inflow and the South African Balance of Payments, 1946-
1955o 
Rand IDo 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Current balance =167 ~354 -337 -242 -39 
Net capital inflow 80 352 165 105 182 
Total change in SA reserves -50 -2 -172 -106 143 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Current balance 
-259 -159 -167 -105 =93 
Net capital inflow 187 144 113 193. 51 
Total change in SA reserves 
-72 -15 ~54 88 -42 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 'A Statistical Presentation of 
South Africa's National Accounts for the period 1946 to 
1970', Quarterly Bulletin 9 June 1971 Supplement, Table 15o 
313. 
Table 16. 
The Composition of South Africa's External Public Debt, 1949-1958o 
£m. 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
London 
Issues 13.4 23.5 33.7 45.7 41 "1 37.9 34.3 26.3 25.9 
IBRD 2.6 7.2 14.0 17.9 17.2 19.9 
IMF Cred. 17.7 
Swiss Pub. 
Loans 3.0 9 .. 8 9.8 9.8 9.8 
Swiss Banks 
Loans 2.5 
Dutch Pub. 
Loans 4o7 4.7 
us Pub. 
Loans 7.1 8.9 8.9 
US Revolv-
ing Credit 3.6 
TOTAL 13.4 30.0 33.7 48.3 48.3 61.7 62.0 73.0 69.2 89.5 
UK % Tot. 100.0 78.3 100.0 95o0 85.0 61 o4 55.3 36.0 37-4 
Source: United Nations Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic 
Survey of Africa since 1950 9 (New York, 1959) 9 Table 4-35, 
Po226. 
Table 17. (a) 
Britain's Exports of Manufactures to South Africa by Main Category as 
per cent of Total British Exports in these Categories, 1952-1963 (sel-
ected years). 
Chemicals 
Leather 
Rubber 
Wood & Cork (excl. furniture) 
Paper, Paperboard et9. 
Woollens & Worsteds 
Cotton Yarns & Woven Fabrics 
Synth. Fibre Yarns & Wovens 
Fabrics 
Miscellaneous Textiles 
1952 
5o5 
5o4 
1.5 
12.8 
9.6 
6.3 
7o5 
Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral Manu-
factures 
Silver, Platinum & Jewellery 
Iron & Steel 
Non-Ferrous Base Metals 
Manufactures of Metals 
Machinery other than Electric 
Elec .rlfachinery 9 Apparatus & 
Appliances 
Railway Vehicles 
Road Vehicles 
Aircraft 
Ships & Boats 
Building Fixtures 
Clothing,. Footwear etc. 
Scientific Instruments etc. 
Niscellaneous 
6.0 
1.3 
6.6 
3 .. 3 
6.7 
7.0 
1954 
4.8 
6.8 
1.6 
11.1 
8.0 
7o5 
10.5 
5.0 
4o 1 
6.2 
501 
4.8 
6.1 
1957 
4o8 
5.6 
2.5 
7o0 
8.7 
501 
9 .. 5 
1960 
4· 1 
4.2 
2.0 
8.6 
8.0 
4.2 
9.7 
10.6 
5o2 
1963 
3·5 
3o5 
1.9 
8.5 
6.7 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, Vo1.3. 
Table 17(b) 
Information on UK Exports to South Africa in 1963 and 1964 submitted by the British Government to the UN Committee on 
Sanctions 
SITC Description of item 1963 First half 1964 1963 First half 1964 heading A B A B c D c D 
51 Chemical elements & compounds 3.00 3 .. 2 2.01 3.8 
53 Dyeing, tanning & colouring materials 1.48 3.1 0.93 3.4 
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.80 3 .. 3 1 .. 04 3.5 1 000cwt. 1 000cwt .. 
58 Plastic materials etc. 3.26 5 .. 1 2.10 5.8 285 4.8 173 5 .. 3 
59 Chemicals n.e.s. 1.96 3 .. 3 1.20 3.6 
61 Leather~ leather manufactures, etc. 1.07 3 .. 8 0 .. 62 4 .. 1 
62 Rubber manufactures n.e.s. 0 .. 94 1.9 0.63 2.5 
64 Paper, paperboard and manufactures y 3-17 6 .. 8 z 1.70 7.0 362 7-7 201 8 .. 2 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, etc. 16.00 6 .. 3 8.88 6.4 1 000 lb. 1 000 lb. 
651.2 of which: wool & animal hair yarn & thread 0.97 4.6 0.59 5 .. 0 1,546 4.6 895 5 .. 1 
651.3 & 651 .. 4 cotton yarn and thread z 1.13 8.9 z 0.72 10.8 1,183 5-7 705 6.4 
651.6 & 651.7 man-made fibre yarn & thread 2.43 7-7 1.49 7.5 5,324 6.5 3,230 6.7 
1 000sq.yds. 'OOOsq.yds. 
652 1110ven cotton fabrics X 3-73 12 .. 0 X 1.70 11.1 29,195 13.1 12,157 11.8 ( woven woollen fabrics 0.82 2.3 0.59 3 .. 0 1,989 3.8 .11,254 4.6 653.21 ( 
woven worsted fabrics 1.13 4 .. 5 0.73 5-9 1,575 5 .. 1 932 6.4 
653.5 & 653.6 woven man-made fibres X 1 .. 59 9.8 y 0.86 9.1 5,881 7-3 3,221 7.2 
66 Non~metallic mineral manufactures n.e.s. 3-93 5.8 2.36 6.2 
664 of which: glass z 1.38 10.0 y 1 .. 08 12.8 1 000 tons 1 000 tons 
67 Iron and steel 5-79 2.8 3-59 3 .. 3 68 1.9 49 2.5 
674 of which: universals, plates & sh~ets 3 .. 84 4.0 2 .. 12 4.2 52 2.9 32 3.1 
68 Non-ferrous metals 2.35 1 .. 9 1 .. 27 1.9 1 000C\-Tt. 'OOOcwt. 682 of which: copper 1.08 2.9 0.68 3.4 64 2.3 39 2.8 
69 Manufactures of metal n.e.s. 6.56 4.9 z 3.89 5.3 
695 of which: tools and parts y 1.92 7.3 X 1.11 7.8 
696 cutlery of base metal z 0.86 6.8 0.42 5 .. 5 
71 Machinery other than electric 1+2.61 5.0 24.90 5 .. 4 1 t421 5.4 780 5-5 
711 .. 3 of which: steam engines z 0.84 7 .. 7 z 0.58 10.2 14 6.7 10 11.1 
711.5 i.e. piston engines 3-29 4.1 1.93 4.3 74 3-3 47 3 .. 7 
712.5 agricultural& track laying Numbers Nu.rnbers \..N f-' 
y . 7-87 7.1 X 4.50 7.8 11,851 6.8 6,930 7-5 \.rl tractors . 
1 000C'IJt • '000C\it. 
714 Office machinery 1.66 4.a 0.88 4.2 9 3.8 5 4.5 
715.1 machine tools 2.66 5-9 1.78 7.1 107 9.0 57 8.7 
717.1 textile mach~nery 3.19 4.8 1.59 4.4 113 7-1 35 4.3 
718.4 construction & mining 
machinery n.e.s. 2.76 5.2 1.35 4.6 104 4.6 52 4.3 
719.1 heating & co@ling equipment 1.16 3-5 z 0.87 5-3 35 3-7 :22 4.3 
719.2 pumps and centrifuges 2.25 5-5 X 1.41 6.1 50 5-3 31 5.8 
719-3 mechanical handling equipt. z 2.13 6.1 y 1.45 7.8 86 5.9 55 6 .. 9 
72 Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances y 22.92 7.2 y 11.02 6.8 
722.1 of which: generators, motors, etc. y 4.19 9.1 z 1.20 5.4 118 8.4 33 4.8 
722.2 switches,voltage regulators, 
etc. X 3-94 12.7 X 2.16 12.9 76 12.4 41 13.0 
724 telecommunications apparatus X 7.61 9-7 X 3-90 9.2 
725 domestic equipment 1.84 5.2 1.03 6.2 
73 Transport equipment y 52.23 8.3 y 29.69 8.6 'OOOtons '000tons 
731 of which: railway vehicles X 3.48 1 Eb. 7 X 1.59 16.9 10 11.6 4 11.8 
thousands thousands 
732.1 motor cars, new y 18.84 8.0 y 11.81 8.6 55 9.0 37 10.2 
732-3 lorries,trucks,ambulances ~tc. X 7.66 9-5 X 4.71 10.6 12 10.0 7 10.6 
732.7(part) Chassis for goods vehicles y 3-37 15 .. 1 y 2.22 18.5 4 13.4 2 15.3 
'000cwt. 'OOOcwt. 
732.8 bodies,chassis,frames,etc. 6.42 5 .. 1 4.18 5-7 175 3o9 119 4.5 
734 aircraft 1.20 2.6 z 1.97 7-9 
735 ships and boats y 8.47 20.0 z 1.90 11.7 
84 Clothing 1.02 2.6 0.68 3.6 
86 Scientific & photographic goods,clocks, etc. 3-13 4 .. 2 1.73 3.8 
89 Miscellaneous manufactures n.e.s. 5-77 4 .. 4 3.27 4.8 
892 of vihich: printed matter,MSS, typescripts Z 2.47 5.8 z 1.49 6.7 
9 Commodities and transactions not classified 
according to kind 
951 of which: firearms of war & ammunition 
Total 9 all merchandise 195-81 4.8 108.99 5.0 
Diamonds and precious stones 9.4o 7.2 6.15 8.2 
IJJ 
f--1 
0'\ 
. 
Table ~ (Contd.) 
A= Value of United Kingdom exports of item to the Republic of 
B = 
c = 
D = 
X = 
y 
= 
z = 
South Africa (£m.) 
Percentage by value of total exports of item exported to the 
Republic of South Africa. 
Volume of United Kingdom exports of item to the Republic of South 
Africa (in units stated). 
Percentage by volume of total exports of item exported to the 
Republic of South Africa. 
Items for which the Republic of South Africa is the United 
Kingdom's principal customer by value. 
Items for which the Republic of South Africa is the United Kingdom's 
second largest customer by value. 
Items for which the Republic of South Africa is the United Kingdom's 
third largest customer by value. 
Report from U.N. Security Council Official Records, 20th Year, Special 
Supplement No.2 Doc.S/6210 and Add.1; Table 2~ submitted to Committee on 
Sanctions by U.K. Government. 
Table 18. 
British Investments in South Africa 9 1950-1964: Analysis of Assets 
by Statistical Source. £m. 
BE1 
1950 28.4 
1951 26.1 
1952 26.9 
1953 28.3 
1954 31.6 
1955 34.8 
1956 35· 1 556.1 
1957 35.8 
1958 
1959 633.6 
1960 258.3 642.5 
1961 270.6 
1962 290.0 659.5 
1963 319.4 670.5 
1964 352.9 686.0 
Portfolio 
BE SARB 
133.0 
134.8 
128.3 
132.4 
130.1 
126.6 
120.4 
111.4 
309.5 
269.4 
257.5 
249.5 
257.5 
266.0 
Total 
BE SARB 
160.0 
161.0 
155.0 
161.0 
162.0 
161.0 
155.0 865.6 
147.0 
903.0 
899.5 
902.5 
909.0 
928.0 
952.0 
Footnotes: 
1. Bank of England: 'United Kingdom Overseas Investments' (published 
as a supplement to the Bank's Annual Report from 1950 until 1959). 
The Bank's figures on direct investment assets are extremely low 
for the following reasons: first 9 they record only the assets of 
"UK-registered companies operating entirely or almost entirely 
abroad" 9 and so exclude those of companies which indulged in both 
domestic and foreign activity; second, they alse exclude all in-
surance and shipping companies 9 investment and financial trusts; 
and third9 they are recorded at 'nominal' or 0book' values. For 
portfolio assets, on the other hand, the Bank's figures are more 
realistic. The method of measurement ensured fewer exclusions 
and both private and official investments were included. How-
ever9 the valuation remained 'nominal'. 
Whilst the Bank included South West Africa in its definition of 
'South Africa', it excluded the High Commission Territories. 
2. British Board of Trade: 'Book Values of Overseas Investments', 
Board of Trade Journal, Jan.26 9 1968 and 'Book Values of Overseas 
Direct Investments', Board of Trade Journal, Sept.23 9 1970. 
Though a considerable improvement on the Bank's figures for dir-
ect investment assets? the figures produced by the Board of Trade 
remain an underestimate since: first, they exclude not only oil 
Table 18. (contd.) 
but also banking and insurance (a very significant exclusion 9 giv-
en the well known dominance of SA banking by Barclays and Stand-
ard Bank); second~ they are only recorded at 'book values'. 
Furt;1.ermore, whilst South West Africa is included in the Board's 
definition of 'South Africa', it is not clear whether or not the 
High Commission Territories are similarly included. 
3. South African Reserve Bank: 'The Foreign Liabilities and Assets 
of the Union (Republic) of South Africa' 9 published as a supple-
ment to the Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics~ Dec.1958 9 Sept. 
1960~ Dec.1961, Dec.1963, Dec.1964, and Sept.1966. For both dir-
ect and portfolio assets, the Reserve Bank's figures include the 
official as well as the privatesector, the High Commission Terri-
tories as well as South West Africa, all foreign activity in the 
country and, most notable in boosting the figures, a large addit-
ion for 'undistributed profits' (in the case of direct investment 
assets) and for 'market' valuation (in the case of portfolio in-
vestment assets). Not surprisingly, therefore, the Reserve Bank's 
figures provide by far the largest estimate of British and other 
foreign investment in South Africa and are for this reason the 
most widely quoted. All of the parties to the political argument 
about South Africa have had an interest in using the highest fig-
ures: the anti-apartheid groups, in order to emphasise the extent 
of the West's guilt and to reinforce the economic explanation of 
its reluctance to desert the Nationalist government in Pretoria; 
the Western governments themselves, in order to demonstrate the 
dimensions of the economic disaster which would follow any hos-
tile political move against the Republic; and the South African 
government itself, lest the West should forget the size of its 
'stake' in South Africa. 
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Table 19. 
South Africa in the Hierarchy of Major Hosts to British Overseas In-
vestment Assets 9 1950-1964 (selected years). 1 
1950 1954 1955 
1 0 AustraL 18.4 Austral. 15.8 Austral. 15.8 
Canada 7.8 USA 8.5 USA 8.7 
s. Africa 108 Canada 7.9 Canada 8.0 
USA 6.2 S. Africa 1·6 S. Africa 1·2 
Br.Cen.Afr. 4.5 Fed. R&N 5.6 Fed. R&N 6.2 
1957 1960 1962 
1. AustraL 15.7 Canada 15.3 Austral. 15.3 
Canada 9.6 Austral. 14.7 Canada 14.2 
USA 8.1 USA 9.1 USA 8.9 
S. Africa 1·0 S. Africa 8.8 s. Africa 8.2 
Fed. R&N 6.5 India 7.7 India 7.6 
1964 
1 0 Austral. 16.8 
Canada 13.0 
USA 9.2 
s. Africa 2·0 
India 7.4 
Source: 1950-1957, Bank of England; 1960-1964 9 Board of Trade. 
There is thus a break in comparability in the middle of 
the period, see f.n. 1 and f.n. 2 to Table 18 above. 
Footnotes: 
1. Per cent of Britain's total recorded overseas assets at book val-
ues. This represents only direct investments after 1957. 
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Table 20. 
British Direct Investment in South Africa: Annual Average Rates of 
Return1 compared with Returns in the Overseas Sterling Area as a 
whole and the World as a whole, 1960-1964. 
Per cent 
s. Africa OSA World 
1960 10.3 9.6 8.2 
1961 10.4 8.4 7.4 
1962 12.1 8 .. 7 7.6 
1963 12.9 9.0 B. 1 
1964 14.8 9.6 §..:.2. 
.Ave. 12.1 9.1 8.0 
Source: 'Book Values of Overseas Investments', Board of Trade Journ-
al.11 Jan.26, 1968, Table 12. 
Footnotes: 
1. The 'average rate of return' is the ratio of earnings to the book 
value of net assets, with oilv banking.and insurance excluded in 
this instance from the former as well as from the latter. It is 
also the return after overseas tax. 
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Table 21. (a) 
British Investments in Sou~h Africa, 1950-1964: Analysis of Earnings 
by Statistical Source. £m. 
Direct Portfolio Total 
BEl 
1950 3.0 
1951 2.8 
1952 2.9 
1953 3.1 
1954 3.3 
1955 3.6 
1956 4.0 
1957 4.1 
1958 21.2 
21.1 
29.0 
28.5 
36.0 
47 01 
61.7 
BE IMF 
15.8 
18.2 
17.6 
15.7 
16.0 
15.1 
15.7 
16.3 
16.4 
BE BE+BT 
18.8 
21.1 
20.4 
18.9 
18.3 
18.7 
19.6 
20.4 
37.6 
37.5 
45.0 
ll1F 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
42.5 
36.0 
31.0 
39.0 
16.4 
16.0 
16.0 20.0 
17.4 20.0 
16.9 20.5 
17.3e 21.5 
44.5 62.5 
53.4 56.0 
64.0 51.5 
79.0e 60.5 
Footnotes: 
1 0 Bank of England: the Bank's figures for the years from 1950 until 
1957 are taken from 'United Kingdom Overseas Investments', which 
was published as a supplement to its Annual Report from 1950 un-
til 1959; for the years from 1958 until 1963? they are taken from 
its Quarterly Bulletin over this period. After 1963 the Bank 
ceased publishing country detail on this~ as on other aspects of 
British overseas investments. 
The Bank's figures on earnings exclude unremitted profits. 
British Board of Trade: Board of Trade Journal, Apr.19, 1963 and 
June 30, 1967. The Board's figures for direct investment earn-
ings exclude the oil industry but include banking and, after 1962~ 
insurance as well. They also include unremitted profits which, 
between 1965 and 1970 (the only years for which figures are avail-
able), accounted for roughly 50 per cent of all earnings on Brit-
ish direct investment in South Africa - see, for instance~ Board 
of Trade Journal, June 30, 1967, p.xix and p.~. 
Nb. The figures here for 1958-1959 are not comparable with those 
for 1960-1964. 
International Monetary Fund: Balance of Payments Yearbook (based, 
of course, on SA Reserve Bank returns). 
Table 21. (b) 
British Investments in South Africa, 1951-1964: Earnings from Direct 
and Portfolio Investments as.per cent of Total British Overseas In-
vestment Earnings in these Categories. 
Direct Portfolio 
£m. % £m. % 
1951 2.8 3.2 18.2 25.2 
1952 2.9 3·5 17.6 24.6 
1953 3.1 3·7 15.7 20.4 
1954 3.3 3·3 16.0 18.1 
1955 3.6 3.1 15.1 16.3 
1956 4.0 3-3 15.7 15.6 
1957 4.1 3·4 16.3 16.8 
1958 21.2 10.91 16.4 18.2 
1959 21.1 8.9 16.4 17.2 
1960 29.0 11.2 16.0 15.9 
1961 28.5 11.4 16.0 15.6 
1962 36.0 13.1 17.4 17.3 
1963 47.1 14.3 16.9 17.0 
1964 61.7 16.7 ... 
Source: Direct Earnings: Bank of England (fn.1, Table 18 above) for 
1951 until 1957; Board of Trade (fn.2,, Tab-
le 21a above) for 1958 until 1964. 
Portfolio Earnings: Bank of England, ibid. 
Footnotes: 
1. No significance is attributable to the great increase over 1957 
shown by this figure, since the basis of computation used by the 
Board of Trade was different from that employed by the Bank. 
The horizontal line .indicates a break in comparability. 
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Table 22. 
South Africa in the Hierarchy of Major Earners on British Overseas In-
vestment Assets? 1950-1964 (selected years). 1 
1950 1954 1955 
1. s. Africa 13.1 s. Africa 9.8 USA 9.6 
2. Australia 11.5 USA 9o3 s. Africa 9.0 
USA 10.4 Australia 8.6 Australia 8.2 
Malaya 7.9 Fed. R&N 7-4 Fed. R&N 7-3 
Br. Cen. Afr. 7.8 India 7.1 Malaya 7.0 
1957 1960 1962 
1. USA 10.7 Australia 13.0 s. Africa 13 01 
2. s. Africa 9-3 s. Africa 11.2 Australia 12.7 
Australia 7.9 India 7.8 India 8.4 
Malaya 7.1 Fed. Malaya 7.8 Canada 8.4 
Canada 6.8 Canada 7.8 USA 8.2 
1964 
1 0 s. Africa 16.7 
2. Australia 14.4 
USA 11.4 
Canada 8.7 
Malaysia 6.1 
Source: see Table 19 above; the same qualifications apply here 9 with 
the added complication that unremitted profits are excluded 
from the earlier period but included in the later one. 
Footnotes: 
1. Per cent of Britain's total overseas investment earnings at curr-
ent prices. 
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Table 23. 
The Character of Britain's Capital Assets in South Africa? 1956-1964 
(selected years). £m. 
Direct Investment Portfolio Investment Total 
Mining Manu. Other Total IVfining Manu. Other Total 
1956 164.0 186.6 205.5 556.1 121.9 26.4 161.2 309.5 865.6 
1959 633.6 269.4 903.0 
1960 164.5 216.0 262.0 642.5 98.5 27.5 131.5 257.5 900.0 
1962 659.5 249.5 909.0 
1963 670.5 257.5 928.0 
1964 686.0 266.0 952.0 
Per cent 
1956 (19.0) (21.6) (23.7) 64.2 (14.1) (3.0) (18.6) 35.8 100.0 
1959 70.2 29.8 100.0 
1960 (18.3) (24.0) (29.2) 71.4 (10.9) (3.1) (14.6) 28.6 100.0 
1962 72.6 27.4 100.0 
1963 72.3 27.7 100.0 
1964 72.1 27.9 100.0 
Source: see Table 7 above. 
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Table 24. 
British Direct Investment in South Africa: Assets, Net Capital Flows 
and Net Earnings by Industrial Sector, end-1965. 
£m. Per cent 
Assets NCF NE Assets NCF NE 
Agriculture 0 0 0 ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( 0 0 0 
Mining 16.8 (1.8 4o4 4o3 (4o0 7o7 
Elec. & Meehan-
ical Engineering 44o 1 4.0 3o0 11.3 9o0 5.3 
Vehicles, Ship-
building & Mar-
ine Engineering 16.1 2o4 1.0 4o 1 5o4 1.8 
Other Manufact. 214.6 17.6 24.4 54.8 39.6 43.0 
Construction 5o6 2.3 1o7 1.4 5.2 3.0 
Distribution 42o5 7 01 8.5 10o8 16o0 14o9 
Transp.& Commun. 0 0 0 ~-Oo7 0.5 0 0 0 ND2 0.9 Shipping 7o5 0 0 0 1.9 ND 0 0 0 
Other 1 39o7 10o0 13o 1 10.1 22o5 23.0 
TOTAL 391o7 44o5 56.9 100.0 100o0 100o0 
Source: Assets- 'Book Values of Overseas Investments', Board of 
Trade Journal 2 Jano26, 1968; NCF and NE - Board of Trade 
Journal July 19, 1968. 
9 
Footnotes: 
1.; Banking and insurance are included in this category for NCF and NE 
orily. 
2o Indicates net disinvestment. 
Table 25. 
British Direct Investment in South Africa: Assets 9 Net Capital Flows 
and Net Earnings by Industrial Sector as per cent of~ British Over-
seas Direct Investment in these Sectors, end-1965. 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Elec. & Meehan-
ical Engineering 
Vehicles, Ship-
building & Mar-
ine Engineering 
Other Manufacto 
Construction 
Distribution 
Transp.& Communo 
Shipping 
Other 2 
Sourceg see Table 24 above. 
Footnotesg 
Assets 
0 0 0 
6.2 
14o8 
16o5 
12o6 
11o3 
6o3 
0 0 • 
8o8 
7o5 
1. Indicates net disinvestment. 
NCF NE 
( (8o0 
12.2 
30.1 18o6 
240o0 111o0 
14.3 14o 1 
31o2 33o4 
8.8 16o8 
(ND1 4o9 ( 
• 0 0 
20o0 16.3 
2. Banking and insurance are included in this category for NCF and 
NE only. 
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Table 26. 
South Africa's Annual Gold Output and Net Sales Abroad, 1950-1964. 
A B c D 
Annual1 Annual Output Net Sal;s Net Sales Ab-Output as % of total Abroad road as % of 
Non-Communist total SA Vis2 World Output ible Exports 
1950 408.0 48 • .0 339.0 36.1 
1951 403.0 48.8 424.0 34o5 
1952 414.0 48.6 442.0 35.4 
1953 418.0 49.4 419.0 33.6 
1954 463.0 51.5 435.0 32.0 
1955 511.0 54·4 495.0 32.4 
1956 556.0 56.9 537.0 31.9 
1957 596.0 58.5 603.0 32o7 
1958 618.0 58.8 616.0 36.2 
1959 702.0 62.4 673.0 35·3 
1960 748.0 63.5 796.0 39.2 
1961 803.0 66.1 681.0 34o5 
1962 892.0 68.0 679.0 33.8 
1963 961.0 70.0 828.0 36.6 
1964 1,019.0 72.5 1,079.0 41.8 
Source: Cols. A and B- F. Hirsch 9 'Influences on Gold Production' 9 
I.M.F. Staff Papers 9 Vol. 15 9 1968 9 p.486. 
Cols• C and D - South African Reserve Bank~ Quarterly Bulletin 
of Statistics. Figures converted into dollars at 00' par val-
ue of R1 = ¢1.40. 
Footnotes: 
1. ¢m. at ¢35 per troy ounce. 
2. The figure for "total SA Visible Exports" from which this per-
centage was computed was arrived at by adding "Net Sales Abroad'~ 
to non~gold exports. 
Table 27 The Sterling Area's Net Gold and Dollar Deficit, 1947-1958.1 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Transactions with$ Area 
United Kingdom 
Total Surplus or Deficit -542 -301 -273 +49 -520 -137 +17 -15 -204 -114 - +114 
On Current Account -510 -252 -296 -·88 -436 -173 -4 -72 -184 +4 -97 +56 
Other Transactions -32 -49 +23 +137 -84 +36 +21 +57 -20 -118 +97 +58 
Rest of Sterling Area2 
Total Surplus or Deficit -306 -65 -54 +170 +102 +38 +87 +27 +34 +11 +47 +139 
UK Colonies +10 +51 +58 +146 +165 +136 +101 +100 +48 +51 +54 
Other Sterling Area 
-316 -116 -112 +24 -63 -98 -14 -73 -14 -4o -7 
Transactions with Non-
¢ Area 
Total payments to, or re-
ceipts from, other coun-
tries & non-territorial 
organizations -260 -95 -89 -12 -67 -147 +58 -23 -235 -313 -309 -193 
THE 'DOLLAR GAP' -1,108 -461 -416 +207 -485 -246 +162 -11 -4o5 -416 -262 +60 
Met by: 
RSA Gold Sales to London3 +84 +55 +68 +100 +78 +71 +78 +138 +176 +220 +223 +227 
SA Gold Loan 
-
+80 
Drawings on: 
US Line of Credit +707 +74 
Canadian Credit +105 +13 +33 -'-16 
D1F +60 +15 - - - - - -4o - +201 
Ex:p-Imp. Bank Credit - - - - - - - - - - +89 
Other 
- -
- - - - -
- - - -
-3 
ERP Receipts - . +169 +312 +252 +63 
Change in Reserves +152 +55 +3 -575 +344 +175 -24o -87 +229 -5 -50 -284 
See following page for Source and Footnotes. 
\_N 
'0 
\.0 
. 
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Table 27. (contd.) 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.95, 1958, Table 277, p.241 
and No. 96, 1959, Table 270, p.233. 
Footnotes: 
1. This Table is modelled on the mode of presentation of Britain's 
gold and dollar account last employed for the year 1953. See 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.91, 1954, Table 278, p.241. 
2. For the years 1955-1957, Ghana, the Federation of Malaya, and 
Singapore are included in "Other Sterling Area". 
3. By convention, this entry should be placed in the top half of the 
Table; it is placed here in order to demonstrate the size of the 
'dollar gap' in its absence. 
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Table 28. 
South Africa's Contribution to the Sterling Area's Dollar Pool, 
1950-1964. ¢m. 
SA's Commercial Def~ Gross SA Net SA Con- Net SA Con-
icit with the £ Area1 Gold Sales tribution tribution as 
to London to Pool %Annual SA 
A B Output 
1950 ~101 -165 207 187 46 
1951 -137 -70 185 185 46 
1952 -160 -151 190 190 46 
1953 -210 =106 218 218 52 
1954 -134 -238 350 283 61 
1955 -246 -151 467 266 52 
1956 -188 -204 530 288 52 
1957 =294 -224 594 300e 50e 
1958 =277 -294 594 300e 49e 
1959 -204 -277 576 300e 43e 
1960 -370 -280 540 300e 40e 
1961 -272 -286 605 300e 37e 
1962 -305 -382 675 350e 39e 
1963 -462 -417 826 400e 42e 
1964 -463 -326 1,080 400e 39e 
Source: The difficulty in establishing the exact magnitude of South 
Africa's net contribution of gold to the dollar pool is con-
siderable. Figures on gross sales to London are available 
from both South African and British sources. The ones in 
this Table are derived from those published by the SA Reserve 
Bank in its Qparterly Bulletin of Statistics and reproduced 
in the I.M.F's Balance of Payments Yearbook. They correspond 
as nearly as one would expect to those released in the 
Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. after 1959 (on this, 
see Samuel Montagu's Annual Bullion Review 1959). Until 1953 
these figures on gross sales can be taken as roughly equivalent 
to South Africa's net contribution to the dollar pool since in 
the late 1940s the Union had agreed to settle directly its own 
non-sterling deficit. Thereafter, however, the Union re-dir-
ected almost its entire annual gold output to the London Gold 
Market and the gross sales figures thus included a substantial 
amount of gold which was 9 in effect, destined for re=export. 
The net contribution figures for 1950-1953 are derived from 
P.W. Bell 9 The Sterling Area in the Postwar World, (1956) 9 p.57 
and for 1954-1956 from Barclays Bank Review 9 Aug.1957, whilst 
the basis on which the estimates have been made for 1957-1964 
is explained in Chp.II. 
Table 28o (contdo) 
Footnotes: 
1o In column A the figures represent the balance of current and pri-
vate capital accountsi whilst in column B the balance of long~ 
and short-term capital movements in the official and banking sect-
or is included as wello For our purposes 9 column B is the most 
significanto The figures are derived from Table 30 belowo 
Table 29. (a) 
Net Contributions to the Sterling Area's Dollar Pool, 1959-1958. 
¢m. 
1953 1954 
United Kingdom +48 -42 
Colonies +283 +302 
South Africa +218 +283 
Total (+) +549 +585 
Per cent 
United Kingdom 8.7 
Colonies 51o6 51.6 
South Africa 22·1 1;8.1; 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Tables 27 and 28 above. 
Table 29. (b) 
1955 1956 
-572 -319 
+367 +328 
+266 +288 
+633 +616 
58.0 53.2 
~2.0 16.8 
100.0 100.0 
1957 
+249 
+151 
~ 
eo o 
1958 
+319 
0 0 0 
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The Financing of the 'Dollar Gap' of the United ICingdom and Dominions 
(excluding South Africa), 1946-1952. 
¢m. Per cent 
North American Loans 4,909 41.1 
IMF 400 3·3 
Receipts under E.R.P. 2,839 23.8 
SA Gold Loan 325 2.7 
Net SA contribution1 918 1·1 
Net Colonial contribution 1,920 16.1 
Net Drawing on Reserves 630 
..2.:l 
THE 'DOLLAR GAP' 2 -11,941 100.0 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.90 9 1953 9 Table 275. 
Footnotes: 
1. This is Wright's figure: 'Dollar Pooling in the Sterling Area 9 
1939-1952' 9 American Economic Review, No.44, Sept.1954. 
2. This constitutes the Sterling Area's 'Total net gold and dollar 
deficit' in the absence of Colonial and South African reckonings: 
it is not, therefore, the orthodox presentation. 
Table 30 SOUTH AFRICA' S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE STERLING AREA, 1946-1964i 
1 
£m . 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 ;J959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Visibl e Exports 31 .0 49 .0 71 .0 63 .0 97.0 139.0 142 .0 152.0 165.0 172 .0 188.0 217.0 200.0 214.0 212 .5 218 .5 196.5 182 .0 206.0 Visible Exports 
Visible Imports - 91 .0 - 122 .0 -141 .0 -156.e ·-159.0 - 217.0 - 192.0 -199.0 -200.0 -220.0 -210.0 -245 .0 - 245.0 -21 4.0 
-223-5 -211.0 -225.0 -263 .5 -284.5 Visible Imports 
Services -8.0 - 18.0 -15.0 -23.0 -25.0 -28.0 -31 .0 -37.0 - 39.0 -42.0 -47.0 -58.0 -63.0 -55.0 -65.5 - 74.5 -63.0 - 62.0 -72.~ Services 
A. Current Balance 1 - 68.0 -91.0 -85.0 -116.0 -87.0 - 104.0 -81 .0 -84.0 -74.0 - 90.0 - 69.0 -85.0 -106.0 -55 .0 -81.5 
- 71 -5 -87.0 -135.0 - 142 .0 A. Current Balance 1 
B. Pri vate Capital2 18 .0 175 .0 82 .0 46.0 51 .0 55. 0 24.0 9.0 26.0 2.0 2.0 -20.0 7.0 -18.0 -50.5 -25.5 -22 .0 -30 .~ -23.5 B. Private Capital2 
OVERALL BALANCE 
-50.0 84.0 -3.0 - 70.0 - 36.0 - 49.0 -57.0 - 75.0 -48.0 -88 .0 - 67 .0 -105 .0 -99.0 - 73 .0 -132.0 -97.0 - 109.0 -165 .0 -165 .5 OVERALL BALANCE (i . e . A+ B) (i.e . A & B) 
COMPENSATORY OFF- COMPENSATORY OFF-
ICIAL FINANCING ~.a9 ICIAL FINANCING 3 3 3 - 45 .0 -15 .0 - 41.0 -14.0 - 38 .0 - 49.0 - 100.0 -125.0 9 o/<. 09 2.59 3-59 Multilateral Settlements - 9.0 -42.0 - 9.0 Multilateral Settlements 
Monetary Gold 80.0 57.0 74.0 66.0 68 .0 78 .0 125.0 167.0 189.0 212.0 212.0 206.0 192 .5 216.0 241 .0 295 .0 386 .0 Monetary Gold 
Short- Term Assets/ 
- 25 .0 -33.0 24.0 3.0 37.0 -37.0 Liabilities 34.0 - 6.0 25 .0 -8.0 -23 .0 
Short- Term Assets/ 
Liabili t ies 
Long-Term Assets/ 2.0 2.0 
- 3.0 Long- Term Assets/ Liabilities Liabilities 
Cent . & Local Govt . (net) 
-11 .0 4.0 -1 .0 7-5 17.0 Cent .& Local Govt . (net) 
Comm.& Cent . Banks(net) 43 .0 - 9.0 - 27 .0 8.5 32 .0 Comm.& Cent. Banks (net) 
59 .04 5 6 83.07 10.o8 Other - 42.0 - 68 .0 Other 
Net errors &Omissions - 2.0 9.0 - 13.0 9.0 - 134.0 - 116.0 -11 4.0 - 95 .0 -117.5 -104.0 -146.0 -269.5 Net Errors & Omissions 
50.0 -84.0 3.0 70 .0 36.0 49 .0 57 .0 75 .0 48 .0 88 .0 67 .0 105 .0 99.0 7.3 .. 0 132 .0 97.0 109 .0 165.0 165.5 
. . 
·:~ ' . • 
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Table 30 (Contd.) 
Source: I.M.F •• Balance of Payments Yearbook. N.B. Format changed 
in 1960 for Short-Term 9 Long-Term presentation to that of Cent. 
& Local Govt. (non-monetary) 9 Comm. and Central Banks (Monetary). 
Footnotes: 
1. This entry includes "Donations" or "Transfer Payments" in all years. 
2. This entry includes "Donations" in 1949-50 9 "Net errors and omissions" 
in 1946=52 and excludes banking capital in all years. 
3. Excluding multilateral settlements through London finanded by new-
mined Gold. 
4. 'Foreign Exchange Assets' (£60.0m.) 9 less 'Special Official 
Financing' (=£1m.) 
5. 'Foreign Exchange Assets'. 
6. 'Foreign Exchange Assets' (£12.0m.) less Gold Loan to UK (=£BO.Om.) 
7. Gold Loan to UK (£80.0m.) plus 'New borrowing' (£3.0m.) 
8. Sterling Loans. 
9. Transactions in currencies with IMF 9 IBRD and BIS. 
10. From 1957 9 includes Multilateral Settlements. 
Table 31. 
The Sterling Area 0 s Central Reserves, 1951-1964. 1 
¢m. 
1951 1952 
Mar. 31 3,758 1,700 
June 30 3,867 1,685 
Sept.30 3,269 1,685 
Dec. 31 2a222 1 2 8~6 
Change -965 -489 
1958 1959 
Mar. 31 2,770 3,139 
June 30 3,076 3,172 
Sept.30 3,120 3,284 
Dec. 31 2a062 22126 
Change +796 =333 
Source: UK Treasury. 
Footnotes: 
1953 1954 1955 
2,166 2,685 2,667 
2,367 3,017 2,680 
2,486 2,901 2,345 
22218 2a62 2 1120 
+672 +244 -642 
1960 1961 1962 
2,780 3,021 3,452 
2,892 2,772 3,433 
3,108 3,553 2,792 
2x221 2a:218 22806 
+495 +81 -512 
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1956 1957 
2,277 2,209 
2, 385 2,381 
2,328 1,850 
2z122 2a21~ 
+13 +140 
1963 1964 
2,814 2,660 
2,713 2,705 
2,736 2,540 
2~628 22 216 
-148 -342 
1. These figures exclude reserves held with the IMF in all years. 
337· 
Table 32. 
Gold as a Proportion of Britain's Central Reserves 9 1950-1968. 1 
Per cent. 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
83.0 91.5 75.6 84.7 83.5 84.0 18.0 68.6 91.5 89.1 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
75.4 68.4 78.0 18.9 92.5 75.6 62.5 48.0 60.9 
Source: I.M.F., International Financial Statistics 9 1972 Supplement, 
pp.6-7 0 
Footnotes: 
1. In the derivation·of this Table, Britain's reserve position in 
the IMF was included in total reserves. 
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Table 32· 
South Africa's Reserves 9 1947=1964: End-year and (at selected intervals) 
monthly. ;6m. 
Gold1' F. Excrumge Total 
1947 761 (75 .. 6) 245 1,006 
1948 183 (56.0) 144 327 
1949 128 (43-7) 165 293 
1950 197 (42o2) 270 467 
1951 190 (49.5) 194 384 
1952 170 (44.8) 209 379 
1953 176 (60.5) 115 291 
1954 199 (47 .. 8) 217 416 
1955 212 (57.6) 156 368 
1956 224 (60.2) 148 372 
1957 217 (75.1) 72 289 
1958 211 (66 .8) 105 316 
1959 238 (55.7) 189 427 
1960 178 (73.8) 63 241 
1961 298 (76.6) 91 389 
1962 499 (82.2) 108 607 
1963 630 (86.8) 96 726 
1964 574 (86.6) 89 663 
1953 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Gold 165 173 174 173 175 175 174 176 175 175 175 176 
F.Ex 190 171 172 156 145 ·130 107 84 90 85 91 115 
1954 
Gold 176 178 175 180 180 187 188 193 195 199 194 199 
F.Ex: 56 98 116 121 133 147 127 130 152 166 182 217 
1955 
Gold 195 201 203 208 207 212 215 212 214 211 213 212 
F .. Ex 203 205 189 161 141 129 129 130 109 108 113 156 
1959 
Gold 212 211 193 190 197 201 217 204 2e5 231 230 238 
F.Ex 98 118 136 143 124 142 155 164 154 178 176 189 
1960 
Gold 248 244 256 258 255 240 233 219 204 187 176 178 
F.Ex 191 175 152 108 71 71 70 59 67 64 61 63 
/contd 
1961 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Gold 170 186 196 172 149 153 159 179 205 
F.Ex 79 74 65 58 66 63 68 67 73 
1962 
Gold 343 361 379 386 407 432 446 468 488 
F.Ex 85 85 97 118 133 132 145 127 129 
1963 
Gold 486 505 551 571 591 598 611 639 643 
F.Ex 127 133 113 85 94 88 100 93 89 
1964 
Gold 632 631 628 627 626 607 615 597 589 
F.Ex 90 93 84 83 77 96 97 76 100 
Source: I.M.F. 9 International Financial Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
Oct Nov Dec 
218 256 298 
95 97 91 
501 509 499 
138 119 108 
630 629 630 
97 97 96 
601 592 574 
96 88 89 
1. Figures in brackets indicate gold as per cent of total reserves. 
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Table 34o (a) 3h0. 
British Imports from South Africa 1 by Main Categoryp 2 1952-1963 
(selected years). £m. 
1952 1954 1957 1960 19633 
A. Food 9 Beverages & Tob. 25.99 43.51 45.50 48.15 66.06 
Of whichg 
Meat and Meat Preparations 1.85 1.23 1.08 0.77 1o47 
Dairy Prods., Eggs & Honey 0.91 1 o32 Oo87 1.71 0.75 
Fish & Fish Preparations 1.65 0.92 0.08 o. 19 0.29 
Cereals & Cereal Prepso Oo35 6.71 7.02 7.29 15o20 
Fruit & Veg.(inc.preserves) 18.51 22.20 29o20 28.85 33o50 
Sugar & Sugar Preparations 7~87 4o78 5.96 10.12 
Feeding Stuffs Oo63 1-49 0.65 1.70 2.14 
Misc. Food Preparations 0.08 o. 19 
Beverages (mainly wine) 0.93 0.76 Oo84 1.03 1o59 
Tobacco Oo 11 Oo 10 0.42 0.51 
Cocoa Butter 0.05 
All Other Oo92 0.83 0.78 Oo22 0.21 
B. Basic Materials 32.52 34.82 39.12 37.28 34o 18 
Of whichg 
Hides 9 Skins & Fur Skins 2.74 2.86 2.04 2.63 2.26 
Oil Seeds etc. 0.90 1.75 1.06 1.29 
Pulp & Waste Paper 2.18 3.44 5.35 
Wool & Other Animal Hair 18.11 19.61 15.31 12 017 12.31 
Cotton Oo05 o. 11 0.26 0.41 
Crude Fertilizers & Minerals 
(mainly Asbestos) 2.07 1.36 2.10 2.64 2.47 
Non~ferrous Base Metal Ores 
& Concentrates 8.26 7o95 13.55 14.00 9.47 
Of which: 
Zinc Oo50 
Tin 0.02 0.45 0.36 0.09 0.48 
Manganese 0.63 0.73 0.60 1.20 1.06 
Chromium Oo54 0.47 0.43 0.45 0.35 
Tungsten 0.34 0.02 
Antimony 1.70 0.88 0.74 Oo96 Oo89 
Titanium 0 • 0 . . . 0.54 0 0 • 
All other sorts 4-53 5.40 11.42 10.76 6.69 
Animal & Vego Oil & Fats 0.82 1.69 1.19 1.62 1.67 
All Other Articles 0.45 Oo 31 0.71 0.53 Oo27 
c. Mineral Fuels & Lubricants 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.43 
D. Manufactured Goods 4.62 5-43 7.80 10.60 12.63 
Of whichg 
-
Wattle Bark 2.19 . 2. 78 1.90 0.97 0.82 
Copper & Copper Alloys 0.44 0.62 0.72 
Iron & Steel 0.87 1. 78 4.664 
Wood & Cork 0.62 1.01 1.14 
Chemicals 2.54 1.03 
Silver Bullion 0.82 
E. Miscellaneous 1.05 0.54 0.30 0.26 0.37 
TOTAL 64.20 84.31 92.75 96.41 115.04 
contd/ 
Table 34.(a) (contd.) 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. 9 Vol. 4 9 
1954 9 1958 9 1961 and 1963. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes South West Africa. 
2. Excludes gold, diamonds and uranium. For the available figures 
on these items 9 see Tables 28 9 37 and 40. 
3o See fn.2 9 Table 10 above. 
I 
4. Hardboard alone in this year. 
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Table 3_4_. (b) 
British Imports from South Africa by Main Category 9 1952-1963 
(selected years). Per cent 
1952 1954 1957 1960 1963 
A. Food, Beverages & Tob. 40.5 51.6 49.0 49.9 57.4 
Of which: 
Cereals & Cereal Preparations 0.5 8.0 7.6 7.6 13.2 
Fruit & Veg. (inc. preserves) 28.8 26.3 31.5 29.9 2-9.1 
Sugar & Sugar Preparations 9o3 5.2 6.2 8.8 
B. Basic Materials 50.6 41.3 42.4 38.7 29.7 
Of \.fhich: 
Wool & Other Animal Hair 28.2 23.3 16.5 12.6 10.7 
Non-ferrous Base Metal Ores 
& Concentrates 12.9 9.4 14.6 14.5 8.2 
C. Mineral Fuels & Lubricants 0.03 0.02 0.02 o. 1 0.4 
D. Manufactured Goods 7.2 6.4 8.4 11.0 11.0 
E. Miscellaneous 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 
100o0 100.0 100o0 100.0 100.0 
Source: see Table 34 (a). 
Table 35· 
South African1 Mineral Production as per cent of World2 Production 9 
1948-1964 (selected years). 
1948 1952 1955 1958 
Antimony 9.0 15.7 30.4 17.7 
Asbestos 4.8 10.0 8.1 12.0 
Chrome 28.6 21.5 19.8 21.4 
Copper 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.6 
Lead 2.5 3.0 4.1 3.9 
Manganese 5.0 8.0 5.0 7.0 
Nickel 0.4 0.9 1.2 2.0 
Phosphates 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Tin 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 
Vanadium 11.1 14.3 7.7 10.5 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook. 
Footnotes: 
1. Includes South West Africa. 
1960 1962 1964 
37 o3 32.2 31.6 
9.8 11.4 9.9 
25.4 31.9 34.3 
1.7 1.7 2.2 
3.2 3-7 4·5 
8.5 9.6 9· 1 
1 01 0.9 0.8 
0.8 0.8 1.3 
1 01 1.3 1.4 
20.3 29.0 30.0 
3l,j. 
2. For antimony, excludes China, Czechoslovakia, USSR 9 Afghanistan and 
Hungary; for asbestos, USSR, China and Czechoslovakia; for chrome, 
Albania, Bulgaria, N. Vietnam, Rumania and USSR; for copper 9 Albania, 
China, N. Korea, USSR, Czechoslovakia and Iran; for lead, China, 
Czechoslovakia, E. Germany, Iran, N. Korea, Rumania and USSR; for 
manganese, China; for nickel, Albania, E. Germany and USSR; for 
phosphates, USSR, China, N. Korea and N. Vietnam; for tin, China, 
Czechoslovakia, E. Germany 9 N. Vietnam and USSR; for vanadium, in-
cludes only Argentina 9 Finland, France, South Africa, South West 
Africa9 USA and Zambia. 
NB. This Table does not include some of South Africa's most significant 
minerals, for instance, platinum*and titanium. It also excludes 
fluorspar, sillimanite, and vermiculite. South African zinc pro-
duction was insignificant as a proportion of world production. 
* In his book Metallic and Industrial Mineral Deposits, (Maidenhead, 
1966), C.A. Lamey estimates that over the 1945-59 period South 
Africa produced an annual average of 30.6% of total world produc-
tion of platinum 9 whilst Canada produced 40 per cent and the 
USSR 22.3 per cent. 
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~able 36. 
Britain's Imports of Non-ferrous Base Metal Ores and Concentrates 
from South Africa as per cent of Britain°s Total Imports by value 
in these Categories 9 1948-1963 (selected years). 
1948 1952 1955 1958 1961 1963 
Antimony 50.0 72.2 95.0 85.0 94o7 90o5 
Chromium 10.4 25o8 15o2 18o5 16o6 21.0 
Lead 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manganese· 13o6 10o6 6o3 3.2 14.0 24.5 
Molybdenum 
Nickel 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tin 2.7 2o8 3o7 
Titanium 10o0 
Tungsten 1 .. 5 3o2 
Vanadium 90.0 100o0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zinc 5o9 
Source: The Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, Vol.2. 
Table 37. 
Britain;s Diamond Imports from South Africa~ 1 1951-1966. £m. 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Total Imports 2 125.7 123.1 
Total Imports 
excl.Diamonds3 59.9 64.2 71.9 84.3 80.4 90.9 92.7 90.4 
DIAMONDS 33.0 32.7 
Diamonds as % 
Total Imports4 26.3 26.6 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Total Imports 128.9 139· 1 156.3 150.5 166.4 182.5 180.9 191.5 
Total Imports 
excl.Diamonds 89.3 96.4 103.3 103.1 115.0 126.6 
DIAMONDS 39.6 42.7 53.0 47.4 51.4 54-55 63.45 67.75 
Diamonds as % 
Total Imports 30.7 30.7 33.9 31.5 30.9 30.0 35.0 35·4 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. 9 and Annual Abstract 
of Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
1. Excludes South West Africa. 
2. The figures for Britain's total imports were revised upwards in 
the Annual Abstract of Statistics as far back as 1957 after the 
Board of Trade decided to release information on diamond imports 
in 1964. These figures still exclude gold and uranium 9 however. 
3. Annual Statement figures. 
4. Excludes gold and uranium. 
5. These are the actual figures for British diamond imports published 
in the Annual Statement. 
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Table 38o 
South Africa1 and World Diamond Production 9 2 1948-1964 (selected 
years). 
1948 
1955 
1958 
1960 
1962 
1964 
Total SA Dia-
mond Product-
ion as % World 
Production 
15.4 
16o3 
12.8 
14.8 
17.6 
20.9 
'Industrials 9 
as % Total SA 
Production 
0 0 0 
48.4 
46o3 
45.6 
47.2 
47.2 
SA 'Gems' 
as % World 
'Gems' 
0 0 0 
26.8 
33.6 
33.6 
54.4 
0 0 0 
Sourceg United Nations 9 Statistical Yearbook. 
Footnotes: 
1. Includes South West Africa. 
2. Excludes USSR. 
SA 'Ind-
ustrials' 
as % vlorld 
'Industr-
ials' 
0 0 0 
9.5 
1·4 
9.0 
10.2 
0 0 0 
Table 39. 
World1·uranium Production 9 1952-1965. thou. long tons. 
Canada 
Australia 
S. Africa 
USA 
France 
Congo Rep. 2 
World Total 
Canada 
Australia 
s. Africa 
USA 
France 
Congo Rep. 
World Total 
Canada 
Australia 
S. Africa 
USA 
France 
Congo Rep. 
World Total 
Canada 
Australia 
S. Africa 
USA 
France 
Congo Rep. 
World Total 
1952 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1959 
12.0 
0.9 
4.9 
12.4 
0.7 
1.8 
40.0 
1952 
0 0 0 
0 • 0 
0 0 0 
100.0 
1959 
30.0 
2.2 
12.2 
31.0 
1.7 
4o5 
100.0 
1953 
0 0 0 
(3.3) 
0 0 0 
1960 
9.7 
1 01 
4.9 
13.4 
1.0 
0.9 
40.0 
1953 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
100.0 
1,60 
24.2 
2.7 
12.2 
33.5 
2.5 
2.2 
100.0 
1954 
(9.7)3 
(15.4) 
1961 
7.3 
1.2 
4o 1 
13.1 
1 01 
o. 1 
37.0 
1954 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
10090 
1961 
19o7 
3o2 
11.1 
35o4 
3.0 
Oo3 
100.0 
1955 
(9.5) 
(25o3) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1962 
6.4 
1 01 
3.8 
12.9 
1.0 
35.0 
1955 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 . 
0 0 0 
100.0 
1962 
18o3 
3o1 
10.9 
36.9 
2.9 
100.0 
1956 
1.7 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
16.0 
1963 
6.3 
0.9 
3o4 
10.8 
1 01 
31.0 
0 0 0 
0 • 0 
100,0 
1963 
20o3 
2.9 
11.0 
34.8 
3o5 
100.0 
1957 
5.0 
0.4 
4o3 
6.5 
0.3 
1.7 
23.0 
1964 
5o5 
0.3 
3o4 
9.0 
1o0 
per cent. 
1957 
21.7 
1.7 
18.7 
28.3 
1.3 
7o4 
100.0 
1964 
20.4 
1 01 
12.6 
33o3 
3o7 
100.0 
Source: Statistical Summa of the Mineral Indust 9 (Overseas 
Geological Surveys o 
1958 
10.7 
0.5 
4.7 
9o5 
Oo5 
1.8 
35.0 
1965 
3o4 
1958 
28.9 
1.4 
13.4 
27.1 
1.4 
5o 1 
100.0 
100.0 
NB.Colonial Geological Surveys for earlier years. Reliable fi~ 
ures did not become available until the late 1950s for security 
reasons. 
Footnotes: 
1. Uranium was also produced in small quantities in the USSR 9 in several 
Eastern European countries, Finland, Italy 9 Sweden 9 W.Germany, 
Mozambique 9 China 9 India, Gabon 9 Malagasy Republic 9 N.Rhodesia 9 
Argentina 9 and elsewhere. The Surveys made an allowance for these 
in the 'World Total'. 
2. Until 1960 9 The Belgian Congo. 
3. Figures in brackets are in sterling. 
Table 40. 
South Africa's Exports of Uranium, 1953-1965. ¢m. 
1952 
1953 10e9 
1954 41.5 
1955 84.0 
1956 108.0 
1957 140.0 
1958 151.0 
1959 138.0 
1960 152.0 
1961 111.0 
1962 104.0 
1963 93-5 
19q4 81.2 
1965 46.5 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
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Table 41. 
Britain's Gold Imports from Major Sources 9 1952=1966. 
1952 1953 
T.ounces % T.ounces % (mill) (mill) 
1 0 S. Africa 9.21 70.2 S. Africa 6.84 56.8 
2. Br. vi. Afr. 0.71 5.4 USSR 1 o32 11.0 
3· France 0.67 5o 1 Br. W. Afr. 0.72 6.0 
4. Canada 0.66 501 Australia 0.66 5o5 
5· Australia 0.34 2.6 Czechosl. 0.64 5.3 
TOTAL 13.12 100.0 12.03 100.0 
1954 1955 
T.ounces % T.ounces % (mill) (mill) 
1 0 s. Africa 12.09 75.2 S. Africa 13o 16 79.5 
2. USSR 1.25 1.8 USSR 1.58 9.6 
3· Br. \v. Afra. 0.81 s.o Br. W. Afr. 0.73 4.4 
4o Fed. R. & N. 0.53 3o3 Fed. R. & N. 0.52 3.1 
5o Belgium 0.29 1.8 Columbia 0.22 1o3 
TOTAL 16.09 100.0 16.53 100.0 
1956 1957 
T.,ounces % T.ounces % (mill) (mill) 
1 0 s. Africa 15.53 83.1 s. Africa 16.55 69.0 
2. USSR 1.62 8.7 USSR 5.68 23.6 
3· Ghana Oo57 3o1 Ghana 0.72 3.0 
4. Fed. R & N •. 0.52 2.8 Fed. R & N. 0.54 2.3 
5o Nicaragua 0.07 0.4 Czechosl. o. 16 0.6 
TOTAL 18.68 100.0 24.00 100.0 
1958 1959 
T.ounces % T.ounces % (mill) (mill) 
1 0 s. Africa 18.6 17o8 s. Africa 11.8 64.5 
2. USSR 2.7 11.3 USSR 7o3 26.4 
3o Ghana 0.9 3o8 Ghana 0.9 3o3 
4o Rhodesia 0.5 2.1 Bel.Congo 0.8 2.9 
5· USA 0.5 2 01 Rhodesia 0.5 1.6 
TOTAL 23.9 100.0 27.6 100.0 
Table 41.(contd.) 
Britain's Gold Imports from Major Sources 9 1952-1966 (Contd.) 
1 0 
2. 
3o 
4. 
5· 
TOTAL 
1 0 
2. 
3· 
4. 
5o 
TOTAL 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4. 
5· 
TOTAL 
1 0 
2. 
3· 
4. 
5. 
TOTAL 
South Africa 
USSR 
Canada 
Australia 
Ghana 
s. Africa 
USA 
USSR 
Ghana 
Rhod. & Nyas. 
S.Africa 
USSR 
Ghana 
Rhodesia 
1960 
T.ounces % (mill) 
17.1 64.5 
3.0 11.3 
2.4 9.1 
2.3 8.7 
0.9 3.4 
26.5 100.0 
1962 
T.ounces % (mill) 
19.0 55~7 
9.6 28.2 
3.0 8.8 
0.9 2.6 
0.5 1.5 
34o 1 100.0 
1964 
T.ounces % (mill) 
31.6 77o4 
7.7 18.9 
0.8 2.0 
0.6 1.5 
40.8 100.0 
1966 
S. Africa 
France 
USSR 
Ghana 
1961 
T.ounces % (mill) 
USA 21.6 42.5 
S. Africa 20.4 40.1 
USSR 6.4 12.6 
Ghana 0.8 1 .6 
Rhod. & Nyas. 0.6 1.2 
50.8 100.0 
1963 
T.ounces % (mill) 
s. Africa 23.3 67.9 
USSR 8.0 23.3 
USA 1.2 3-5 
Ghana 1.0 2.9 
Rhodesia 0.6 1.7 
34.3 100.0 
1965 
T.ounces % (mill) 
S. Africa 34.6 87.8 
USSR 3.2 8.1 
Ghana 0.7 1.8 
Rhodesia 0.5 1.3 
39.4 100.0 
T.ounces 
(mill) % 
23.8 89.5 
0.9 3.4 
0.9 3.4 
0.7 2.6 
26.6 100.0 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. Vol.2. 
Table 42. 
South Africa's Main Exports 9 1 1952-1964 (selected years) 9 
1952 1955 1958 1960 
Food & Live Ano 2 0 0 0 20o3 25o4 21o3 
Of which ~-
Maize 5o0 4o 1 5.0 2.5 
Fro & Veg. 15.6 9.8 10o7 9.1 
Sugar 0 0 0 2.1 4o2 2 01 
Bev. & Tob. 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 
\.fool 20.3 1101 11.8 n.o 
Asbestos 3· 1 2o5 2.9 3.2 
N.F. Ores & Con. 0 0 0 8.7 4o5 4.6 
Uranium 9.0 15.0 13.5 
Chemicals 1.0 1 01 4.1 3.9 
Manufactures 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.7 22.6 
Of which :-
Diamonds 5o8 9.6 8.6 8.6 
Iron & Steel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4o2 
N.F. Metals 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 5o2 
Machine~ & TransEort 
Eguipment3 5.2 5.6 4o 1 4.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: U.N., Yearbook of InternationnTrade Statistics. 
Footnotes: 
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per cent by value. 
1962 1964 
30o4 28.5 
8.3 5.6 
9.6 10.5 
3.8 3.8 
0.8 1.0 
13.3 13.9 
2.9 2.9 
4.2 3o6 
8o6 6.1 
3o5 3.5 
21.2 22.3 
8.5 10o0 
4.8 4.2 
4.3 4o9 
3o4 2.9 
100.0 100.0 
1. Excludes gold and, since only "main" exports are included 9 totals do 
not add up to 100 per cent. 
2. Underlined items are SITC categories. 
3. In 1952 and 1955, this category includes "machinery and parts" 9 "motor 
cars and trucks", "tyres and tubes" and "ships and stores". 
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Table 43 
South Africa's Exports to Britain as per cent of Total South African 
Exports (by value) by Major Commodity Group, 1952~1964 (selected years). 
1952 1955 1958 1960 1962 1964 
Food & Live An. 72.8 61 .o 62.5 56.4 42.0 48.3(ho.4) 
Of t·Ihi ch : -
Haize 21.7 55.8 61 .5 19.1 56.5 
Fr.& Veg. 78.0 73.0 70.2 
Sugar 65.5 77.0 70.2 28.1 28.1 
Bev.& Tob. 30.2 48.8 49.0( 41 .o) 5?.o6(43.0) 
Hool 28.4 28.4 27.1 20.0 15.0 17.0 
Asbestos 0 0. 16.0 13.5 13.0 
N.F.Ores & Con. 100.0 45.0 30 .. 8 75.0 62.0 89.0 
Of 't'!hich:-
l\ntimony 100.0 82.0 
Chrome 31.8 12.6 14.0 
Nanganese 16.9 11.4 4.7 
Uranium 
C~1 eeli cals 16.0 15.0(13.3) 13.0(12 .. 0)1 
Manufactures ••• (41.0) 
-----='-~--~-Of 1r1hich:-
Diamonds 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Iron & Steel 10.5 
N .F .l"'etals 7.2 5.3 15-3 
Macfiinery & T.Eq. 0. 0 (5.0) 
~lise .Manufactures (8.7) 
Source: The nature of the presentation of South Africa's trade statistics 
by the SA Dept. of Customs and Excise in its Nonthly Abstract of 
Trade Statistics made it almost impossibly complex~a task to prod-
uce this Table (as it should be produced) exclusively from the 
South African end. The figures are at once too simple and too 
detailed. As a result, the percentae;es t·Jere calculated by employ~ 
ing Annual Statement of the Trade of the me figures for South 
Africa's exports to Britain (British imports, of course, in these 
figures) and UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics for 
South Africa's total exports in these categories. \'/here possible, 
this procedure was checked by employing the South African Monthly 
Abstract figures and the results of this are shown in the figures 
in brackets in the Table. The discrepancies are obvious and 
emphasise the dubious nature of the procedure by \·Jhich the Table 
was constructed. On the other hand, since the same procedure was 
employed throughout, the Table does provide valid evidence of 
trends and the bracketed figures suggest that the rough proportions 
are correct. 
Footnotes: 
1. Mainly a result of diamonds, of course. 
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Table 44. 
The Marketing of South Africa's Gold9 1951-1964. 1 
2 London Continental New York Other 
w. Europe 
1951 44.0 0.7 52.7 2.7 
1952 42.8 0.6 56.6 
1953 51.8 3o3 45.2 
1954 79.9 0.6 19.2 
1955 93.8 1.1 501 
1956 98.7 1.3 
1957 98.5 1.5 
1958 96.4 3.6 
1959 85.6 14.4 
1960 67.8 32.2 
1961 88.8 11.2 
1962 99.4 0.6 
1963 99.8 0.2 
1964 100.0 
Sourceg South African Reserve Bank 9 Qgarterly Bulletin of Statistics 9 
and I.M.F. 9 Balance of Payments Yearbook. 
Footnotesg 
1. Per cent of South Africa's total annual net gold sales abroad. 
2. Until 1954 these figures simply represent gold deliveries to the 
British government since the London Gold Market was not re-opened 
until this year. 
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APPENDIX C 
Edited Text of Reply submitted by the Labour Government to the QQestion-
naire sent out by the U.N. Committee on Sanctions (1964-65)o 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1o What were the most important commodities of South African origin by 
volume and by value which you imported in 1963 and in the first half of 
1964 ? 
2. What percentage by volume and value did these imports represent of 
your total imports of those commodities and of your total imports of all 
commodities in 1963 and in the first half of 1964 ? 
3o What were the most important commodities, including all forms of 
armaments, which you exported to South Africa by volume and by value in 
1963 and in the first half of 1964 ? 
4. What percentage by volume and value did these exports represent of 
your total exports of those commodities and of your total exports of all 
commodities in 1963 and in the first half of 1964 ? 
5o If you prohibited all imports of South African origin and all exports 
to South Africa could you find alternative sources for these imports and 
alternative markets for the exports ? 
6. If not, what would be the effects on your economy of the absence of 
imports from and exports to South Africa ? 
7o What would be the effects of the prohibitions in question 5 above on 
your balance of payments ? 
8. What political actions have you taken with respect to South Africa 
and how have they been put into effect ? 
9. What economic actions have you taken with respect to South Africa 
and how have they been put into effect ? 
10. What effect have they had on your country's internal economy and on 
its foreign trade and payments ? 
11. What military or economic assistance, if any 9 is being given by you 
to the Republic of South Africa ? 
12. What capital investment, if any, is being made from your country, 
privately or from Government sources, in the Republic of South Africa ? 
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13. \1hat other observations would you wish to make at this stage relat-
ing to external or internal implications affecting your country, result-
ing from measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Security 
Council under the United Nations Charter ? 
The Labour Government answered the first four questions by means of 
detailed statistical tables; that answering questions 3 and 4 is 
reproduced as Appendix B, Table 17(b) above. 
5, 6, 7. It is convenient to answer these three questions together. 
(a) British exports to South Africa are now running at over £200 
million per year and Britain could not expect to find alternative mark-
ets for anything like this amount of tradep There would be particular 
difficulties for goods made especially to meet South African requirements. 
Engineering products· accounted for nearly £66 million of British exports 
to South Africa in 1963 9 and many of these are individual rather than 
mass produced goods which it would be difficult to divert to other mark-
ets. The highly competitive world market for motor vehicles (British 
exports to South Africa of £36 million in 1963) would make difficult any 
significant or quick diversion. South Africa is the largest market for 
British woven cotton fabrics, switchgear, telecommunicationsequipment, 
railway vehicles and commercial vehicles; and one of the three largest 
markets for British cotton yarn, tractors, motor cars, ships, electrical 
machinery as a whole and transport equipment as a whole. It would be im-
possible to find alternative customers for all of these exports. The 
difficulty of finding new markets would be increased because exporters in 
other countries would also be looking for alternatives to the South African 
market. There might be some compensation in markets hitherto supplied by 
South Africa and as a result of higher demand from countries whose own 
exports benefited from the stoppage of competing South African exports; 
but there could be no guarantee that this compensation would take the form 
of additional demand for the type of goods which Britain currently exports 
to South Africa; and the net loss of British exports would be very great. 
(b) To replace British imports from South Africa by supplies from other 
sources would involve extra cost, inconvenience and dislocation, especially 
where South Africa.is the main supplier. The loss of South African supplies 
to the world market would, moreover, be likely to have a substantial 
effect on world prices in a number of cases (especially wool, and also 
sugar, some f~t, wattle tanning extract, and the ores of certain non-
ferrous metals)o The result would be a big increase in the British 
import bill for supplies of these commodities from all sourceso 
(c) To the effect on the British balance of payments of export losses 
and increased import costs would be added the loss of substantial 
invisible earnings as a result of stopping South African tradeo For 
example~ there would be direct losses on freight { a large part of South 
Africa's import and export trade is carried in specialized British ships) 
and insurance; and it could also be expected that foreign exchange 
earnings from British investments in South Africa (these earnings are 
running at over £60 million per year) will be cut offo 
(d) All in all the effect of stopping British trade with South Africa 
might be to worsen the British balance-of-payments position by something 
b 
of the order of £300 million in the first yearo This would require 
corrective measures which would inevitably have substantial effects on world 
trade - effects which would be heightened if the stoppage occurred at a 
time when the British reserves were under pressure from other causes - as 
well as affecting British ability to maintain aid and investment for 
developing countrieso 
(e) The net loss of export trade would have important direct effects on 
the level of British economic activity 9 especially in those industries for 
which South Africa represents a significant proportion of total exports. 
These include ships, railway and motor vehicles, electrical machinery, 
telecommunications equipment, glass and textileso Redundancies could be 
expected in these tradeso In the case of ships 9 for example, the combined 
loss of South African orders and orders from British owners engaged in the 
South African trade would put 15 9 000 jobs at risk in the shipyards and 
ancillary industrieso The loss of imports from South Africa would also 
affect employment in firms that handle or process themo 
{f) There would, in addition, be widespread and substantial effects on 
the economy and on employment from internal measures which had to be taken 
to redress the balance of paymentso The impact of such measures, and of 
the direct loss of trade with South Africa, would be likely to bear more 
than proportionately on areas of the country which have a higher than 
average level of unemploymento 
8o (a) Change from Commonwealth to foreign status 
Following the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Marchp 1961 9 
when South Africa withdrew from membership of the Commonwealth, the 
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United Kingdom Parliament passed legislation to formalize South Africa's 
change of relationship from that of a member of the Commonwealth to that 
of a foreign country. This legislation had wide ranging effects on 
matters such as nationality and citizenshipp telecommunications, extradi-
tion and a number of legal matters. Certain forms of co=operation with 
South Africa in various important fields were also curtailed. 
(b) South African racial policy 
Her Majesty's Government has left the South African Government in no 
doubt as to their abhorrence of apartheid and about the strong feelings 
in the United Kingdom on trials based on arbitrary laws. It has made 
its position clear both in the United Nations and in Parliament as well 
as in private confidential diplomatic representations. Political asylum 
has been granted to a large number of refugees from South Africa to 
Bechuanaland9 Swaziland and Basutoland. Her · Majesty's Government has 
publicly deplored the absence in South Africa of any political means of 
expression for African political leaders in South Africa. H.M. Ambass-
ador in South Africa has been instructed from time to time to make 
representations on these lines to the South Africans. Although Her 
Majesty's Government abstained on the Security Council resolution of 
9 June 1964? which condemned the Rivonia trial, the United Kingdom 
Permanent Representative stated his Gove1nment's abhorrence of the prov-
isions of the Sabotage Act under which the defendants were tried. He 
explained his Government's abstention on the grounds that it might not be 
in the interests of the defendants on trial to vote in favour of the 
resolution. 
Her Majesty's .· Ambassador in Pretoria asked for an abatement of the 
sentences but without success. Protests have also been lodged against 
detention of any British nationals under the ninety-day clause of the 
General Law Amendment Act. The British Ambassador has set an example 
in South Africa by holding non=racial national day parties. 
(c) Arms Supply 
Following the Security Council resolution of 1 August 1963, Her 
Majesty's Government refused all applications for licences to supply 
South Africa with arms which could be used to maintain the policy of 
apartheid. On 17 November 1964, Her Majesty's Government announced 
that it has decided to impose an embargo on the export of arms to South 
Africa. 
9o Her Majesty's Government has not taken any specific economic action 
with respect to South Africa except with regard to the supply of arms 
mentioned in the reply to question 8. 
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10. It is not possible to quantify the effects upon the internal economy 
of the United Kingdom of the measures described in the answer to question 8. 
11o From time to time individual members of the South African forces attend 
specialist training courses~ for which the South African Government pay~ 
arranged by the United Kingdomo No economic assistance is provided to 
South Africa by the United Kingdom. 
12o Taking direct and portfolio investment together~ there has been a 
sizable net withdrawal of private British investment funds from South 
Africa in recent yearso 
Average net direct investment in the last five years has been about 
£14 million per annum, nearly all from ploughed-back profits on operations 
in South Africa. Average portfolio disinvestment has been about £22 milli-
on per annumo No capital investment from Government sources is being made 
in South Africa. 
14. At this stage, none. 
Source: Security Council Official Records, 20th Yearo Special Supplement 
Noa2 (Doc. S/6210 and ADD.1), Mar.2nd., 1965: The Report of the 
Expert Committee established in 1964 to study the feasibility of 
applying economic sanctions against South Africa. 
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APPENDIX D 
In 1961 Sir Hugh Foot was sent by Macmillan to join the UK Delegation 
to the UN in New Yorko He was to serve under the Head of the British 
Mission 9 Sir Patrick Dean 9 but was given the personal rank of Ambassador 
and was to be the principal adviser to the UK Mission on problems affect-
ing the "emergent and newly emerged countries". Accordingly? he was also 
to be the UK Representative in the Trusteeship Council and in the Fourth 
Committee of the General Assembly. The following consists of the open-
ing paragraphs of a memorandum which he submitted to the Macmillan 
government shortly before his resignation in October 1962o 
"Colonial Questions at the United Nations 
It is the future that matters~ particularly the future in Africa. It will 
be useless to continue patting ourselves on the back for past achievement 
and winning debating points against the Communists if we are on the wrong 
side in the struggle between African nationalism and white domination in 
Africa. We would then throw away all the good-will and influence which we 
now enjoy in Africa and Asia. 
In this all-important question of the future in Africa we are already 
dangerously vulnerable. More and more we are coming to be regarded as 
the champions of the status quo. We speak of peaceful change, but we can 
point to no effective action to bring it about in the southern part of 
Africa. We show no concern for the subject African peoples, and no indig-
nation at their continued suppression. We are looked upon as the supporters, 
if not the friends, of Tshombe, Welensky, Salazar and Verwoerd. We may soon 
be regarded as accomplices in a policy of repression in Southern Rhodesia. 
We have made no positive proposal about the Portuguese territories or about 
South-West Africa. 
We may soon find ourselves on the wrong side in a losing battle. All that 
we have done in preparing colonial territories for independence will then 
count for little or nothing in our favour. Our many African friends will 
turn against us. Instead of dis-crediting the Soviet Union we shall play 
into its hands. We shall be divided from the Commonwealth. The Americans 
will not stay with us. We shall be isolated with Portugal and South Africa". 
Repr. from Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom, (1964) 9 pp.219-220. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES 
The conventional distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' sources 
has been employed in the compilation of the following bibliographical 
materialsp though I have chosen to include within the former category 
works which are sometimes placed in the latter. In particular9 I have 
included under primary sources not only memoirs and autobiography but 
also books and articles by persons whop at the time of publication9 
had earlier held 9 were currently in the enjoyment of 9 or were to 
assume 9 some sort of official position (i.e. in government or in a 
government agencyp such as the NCB or the SAAEB) during the 1951=1964 
period. I have done this because there would seem to be no justific= 
ation for including9 for example 9 Anthony Eden's memoirs under 'primary' 
sources ahd his article 'Britain in World Strategy' 9 Foreign Affairs 9 
Vol. 29P Apr. 1951P under 'secondary' sources when 11 since he was.so 
shortly to become Foreign Secretary once more and 9 subsequently 9 Prime 
Minister 9 the article is as clearly the product of the thought of an 
'insider' as the memoirs. In fact 9 since memoirs are usually vrritten 
at some distance from the events which they concern (Eden's actually 9 
are a bad example in this respectp 11acmillan's a better one) 9 and 
usually with a view to self-justification (Eden's here are the more 
illustrative)p more contemporaneous and topic=specific works by 
'insiders' are clearly no less reliable and often more informative in 
the primary sense. 
Given the existence of the thirty years rule on the release of official 
records in Britain 9 the contemporary historian hasp in any case 9 no 
alternative but to place heavy reliance on accounts such as these. 
In the light of Richard Crossman's reYelations about the writing-up 
of Cabinet minutes 9 however 9 this reliance is perhaps notp after all 9 
such a weakness (see R.H.S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet f1inister, 
Vol. One/ London~ Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Capep 1975 9 pp.103=104 
and pp.198-199). 
Official histories are recorded under 'Secondary Sources' but are 
marked by an asterisk against the author's name. 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
1 o Newspapers: 
The Chatham House Press Library was used extensively for the excellent 
access which it provides to the contemporary press. Amongst the 
British newspapers used were The Times, The Sunday Times, The Daily 
Telegraph 9 The Sunday Telegraph, The Guardian 9 The Observer, The 
Financial Times 9 The Scotsman, The Morning Star, The Ne\vs Chronicle 
and The Daily Express; amongst American ones, The New York Times 
and the Christian Science Monitor; and amongst South African ones, 
The Johannesburg Star, The Cape Times and the South African Press 
Digest. 
The Times Weekly Review, including a selection of the more signifi-
cant reports, features and leaders of the previous weeks' Times, 
was also employed. 
2. Periodicals~ 
The most frequently drawn upon under this heading were The Economist, 
The Banker, The Board of Trade Journal, The Times Review of Industry, 
Samuel Montagu & Co.'s Annual Bullion Review, Atom, Barclays Bank 
Review and The Midland Bank Review. 
3. House of Commons Debates ('Hansard'), passim; in endnotes referred 
to as 'HCDeb'. 
4. South African Parliament, House of Assembly, Debates, passim; in 
endnotes referred to as 'SA House of Assembly Deb.' 
5. I.M.F. Board of Governors, Summary Proceedings, passim. 
6. United Nations documents: 
Official 
passim; 
passim; 
passim; 
records of the General Assembly's Plenary Sessions 9 A/PV, 
the General Assembly's Fourth Committee (Trusteeship), A/C, 
the General Assembly's Special Political Committee, A/SPC, 
and of the Security Council's proceedings, S/PV, passim. 
1. Published official papers and reports: 
UK Treasury 9 Economic Survey 11 passim. 
South Africa Yearbook 9 passim. 
N. Mansergh (ed.) Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 
1952=1962, (London: OUP for R.I.I.A. 9 1963). 
UK Atomic Energy Authority, Annual Report, passim. 
Cmnd. 9391 9 Feb. 1955 9 Statement on Defence. 
Cmnd. 9396, Feb. 1955 9 Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates, 
1955-56. 
Cmnd. 9520 9 July 1955, Exchange of Letters on Defence Matters between 
the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, 
June 1955. 
Cmnd. 124 9 Apr. 1957 9 1957 Defence White Paper. 
Cmnd. 827 9 Aug. 1959 9 Committee on the Working of the Monetary System: 
Report (Radcliffe Report). 
Cmnd. 2798 9 1965, Fuel Policy. 
Cmnd. 4107 9 July 1969 9 Report of the Review Committee on Overseas 
Representation 9 1968=1969 (Duncan Report). 
8. Statistical Material: 
General: Annual Abstract of Statistics; IMF9 Balance of Payments 
Yearbook; IMF9 International Financial Statistics and espo 1972 
Supplement; Mineral Resources Division/Overseas Geological Surveys, 
Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry; Annual Bullion Review9 
SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics (until 1963) 9 
thereafter simply ~arterly Bulletin; SA Reserve Bank9 'A Statistical 
Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payments for the period 
1946 to 1970 1 9 supplement to .9J?., Maro 1971; SA Reserve Bank 9 1A 
Statistical Presentation of South Africa's National Accounts for 
the period 1946 to 1970' 9 supplement to £W 9 June 1971; United 
Kingdom Balance of Payments Accounts; UN 9 Statistical Yearbooko 
Trade: Ann:t;1al Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, Volso 
II, III and IV (this is by far the most detailed source available 
on Britain's bilateral trading relationships during this period); 
Commomreal th Economic Committee 9 Commonwealth Trade; Report on 
Overseas Trade; Monthly Overseas Trade Accounts of the United 
Kingdom; GATT Secretariat, International Trade (Geneva); UN, 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; FA0 9 Commodity Reviewo 
Overseas Investment: There are three primary sources of statistics 
on overseas investment as far as Anglo-South African relations during 
the 1951~1964 period are concerned: those published by the Bank of 
England, the British Board of Trade, and the SA Reserve Banko The 
strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources is demonstrated in 
Tables 18 and 21(a) in Appendix Bo \~at follows, therefore, is simply 
a record of the most relevant publications o 
Bank of England:= In 1950 the Bank published a supplement to its 
Annual Report entitled 'United Kingdom @verseas investments, 
1938-48' 9 which brought up to date a series begun in the inte~war 
years by Lord Kindersley and which had hitherto been published in 
the Economic Journalo Thereafter, subsequent years were dealt with 
in further supplements to the Bank's Annual Report until 1960 9 which 
brought the series complete up to 1957o In 1960 itself, however, 
the Bank drastically curtailed the scope and the nature of its 
published results (though it continued its survey of portfolio 
investment flows) 9 cutting out, in particular9 the publication of 
country detailo Fortunately, the June issues of its Qqarterly 
Bulletin continued to provide some random country detail and this 
gave figures on Britain's earnings from portfolio investments in 
South Africa up to and including 1963o After this year 9 however 9 
the Bank ceased publication of the results of its survey altogether 
on the grounds that the official UK Balance of Payments Accounts were 
by then publishing more accurate global totalso They clearly were 
but not with country detail! Since the Board of Trade's survey only 
covered direct investments overseas, this meant that published 
information giving country detail of Britain's overseas portfolio 
investments was no longer available after 1963o The Bank's partly 
inaccurate and less plausible account of this discontinuation is 
given in its Qgarterly Bulletin, June, 1965 9 po156o The Bank 
refused a personal request for more country detail on portfolio 
flows and assets for the early and mid-1960s (though it admitted 
possessing it); shortly thereafter I was declared persona non grata 
in the Bank's Library and thus prevented, also, from looking at its 
extremely comprehensive collection of South African economic and 
financial periodicals and journalso 
Board of Trade:= The Board of Trade began its progressively more 
detailed survey of British direct investment overseas in 1958-9 conducted 
by periodic inquiries to British companies and supplemented by estimates 
based on sampling techniques in the intervening periods. The results 
were published in The Board of Trade Journal at irregular intervals. 
For assets, see: BTJ, Jan. 26 9 1968, 'Book values of overseas 
investments' and ~9 Sept. 23, 1970 9 'Book values of overseas 
direct investment'. For flows, see: ~' Apr. 19, 1963 and June 30, 
1967. These were the principal sources employed; for other references, 
see footnotes to Tables in Appendix B. 
SA Reserve Bank:- In 1956 the Reserve Bank conducted its first 'Census 
of Foreign Assets and Liabilities in the Union of South Africa', 
repeated the process in 1959 &nd, with the exception of 1961, annually 
thereafter. The results were published in its Quarterly Bulletin of 
Statistics ~ after 1963) as follows: 
End= Yr. 
1956 
1959 
1960 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
Source 
~Dec. 1958 
~9 Sept. 1960 
9Jlli, Dec. 1961 
Dec. 1963 
Dec. 1964 
Sept. 1966 
Sept. 1967 
June 1968 
Sept. 1969 
1968 £m, June 1970 
1969 ~9 Sept. 1911 
1970 .91!, Sept. 1972 
1971 £!?., Mar. 1973 
Detail 
Country data; direct and portfolio 
and by industry. 
Country data; direct and portfolio. 
and 
by industry. 
Country data; direct and portfolio. 
Regional data only (e.g. no 'UK', only 
'Sterling Area'); direct and portfolio. 
The decision of the SA Reserve Bank in 1969 to stop publishing country 
detail on overseas investments in the Republic (wherein lie echoes of 
the Bank of England's similar decision seven years earlier) is probably 
not unconnected with the establishment of the UN's Unit on Apartheid 
in 1966 and, more especially, with the passage of the General Assembly 
resolution of Dec. 13, 1967, which requested the Secretary~General 
"to publish periodically information on economic and financial 
relations between South Africa and other States" (see UN Dec. ST/PSCA/ 
SER.A/11 9 'Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa'). 
In fact, of course, the Unit on Apartheid has subsequently marshalled 
much of the data produced from the above three primary sources in 
more summary form. See the various editions of 'Foreign Investment 
in the Republic of South Africa': ST/PSCA/SER.A/1 (New York, 1967j• 
.ST/PSCA/SER.A/6 (New York, 1968 • 
ST/PSCA/SER.A/11 (New York, 1970 • 
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'Recession and the Sterling Area', The Banker9 
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International Finance 9 No. 27 9 International 
Finance Section of Princeton UP (Princeton 9 1956). 
Capital Imports into Sterling Countries 9 (London: 
Macmillan 9 1960). 
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R. Boardman and A.J .R. Groom, The Management of 
Britain's External Relations 9 (London: Macmillan 9 
1973). 
A Start in Freedom 9 (London: Hodder & Stoughton9 
1964). 
Sir vlilliam Hayter 9 The Diplomacy of the Great Powers 9 (London: 
Hamish Hamilton 9 1960). 
J.E. Holloway 9 
do. 
do. 
'South Africa remains a sound investment field 1 9 
Optima 9 Vol. 11 9 Sept. 1961. 
0The Radcliffe Committee and Gold 1 9 SA Journal 
of Economics 9 Vol. 27 9 nee. 1959. 
'Theodore Geiger - The Premium Gold Controversy 
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